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Abstract 
This research examines how individuals experience the diagnosis of anorexia. Specifically, it 
explores how individuals come to be diagnosed with anorexia and the meanings they attach 
to this process, how the diagnosis informs their self-understanding and identity, including in 
a treatment context, and how they manage and perform the diagnosis, both within and 
outside treatment. I used two qualitative methods; autoethnography and interviews. The 
former was a ‘moderate’ autoethnography. Drawing on memory, personal diaries, and 
clinical documents, I analysed my own experiences of being diagnosed with anorexia and 
undergoing four long-term inpatient admissions in an adult specialist eating disorder unit. I 
undertook the interviews, which were ‘in-depth’ and minimally structured, with 14 
individuals. All but one had been formally diagnosed with anorexia and undergone 
treatment, and one was self-diagnosed. Analysing the data, I identify different routes to 
diagnosis, which involve varying interpretive processes and are associated with different 
subjective meanings of being diagnosed. Drawing on Brinkmann’s cultural psychology of 
diagnosis, I also address the ‘being’ and ‘doing’ of anorexia. In terms of ‘being’, I show how 
individuals learn a diagnostically-informed anorexic identity in treatment contexts. However, 
diagnostic understandings are not necessarily wholly accepted or internalised. Rather, they 
are reflectively and critically engaged with, such that individuals may reject aspects of the 
diagnosis and associated clinical understandings. I argue that clinically-based ‘anorexic scripts’ 
inform how individuals relate to and ‘do’ their diagnosis. In valuing being positioned as 
anorexic, individuals sometimes seek to ‘live up to’ these scripts, monitoring their own 
illness-performances against them. The findings shed light on ‘hidden’ consequences of being 
diagnosed and related clinical activity, and on how individuals experience their ‘symptoms’ 
and engage with treatment. 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
 
Anorexia nervosa (or anorexia as I shall frequently refer to it1) is predominantly 
conceptualised as a clinical disorder rooted in individual pathology. It is typically understood 
as an object of the ‘psy’ and medical professions (Darmon, 2017) and much writing on the 
topic therefore has a ‘strong biomedical contour’ (Warin, 2010: ix). That said, there is an 
extensive body of literature on anorexia which spans a range of disciplines, including the 
social sciences. Sociological and anthropological approaches have challenged dominant 
medical conceptualisations of anorexia by focusing on the social and cultural aspects that 
constitute and influence the condition and its medical categorisation.  
This thesis seeks to contribute to sociological knowledge by approaching the diagnosis of 
anorexia as a social process that influences the individual. The overall aim is to examine 
individuals’ experiences of ‘having’ a diagnosis of anorexia, including in a treatment context. 
In particular, I explore personal meanings and functions of the diagnosis, how it informs a 
person’s identity and identity-work, and interactional, performative dimensions of the 
condition. The findings shed light on ‘hidden’ consequences of being diagnosed and related 
clinical activity. These consequences have relevance for understanding how individuals 
experience their ‘symptoms’ and how they engage with treatment. This is important given 
the limited success of current clinical interventions. Anorexia is associated with high rates of 
‘treatment drop-out’ and relapse (Eivors, 2003; Wallier et al, 2009; Surgenour et al, 2004; 
Bulik et al, 2005; Hubert et al, 2013), and chronicity (Walsh, 2013; NICE, 2017b). Family-
 
1 In most places within this thesis, I refer to ‘anorexia nervosa’ simply as ‘anorexia’. Anorexia is common 
parlance for referring to the condition, and was the phrase used by participants to refer to their diagnosis. 
However, I write ‘anorexia nervosa’ in full on those select occasions when it is necessary to be accurate with 
wording. This is usually when it is being discussed in relation to clinical literature or diagnostic manuals. 
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based therapeutic approaches have been shown to have some success in treating anorexia 
during adolescence (Zipfel, 2015; Lock, 2015; NICE, 2017b). However, no treatment 
programme for anorexia in adults, and/or those who have had the condition for longer than 
three years, leads to substantial levels of recovery (Le Grange, 2016; Treasure and Cardi, 
2017) or has been identified as demonstrating sustained long-term benefits (NICE, 2017b). 
Moreover, both clinical and social scientific literature has suggested that there are iatrogenic 
effects of treatment for anorexia, especially inpatient treatment (e.g. Gowers et al, 2000; 
Gremillion, 2003; Treasure et al, 2011), and it appears that around a third of individuals who 
receive inpatient treatment go on to experience chronic anorexia (Keel and Brown, 2010). 
This research, then, is motivated by a need to better understand how being diagnosed with 
anorexia, and engaging with the diagnostic understandings that abound in treatment 
contexts, affect the individual. 
The research adopts a broadly interpretivist approach, with a focus on understanding what 
events mean, how people adapt, and how they understand what has happened to and 
around them (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). I used two qualitative methods: an analytically-
focused autoethnography and in-depth interviews. The autoethnography examines my own 
experiences of being diagnosed with anorexia and treated in an adult specialist eating 
disorder unit (SEDU) for four inpatient admissions, and draws on memory, personal 
journals, and clinical documents. The interviews were conducted with 14 individuals, 13 of 
whom had been formally diagnosed with anorexia (some had since ‘recovered’, some had 
not) and had undergone treatment on this basis. The remaining individual was a man who 
was self-diagnosed.  
My direct personal experience of the subject matter and incorporation of autoethnographic 
methods mean that I am present within this thesis as both researcher and researched. This 
dynamic has added (often unforeseen) layers of complexity to the conduct of the research 
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since the outset, and has required constant negotiation. While challenging, I have sought 
throughout to make effective and productive use of my experiences. This is not only within 
the autoethnography, where I directly use my experiences as ‘data’, but also in the 
interviews, where I have drawn on my ‘insider’ positioning to facilitate the conversation with 
participants and better understand their experiences.  
Aims and objectives 
The aim of this research is to investigate how individuals experience the diagnosis of 
anorexia. Specifically, the research aims to explore: 
• How individuals come to be diagnosed with anorexia and what meanings they attach 
to this event  
• How individuals relate to the diagnosis of anorexia and how it informs their self-
understanding and identity, and how these facets are influenced by the experience of 
treatment  
• How individuals manage and perform the diagnosis, both in and outside of treatment 
contexts 
The design of the research began with reflections on my own experiences. I was aware that 
being diagnosed and undergoing long-term inpatient treatment had significantly shaped my 
identity and experiences of self-starvation, including in ways that were problematic and that 
extended my distress. I believed that at the core of this, had been the strong ‘anorexic 
identity’ that I had developed in treatment and (ambivalently) come to value, and which 
made it all the more difficult to leave behind the self-starvation which I found both 
compelling and excruciating. Having spoken with other patients during treatment and read 
extensively about others experiences, I suspected that my valuing of an anorexic identity 
was not especially unique. Informed by these personal reflections, I questioned what the 
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diagnosis of anorexia, and the lay impressions and clinical knowledge(s) that surround it, 
mean to those who are diagnosed. With this in mind, I reviewed relevant bodies of 
literature and developed the specific foci of my research. Two significant theoretical and 
conceptual influences on the design of, and analytic framework within, this research, are the 
sociology of diagnosis, and Brinkmann’s cultural psychological analysis of psychiatric 
diagnoses. I discuss these later in this chapter, but firstly I introduce the diagnostic category 
of anorexia and related epidemiological statistics by way of setting the context for the 
research.  
The diagnostic category of anorexia  
Anorexia is a psychiatric disorder which is characterised by a low body weight and 
restricted food intake, and is typically portrayed as having a pathological ‘fear of fatness’ at 
its core. Anorexia is somewhat unique in that, while it is a ‘psychological’ condition, it is 
primarily measured and made visible by its ‘physical’ manifestation (an underweight body). 
The stereotypical demographic profile of an individual with anorexia is a middle class, 
adolescent, white female (Dignon, 2007; Bordo, 2009). Indeed, anorexia has a distinctive 
place as a female mental disorder (Busfield, 1996) and has always been identified 
predominantly (although not solely) in females.  
The clinical definition of anorexia nervosa in the fifth edition of the specifies the following 
diagnostic criteria:  
A. Restriction of energy intake…leading to a significantly low body weight… in the 
context of age, sex, developmental trajectory, and physical health. Significantly low 
weight is…weight that is less than minimally normal…B. Intense fear of gaining 
weight or becoming fat, or persistent behavior that interferes with weight gain…C. 
Disturbance in the way in which one's body weight or shape is experienced, undue 
influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or persistent lack of recognition 
of the seriousness of the current low body weight (APA, 2013: 338 – 339). 
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The DSM-5 also distinguishes between ‘restrictive’ and ‘binge/purge’ subtypes, and 
categorises severity using body mass index (BMI) thresholds (for example, an individual with 
a BMI below 15 has ‘extreme’ anorexia). The DSM-5 definition broadens the diagnosis as 
compared to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) (in ways I examine in the next chapter), reflecting the 
‘fluid’ nature of the diagnostic category (Dignon, 2007; Micali and Hebebrand, 2015). 
The incidence rate for clinically recognised anorexia in the UK and Europe in recent years is 
around 5 - 8 per 100,000 per year (Hoek and van Hoeken, 2003; Currin et al, 2005; Micali 
et al, 2013). Incidence rates for anorexia in the UK and Europe increased during the 20th 
century up until around the 1970s, but they appear to have stabilised since then (Turnbull et 
al, 1996; Hoek and van Hoeken, 2003, Smink et al 2012; Currin et al, 2005; Hudson et al, 
2007; Micali et al, 2013; Keski-Rahkonen and Mustelin, 2016). Very recent research has 
suggested a slight increase in the incidence of anorexia, but this is likely attributable to the 
broadening of criteria in the DSM-5 (Vo et al, 2016; Micali et al, 2017).  
Eating disorders are identified more frequently in young women in Western countries (i.e. 
Europe and the USA), however they are also identified in older males and females and 
individuals in non-Western countries (Hoek, 2014). Clinical samples suggest that 
approximately 10% of identified cases of anorexia are male (e.g. Hoek and van Hoeken, 
2003; Micali et al, 2013) while community studies suggest higher rates of around 25% 
(Hudson et al, 2007; Sweeting et al, 2015). Anorexia is much more commonly found among 
younger than older age groups, with the peak age of diagnosis being 15 – 19 years (Micali, 
2013). In line with these gender and age patterns, females in adolescence/young adulthood 
are typically identified as the most ‘at risk’ group for anorexia (Currin et al, 2005; Hoek and 
van Hoeken, 2003; Smink et al, 2012). Females aged 15 – 19 constitute around 40% of all 
clinically recognised cases (Hoek and van Hoeken, 2003; Smink et al 2012) and have the 
highest rates of hospitalisation for the condition (Holland et al, 2016; see also NHS Digital, 
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20192). Smink et al (2012) argue that there is some evidence of an increase in the number of 
identified cases among this high-risk group, despite the overall incidence rate for anorexia 
having recently remained stable, and that this reflects either earlier detection of anorexia or 
an earlier age of onset. Regarding older age groups, Micali et al (2017) have highlighted that 
both chronic and new onset eating disorders, including anorexia, are apparent among 
women in the fourth and fifth decade of life; among their community sample of women in 
mid-life, 3.64% reported life time prevalence of anorexia.  
Epidemiological findings, including those considered above, are problematic. This is due to 
broadening diagnostic criteria over time, changing diagnostic overlap between anorexia and 
other eating disorders and ‘diagnostic drift’, which reflects a heightened awareness and 
reporting among families and doctors (Brumberg, 1988). 
A sociology of diagnosis  
This research is situated in, and seeks to contribute to, the sociology of diagnosis. This 
addresses the social nature of medical diagnosis (Jutel, 2009, 2011; 2015; Jutel and 
Nettleton, 2011). Brown (1990) initially proposed a sociology of diagnosis in the context of 
psychiatry, outlining both “an approach to the study of diagnosis” and “an overall critique of 
modern psychiatry” (1990: 386). He suggested as loci of study such issues as weaknesses in 
diagnostic categorisation and the professional dominance of psychiatry. Brown (1990) noted 
that while primarily concerned with psychiatric diagnosis, many of the issues could be 
extended to medical diagnosis more generally, and in a later paper discussed a more general 
 
2The latest available data showing rates of completed hospital admissions for a primary or secondary diagnosis 
of anorexia in the UK in 2018 - 2019 by gender and age group organises rates using the age groups 13 – 15 
years, 16 – 18 years, 19 – 25 years, and others. Thus, while it is not possible to determine whether those in age 
group 15 – 19 have the highest rate of hospitalisation, the rate for females within this group is relatively high.  
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sociology of diagnosis (Brown, 1995). This paper took a social constructionist perspective, 
and highlighted the central role of diagnosis in constructions of illness.  
Brown’s initial suggestions for a sociology of diagnosis lay dormant until around 20 years 
later, when they were taken up by Jutel (2009; 2011; 2015). She outlines a case for the study 
of diagnosis as a specific sub-discipline, arguing that diagnosis is a “powerful social tool, with 
unique features and impacts which deserve their own specific analysis” (2009: 278), and that 
“the sociology of diagnosis offers a valuable vantage point from which to study health and 
illness” (2015: 841). Indeed, diagnosis makes an important contribution to both the social 
structure and to individual experiences. It does this by defining the roles of the medical 
profession, shaping the doctor-patient relationship, legitimising illness, providing access to 
treatment, affording power and authority to doctors, and structuring interaction in clinical 
contexts (Jutel, 2011).  
She also argues that diagnosis has historically had an ‘absent presence’ within sociology (Jutel 
and Nettleton, 2011). It has not been clearly isolated and explored on its own, but has been 
concealed within other foci such as medicalisation, history of medicine and theories of 
disease (Jutel, 2009; 2011). Brown (1990; 1995) made a similar point, suggesting that while a 
considerable body of work existed that directly touched on diagnostic issues, “they are not 
usually considered specifically as such” (1990: 386).  
Jutel and Nettleton (2011), building on Blaxter (1978), offer a framework for approaching a 
sociology of diagnosis which distinguishes between diagnosis as category, process, and 
consequence. The term ‘category’ refers to how diagnoses are defined, and corresponds 
with what Jutel (2011) describes elsewhere as ‘creation’. The focus is on the classification of 
diseases and disease discovery processes, and the social contexts and relations that shape 
these. It is recognised that diagnostic classification systems have their own (politically 
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influenced) histories and serve their own purposes (Jutel and Nettleton, 2011). Jutel 
highlights how the boundaries of disease are ever-shifting, and argues that diagnoses are 
cultural expressions; they give an indication of what a society accepts as “normal, healthy, 
moral, and bearable” (2011: 139). However, she stresses that while diagnoses are always a 
social creation, this does not necessarily mean that the diseases the diagnosis refers to are 
not ‘real’. Rather, it means that a disease needs to be visible, perceived as problematic, and 
understood as belonging to the field of medicine, in order to become a diagnosis.  
‘Process’ refers to the implementation of a diagnosis (Jutel and Nettleton, 2011). Jutel 
(2011) refers to this as ‘application’, and describes it as the transfer of diagnosis from the 
medical domain to the lay person’s experiences of illness. This process occurs within certain 
relations – between the patient and medical professional – and is influenced by the position 
and roles of both parties.  It “may (or may not) take into account a lay of version of events, 
may (or may not) rely upon clinical judgement, or alternatively laboratory findings; and may 
(or may not) align with the patient’s own version of her symptoms” (Jutel and Nettleton, 
2011: 794). Diagnosis is recognised as a complex, negotiated activity which is impacted by 
the experiences of both practitioner and patient and is shrouded in personal meaning (Kralik 
et al, 2001; Jutel, 2011; Jutel and Nettleton, 2011). 
Consequence refers to the implications that a diagnosis has for those to whom it applies 
(Jutel and Nettleton, 2011). It recognises the personal functions and meanings of diagnosis, 
its potential to legitimise symptoms and create stigma, and its role in personal sense-making 
and impact on identity. Research which has attended to the consequences of diagnosis 
includes that of Russel et al (2012), who frame the diagnosis of autism as a potential social 
influence on health, in that it may have implications for health outcomes. Kralik et al (2001), 
in an exploration of women’s experiences of being diagnosed with a long-term illness, found 
that receiving a diagnosis was often a momentous event and chaotic experience. While their 
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experiences were largely negative, being diagnosed also led many of their participants to feel 
validated by medical science; the diagnostic label carried medical weight, meaning it was then 
perceived as ‘real’ by others, and also led to the possibility of cure and treatment. This 
suggests that medical labels can play an important role in transforming the lived experience 
of illness into a recognised disease or disorder. Kralik et al also highlight the significance of 
diagnosis for identity. For some participants, being diagnosed changed their self-perception 
dramatically. Karp’s (1996) sociological study of the interpretive processes involved in 
developing a ‘depression identity’ addresses how being diagnosed can mark a significant 
turning point in this respect. Critical psychology literature has explored how receiving a 
psychiatric diagnosis can have various subjective meanings and be experienced both 
‘positively’ and ‘negatively’. This includes in relation to, for example, Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (Hansson-Halleröd et al, 2015); Borderline Personality 
Disorder (BPD) (Horn et al, 2007); depression (Shooter, 2010), and (more generally) 
‘severe and enduring mental illness’ (Hayne, 2003). 
Jutel also offers a summative model for a social understanding of diagnosis. This model 
recognises “the assemblage that constitutes diagnosis, the relational nature of the diagnostic 
moment, and the transformative potential of diagnosis as process” (2011: 143). Within this, 
she argues that the social framing of diagnosis, including the historical and contemporary 
classification systems, disease discovery, risk profiles and surveillance, and diagnostic 
technologies, has implications for the social consequences of diagnosis – in terms of 
allocation, exploitation, legitimization and stigmatisation: “Diagnoses are social categories 
that organise, direct, explain and sometimes control our experiences of health and illness“ 
(2011: 145). The reverse is also true, because in turn, the social consequences then feed 
back into the framing of a diagnosis. This is a dynamic, circular process in which both ‘sides’ 
shape each other; it is what Jutel describes as a ‘chicken and egg’ situation.  
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The sociology of diagnosis, then, recognises the importance of examining the act of 
diagnosis, and its subjective meanings and potential personal and social consequences. There 
is a dearth of research specifically concerned with the processes and subjective meanings of 
being diagnosed with anorexia in particular. Existing research addresses, for example, how 
individuals manage their diagnosis of anorexia as an identity and an illness (Rich, 2006) and 
how one learns to ‘internalise’ institutional understandings of their diagnosis while in 
inpatient treatment (Darmon, 2017). However, research to date has tended not to 
specifically address the process of being diagnosed with anorexia, what this means to the 
individual at that time, and how it intersects with their experiences up until that point. This 
is particularly important given that individuals with anorexia may actually enjoy being defined 
as clinically ill (Dignon et al, 2006) and may wish to ‘be medicalised’ through the label of 
anorexia (Boughtwood and Halse, 2008). Moreover, the process of diagnosing anorexia is 
believed to be potentially complicated due to the individual valuing their illness and ‘lacking 
insight’, and thus not fully disclosing their motives and ‘symptoms’ (Garner, 1985; NHS, 
2004; 2017b; Treasure et al, 2015). An exception is Lavis (2011). Her research explores 
pro-anorexia, defined as “a desire among some anorexics to maintain or enhance their 
existing illness” (2011: 3), and briefly considers being diagnosed from the perspective of the 
‘patient’. Here, she notes that the act of being diagnosed can in itself be “invested with pro-
anorexic desire” (2011: 234), and suggests that this is due to the sense of legitimacy that the 
diagnosis confers, as being diagnosed can confirm an already existing sense of self.  
My research attends to the need to better understand the act of diagnosis. This includes an 
exploration of not only the occasion of diagnosis itself, but the circumstances and 
experiences that precede it. My focus here is on the dynamic, interpretive processes 
involved in routes to help-seeking and reaching diagnosis. This focus contrasts existing 
research into help-seeking for eating disorders, which is usually conducted from a clinical, 
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service-focused, or ‘psychological’ perspective. Such research proposes psychological 
models of eating disorder related help seeking, which address attitudes, ‘motivation’, and 
other internal processes (Schoen et al, 2012; Gullisken et al, 2015). It also identifies ‘barriers 
to treatment’ and variables that influence the likelihood of help-seeking (e.g. Akey et al, 
2013; Regan et al, 2017). For example, Regan et al reviewed empirical studies to explore 
“barriers and facilitators” to eating disorder treatment among young people. This included a 
review of quantitative and qualitative studies. Analysing the former, they identified factors 
associated with treatment seeking, and argue that age, ethnicity, type of eating disorder, 
specific eating related behaviour and time spent waiting to begin treatment have “some 
degree of predictive utility” (2017: 190). For example, older individuals are more likely to 
seek treatment, and those of an ethnic minority are less likely than non-minority individuals 
to do so. With respect to the qualitative research they reviewed, Regan et al identify an 
array of factors that participants in these studies had nominated or endorsed as barriers to 
seeking treatment. These included personal feelings of shame or fear, eating disorder related 
perceptions and beliefs, issues related to access and availability of treatment, and aspects of 
treatment itself. Factors identified as facilitating treatment seeking included health-related 
concerns, emotional distress, and support and encouragement of friends or family. 
However, such research can be considered deterministic, with complex beliefs and actions 
reduced to descriptive categories (Biddle et al, 2007), and this is a problem that my research 
aims to avoid.  
This research is also concerned with the implications that the diagnosis, and the various 
understandings of it encountered in treatment, has for the individual over the longer term. 
Informed by Brinkmann (2016) (see below), this includes in relation to identity and illness 
sense-making, and performative aspects of the condition. In short, while the categorisation 
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and creation of the diagnosis of anorexia have been well examined (e.g. Hepworth, 1999), 
this research is concerned with the process and consequences of the diagnosis.  
Brinkmann’s heuristic model of psychiatric diagnoses 
Brinkmann (2016) uses a cultural psychological analysis – informed by sociology and cultural 
studies – to explain, analyse and critique diagnostic cultures. The term diagnostic cultures 
refers to “the numerous ways that psychiatric categories are used by people – patients, 
professionals, and almost everyone else - to interpret, regulate and mediate various forms of 
self-understanding and activity” (2016: 1) and points to “the spread of vocabulary and 
associated social practices into new areas of sociocultural life” (2016: 11). Brinkmann 
suggests that in recent years there has been an increasing emergence of diagnostic cultures, 
referred to as diagnostic expansion. Parts of this process include an increase in the number 
of people diagnosed with psychiatric problems and an increase in the range of diagnoses it is 
possible to receive. Diagnostic expansion is linked to ongoing cultural processes of 
pathologization, in which many ‘normal human problems’ come to be diagnosed and treated 
as psychiatric disorders.  
As part of his analysis, Brinkmann offers a heuristic model for understanding what a 
psychiatric diagnosis makes possible in the lives of those who are diagnosed, and highlights 
three interrelated dimensions to this: ‘having’, ‘being’, and ‘doing’. The model is intended “to 
be used in qualitative studies of the lives of people with mental problems and diagnoses” 
(2016: 30).  
‘Having’ refers to the entity aspect of diagnosis. Brinkmann describes how everyday language 
implies that psychiatric diagnosis is an identifiable object, such that we think about whether 
or not someone ‘has’ a psychiatric diagnosis in the same way that they might have a physical 
object. This is problematic, however, because whereas with somatic illness there is a 
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relatively clear distinction between the illness and its symptoms (for example, a broken 
bone is the illness and pain is the symptom), this is not the case for psychiatric diagnoses. 
For psychiatric diagnoses, symptoms and illness conflate; diagnostic criteria describe 
symptoms and also constitute the illness itself. Using Brinkmann’s example, symptoms such 
as hyperactivity and inattentiveness “are not only symptoms of ADHD, they are ADHD” 
(2016: 31. Emphasis in original). This leads to a circular process whereby the existence of 
psychiatric illness is used to explain one’s symptoms, and symptoms are used to prove the 
existence of one’s illness. 
‘Being’ addresses psychiatric identity and the extent to which one identifies with a 
psychiatric diagnosis. Individuals can be understood not only to have a diagnosis, but also to 
be the diagnosis (i.e. the person ‘is’ ‘anorexic’ or ‘manic’). In Brinkmann’s research into 
ADHD, this category is one way (among others) that individuals with the diagnosis self-
identify. He explains how the diagnosis is one significant component that informs people’s 
self-understanding - an observation which overlaps with his analysis of a diagnosis as a 
semiotic mediator, that I discuss below. 
There is also an action aspect to a diagnosis, referred to as ‘doing’. This incorporates the 
idea that diagnoses are “something people do or perform relative to specific categories” 
(2016: 31). A diagnosis conveys norms which define appropriate behaviours, and in doing so 
“provides a “script” for the proper performance of one’s suffering” (2016: 32). In addition 
to acting in accordance with the norms of their diagnosis, individuals also come to act in 
ways that are situationally appropriate. They learn to perform their suffering differently 
across different settings, and therefore may do their diagnosis differently in a therapeutic 
support group as compared to when with family, for example. Ringer and Holen (2016) 
address related performative aspects of psychiatric diagnoses, and for example describe how 
mental health patients learn to outwardly display their symptoms in recognisable ways in 
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order to legitimise their need for care. The importance of ‘correct’ performances is 
highlighted in Chandler’s (2016) research into self-injury. She examines how dominant 
narratives construct the notion that discrete and hidden self-injury is authentic, whereas 
self-injury that is revealed and obvious is ‘attention-seeking’. Such notions inform how 
individuals perform self-injury, in terms of the practice itself, and managing scars and help-
seeking in the aftermath. As Brinkmann notes, such understandings of how individuals do 
their diagnosis assumes an understanding of the individual as having “a large degree of 
responsibility understood as capabilities for action and reflexive self-consciousness” (2016: 
32). He is clear that the doing dimension is not intended to suggest that individuals do not 
suffer. Rather, individual suffering becomes aligned with dominant diagnostic models via 
individuals’ reflexive self-consciousness and capabilities for action.  
Regarding diagnoses as semiotic mediators, Brinkmann identifies three specific functions of a 
diagnosis in people’s lives. He mainly centres this discussion around ADHD, but suggests 
that the functions are likely also relevant to psychiatric diagnoses more generally. Firstly, a 
widespread function of the ADHD diagnosis is its use as an explanatory tool. It is typical for 
those diagnosed to adopt ‘ADHD’ as an explanation for their life experiences and problems, 
and the diagnosis mediates their personal understandings of these. Relatedly, Brinkmann 
argues that in contemporary diagnostic cultures, diagnostic systems offer a way for 
individuals to search for meaning and explain their suffering. A second function of the 
ADHD diagnosis is self-affirmation; the diagnosis tends to affirm itself. Brinkmann suggests 
that when interpreted through a diagnostic lens, a whole range of experiences (even those 
that might also have potential to counteract the diagnosis) come to be understood as 
‘symptoms’. Lastly, a diagnosis can have a disclaiming function, and this is a subcategory of 
the explanation function. Responsibility for a person’s actions (or lack there of) can be 
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shifted from the person to the ADHD entity, and the ADHD diagnosis is sometimes used as 
exemption from common moral demands and responsibilities. 
When summarising the above ideas, Brinkmann suggests that the ADHD diagnosis makes 
possible an understanding of oneself as being ‘possessed’ by an entity that interferes with 
one’s life, and that this entity can be referred to to explain one’s problems, sometimes in a 
self-affirming manner. In addition, the diagnosis can be used to disclaim responsibility. 
However, the ADHD diagnosis is not the only process through which diagnosed individuals 
mediate their self-understanding, because this emerges through numerous sources, 
languages and categories. In addition, Brinkmann stresses that the process is not 
deterministic; being diagnosed with ADHD does not automatically impose “some kind of 
“ADHD identity” (2016: 72). Understanding people as creative, skilled human actors, he 
argues that the diagnosis is instead used “flexibly and creatively” as an “interpretive 
resource”.  
In this thesis, I use aspects of Brinkmann’s heuristic model as a “tool to think with” (2016: 
30), and adopt notions of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ anorexia as a central analytic frame. I am 
concerned with how the diagnosis of anorexia informs self-understanding and identity 
(including in ways that relate to the entification of the diagnosis), and with the ‘diagnostic 
scripts’ that inform how individuals ‘do’ anorexia.  
Thesis outline 
In this chapter, I have set the disciplinary, theoretical, and practical context for this research. 
I have outlined the central research questions and introduced the methods I used to address 
these. I have also discussed two areas of literature that are central to this thesis; the 
sociology of diagnosis, and Brinkmann’s heuristic model of psychiatric diagnosis.  
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In chapter two, I undertake a broader review of literature that underpins this research. 
This review is organised into four sections. The first two address anorexia, firstly from a 
clinical, and then from a sociological and anthropological perspective. In the third section I 
examine symbolic interactionist approaches to identity, a theoretical approach that 
influenced my analysis. Lastly, I review concepts in the sociology of health and mental health, 
making links to the above discussion of a sociology of diagnosis. 
Chapter three addresses research methodology. I discuss the epistemological and 
theoretical underpinnings of my autoethnography and interviews, as well as describing the 
practical approaches I undertook. Throughout, I reflect on the challenges I faced and 
evaluate the research using method-appropriate criteria. I also critically address ethical 
dimensions of my research.  
Chapter four presents my autoethnography, in which I closely examine my experiences of 
being diagnosed with and treated for anorexia, drawing on sociological and anthropological 
literature. The arguments I introduce in this chapter, particularly in relation to what I refer 
to as ‘anorexic scripts’, are later developed further in the analysis of participants’ 
experiences.  
The analysis of participants’ experiences begins in chapter five. Here, I consider individuals’ 
routes to obtaining a diagnosis of anorexia, including the extent to which they personally 
drove the help-seeking process. In addition, I address participants’ subjective meanings of 
being diagnosed, and how these link to the aforementioned routes. This chapter also 
includes a detailed case study of one participant who was self–diagnosed with anorexia, and 
how his identification with the diagnosis emerged.  
Chapter six concerns identity. I examine the role of clinical discourse in socialising 
individuals into diagnostic understandings of their experiences, and the differing extents to 
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which clinical discourse informs individuals ‘anorexic identities’. This chapter also addresses 
the meaning of an ‘anorexic identity’ to participants. Returning to threads of ideas 
introduced in preceding chapters, I examine how anorexia can be a valued and sought-after 
positioning. This sets a vital context for the remaining analysis chapter. 
The final analysis chapter is chapter seven. I address the different ways in which individuals 
move themselves towards and away from an identification with anorexia. The former facet 
involves examining how individuals ‘do’ or ‘perform’ in line with various conceptualisations 
of anorexia, seeking to align themselves with the diagnosis. The latter facet considers the 
reasons why participants sometimes work to disavow the diagnosis of anorexia, and the 
strategies they adopt to do so. 
Chapter eight concludes the thesis. I summarise and link the main concluding points from 
each analysis chapter. I also consider their implications, for both clinical practice and social 
science knowledge. I suggest some further areas for research which would strengthen and 
expand the findings in this study. Lastly, I offer some concluding reflections on what this 
research suggests about the diagnosis of anorexia and the role it plays in individuals’ lives.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
This literature review is organised around four areas: the clinical construct and treatment of 
anorexia nervosa; sociological and anthropological understandings of anorexia; symbolic 
interactionism and identity; and sociological approaches to health and mental illness. The 
first area offers insight into anorexia nervosa as a clinical object, examining the diagnostic 
category and related clinical knowledge and activity. The sociological and anthropological 
understandings reviewed in the following section stand in contrast with the clinical picture. 
They identify social and cultural tenets that shape lived experiences of self-starvation and its 
constitution as a diagnosis, and critically examine treatment environments. In the last two 
areas the focus is broadened away from anorexia. In the first of these, I review symbolic 
interactionist approaches to identity. The notion of identity, particularly diagnostic identity, 
is central to this research, and symbolic interactionism offers a sociological theorisation that 
has influenced my approach, especially in terms of identity-work. In the final section on 
sociological approaches to health and mental illness, I explore identity specifically in relation 
to mental illness, as well as relevant key concepts from medical sociology that have informed 
the sociology of diagnosis and this research. I conclude each section with reflections on how 
the literature reviewed relates to my research. Finally, I conclude the whole chapter by 
restating the intended contributions of my research in relation to existing knowledge.  
The clinical construction and treatment of anorexia nervosa 
Definitions and features of anorexia nervosa  
The ‘discovery’ of what is now called anorexia nervosa and its delineation as a clinical entity 
occurred in the late 19th century and is usually attributed to William Gull (in the UK) and 
Ernerst Laseque (in France). Gull and Laseque introduced ‘anorexia’ to the medical 
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literature as a largely female condition with a basis in neurosis and hysteria (Brumberg, 
1988; Hepworth, 1999; Dignon; 2007; Simonivic et al, 2015). After an unsuccessful search 
for organic causes, Gull added the concept of neurosis to define and explain anorexia and 
concluded that it resulted from ‘perversions of the ego’ and a ‘morbid mental state’. At that 
time, neurosis was a predominantly medical term which, when applied to anorexia, classified 
it as a ‘nervous disease’ (Hepworth, 1999). Laségue considered anorexia a form of hysteria 
and often used the terms interchangeably (ibid). Hysteria was a popular concept at the time 
Laségue was writing (Simonovic et al, 2015). It originates from the Greek word hysteria 
meaning womb, and at that time was identified as the cause of nervous diseases in women 
(Hepworth, 1999). Indeed, Gull and Laségue both drew heavily on discourses of femininity 
to document and explain anorexia (Hepworth, 1999), defining it as primarily a female 
condition. Gull did recognise the existence of anorexia in males, and this was one of the 
reasons that he preferred the term ‘nervosa’ to ‘hysteria’ (Simonovic, 2015). None the less, 
he continually referred to anorexia as a female condition and treated the occasional male 
cases that he saw as having marginal importance, while Laségue made no references to male 
anorexia (Hepworth, 1999). Further, both physicians explained the aetiology of anorexia as 
related to the inherently irrational, emotional and unstable nature of women (ibid, 1999). 
There are cases of female self-starvation documented from as early as 1200. However, prior 
to the late 19th century, self-starvation tended to be interpreted in a religious context. Gull 
and Laségue, who drew on clinical and medical scientific discourse in their descriptions of 
anorexia, served to mark a shift away from religious discourse to medical discourse to 
explain self-starvation (Brumberg, 1988; Hepworth, 1999).  
The specific term ‘anorexia nervosa’ was coined by Gull in 1874, and remains the diagnostic 
term in use today. Indeed, Gull’s work has had significant influence on the subsequent 
historical development of understandings of anorexia (Hepworth, 1999) and his descriptions 
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still form the basis of modern-day definitions (Madden, 2004). The recent clinical definition 
of anorexia nervosa in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) was stated in the previous chapter, where I 
noted that this is a broader definition than in the DSM – IV. Previously, the DSM-IV defined 
anorexia nervosa as: 
a. Refusal to maintain body weight at or above a minimally normal weight for age and 
height (e.g…body weight less than 85% of that expected…) b. Intense fear of gaining 
weight or becoming fat […] c. Disturbance in the way in which one’s body weight or 
shape is experienced, undue influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or 
denial of the seriousness of the current low body weight [...] d. In postmenarcheal 
females, amenorrhoea (APA, 1994: 544 – 545).  
 
The DSM-5 therefore broadens the diagnosis through the inclusion of a more 
contextualised and less ‘strict’ criterion relating to body weight, by no longer specifying that 
avoidance of weight gain need necessarily be motivated by ‘fat phobia’ (see Becker et al, 
2009), by omitting the requirement of amenorrhoea in females (thereby making its 
application to men easier), and omitting the terms ‘refusal’ (in relation to maintenance of 
body weight) and ‘denial’ (in relation to recognition of the seriousness of the condition) (see 
Micali and Hebebrand, 2015).  
Anorexia nervosa is one of eight feeding and eating disorders identified in the DSM-5. The 
others are: bulimia nervosa, binge eating disorder, pica, rumination, avoidant/restrictive 
intake disorder (ARID)3, other specified feeding and eating disorder (OSED) and unspecified 
feeding and eating disorder (UFED). The latter two disorders are residual categories which 
replace the DSM-IV residual category ‘eating disorder not-otherwise specified’ (EDNOS)4. 
Binge eating disorder is newly recognised as a separate disorder; in the DSM-IV, binge eating 
was described in the appendix and diagnosable only as EDNOS. The inclusion of binge eating 
 
3 In the DSM-IV, Pica, rumination and ARID were categorised among ‘Disorders Usually First Diagnosed in 
Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence’, a section that does not exist in the DSM-5. 
4 This change, from the designation ‘not otherwise specified’ to ‘other specified’ and ‘unspecified’, has 
occurred for all psychiatric disorders, including feeding and eating disorders. 
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disorder as a separate diagnosis in the DSM-5, as well as the broadening of criteria for both 
anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa5, was intended to reduce the number of eating 
disorder cases diagnosed using the residual category; EDNOS was a widely used category, 
which accounted for at least half of all clinically recognised eating disorders (Fairburn and 
Cooper, 2011; Keel et al, 2011; Dell’Osso et al, 2016). This intention appears to have been 
realised, as studies show lower numbers of EDNOS diagnoses and higher numbers of 
bulimia and anorexia diagnoses when DSM-5 criteria are applied to eating disorder 
symptoms compared to DSM-IV criteria (Keel et al, 20116; Vo et al, 2016). The changes in 
DSM-5 were also intended to better represent the psychopathology of eating disorders 
(APA, 2013; Dell’osso et al, 2016; Vo et al, 2016). Definitions of anorexia nervosa in the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) also require consideration. They are less 
widely utilised in eating disorder research than DSM definitions, but are used by many UK 
services in their clinical practice (Nicholls and Arcelus, 2010). The ICD-10 criteria for 
anorexia are: 
Body weight is maintained at least 15% below that expected, or [BMI] is 17.5 or 
less…The  weight loss is self-induced…There is body-image distortion in the form of 
a specific psychopathology whereby a dread of fatness persists as an intrusive, 
overvalued idea and the patient imposes a low weight threshold on [him/herself]…A 
widespread endocrine disorder…is manifest [amenorrhoea in women and loss of 
sexual interest and potency in men]” (WHO, 1992: 177).  
 
There are some notable similarities between the ICD-10 and DSM–IV criteria, for example a 
specific body weight and a ‘fear of fatness’ being necessary to the diagnosis in both 
definitions. The ICD–10 has therefore been subject to similar critiques as the DSM–IV was 
 
5 Bulimia nervosa is a condition which is clinically characterised by episodes of binge eating and compensatory 
behaviours such as self-induced vomiting. The diagnosis of bulimia nervosa has been broadened within the 
DSM-5 via a reduction in the frequency of binge eating and compensatory behaviours that individuals must 
exhibit in order to fulfil the diagnosis.  
6 This research was undertaken prior to the publication of the DSM – 5, but used the (then) proposed DSM – 5 
criteria. 
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(Nicholls and Arcelus, 2010; Uher and Rutter, 2012; Micali and Hebebrand, 2015)7. 
Accordingly, the new ICD-11 represents a similar ‘shift’ to that seen in the transition 
between the DSM–IV and DSM–5. It characterises anorexia nervosa as: 
 Significantly low body weight for the individual’s height, age and developmental stage 
[…BMI less than 18.5 kg…] accompanied by a persistent pattern of behaviours to 
prevent restoration of normal weight […] typically associated with a fear of weight 
gain. Low body weight or shape is central to the person's self-evaluation or is 
inaccurately perceived to be normal or even excessive (WHO, 2018: n.p).  
 
The ICD-11 retains a specific definition of low body weight, but the stated BMI is higher 
than in the ICD-10. Both the ICD–11 and the DSM–5 remove the criterion relating to 
amenorrhea and both seek to avoid statements regarding the intentions of individuals, 
orientating more towards observable behaviour and cognitions. This is reflected in the ICD–
11 removal of the requirement of ‘self-induced’ low weight and the ‘relaxation’ of the ‘fear 
of fatness’. These changes are akin the DSM–5 offering a behavioural alternative to the ‘fear 
of weight gain criterion’ and omitting the term ‘refusal’ in relation to low weight (Micali and 
Hebebrand, 2015).  
Anorexia is known to be a cause of significant physical and psychosocial morbidity (Zipfel et 
al, 2015). Individuals with the condition experience a broad range of medical complications, 
due to weight loss and malnutrition adversely affecting almost every body system (Mehler 
and Brown, 2015). Anorexia also has a relatively high mortality rate (Crisp et al, 2006; 
Berkman et al, 2007; Button et al, 2010; Arcelus et al, 2011) of 5.1% per decade (Arcelus et 
al, 2011; Smink et al, 2012) and is often described (both within academic literature and 
colloquially) as the ‘deadliest mental illness’.  
 
7For example, in relation to both the DSM IV and ICD – 10, it has been claimed that there is a need to merge 
‘eating’ and ‘feeding’ disorders into a single category and both have been criticised for overuse of residual 
eating disorder categories and too-specific and limiting criteria for anorexia and bulimia. 
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Comorbidity in anorexia has been described as “the rule rather than the exception” 
(Treasure et al, 2015: 1). Comorbidity refers to the occurrence of more than one distinct 
clinical entity in one individual (Maj, 2005: 67) and is now a commonly used idea in 
psychiatry (van Loo and Romeijn, 2015: 42). However, the application of the concept to 
mental disorders is controversial because it is unclear whether co-existing psychiatric 
diagnoses “actually reflect the presence of ‘distinct clinical entities’ or refer to multiple 
manifestations of a single clinical entity” (Maj, 2005: 67) and because comorbidity may be an 
artefact of diagnostic classification choices (Maj, 2005; van Loo and Romeijn, 2015). None 
the less, anorexia has been claimed to be significantly comorbid with psychiatric disorders 
such as anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, depression and personality 
disorders (Berkman et al, 2007; Hudson et al, 2007; Swinbourne and Touyz, 2007; Pancheko 
and Arnfred, 2015; Martinussen et al, 2017). Substance use disorders are also common in 
anorexia, although this is more so in subtypes that include bulimic symptomology (Root et 
al, 2010).  
In a recent Spanish study, Andrés-Pepiñá et al (2020) examined 20-year outcomes for 
women who were first treated for anorexia in adolescence. Of the 38 participants, 34% 
presented with some degree of eating disorder, and 26% met full DSM-5 criteria. Of the 
34%, 70% had another psychiatric disorder. Indeed, research suggests that despite 
recovering from anorexia in the long-term in the sense of no longer meeting full diagnostic 
criteria, many individuals cross over into a diagnosis of bulimia or ‘partial’ anorexia and/or 
experience long-term ‘psychiatric disorders’ (Hudson et al, 2007; Bulik et al, 2005; Button 
and Warren, 2001; Steinhousen, 2002; Berkman, 2007; Keel and Brown, 2010).  
Anorexia is associated with high treatment drop-out rates and levels of relapse across 
Western countries, including the UK (Wallier et al, 2009; Surgenour et al, 2004; Bulik et al, 
2005; Waller et al, 2009; Hubert et al, 2013). In a UK survey commissioned by Beat (a UK 
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eating disorder charity), around two-thirds of respondents with anorexia had experienced at 
least one relapse which required repeat treatment (Beat, 2015). Many cases of anorexia 
continue for decades, although this may include periods of remission and changing severity 
(NICE, 2017b). The terms ‘chronic’, ‘severe’, enduring’ and ‘treatment resistant’ anorexia 
are used to refer to instances where individuals experience anorexia over an extended 
period of time and lack motivation to recover, despite attempts at treatment (Strober, 
2004; Abbate-Daga et al, 2013; Fox and Diab, 2015; Lacey and Sly, 2016; Hannon et al, 
2017). It appears that around a third of individuals who receive inpatient treatment go on to 
experience this course of anorexia (Keel and Brown, 2010). 
Anorexia is sometimes described as ‘egosyntonic’. This term describes an aspect of an 
individual’s experience which is consistent with their personal goals and sense of self, and is 
used to refer to the personally desirable or acceptable aspects of psychiatric symptoms 
(Marchesi et al, 2008; Roncero et al, 2013). Describing anorexia as egosyntonic therefore 
alludes to the condition (or aspects of it) being valued by the individual (Garner, 1985; 
Vitousek et al, 1998; Roncero et al, 2013; Gregertsen et al, 2017). For Laségue, the valued 
nature of anorexia was a core defining feature: 
What dominates [in anorexia is] the state of quietude - I might almost say a 
condition of contentment truly pathological. Not only does she not sigh for 
recovery, but she is not ill pleased with her condition, notwithstanding all the 
unpleasantness […] In comparing this satisfied assurance to the obstinacy of the 
insane, I do not think I am going too far […] the whole disease is summed up in this 
intellectual perversion (Laségue, 1873/2016: 28 – 29).  
 
Similarly, Orimito and Vitousek, writing one century later, argue that the pleasure and 
accomplishment that the anorexic finds in their pursuit of thinness is “the essential anorexic 
attitude” (1992: 87), and Schmidt and Treasure claim that “one of the most striking aspects 
in the clinical presentation of individuals with AN [anorexia nervosa] is the extreme degree 
to which they value and ‘defend’ their undernourished state” (2006: 343). The personally 
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valuable aspects of anorexia have also been clinically framed as ‘maintenance factors’ (Serpell 
et al, 1999; Norbdø et al, 2006; Schmidt and Treasure, 2006). These are factors which 
contribute to the persistence of anorexia over time, as opposed to factors which contribute 
to the initial development of the condition (Schmidt and Treasure, 2006).  
Denial of illness and resistance to change are thought to be prominent features of anorexia 
which reflect the individual’s attempt to preserve its valued symptoms (Vitousek et al, 
1998). The denial of illness is such that the individual typically does not experience 
her/himself as ‘sick’ (Treasure et al, 2015).  Relatedly, individuals with anorexia are often 
described as ‘lacking insight’ into their condition, and sometimes as having ‘severe 
impairment of insight’ (Konstantakopoulos, 2011). This suggests that they do not understand 
the ‘reality’ of their experience or health.  
The egosyntonic nature of symptoms may contribute to the ambivalence typically 
experienced by individuals in treatment (Williams and Reid, 2010; Cokell et al, 2013), 
difficulties in therapeutic relationships and high rates of ‘treatment drop-out’ and relapse 
(Vitousek et al, 1998). Such treatment related complications and the individuals apparent 
lack of acceptance of ‘illness’ have led to anorexia having a “clinical reputation [as] one of 
the most frustrating and recalcitrant forms of psychopathology” (Vitousek et al, 1998: 391).  
Gender, class and ethnicity   
Anorexia is generally understood as a ‘female’ disorder. As discussed above, Gull and 
Laségue’s descriptions of the condition construed it in this way (Hepworth, 1999). 
Subsequent theoretical developments in the ‘psy’ disciplines (and feminist critiques of these) 
have largely served to strengthen the association between femininity and anorexia (Till, 
2011). Indeed, influential aetiological explanations of anorexia during the 20th century 
directly incorporated the gender bias of the condition. Anorexia has been understood in 
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terms of, for example, female sexual conflict (psychoanalysis), female family relationships and 
a weakening of autonomy (a characteristic which is traditionally associated with femininity 
(Bruch, 1974; Till, 2011), and the social, cultural and political position of women (feminist 
psychologists and sociologists). ‘Psy’ knowledge and practice has therefore served to 
construct a relationship between anorexia and gender. In addition, feminism has portrayed 
the idea that ‘fear of fatness’ (which is strongly associated with anorexia) is ‘tied up’ with 
femininity (Bell and McNoughton, 2007).  
However, there appears to be increasing identification of anorexia in males and it is 
sometimes asserted that male eating disorders are becoming more prevalent (e.g. Strother 
et al, 2012; Sabel et al, 2014). Among males, homosexual and bisexual men have been said to 
be most ‘at risk’ of developing an eating disorder (Russell and Keel, 2001; Yelland and 
Tiggemann, 2003; Boisvert and Harrell, 2009). Between 10% and 40% of men with an eating 
disorder identify as homosexual or bisexual, and this is in contrast to much lower rates of 
homosexuality among the general population (Russel and Keel, 2001); in the UK, around 
2.5% of males identify as gay or bisexual (Office of National Statistics, 2020).  
An increasing body of clinical literature addresses male eating disorders. This has explored 
the ‘clinical presentation’ of male anorexia and how this compares to female anorexia (both 
similarities and differences have been asserted in this respect) (e.g. Guegen et al, 2012; 
Norris, 2012; Strother et al, 2012; Núñez-Navarro et al, 2012; Smith et al, 2013; Sabel et al, 
2014) and treatment of male anorexia (Greenberg and Schoen, 2008; Weltzin et al, 2012; 
Robinson et al, 2013). Further, research has addressed media representations of male eating 
disorders and the potential for ‘stigma’ and cultural assumptions about the feminine nature 
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of eating disorders to impact diagnosis and treatment (Strother et al, 2012; Raisanen and 
Hunt, 2014; MacLean et al, 2015; Sweeting et al, 2015)8. 
Prevailing clinical and lay wisdom suggests that there is a higher prevalence of anorexia 
among middle and higher classes than lower classes (Gard and Freeman, 1996; Dignon, 
2007). This supposed class – anorexia relationship has proven controversial however, due 
to methodological difficulties associated with measuring both social class and incidence rates 
of anorexia, and studies generating conflicting findings.  
There is a clinical stereotype of the anorexic as middle class (Dignon, 2007). This originates 
from the creation of the diagnostic category, as it was mainly middle-class women who were 
diagnosed with anorexia when it was introduced to the medical literature in the 19th century 
(Hepworth, 1999), not least because they were more able to seek treatment. In the 1970s 
and 1980s psychologist and psychoanalyst Hilde Bruch published several works on eating 
disorders (1974; 1978; 1988) in which social class was a central facet to her descriptions and 
explanations of anorexia (see below). Among a sample of 51 anorexics whom Bruch saw in 
her clinic, 29 were ‘upper-class’, 18 were middle class, and only 4 lower class (Bruch, 1974). 
However, her sample likely represented a skewed impression, given that middle/upper 
classes will have had more money and cultural support to access treatment than lower 
classes (Bordo, 2009). 
Gard and Freeman’s (1996) and Dignon’s (2007) reviews of epidemiological literature show 
that during the 1970s and 1980s, studies supported the view that individuals with anorexia 
tended to be from middle and higher class backgrounds (e.g. Morgan and Russell, 1975; 
Crisp et al, 1976; Szmulzer et al, 1986; Gower and McHowen, 1989). Crisp et al (1976), for 
 
8 Although Holmes (2016) notes that the suggestion that “treatment paradigms have been geared towards 
females” (Strother et al, 2014: 436) exaggerates the extent to which mainstream treatment programmes tailor 
towards a specific gender.  
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example, surveyed nine schools between 1972 and 1974. They found that severe forms of 
anorexia were relatively common in the private sector of education and argued that this 
suggested a class factor. However, the validity of such studies has been questioned due to 
methodological flaws. In the Crisp et al study, the researchers ‘case-spotted’ anorexia in 
collaboration with school teachers, and a greater awareness of anorexia among staff in the 
private schools may have increased the likelihood of them ‘spotting’ a case (Gard and 
Freeman, 1996; Dignon, 2007).  
Gard and Freeman (1996) and Dignon (2007) both found that studies from the mid to late 
1980s to late 1990s rejected the idea of a class-anorexia relationship (e.g. Leighton and 
Millar, 1985; Whitikar et al, 1989; Rogers et al, 1997). For example, in an exploration of 
levels of ‘clinically significant’ eating disorder behaviours, Rogers et al (1997) found no 
differences between working class and middle class subjects. Both reviews concluded that, 
on the whole, more recent literature did not support a clear class-anorexia relationship 
(Guard and Freeman, 1996; Dignon, 2007). However, McCelland and Crisp (2001) reject 
this view. They examined the social class of female patients with anorexia using a 
retrospective survey of a clinical database covering the years 1960–1993. They conclude 
that social class distribution is consistently weighted towards the higher social classes. They 
contend that the strength of the anorexia-class relationship appeared to weaken post-1985, 
but remained significant.  
In addition to reviewing literature, Dignon (2007) directly ‘tested’ the class stereotype of 
anorexia. Examining a sample of 104 anorexics seen in a district general hospital between 
1985 and 20019, she found they were from both middle and working-class backgrounds and 
that the class distribution did not significantly differ from that observed in the general 
 
9 The sample is made of 80 patients from the years 1985 – 1990 and 24 patients from 1997 – 2001.  
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population. Further, a more recent review of the epidemiology of anorexia which covered 
literature from the years 2000 – 2011 concluded that a relationship between class and 
anorexia was not established (Roux et al, 2013).   
Eating disorders are typically understood as occurring among white, western, middle-class 
girls and young women (Bordo, 2009) and have been understood as a ‘culture bound 
syndrome’ (Swartz, 1985). There is an ethnic and cultural dimension to conceptualisations of 
the condition, in addition to those of gender and class. However, reviews of literature 
addressing the prevalence of eating disorders among girls and women of ethnic minorities in 
the UK and the US and in non-western countries over the past 30 years suggest that these 
are rising (Miller and Pumarega, 2001; Nasser and Malson, 2009), and that eating disorders 
cannot be considered exclusively western and white. Keel and Klump (2003) undertook a 
study involving a quantitative meta-analysis of incidence rates of anorexia and bulimia 
nervosa, qualitative summaries of historical evidence of eating disorders, and an evaluation 
of the presence of eating disorders in non-Western cultures. They concluded that bulimia 
nervosa is a ‘culture-bound syndrome’, but anorexia is not. They state that “epidemiological 
data not only support the existence of anorexia in non-Western countries but suggest that 
it’s prevalence may be similar to that in Western nations” (2003: 755). Importantly, Bordo 
(2009) notes that early paradigms for understanding eating disorders were derived from 
populations that were skewed in relation to race and class. Clinical data came from white, 
middle, and middle – upper class patients (Saukko, 2009), because these groups were more 
able to seek treatment. As such, eating disorders were conceptualised around the 
presentations and experiences of these particular groups. 
The diagnosis and treatment of anorexia in the UK 
Most individuals with anorexia initially receive a clinical diagnosis and access to treatment in 
a primary care context (e.g. via a general practitioner (GP)). Clinical literature suggests that, 
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due to anorexia being egosyntonic and/or the individuals ‘poor insight’, initial contact with a 
health professional is often initiated by a family member (typically a parent) or friend 
(Vitousek et al, 1998; Schmidt and Treasure, 2006; NHS, 2017b). When an individual does 
initiate care themselves, they do not necessarily present with eating/weight related distress 
as their problem, but with a related concern (e.g. amenorrhea) (NICE, 2017b). They may 
also be reluctant to fully disclose their motives and symptoms, and this can delay diagnosis 
and the initiation of treatment (Garner, 1985; NHS, 2004; 2017b; Treasure et al, 2015).  
Upon identifying or suspecting a case of anorexia, a primary care clinician usually makes a 
referral to secondary mental health care or a specialist eating disorder service (EDS). 
However, there is variation in the level of knowledge, experience and skill that primary care 
clinicians have in identifying anorexia and managing treatment referrals (Currin et al, 2009; 
NHS, 2017b). As we might expect, House et al (2012) found a greater likelihood of cases of 
anorexia10 being identified and referred on for further help in areas with specialist outpatient 
EDSs as compared to those with non-specialist services11. Similarly, Hugo et al (2000) found 
relatively high rates of referral to eating disorder treatment centres by GPs in practices in 
close proximity to a centre. This may be partly due to heightened awareness and knowledge 
of eating disorder treatment among GPs who have links to specialist services (House et al, 
2012).  
Hugo et al (2000) and Schmidt et al (2006) found that female GPs were more likely to refer 
patients to an eating disorder treatment centre than were male GPs. However, other 
research has identified no correlation between GPs gender and diagnostic and treatment 
 
10 Or unspecified eating disorders with a presentation similar to anorexia  
11 Geographical variation in treatment provision is discussed below 
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decisions for eating disorders (Currin et al, 2007).  Feeney et al (2007) identified such a 
correlation for binge eating disorder and EDNOS, but not for anorexia and bulimia.  
Treatment for anorexia may be as an outpatient or inpatient, with either a generic mental 
health service or a specialist eating disorder service. The average length of NHS treatment 
for anorexia is 12.3 months (Beat, 2009).  Treatment usually seeks to improve nutrition and 
increase body weight (known as ‘refeeding’) and engage the individual in psychological 
treatment. While inpatient care was central to managing eating disorders during the 20th 
century, more recently there has been a shift towards community-based provision in the UK 
(NHS, 2017b), a pattern which has occurred across mental health services (Fakhoury and 
Priebe, 2002). Inpatient treatment is now restricted to those with severe medical risk or 
those who have not responded effectively to outpatient care (NHS, 2017b). That said, rates 
of inpatient admission for anorexia and individual cases of multiple admissions appear to 
have steadily increased since the late 1990s (Holland et al, 2016; NHS Digital, 2018). The 
central goal of inpatient care is to reduce risk of physical illness and death through improved 
nutrition, usually via supervised meals (NICE, 2017b). The average length of stay in a 
specialist eating disorder unit (SEDU) is 18.2 weeks (RCP, 2012). Traditionally, inpatient 
treatment has sought to restore an individual’s weight to normal, and this is often 
understood as the ‘best’ outcome of inpatient treatment. However, ‘partial recovery’ 
programmes involving short periods of inpatient stay and relatively low body weight at 
discharge are also offered by most UK adult SEDUs (Goddard et al, 2013; NHS, 2017b). Day 
care services or partial hospitalisation are sometimes used as an alternative to, or follow up 
from, inpatient care. Hay et al (2019) reviewed existing studies to assess the effectiveness of 
treatment for eating disorders across different settings, and found no setting to be notably 
more effective than others in respect to weight restoration. Assessing weight gain after 12 
months, there was little or no difference between specialist inpatient care and active 
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outpatient or combined brief hospital and outpatient care. The proportion of eating 
disorder inpatients legally detained under the Mental Health Act in the UK is around 8% 
(RCP, 2012)12, and these individuals tend to have more severe symptoms and longer 
inpatient stays (Elzakkers et al, 2014). Severely medically ill individuals may also be admitted 
to a general hospital for treatment of physical aspects of the condition (NICE, 2017a; RCP, 
2014).  
A notable feature of anorexia is its reputation as being ‘difficult to treat’ due to the 
individual being considered unwilling to participate in therapy and/or because they are 
manipulative and devious (Bruch, 1988). Individuals with anorexia “are notorious for their 
often concerted resistance to therapeutic processes” (Gremillion, 2003: 3), and in hospital-
settings are generally defined as ‘non-compliant’ and ‘difficult’ (Darmon, 2017). It is claimed 
that ambivalence about their condition leads ‘anorexics’ to actively subvert therapy and that 
this can lead to difficulties in establishing a therapeutic relationships (Vitousek et al, 1998). 
There is substantial variety in the care that individuals with anorexia receive in the UK and 
this is linked to geographical inconsistencies in service provision (Beat, 2009; Escobar-Koch, 
2010; RCP, 2012; NHS, 2017). Treatment variation is evident throughout the pathway of 
care, from initial identification of the condition through to the termination of treatment 
(House et al, 2012) and exists for both adults and children, and in relation to both 
outpatient and inpatient services (NHS, 2017). The trajectory of an individual’s ‘care 
pathway’ (including whether or not they are referred for treatment and the type of 
treatment they receive) can depend on geographical factors such as levels of funding and 
local service availability (Hugo et al, 2000; House et al, 2012; NHS, 2017). As has previously 
been discussed, GP’s referral rates differ in accordance with the ‘type’ of locally available 
 
12 Although Elzakkers et al (2014) note that this is a crude figure.  
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services for eating disorders (Hugo et al, 2000; House et al, 2012). Parts of the UK have 
little or no specialist eating disorder provision (RCP, 2012)13 and different areas adopt 
different referral criteria for entry into inpatient treatment (NHS, 2017). In some areas, 
specialist services (such as SEDUs) utilise strict BMI thresholds for admission due to limited 
funding (NHS, 2017). 
Regarding the association between anorexia and high rates of treatment ‘drop–out’, Waller 
et al (2009) note that there is substantial attrition throughout all stages of the care pathway. 
In their sample of individuals referred to a specialist adult inpatient eating disorder service, 
only two-thirds of referrals resulted in an assessment, three-quarters of those assessed 
entered treatment, and half of those who entered treatment completed it14. Reasons for 
attrition included, for example, the individual declining treatment and unsuitability (due to 
e.g. moving out of catchment area). 
There is significant variation in the therapeutic approaches offered to individuals with eating 
disorders, and in the skill set of the health professionals who deliver them (NICE, 2017b). 
The approaches most often offered by UK eating disorder services in the treatment of 
anorexia (either individually or simultaneously with other approaches) include cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) (used by 84% of eating disorder services), nutritional advice and 
monitoring (82%) and family-based treatment (77%) (RCP, 2012). The approach offered 
differs across adolescent services and adult services (Treasure et al, 2005; Winston et al, 
2012). Winston et al (2012) report that adolescent services tend to include family therapy, 
and parents/carers are encouraged to take control of the adolescent’s eating. In contrast, 
 
13 The RCP (2012) report does not specify which parts of the UK have little/no provision.  
14 The researchers recognise that this may be a distorted representation, as some of the individuals in the 
research cohort were still in treatment at the time of addressing rates of drop-out (and may have eventually 
come to complete treatment).  
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adult services tend to encourage the individual to act autonomously and take control of 
their own eating.  
The official guidelines for the assessment and treatment of anorexia in the UK are published 
by the National Institute of Clinical Evidence (NICE) and are based on clinical research 
findings. The newest version of these guidelines was published in 2017 (NICE 2017a; 2017b). 
When considering the recommendations in these guidelines, it is essential to note that there 
are significant methodological complexities which make the measurement of ‘recovery’ 
and/or successful treatment in research problematic (Khalsa et al, 2017). 
NICE (2017a) advise that when initially assessing for an eating disorder, clinicians should 
consider a range of factors, including BMI, social withdrawal, and physical signs of 
malnutrition. Individuals with a suspected eating disorder should be immediately referred to 
a community-based eating disorder service for further assessment or treatment, and those 
with, or at risk of, severe emaciation should be prioritised for treatment. Weight gain is 
described as a ‘key goal’ in the treatment of anorexia, and necessary for psychological, 
physical and ‘quality of life’ improvements (NICE, 2017a).  
NICE (2017a) suggest that an individual with anorexia should normally be treated as an 
outpatient, but when this is not suitable (e.g. if too medically unstable), day patient or 
inpatient services should be considered. It is advised that absolute BMI thresholds should 
not be used as the basis for admission to more intensive services, due to BMI having limited 
use as a single risk marker (Treasure, 2009; Treasure et al, 2015). The guidelines state that a 
patient who does not consent to treatment but is at serious medical risk and requires 
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inpatient treatment should be assessed under the Mental Health Act198315 so that they may 
be involuntarily treated (Treasure, 2009; NICE 2017a).  
Eating disorder focused cognitive behavioural therapy, Maudsley anorexia nervosa treatment 
for adults, and specialist supportive clinical management are recommended as first line 
treatments for adults, based on a cost-benefit analysis (NICE, 2017a, 2017b) which includes 
an examination of clinical evidence (e.g. Dare et al., 2001; Zipfel et al., 2014). However, the 
apparent benefits of these therapies as compared to other psychological treatments are 
minimal16, and none the less show relatively low remission rates and a failure to sustain long 
term benefits (NICE 2017b). Further, the quality of the evidence included in the cost-benefit 
analysis is rated as low or very low. Recent clinical literature concludes that, despite a 
recent increase in the availability of evidence relating to the treatment of adult anorexia, no 
specific treatment approach demonstrates clear superiority (Zipfel et al, 2015). No 
treatments used for adults (and/or those who have had the condition for longer than three 
years) leads to substantial levels of recovery (Le Grange, 2016; Treasure and Cardi, 2017). 
Indeed, NICE (2017a) state that despite the wide range of treatments available for adult 
anorexia, they are often ineffective. 
With regard to anorexia in children and young adults, anorexia nervosa focused family 
therapy is recommended as a first line treatment. Family–based approaches were also 
recommended for this age group in the previous guidelines, and other recent reviews (in 
addition to NICE, 2017b) have also concluded that these are the most well-established 
treatments for children and young adults (Zipfel, 2015; Lock, 2015).  
 
15 This may be the Mental Health Act 1983/2007 or the Children Act 1989 in the case of children and young 
people, or may involve parents/carers consenting to treatment on the individuals behalf.  
16 The psychological interventions included in the analysis other than those that are recommended as first and 
second line treatments for adults “were not recommended because they were either not effective on 
remission, the sample size was too small, or the quality of the evidence was too low” (NICE, 2017b: 270).  
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Overall, clinical literature tends to suggest that treatment outcomes for adults are poor or 
not especially promising, but are better for adolescents (e.g. Fairburn, 2005; Goddard et al, 
2013; Walsh, 2013; Le Grange, 2016; Zipfel, 2015; Treasure and Cardi, 2017). It is therefore 
frequently concluded that more effective treatments for anorexia are needed, especially for 
adults (Keel and Brown, 2010; Ziplfel, 2015; Le Grange, 2016; Treasure and Cardi, 2017).  
Psychopharmacological treatment is recommended to only have a secondary role in the 
treatment of anorexia (Treasure et al, 2015; NICE, 2017a). However, drugs are widely used 
in the treatment of eating disorders (NICE 2017b) and research in the US17 suggests that 
they are prescribed to most individuals with anorexia (Fazeli et al, 2012). Antidepressants 
and atypical antipsychotics are the main psychoactive drugs proposed for anorexia on the 
basis that they may promote weight gain and reduce ‘anorexic’ preoccupations and 
behaviours and mood and obsessive symptoms related to comorbid disorders (Treasure et 
al, 2015). However, systematic reviews conclude that antidepressants are not effective in 
treating anorexia, in terms of improving weight gain, reducing symptoms during refeeding, or 
preventing relapse (Fazeli et al, 2012; Treasure et al, 2015, NICE, 2017b). Regarding 
antipsychotics, research claims that a subgroup of individuals may benefit from a short-term 
reduction of symptoms, but that there is no evidence of long-term benefits (Fazeli et al, 
2012; Treasure et al, 2015, NICE, 2017b). 
Research suggests that UK clinical psychologists are inconsistent in their use of clinical 
guidelines (Court et al, 2017). It is unknown to what extent NICE eating disorder guidelines 
are implemented (RCP, 2012), although one study suggests that previous NICE (2004) 
guidance stating that high risk cases of anorexia should be referred to a specialist service 
was not necessarily enacted by GPs (Currin et al, 2007). It has been suggested that clinicians 
 
17 I was unable to locate any literature detailing the rates of drug use for anorexia in the UK.  
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treating eating disorders demonstrate good awareness of ‘evidence based treatments’, but 
that they use these treatments (and the psychotherapy manuals that underpin them) 
infrequently or in an adulterated and relatively ineffective form (Simmons et al, 2008; Waller 
et al, 2012; Waller et al, 2013; Von Ranson et al, 2013). This tendency may be related to the 
more general phenomenon of ‘therapist drift’, which has seen a substantial increase in 
recent years (Waller, 2016). This refers to therapists’ not delivering evidence-based 
treatments effectively (or at all), due to factors that are personal to them, such as their 
personality, emotions, beliefs and attitudes (Waller et al, 2016). 
Iatrogenic effects of treatment  
There has been some clinical recognition of iatrogenic effects of treatment for anorexia. 
NICE guidelines recommend that clinicians 
[…] take into account the risk that people with an eating disorder can become 
institutionalised by a long admission, and that a lack of change in their condition 
could indicate that inpatient treatment is harmful (NICE, 2017a: 34). 
 
 
Treasure et al (2011) explore iatrogenic aspects of treatment in the context of a 
maintenance model of anorexia (Schmidt and Treasure, 2006). This psychological model 
addresses four domains of ‘maintenance factors’ (as defined above) and Treasure et al argue 
that iatrogenic harm can occur in relation to each of these. The domains are interpersonal 
factors, thinking style and obsessive personality traits, pro anorexia beliefs, and emotional 
style, avoidance and anxiety. In this discussion, I focus on the first two of these. 
‘Interpersonal factors’ includes the tendency for others to react with criticism or 
overprotection, and to accommodate or enable aspects of the eating disorder. Regarding 
iatrogenic harm, services may act in an ‘overprotective’ manner through over-zealous use of 
inpatient care, limiting opportunities for individuals to develop ‘real world’ recovery skills. 
Treatment may be ‘critical’ if it is experienced as coercive and confrontational, leading the 
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patient to ‘rebel’ and not comply. Other clinically-oriented studies have also identified harm 
associated with ‘punishing’ treatment. Rigid treatment structure and highly standardised 
treatment programmes, especially those based on strict behavioural approaches, may be 
experienced as punitive and arbitrary and undermine therapeutic relationships and 
motivation (Bruch, 1978; Garner, 1985; Offord et al, 2006; Colton and Pistrang, 2004).  
Treasure et al (2011) also suggest that inpatient environments may enable anorexia because 
of the tendency for those diagnosed to ‘pick up’ behaviours from other patients, and 
compare themselves to, and compete with them. The dynamics of comparison and 
competition among patients are well recognised in clinical literature, and have been 
suggested to lead individuals to learn new illness-related behaviours, seek to ‘be the best 
anorexic’ and ultimately to become ‘more ill’ (Colton and Pistrang, 2004; Offord et al, 
2006). Additionally, services can enable anorexia when they become the main social 
network for the individual, as this encourages them to ‘hang on’ to their illness to feel 
accepted: “The sick role and benefits it brings may be part of the [eating disorder] aetiology 
and serves to arrest the need to take responsibility” (Treasure et al 2011: 299). Similarly, 
Gowers et al (2000) suggest that the care, support and feeling of safety that individuals 
experience during inpatient treatment may be greater than in the community, and that this 
can encourage individuals to seek a return to hospital after discharge by relapsing (see also 
Offord et al, 2006).  
‘Thinking style and obsessive-personality traits’ is a maintenance model domain that 
addresses the rigidity and attention to detail which is believed to be exaggerated within 
anorexia. Treasure et al (2011) suggest that the highly structured inpatient environment, 
which is abound with rules and routines, can be valued by eating disorder patients with 
obsessive-compulsive tenancies. Further, the problematic belief of needing to be thinner to 
deserve help may be enhanced in scenarios where patients are not accepted into treatment 
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due to ‘not being thin enough’ to meet referral criteria. Relatedly, Rance et al (2017a) argue 
that BMI contingent admission to services within NHS treatment systems can incentivise 
weight loss18.  
Treatment which is perceived to incorporate too much focus on weight gain and food 
intake and not enough on psychological aspects of the condition may be ineffective and 
iatrogenic. Participants in a range of clinically-oriented studies report a preference for 
‘wholistic’ approaches to treatment and perceive a disproportionate focus on weight and 
food as problematic (Eivors et al, 2003; Colton and Pistrang, 2004; Offord et al, 2006; 
Escobar-Koch, 2010; Rance et al, 2017a). This focus may inadvertently encourage individuals 
to continue their eating disordered behaviour by perpetuating concerns about food and 
weight (Rance et al, 2017a; Eivors et al, 2003). Enforced weight gain and a neglect of 
corresponding emotional support may also compound an existing sense of lack of control 
(Offord et al, 2006).  
Clinical approaches: concluding remarks 
In this review I have addressed clinical approaches to anorexia, including historical and 
current definitions, clinically recognised features of the condition, and its epidemiology and 
treatment in the UK. This has been crucial for contextualising my research, and for 
understanding the clinical construct that participants encountered when diagnosed with 
anorexia, as well as the treatment environments they were immersed in. In the following 
section, I review alternative approaches to understanding anorexia and treatment from 
within the social sciences.  
 
18 This research reported on women’s perceptions of the NHS treatment that they received, and may not 
accurately reflect the way that clinical decisions were ‘really’ made. However, NHS (2017) do recognise that 
admission decisions are sometimes made on the basis of BMI, especially in areas where funding is limited.  
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Sociological and anthropological understandings of anorexia 
Feminism 
Feminism has made significant contributions to sociological theorising of eating disorders. 
Feminist scholarship (including feminist psychology and sociology) has collectively served to 
cast into doubt the ‘psychopathology’ of eating disorders and question the supposed 
boundaries between normal and pathological eating (Bordo, 1993). This ‘rethinking’ of an 
‘abnormality’ is characteristic of much feminist work related to health (Brook, 1999). 
There are two phases of feminist approaches to eating disorders; ‘classic feminism’ and 
‘critical feminism’ (see Saukko, 2008 and Malson and Burns, 2009)19. The classic feminist 
literature emerged in the 1970s and includes, for example, Lawrence (1984); Chernin (1985) 
and Orbach (1978; 1986), all of whom were practising therapists who developed their 
theories in the context of therapeutic application and so drew on their experiences with 
individual cases. This literature focuses on the development and psychologies of women 
(Busfield, 1996) and explains anorexia in terms of ‘traditional’ feminist concerns such as 
women’s (changing) social, political and economic positions, female subordination and 
patriarchal oppression. Since the 1990s, critical feminist literature has developed analyses of 
eating disorders taking its influence from post-modern and post-structural theory (e.g. 
Bordo, 1993; Malson, 1998; Hepworth, 1999; Saukko, 2008). It has examined the discursive 
construction and regulation of eating disorders. Malson and Burns suggest that classic 
feminist approaches viewed eating disorders as individual, pathological responses to 
patriarchal cultures, but that critical feminist literature sees eating disorders as “constituted 
within and by the always-gendered discursive contexts in which we live: (individual) 
‘disorder’ is re-theorised as part and parcel of the (culturally normative) order of things” 
 
19 Although precise divisions cannot be drawn between the two. 
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(2009: 2). Critical feminist literature is more exclusively theoretical than the classic 
literature, having been developed at a ‘scholarly distance’ (Holmes, 2016) and not in a 
context of direct therapeutic application.  
I begin this discussion with an overview of Hilde Bruch’s (1974; 1978; 1988) work. Bruch 
was a psychoanalytic psychiatrist and psychotherapist and her ideas provided the 
foundations that were later built on by feminists (Busfield, 1996). I then consider Orbach’s 
psychoanalytically-oriented work, as an example of classic feminism. This is followed by a 
review of Bordo (1993) who, in her critical engagement with post-modern and Foucauldian 
ideas, represents the beginnings of critical feminist approaches to anorexia (Malson and 
Burns, 2009). Lastly, I critically discuss feminist approaches, and draw on insights from 
critical feminists (Hepworth, 1999 and Malson, 1998) in so doing.  
Bruch identified two processes in the development of severe eating disorders: an inability to 
recognise and adequately respond to hunger and a lack of self-identity (1974). She tied this 
abnormal development to family dynamics and interactional patterns with parents (mainly 
the mother) during childhood (1974; 1978; 1988). Bruch examined the family background of 
her ‘anorexic’ patients, noting that they came from upper middle class/upper class families 
(see above). These families initially seemed stable and well-functioning, affording their 
daughters many privileges and opportunities. However, she contended that patterns of 
interaction within the family during childhood had led to them (the daughters with anorexia) 
being confused in their concepts about the body and its functions, and deficient in their 
sense of identity, autonomy and control (1974; 1978; 1988).  
Bruch described the mothers of her anorexic patients as conscientious and devoted to their 
children, but noted that they often provided for their child in accordance with what they felt 
was needed, and not with child-initiated cues. This led to the child’s innate needs not being 
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properly attuned with the responses in their environment (1974), thus preventing ‘healthy’ 
conceptual development. In this context, hunger and satiety signals became misused, serving 
emotional and interpersonal (as opposed to physiological) needs.  
As children, Bruch’s patients experienced the privileges and opportunities they were 
afforded as a heavy burden and felt obligated to be ‘someone special’. Their parents tended 
to exert excessive control over them and they were not acknowledged as an individual in 
their own right. They therefore ‘over-conformed’, and these experiences led them to 
develop an inadequate sense of identity, self-confidence and autonomy and precipitated 
anorexia. They became actively engaged in the process of anorexia in an attempt to fill a 
desire to be special and outstanding, and in a struggle “for control, for a sense of identity, 
competence and effectiveness” (1974: 251). 
Susie Orbach’s work Fat is a Feminist Issue was a self-help manual based on her therapeutic 
work with compulsive overeaters in which she adopted a “feminist rethinking of traditional 
psychoanalysis” (1978: 13). Orbach argued that women develop compulsive overeating as an 
adaption to sexist pressure, and it is therefore rooted in gender inequality. Compulsive 
overeating and fatness hold symbolic meaning, and may be a means of rejecting women’s 
powerlessness, self-denial and limited social roles. Orbach argued that anorexia and 
compulsive overeating are both a response to the same oppressive conditions and are ‘two 
sides of the same coin’. 
In Hunger Strike (1986), Orbach focused specifically on anorexia and suggested that it is a 
form of active rebellion and attempt at self-assertion. She argued that contemporary 
western women experience profound confusion and face contradictory requirements. 
Focusing on gender roles, she suggested that women are culturally and psychologically 
prepared for a domestic life looking after others and that femininity requires that women 
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define themselves through their connections with others and that they anticipate others’ 
needs. However, they are also ‘teased’ with the possibility of living life for themselves and 
becoming ‘successful’ outside of the home. Anorexia is a bodily transformation which 
reflects an attempt to deal with these contradictions, it being “at once the embodiment of 
stereotyped femininity and its very opposite” (1986: 30). Orbach also claimed that anorexia 
is an expression of a woman’s internal struggle to negotiate her passions and desires. As 
women are socialised into meeting the needs of others, they are unfamiliar with their own 
needs and ashamed of their own desires and wants. The anorexic attempts to create a 
needless self and to establish a sense of control and autonomy over her emotions 
metaphorically through the external control of a strict diet.  
Turning to critical feminism, in Unbearable Weight (1993), Susan Bordo’s feminist analysis 
draws on ideas from Marxism and cultural theory. In this, she shifts the focus from gender 
roles to culture. She argues that slenderness is a contemporary ideal of female 
attractiveness and analyses how slender bodies are ‘read’. She decodes the meanings related 
to what are perceived as the correct and incorrect management of desires that are 
perceived within the body, and argues that a slender body that is ‘tight’ and contained is 
perceived as being protected from internal eruption, and thus represents controlled internal 
processes of desire and impulse. The slender ideal also encapsulates the contradictions of 
‘being female’ by being both a rejection of a domestic identity and an expression of 
discomfort with greater female presence and power. For women, these contradictions of 
femininity are layered with the contradictions of capitalism. While consumer culture 
encourages women to “let go” and indulge their desires, diet and exercise industries 
simultaneously code fat as undesirable and symbolic of laziness. In this context, at the 
“intersection of patriarchal culture and post-industrial capitalism” (1993: 32), it is difficult to 
negotiate a place of moderation and “easy to fall into disorder” (1993: xxi).  
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Bordo also addresses the impact of cultural images of ‘ideal’ bodies, which are more 
prevalent for women than men. She argues that digitally modified images alter our 
perception of a ‘normal body’ and raise our standards of bodily perfection.  Further, she 
argues that while the medical model of anorexia has noted that culturally prevalent images 
of thin bodies play a contributory role in the development of eating disorders, it has failed 
to grasp “just how powerful, ubiquitous, and invasive the demands of culture are on our 
bodies and souls” (1993, xix). More recently, Bordo (1999; 2009) has also addressed the 
relatively recent exploitation of male body insecurity by cultural industries.  
In The Social Construction of Anorexia (1999), Julie Hepworth argues that classic feminist 
literature inadvertently reproduced dominant medical scientific discourse, for example by 
retaining the category ‘anorexia nervosa’ and by focusing on the psychology of the mother-
daughter relationship. Critical feminists, however, have been critical of the category 
‘anorexia nervosa’ and the implication that it is a ‘natural’ pre-existing clinical entity, and 
have examined its discursive construction (Malson, 1998; Hepworth, 1999). Drawing on 
Foucault, Hepworth (1999) argues that anorexia is a product of medical science which 
cannot be separated from the social practices through which it became defined. The 
‘scientific discovery’ of anorexia in the 19th century was made possible through a set of 
discourses and social practices which emerged in a particular historical, cultural and 
institutional context. These include discourses of femininity, hysteria, and discovery as well 
as medical scientific and clinical discourse.  
A limitation of feminist approaches to eating disorders is the lack of insight into the 
diagnosis in males. Lawrence (1984), for example, argues that anorexia sometimes affects 
men because male and female psychology are not wholly distinct, and because the issues 
that are problematic for women are sometimes also problematic for men. However, her 
explanation is brief and does not account for the ways that gender may differentially shape 
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the experience of anorexia. Bell and McNoughton argue that feminists, through their 
commitment to the notion of patriarchy, have implied that an intense ‘fear of fatness’ is only 
experienced by females, and thus have failed to recognise that “reviling fatness is not a 
peculiarly feminine preoccupation” (2007: 108).  
I suggest that it is questionable whether feminist interpretations of anorexia as an 
‘unconscious’ rebellion or attempt to reconcile contradiction can be taken as ‘correct’. 
These interpretations assume that the meaning of self-starvation is located within its 
feminist interpretation, thus divorcing the meaning from the ‘conscious’ motivations and 
lived experience of the ‘anorexic’ themselves. In this sense, feminism potentially imposes 
rather than ‘unearths’ meaning. This potential for imposed meaning is captured in Orbach’s 
drawing of a parallel between anorexia and the suffragettes hunger strike, which “too readily 
attributes a political motivation to actions whose element of resistance does not have an 
equivalent conscious political intent” (Busfield, 1996: 183). Relatedly, Dignon argues that 
feminist literature has created a stereotype of the ‘anorexic’ as a “political protester 
reacting against society’s oppression of women” (2007: 31), although this stereotype has 
been less powerful than clinical stereotypes. Despite the problems inherent in feminist 
perspectives however, these have none the less greatly enhanced understandings of 
anorexia (Busfield, 1996), and have been particularly valuable in challenging psychiatric 
explanations (MacSween, 1993).  
The career and social space of anorexia 
In Becoming Anorexic: A Sociological Study (2017) (originally published in French in 2003), 
Muriel Darmon departs from preceding sociological approaches by focusing on the activity of 
anorexia, and then analysing the specific ‘social space’ in which this activity occurs. She 
undertook interviews with 14 female adolescent ‘anorexic’ patients in France, some in a 
hospital and some in a psychiatric clinic, and interviews with three female former anorexics, 
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recruited via snowball methods20.  She also undertook five months of observation in units 
where her interviewees were patients21.  She utilises the symbolic interactionist notion of 
career (discussed later) to understand the activities involved in anorexia and the processual, 
temporal dimensions of the condition. Drawing on Bourdieu, Darmon then analyses the 
underlying social influences on these activities. Class, gender and age are framed not as 
‘causes’, but as ‘social conditions of possibility’ for the activity that anorexia involves.  She 
contends that anorexia is a process of self-transformation which follows sequential phases 
and involves specific and deliberate forms of work, and that the practices involved in this are 
characteristic of a specific gender (female) and class (middle/upper class).  
Darmon identifies four phases in the ‘anorexic career’. During the first phase (‘beginning’), 
the individual ‘takes themselves in hand’ and commits to changing their habits. Some begin 
with a diet and some with accidental weight loss which is then continued with a diet. Others 
begin with a multifaceted self-transformation whereby the dieting occurs alongside an 
increase in other organised bodily practices (e.g. sports) and cultural practices (e.g. 
schoolwork). In all cases, there is a temporally situated, determined and efficient 
engagement into the anorexic career involving a deliberate ‘break from the past’.  
The second phase ‘Carrying on (one)’ involves distinct forms of learning, as the individual 
undertakes considered and determined work, including a rationalisation, intensification and 
more systematic implementation of techniques used during the previous phase, as well as 
new techniques. For example, the reflexive work of calorie counting and measuring is used 
to increase the knowledge base, guiding food consumption. The individual also learns to 
enjoy the effects of their practices, including the physical sensations associated with food 
 
20 Darmon also interviewed ‘non-anorexic’ secondary school pupils (11 interviews) and teachers who worked in 
a school attached to a psychiatric clinic (11 interviews).  
21 Details regarding the number of interviews are taken from an additional publication (Darmon, 2009) based 
on the same research. 
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restriction. During this phase, the techniques and practices that the individual has previously 
deliberately implemented come to create habits and long-lasting, embodied dispositions. 
These constitute an internal driving force which ‘propel’ them towards maintaining anorexia.  
During the third phase - ‘carrying on (two)’ - the commitment to the anorexic endeavour is 
maintained, despite others labelling this as deviant and the individual being increasingly 
monitored. The phase begins when an ‘alerter’ (or successive alerters) such as a family 
member or friend publicly indicates that something is wrong. From this, a ‘circuit of agents’ 
develops, constituted of lay and professional individuals. This circuit employs various 
techniques to ‘normalise’ the individual and encourage them to end their commitment. The 
‘circuit of mediators’ refers to the network of professionals involved in the individual’s 
medical care, usually beginning with a GP and ending with a psychiatrist. As the individual 
travels through this circuit, a diagnosis emerges and the individual is eventually ‘officially’ 
diagnosed. Towards the end of the circuit, the threat of hospital comes into play, leading 
either to hospitalisation22, or to the individual ending their commitment.   
In the final stage – ‘being taken in hand’ – individuals give themselves over to the hospital 
institution23, which works on them by redefining their existing dispositions as pathological, 
and replacing them with ‘healthy’ dispositions. This involves getting the individual on board, 
such that they eventually internalise the hospitals point of view and commit to a new form 
of work (‘recovery’).  Eventually, they actively engage in their own fight against their 
‘anorexic’ dispositions, and so begin a new endeavour of self-transformation.   
 
22 This was the typical outcome in Darmon’s sample due to most of the interviews being undertaken in a 
hospital setting. 
23 Darmon recognises that hospitalisation “can be part of a diverse and discontinuous medical trajectory” (for 
example, numerous admissions may occur) and that the exact nature of the experience can vary in accordance 
with different hospitals therapeutic orientations. Her analysis therefore focuses on common practices that 
occur across hospitalisations (2017: 158). 
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Darmon draws on Bourdieu to explore the ‘social characteristics’ of the activity within the 
first three phases, arguing that these tend to be middle/upper class, female and (to a lesser 
extent) ‘young’ practices. For example, she argues that the anorexic’s food choices are not 
only driven by perceived impact on weight, but also reveal ‘dominant tastes’; they eat food 
that tends to be associated with middle/upper classes (e.g. fish, lean meat, fruits) and reject 
food associated with working classes. Darmon argues that for women more so than men, 
the bodily changes that are pursued in anorexia are socially oriented towards ‘excellence’, 
because the body is more profoundly caught up in class categories for women than for men. 
She also analyses class in respect of the ‘hospital phase’ of anorexia, arguing that ‘patient 
resistance’ (‘non-compliance’) is class based. Middle/upper class dispositions (such as self-
assurance and a sense of entitlement) account for the ways in which patients ‘resist’ medical 
authority. Thus, class, gender, and age are all social conditions of possibility for the work 
that anorexia involves.  
Other scholars have also framed anorexia as a career (McLorg and Taub, 1987; Peters, 
1995), however Darmon (2017) was the first to have focused on the activity involved. Her 
analysis of the ‘social space’ of this activity offers a novel way of approaching the 
epidemiology of anorexia, which avoids implying over simplified causal relations (Darmon, 
2017). However, it is unclear to what extent the experiences of Darmon’s participants are 
relevant to others. The findings may indicate the specific ways in which anorexic activity 
happened to manifest for her sample, who were female, upper/middle class and young. 
Rather than being a member of these groups facilitating an ‘anorexic career’, it might be that 
it allows for a particular manner of engagement. Alternatively, some combination of both 
dynamics might also be at play.  
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Anthropological approaches  
Anthropological studies have examined institutional practices and embodied experiences of 
eating disorders. By theorising “how local, shared worlds shape disordered eating [and the] 
grounding of the disorder in social structures and relationships” (Eli and Warin, 2018: 443), 
they have challenged clinical and popular interpretations of anorexia. In this discussion, I 
focus on anthropological work from the past decade (Lavis, 2011; Warin, 2010; Eli, 2014b). 
This work addresses themes such as the value and meaning of anorexic identities, the power 
of the diagnostic category of anorexia, belonging and social relationships among individuals 
in treatment, and altered forms of relatedness in experiences of anorexia. I also incorporate 
insights from sociologist Rich’s (2006) ethnographically-oriented study of young women’s 
experiences of anorexia and identity. The findings from her research concur with insights 
made by anthropologists, and she draws directly on their work (specifically Warin).  
Warin (2010) undertook an ethnography of people’s everyday experiences of anorexia. This 
involved multi-sited fieldwork during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Locating sites for her 
ethnography, she began with hospital settings in South Australia, and then located two 
further treatment settings overseas in British Columbia and Scotland, based on their 
international reputation and innovative programmes24. Once based in these institutional 
locations, she then ‘moved outwards’ into domestic and public spaces. The focus was thus 
not only anorexia in clinical settings, but also in everyday life, in people’s homes, 
employment, and relationships more broadly. Participants included 44 women and 3 men 
aged between 14 and 45, most of whom were single and had a range of economic and 
occupational backgrounds and living situations.  
 
24 These eating disorder programmes were considered innovative in their focus on outpatient treatment and 
because they incorporated a range of fields of knowledge for treating eating disorders, including feminism.  
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According to Warin, “relatedness […] is central to people’s practices and experiences of 
anorexia” (2010: 3). She uses a broad anthropological conceptualisation of relatedness to 
refer not only to familial and social obligation and ties, but to the multiple elements and 
everyday acts that comprise these. This includes “the everyday exchanging and sharing of 
food and substances, living together, domestic arrangements, places, memories, emotions, 
and relationships” (2010: 3).  
Warin found that her participants often negated ‘ordinary’, everyday practices of 
relatedness, such as social eating and the desire to have children, because, for example, they 
were experienced as threatening. However, they created new meanings and experiences of 
being related through the practices and identity of anorexia. Anorexia offered new avenues 
for relatedness through the concealment and revealing of anorexic practices, friendships, 
competitiveness, secrecy and shared experiences with others who have the diagnosis, and a 
personal relationship with anorexia. I focus here on three aspects of relatedness: a 
relationship with anorexia, the social relation of secrecy, and the ‘hierarchy of anorexia’.  
Regarding the first, anorexia was often personified as both friend and enemy. Individuals 
formed intimate connections with anorexia, which sometimes became central to who they 
perceived themselves to be and were thus pivotal to their identity. These connections were 
often valued and cherished, such that ‘recovering’ meant leaving behind a significant 
relationship and could entail an intense loss and sadness.  
Social relations of secrecy concerns the concealing and revealing of anorexic practices. 
Warin describes how an element of concealment around anorexia was clearly evident in 
clinical settings, and that this led health professionals to view patients with suspicion. 
Outside of treatment, individuals were reluctant to reveal weight loss and food restriction 
to others. They used ‘anorexic tricks’ (such as drinking water before being weighed) to give 
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the appearance that all was normal and to hide the extremes they went to to lose weight. 
Warin argues that “the power of secrecy lies not only it what it conceals […] but also in 
what it reveals and creates” (2010: 85 – 86). It was the creation of meaning involved in 
secrecy and concealment that was important, more so than the content of what was being 
hidden. Performing secrecy was productive. It marked differences between those with and 
without anorexia and distinguished anorexia from other illnesses. In treatment settings, it 
facilitated the establishment of new relationships. Bodily practices were known and shared 
among those with anorexia, forming what participants referred to as the “secret language of 
eating disorders”. Secrecy thus created exclusion, difference, and power.  
Warin describes a ‘hierarchy of anorexia’ that exists in treatment settings. In this hierarchy, 
the top is represented by “pure” or “true” anorexia, which refers to “weight loss by total 
control through almost total abstinence from food and drink” (2010: 94). In treatment, 
individuals compete with themselves and others within the hierarchy, striving towards the 
top to become ‘the best anorexic’. Being the ‘most sick’ and ‘most thin’ is appealing because 
it distinguishes oneself from other members of the group. In this context, serious medical 
complications make one more distinguished and give credibility to one’s diagnosis. 
Warin also found that the maintenance of anorexia, particularly in its earlier stages, created 
feelings of superiority over others and a sense of prestige. Anorexia was experienced by 
many as a desirable positioning and was something they worked towards. She describes how 
the diagnosis can offer symbolic power, and that this arises from its mark of distinction and 
sign of belonging to an elite group. Participants sought to mobilize the worth of the 
diagnostic label of anorexia such that they transformed it, and it became more to them than 
a medical diagnosis. Rather, it was “an empowering state of being, a friend, an enemy, and a 
way of life” (2010: 7).  
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Rich (2006) undertook a study of anorexia in which she drew on a range of ethnographic 
data and ‘voices’. These data were primarily narratives from semi-structured interviews with 
young women (aged 11 – 17) diagnosed with anorexia and bulimia, all of whom were at 
different stages of ‘recovery’ in a UK inpatient treatment centre for eating disorders. Rich 
argues that the young women in her study had come to manage anorexia as an identity as 
well as an illness. They navigated the complexities of stigma attached to the label of 
anorexia, the ways in which they presented themselves to others, and the relationships they 
developed with others with anorexia. 
Participants in Rich’s research said they had often felt misunderstood by others (such as 
peers, teachers, family members and medical professionals) due to medical discourse 
positioning anorexia as a pathological and ‘irrational’ condition. The way that others ‘read’ 
their anorexic body and reduced anorexia down to an issue of weight meant that they felt 
disconnected from them. Given this, relationships with other patients in the treatment 
environment provided an alternative context in which they did feel understood, and were a 
source of valued understanding and support. Drawing on Warin’s insights regarding 
secrecy25, Rich describes how connections were built among inpatient peers through the 
sharing of eating disorder knowledge and practices. However, while largely feeling 
connected to other ‘patients’, they could also quickly move into feeling disconnected, and 
were sometimes ‘competitive’ and unfriendly.  
Similar to Warin’s ‘hierarchy of anorexia’, Rich (2006) suggests that being a ‘successful 
anorexic’ affords a certain status and sense of empowerment. The young women in her 
study managed the negative social positioning of anorexia by presenting alternative 
narratives whereby they are not ‘abnormal’ and attention seeking, but embodying 
 
25 Rich draws on earlier publications by Warin (e.g. Warin, 2002, cited in Rich, 2006), which describes the same 
research as the book (Warin, 2010) reviewed above. 
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extraordinary strength and finding ‘empowerment’ through anorexia. She also understands 
competition between patients in these terms, suggesting that competing could be about 
wanting an identity as an anorexic that is ‘better’ than others.  
Eli (2014b) undertook interviews with thirteen individuals who had been hospitalised in an 
adult inpatient eating disorder ward in Israel. Her analysis focuses on how the dynamics of 
difference and belonging played out in various aspects of treatment. Her participants 
expressed ambivalence towards the identities, social environment, and regimented living 
constructed by the ward. Eli suggests that participants’ ambivalent positionings can be 
understood through liminality, an anthropological concept which captures transitions and 
indefinitely marginal and ambiguous states.  
She addresses participants’ contradictory experiences within three facets: a sense of 
legitimacy and recognition, dynamics within the inpatient community, and boundaries vis a 
vis the outside world and one’s own illness. Regarding the first, Eli found that her 
participants valued being hospitalised and treated for anorexia for the sense of recognition it 
afforded by affirming their eating disorder. In a context in which their eating disorder 
identities required ongoing negotiation and justification, being hospitalised fed into this 
continuous identity-work, by legitimising their eating disorder identity. However, some 
participants felt delegitimised in treatment due to being treated as part of an eating disorder 
collective, rather than as an individual. When this occurred, their individual sense of self was 
subsumed to an eating disorder diagnosis and they felt unheard.  
Addressing dynamics within the inpatient community, Eli describes how being on the ward 
offered social belonging. Participants valued the sense of community, which contrasted the 
solitude of life with an eating disorder pre-hospitalisation. However, being on the ward also 
risked over-identification with, and worsening of, illness. “The community triggered 
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disorder-supportive desires” (2014b: 6) and living closely alongside other patients led to 
being exposed to, and embodying, their eating disorder logic and practices.  
Regarding boundaries, participants described how the highly restrictive practices and 
routines on the ward created a bounded space which separated them from external forces. 
They expressed ambivalence towards these boundaries, which felt both sheltering and 
oppressive. Some found that regimented ward-life was comforting because it allowed them 
to ‘let go’ of aspects of their life (such as food) about which they had previously ‘obsessed’, 
or because it felt they were in a protective ‘bubble’. Yet, others found these same 
boundaries exhausting and disempowering.  
Lavis’ explores ‘pro-anorexia’ which she defines as “a desire amongst some anorexics to 
maintain or enhance their existing illness” (2011: 3). Outside of her research, the term is 
often used in relation to ‘pro-ana websites’, which are used by individuals who “desire to 
maintain their anorexia and resist recovery” (2011: 14). Pro-anorexia websites have been 
well-researched by social scientists who have ‘led the way’ in defining this field of study 
(Casilli et al, 2012). However, Lavis’ ethnographic study explores pro-anorexia both on the 
internet and in ‘the clinic’, in an English eating disorder unit. By using both as fieldsites 
alongside each other, she seeks to retain the connections between them, and avoid an 
artificial separation. I consider Lavis’ research in detail here, because I draw on insights from 
it frequently in the analysis of my own experiences (see chapter four).  
Within her ethnography, Lavis analyses the construct of a ‘good anorexic’ and the practices 
that individuals undertake to maintain themselves in line with this positioning. She contends 
that bodily thinness is important to being good at anorexia. It visually defines what it means 
to be anorexic and is the marker against which one’s self is measured. Being good at 
anorexia entails a relentless, effortful daily enactment of surveillance over one’s own 
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thinness. This surveillance “is an active modality of being good at anorexia” (2011: 96) not 
only in a manner that is secondary to the thinness it produces, but also in itself. Self-
weighing is a part of this surveillance, as being good at anorexia requires both reducing the 
number on the scales and keeping it down. Given this, the distress that can occur as a result 
of even minimal weight gain can be understood as resulting from the potential for this to 
undermine one’s sense of self as good at anorexia.  
Lavis argues that a ‘good anorexic’ is enacted both individually and relationally; it is a 
positioning that can be ‘made’ or ‘unmade’ via mutually productive social and individual 
processes. One’s sense of self is shaped by an awareness of the gaze of others on oneself; 
this has the power to confirm or undermine oneself as ‘good at anorexia’. Bodily markers of 
anorexia such as weight or BMI are a part of this, as these threaten to (un)make one’s 
anorexia when publicly known. These markers are treated as indexical to anorexia because 
they reveal the success of one’s ability to self – starve. Related to this is the competitiveness 
that occurs among patients when they find their own anorexia ‘falling short’ of others’. 
These relational processes are intra-subjective as well inter-subjective, and individuals may 
use illness in others as a motivational tool for making oneself a ‘better anorexic’.  
Furthermore, Lavis suggests that there is sometimes a ‘blurring’ between the making of 
one’s anorexia in appearance and in ‘actuality’. Appearing to be good at anorexia, for 
example by appearing to be not-eating or to have lost weight (without these having ‘really’ 
occurred), can be one way in which individuals develop a sense of themselves as ‘good at 
anorexia’. Indeed, presenting oneself as good at anorexia can produce oneself as this. This 
highlights the inseparability of individual and relational processes, as it suggests that others’ 
gaze can (un)make you to yourself, as well as socially. Crucially: 
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Being good at anorexia is […] always dual - a continual dialogue of social and 
individual, outside and inside, each shaping and making the other. Moreover, these 
dialogic transactions may continually journey back and forth with inferences and 
refractions coming into being on many levels at once (2011: 106).  
 
Lavis also argues that inpatient practices perform anorexia in a certain way. Daily life in 
treatment assumes, produces and solidifies a conflation of anorexia with bodily thinness and 
equates ‘more thin’ with ‘more anorexic’. Treatment also performs anorexia by replicating 
the practices that it assumes to be central to the condition. This occurs when ‘anorexic 
behaviours’ are pre-emptively responded to, for example through rules which prevent 
patients from hiding or otherwise not consuming even the tiniest amounts of food. Thus, 
patients come to learn what anorexia is and how it ‘should’ be done. She describes this 
clinical projection of anorexia as a ‘hyperreal’ (Baudrillard, 1983) anorexia that is “at once 
mimetic and nascent” (2011: 231), and which becomes the focus of pro-anorexic desire. 
When patients notice a comparative lack in their own anorexia, “many learn how to ‘do’ 
and ‘be’ the clinic’s anorexia” (2011: 279).  
Examining the diagnostic category of anorexia and the act of diagnosis itself, Lavis suggests 
that these “are invested with pro-anorexic desire” (2011: 234) due to the sense of 
legitimacy that they confer. Often, being diagnosed affirms to the individual “what is already 
felt to be there” (2011: 231). Rather than the act of diagnosis setting in motion a diagnostic 
view of oneself which changes the individual, it confirms ones existing sense of self as 
anorexic.  
However, while being diagnosed can feel comforting in its indication that one is ‘good 
enough’ to be clinically recognised, it concurrently “carries with it a visceral anxiety about 
not being good enough” (2011: 238). Being diagnosed can generate a desire to live up to and 
‘prove’ the diagnosis. The diagnostic category can become a tool against which one 
measures themselves, and is not passively done to individuals, but is actively done by them: 
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[Diagnosis] is something that [diagnosed individuals] reach towards, feeling their 
away around its perimeters and, importantly, attempting to fit themselves into, and 
within, these (2011: 239). 
 
Sociological and anthropological approaches: concluding remarks 
I have addressed approaches to anorexia from within feminism and social anthropology, as 
well as Darmon’s sociological theory.  These approaches offer socially and culturally situated 
understandings of the diagnosis and stand in contrast to clinical conceptualisations. While 
the process of being diagnosed with anorexia has not previously been a substantial focus of 
social scientific research into anorexia, I have shown how Lavis (2011) addresses this briefly 
in her ethnography of pro-anorexia. I draw on and extend her insights in this research when 
examining experiences and meanings of being diagnosed. This review has also shown how 
the diagnosis may be valued by some as a source of identity, including in treatment contexts 
(Rich, 2006; Warin, 2010; Lavis, 2011; Eli, 2014b), and that individuals may learn new 
understandings of themselves and of anorexia as they engage in clinical environments (Lavis, 
2011; Darmon, 2017). I incorporate these insights into the analysis in this research when 
exploring the meaning of the diagnosis to participants and the ways in which the it influences 
their self-understanding and performance of symptoms.  
Symbolic interactionism and identity  
Introduction to identity  
Identity is a vague, intangible and ‘slippery’ concept26 (Strauss, 1959; Lawler, 2008). Broadly, 
it is “a set of interrelated ideas about the self, the roles we play, and the qualities that make 
us unique” (Scott, 2015: 2). At the core of identity are processes of identification, which 
involve notions of similarity and difference, recognition, association and categorisation 
 
26Different scholars use the term ‘identity’ (and other related concepts) to invoke varying meanings and they 
sometimes do so by relying on context and application to imply meaning. This can add to the intangible ‘feel’ 
of the concept.  
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(Lawler, 2008; Jenkins, 2014; Chandler, 2017). This research is concerned with individuals 
‘anorexic identities’, including how they come to identify with the diagnostic category of 
anorexia, and what this means to them, in terms of how this is informed by clinical 
understandings. 
Literature from a range of disciplines posits identity as important to understanding anorexia. 
Clinical research utilising patients descriptions of the meaning of their illness argues that 
anorexia is a means for constructing a new identity (Nordbø, 2006; Espindola and Bray, 
2009). Health psychology literature, informed by individuals’ personal accounts, has also 
recognised that anorexia is a means for developing a new identity (Fox and Diab, 2015). 
Patching and Lawler (2009) describe the ‘whole journey’ of anorexia (illness through to 
recovery) as entailing a ‘strong identity component’ and others suggest that recovery 
involves ‘giving up’ an anorexic identity, and building a new (or rediscovering an old) identity 
(Jenkins and Ogden, 2012; Dawson et al, 2014; Smith et al, 2014). In the anthropological 
literature above, we have seen that Warin (2010) points to the symbolic power and sense of 
distinction afforded by an identification with anorexia, and how the negotiation of an eating 
disordered identity is central to the experience of being hospitalised for anorexia (Eli, 
2014b). Moreover, sociological work has described the social processes involved in the 
development of an eating disordered identity (McLorg and Taub, 1987). In respect to 
inpatient treatment, it has described the myriad of ways in which patients resist and manage 
pathologised and stigmatised aspects of an eating disordered identity, while sometimes also 
desiring a medicalised anorexic identity (Rich, 2006; Boughtwood and Halse, 2010). 
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The body of literature addressing sociological approaches to identity is large, and the 
concept has been used, theorised and challenged27 from a range of theoretical and topical 
perspectives. I therefore restrict my focus to symbolic interactionism. This is the 
sociological approach that has most heavily influenced my thinking around identity, and I use 
the symbolic interactionist concept of ‘identity-work’ as a key analytical tool in this research.  
Symbolic interactionist approaches  
The development of symbolic interactionism was bound up with sociology scholars at the 
University of Chicago in the 20th Century, including W. I. Thomas, Park, Hughes, Becker 
and Strauss28. Additionally, social psychologist Mead and Blumer are frequently cited as the 
most important founders29. 
In symbolic interactionism, the self and identity are viewed as processual, reflexive, emerging 
in social interaction and, therefore, as social in nature. While ‘identity’ and ‘self’ are central 
concepts in symbolic interactionism, the perspective tends to lack a consensual definition of 
these terms and some authors are vague when using them (Weigert et al, 1986). However, 
 
27 Post-structuralists refer to discursively produced ‘subjectivities’ or ‘subject positions’ instead of identity. 
‘Subject’ is believed to be a more precise term for addressing issues which are relevant to post structuralism 
(Belsey, 2002).  
28 Some of the authors whom I include under the heading of ‘symbolic interactionism’ (such as Hughes and 
Becker) may be more accurately described as ‘interactionists’. Their work has been linked to a specific 
intellectual tradition which is separate (but linked) to the strictly ‘symbolic’ interactionist tradition which is 
more directly influenced by the social psychology of Mead (see Fisher and Strauss, 1978, 1979; Atkinson and 
Housley, 2003). However, I have chosen to avoid the complexities of these considerations as they are not 
relevant for my purposes and (like some others), I use the terms ‘interactionism’ and ‘symbolic interactionism’ 
interchangeably. 
29 Atkinson and Housley (2003) note that different accounts of the history of interactionism place varying 
emphasis on the importance of different scholars. Mead is frequently cited as the most significant influence, 
however his work has possibly shaped certain ‘lines of thinking’ within interactionism more than others (see 
above footnote). Furthermore, Atkinson and Housley (2003) note that Mead’s role in the development of 
interactionism is contested, and that while he “is acknowledged as a founding figure, he may be viewed as a 
symbolic founding hero, invoked but with rather little direct influence” (see also Fisher and Strauss, 1978, 
1979).  
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Thoits (1999) offers a clear definition of both self and identity deriving from symbolic 
interactionist literature:  
The ‘self’ is that aspect of the person that has experiences, reflects on experiences, 
and acts upon self-understandings derived from experiences [and identities are] 
more specific understandings of oneself and one’s experiences [they] are essentially 
parts of the self [and] understandings of ourselves as specific objects that can be 
named or classified (1999: 347. Emphasis in original).  
 
Mead (1934), a founder of symbolic interactionism, argued that the self emerges from the 
dialectic interplay between two components or ‘phases’; the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. The I is the 
impulsive, responsive and automatic element of human action, and the me represents an 
internalised other: “the organised set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes” 
(1934: 175). The I and me phases occur in a continuous back-and-forth process; the I “both 
calls out the me and responds to it” (1934: 178). We act automatically (the I), reflect on this 
action via an internalised other (the me), and then respond back again in terms of the I. We 
are not conscious of the I until it is reflected upon, such that “the I of this moment is 
reflected in the ‘me’ of the next” (1934: 174). Mead notes that we are able to respond to 
ourselves as an object, and that this allows us to control our actions and act in a ‘minded’ 
fashion (Hewitt and Shulman, 2011).  
Many authors have incorporated, extended and/or adapted Mead’s ideas (e.g. Stone, 1962; 
McCall and Simmons, 1966; Athens, 1994; Jenkins, 2014). While he has been criticised for 
using vague and problematically defined terms (Meltzer, 1978; Kolb, 1944) and ignoring the 
role of the unconscious (Meltzer, 1978), his social view of the self has been significant in its 
influence on symbolic interactionist ideas regarding identity30. In the following discussion, I 
 
30 But see previous footnote.  
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critically review three identity-related areas of symbolic interactionism: role and 
performance, careers and labelling, and identity-work. 
Role and performance 
During the 1960s and 1970s, symbolic interactionists explored identity using the concept of 
role (Turner, 1962; Stryker, 1968; McCall and Simmons, 1978; Burke and Reitzes, 1981). 
Roles are the shared behavioural expectations that are associated with particular positions 
(Stryker, 1968), and role identity is “the character and the role that an individual devises for 
himself (sic) as an occupant of a particular social position” (McCall and Simmons, 1966: 68). 
Goffman (1961b) distinguished between ‘role’ and ‘role performance’.  The former is “the 
activity an incumbent would engage in were he (sic) to act solely in terms of the normative 
demands upon someone in his position” (1961b: 75) and the latter refers to “the actual 
conduct of a particular individual while on duty in his position” (1961b: 75). This 
differentiation neatly reflects the symbolic interactionist view that individual behaviour is not 
automatically determined by role expectations (Stryker, 1968). Rather, individuals are 
actively involved in role taking and role making. A role is a ‘sort of ideal conception’ that an 
individual uses to frame their behaviour during social interaction, thereby creating and 
modifying (making) the role (Turner, 1962). 
Goffman’s dramaturgical approach (1959) explores role performance using a theatrical 
analogy. He likens an individual’s presentation of self to others across day-to-day social 
interaction to an actor performing for different audiences. He argues that through their 
strategically enacted performances, individuals give meaning to the particular situation and 
their own identity. An individual’s performance makes an impression on the audience, 
whose reaction influences the success and perceived authenticity of the self-images and 
situational meanings being portrayed.  How an audience receives an identity therefore has 
implications for the self. By recognising that identity is asserted in interaction, and then 
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validated (or not) by others, Goffman shows that identity is never unilateral (Jenkins, 2014), 
and that selves depend heavily on social cooperation (Branaman, 2009).  
In Stigma (1963), Goffman addressed the impression management techniques used by 
individuals managing stigma. These are the methods one adopts to control the impressions 
they ‘give’ during a performance (Goffman, 1959). Stigma is ‘spoiled identity’, and it occurs 
when the image that an individual hopes to portray (their ‘virtual identity’) is undermined by 
a characteristic/s they possess (their ‘actual identity’). Stigma arises from a ‘deeply 
discrediting’ attribute, but it is relational (it emerges out of interaction), and not a pre-given 
‘fact’. Goffman identifies three types of stigma: abominations of the body, blemishes of 
individual character (such as mental disorder) and tribal stigma (of race, nation and religion). 
He also distinguishes between attributes that are discrediting and those that are 
discreditable. Discrediting attributes are “evident on the spot” (1963: 14). Discreditable 
attributes are not immediately obvious and may be ‘hidden’ in social interaction. Goffman 
describes how living with either form entails careful impression management. Discreditable 
individuals control information about themselves as they negotiate social interactions and 
manage the problem of what to reveal and what to conceal from whom.  
Role, once a central sociological concept, is now far less utilised in sociology. Chandler 
(2017) argues that it has been superseded by the notion of collective identity, because this is 
a more fluid concept than ‘role’, and better captures complexities such as rivalled 
interpretations of expectations. However, given the symbolic interactionist portrayal of role 
as a resource, symbolic interactionist ideas relating to role-identity perhaps do begin to 
allude to some of the complexities which Chandler credits to ‘collective identity’.  
Gouldner (1971) argues that Goffman failed to explore the reasons that particular selves are 
projected and then accepted or rejected by others, and did not systematically address how 
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the production of a self is affected by resources linked to power and wealth. Such criticisms 
portray Goffman’s work as apolitical. However, it has been argued that Goffman does 
address politics in the context of everyday life and interaction (Jacobsen, 2009; Scott, 2015; 
Brannamen, 2009). In Stigma (1963) and Asylums (1961a) Goffman demonstrates how 
“inequalities in social status, power and resources constrain the selves people are able to 
present and have supported by others” (Branaman, 2009: 236). I would contend that 
Goffman’s work has had significant influence in the field of micro-sociology. Despite societal 
changes that have occurred since the time Goffman was writing that may have had 
implications for identity construction (see Giddens, 1991), his insights have ‘timeless 
relevance’ (Jacobsen, 2009).  
Careers and labelling  
‘Career’ refers to an individual’s movement through a series of related, progressive social 
positions (Aneshensel, 1999). The notion has been used broadly by symbolic interactionists31 
to address “any social strand of a person’s course through life” (Goffman, 1961a: 119). The 
concept has been used to study occupational deviancy (Arnold and Hagan, 1992), deviant 
occupations (Becker, 1963), drug and alcohol use (Jellinek, 1952), leisure (Hardie-Bick, 
2005), ‘physical’ illness (Roth, 1963), mental illness (Goffman, 1961a) and ‘personality traits’ 
(specifically, shyness) (Scott, 2007). 
Career has two (linked) facets: the objective and the subjective (Stebbins, 1970). As 
Goffman argues:  
One side is linked to internal matters held dearly and closely, such as image of self 
and felt identity; the other side concerns official position, jural relations, and style of 
life, and is part of a publicly accessible institutional complex (1961a: 119). 
 
 
31 See Barley (1989) for an historical overview of the development of the concept, and its application beyond 
the scope of formal occupation by symbolic interactionism. 
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Symbolic interactionists use the concept to understand identity change over the life course 
(Scott, 2015), and Strauss (1959) was an early influence here. He conceptualised an 
individual’s career as movement through various formal and informal status positions and 
social roles which shape their sense of personal identity. This movement is marked by 
‘critical incidents’ which act as ‘turning points’ in the career. These are events that are 
significant to an individual’s self-appraisal, and lead them to re-evaluate their self, resulting in 
a recognisable change in who they are. Examples include a change in relation with others 
and meeting a challenge. 
 ‘Labelling theory’32, an offshoot of symbolic interactionism, refers to a body of literature on 
deviance which concerns the nature, emergence, application and consequences of labels 
(Plummer, 1979), and includes the work of Becker (1963), Schur (1971) and Scheff (1966)33. 
A deviant label is a definition of a person which identifies them as having violated a social 
norm (Link and Phelan, 1999). It may be official or unofficial, and can include self-labelling 
(Thoits, 1985). Labelling theory contends that deviant labels are potentially consequential for 
the person to whom the label is applied in terms of shaping their sense of self, public 
identity and behaviour.  
‘Career’ and ‘labelling’ are linked because labels play a role in the emergence of a deviant 
career. This is analysed by Becker (1963) who used the concept to understand the 
sequential development of deviance. According to Becker, the first step in a deviant career 
occurs when an individual or group breaks a rule. If others (agents of social control such as 
 
32 ‘Labelling theory’ is perhaps a misnomer on two grounds. Goode (1975), Becker (1973) and Plummer (1979) 
argue that the body of work to which the phrase refers does not constitute a ‘theory’ in the strict sense. Also, 
the use of the word ‘labelling’ has been recognised as problematic due to its tendency to distort the 
arguments that are made by so called ‘labelling theorists’ (Goode, 1975; Becker, 1973). Becker (1973) actively 
rejected being identified as a ‘labelling theorist’ and called his approach to deviance ‘interactionist’. 
33 Plummer (1979) demonstrates that the ‘labelling perspective’ is diverse in theoretical orientation and is 
therefore not directly synonymous with symbolic interactionist approaches to deviance. However, the 
perspective is most closely affiliated with symbolic interactionism, and key contributors are at least partly 
influenced by symbolic interactionism. 
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the police) enforce the rule, then the individual is labelled as deviant. Being publicly labelled 
as deviant is claimed to be one of the most crucial steps in building a stable pattern of 
deviant behaviour because it can have consequences for self-image and future social 
participation and can change one’s public identity. The deviant label can become a master 
status by ‘overriding’ other forms of identification, and this can lead to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, whereby the individual’s self-concept ‘lines up’ with the view that others hold of 
them. The final step in the deviant career occurs when the individual moves into an 
organised deviant group. This has a powerful influence on one’s self-conception and 
strengthens the deviant self-view.  
The concept of career is analytically useful in linking the individual to social structure, and 
the objective and subjective (Barley, 1989; Collins and Young, 2000). The notion of 
subjective career may be particularly useful in the study of deviance where there are not 
always objectively clear beginning and end points (Stebbins, 1970). Traditional symbolic 
interactionist uses of career have been criticised, however, for their lack of attentiveness to 
institutional change in relation to individual perceptions and subjective aspects of careers 
(Barley, 1989). 
Labelling theory initially emerged as a ‘radical’ approach in the early 1960s, and by the later 
years of that decade had become incorporated into mainstream sociological thinking. 
However, heavy criticism also developed (Gibbs, 1966, Bordua, 1967; Gouldner, 1968; 
Mankoff, 1971; Davis, 1972; Gove, 1970). In turn, there were counter criticisms which 
defended the perspective (e.g. Plummer, 1979; Goode, 1975; Conover, 1976). These argued 
that many of the initial criticisms of labelling theory were based on narrow 
(mis)interpretations of the literature, and a tendency to accuse the theory of not achieving 
what it had never set out to achieve (Goode, 1975; Plummer, 1979; Becker, 1973).  
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Here, I will briefly consider one major criticism of labelling theory: the accusation of passive 
determinism34. Other criticisms include accusations of problematic definitions and concepts 
(Davis 1972; see also Goode, 1975), extreme relativism (Gibbs, 1966), ‘underdog bias’ 
(Gouldner, 1968; Liazios, 1972), lacking an explanation of reasons for initial deviance (Gibbs, 
1966; Mankoff, 1971; Davis, 1972) and limiting methodology (Davis, 1972). 
Labelling theory has been accused of positing deviant individuals as passive ‘empty 
organisms’ who are determined by societal reactions (Bordua, 1967; Gouldner, 1968; 
Schervish, 1973; Quadagno and Antonio, 1975)35. It “locates the fate of the deviant, and 
indeed his (sic) very development, in the acts of the reactors” (Bordua, 1967: 153). This 
deterministic view is arguably tacit in labelling theory’s tendency to focus only on cases 
where societal reaction leads to career deviance (Bordua, 1967). Relatedly, labelling theory 
has been accused of exaggerating the extent to which labelling necessarily leads to career 
deviance, and failing to recognise that the ‘effects’ of labelling may vary for different types of 
deviance (Mankoff, 1971). However, Plummer (1979) notes that labelling theorists do 
sometimes identify instances which do not suggest passivity and determinism. While the 
notions of labelling and career declined in popularity during the 1970s, they continue to be 
relevant to sociological analysis (e.g. Scott, 2007; Pavalko, et al, 2007; Darmon, 2017). 
Identity-Work 
The concept of identity-work was first used by Snow and Anderson (1987) in their 
ethnographic study of homelessness. They defined it as “the range of activities individuals 
engage in to create, present, and sustain personal identities that are congruent with and 
supportive of the self-concept” (1987: 1348). Here, the self-concept is one’s overarching  
image of themselves, including physical, social, spiritual and moral dimensions. For the 
 
34 The ‘labelling debate’ as it relates to the labelling of mental illness will be discussed later. 
35 See later for a discussion of this criticism specifically as it applies to labelling and mental illness.  
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homeless people in their study, identity-work was an attempt to generate an identity that 
provided a sense of meaning, dignity and worth. Snow and Anderson focused specifically on 
‘identity-talk’, which is one way of doing identity-work and is defined as the “verbal 
construction and assertion of personal identities” (1987: 1348). They identified three 
common forms of identity-talk: distancing, embracement, and fictive storytelling. Distancing 
refers to ‘role distancing’ (distancing oneself from the occupational roles associated with 
homelessness); institutional distancing (distancing from the institutions that serve homeless 
people); and associational distancing (distancing from other homeless people). Embracement 
refers to expressions of attachment. Snow and Anderson found evidence of role 
embracement (attachment to ‘the homeless role’), associational embracement (attachment 
to other homeless people) and ideological embracement (attachment to a set of ideas or 
beliefs, usually religious). Fictive storytelling “involves the narration of stories about one’s 
past, present, or future experiences and accomplishments that have a fictive character to 
them” (1987: 1359), where the fictive elements ranged from minor exaggerations to 
fabrications.  
Since Snow and Anderson, identity-work has been applied within a range of topics, such as 
mental illness (Estroff, 2001), social movements (Reger et al, 2008), gambling (Wagner, 
2017) and sun bed use (Taylor et al, 2017). Reviewing this literature, I noted that the ways 
in which the term is applied varies, and it is not always used in precise ways. Considering 
this, I suggest that the term can be used to focus on three different (but related) dimensions 
of activity and processes surrounding identity; I call these performative identity-work, 
transformative identity-work and interpretive identity-work. All three elements are relevant 
to understanding experiences of anorexia and treatment, and I adopt the concepts of 
performative and interpretive identity-work specifically in the analysis in this research.  
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Performative identity-work refers to the activity that individuals engage in to achieve a 
particular identity in interaction and addresses the situation-specific efforts that people make 
to manage their identity. It therefore closely relates to Goffman’s ideas about impression 
management (1959) and managing stigma (1963). Wagner et al address an example of 
performative identity-work in research on adult gamblers use of neutralisation techniques. 
They define identity-work as “the management of personal and social identities to control 
impressions of the self” (2017: 353). Neutralisation techniques are accounts of personal 
actions that attempt to nullify or excuse behaviours (see Sykes and Matza, 1957; Maruna and 
Copes, 2005). Gamblers in Wagner et al’s (2017) study used neutralization techniques, such 
as ‘claims of relative acceptability’ (regarding gambling behaviour) and ‘denial of self-injury’ 
(regarding the impact of gambling), in an attempt to align their identities with socially 
acceptable standards. 
Transformative identity-work includes more sustained, ongoing attempts to move towards a 
particular identity and involves a fundamental change in one’s identity. Cain’s (1991) 
ethnographic research into alcoholics anonymous (AA) provides an example. Over time, AA 
attendees not only changed their behaviour (by ceasing to consume alcohol) but also their 
identities. By learning AA beliefs and coming to understand themselves in new ways, 
attendees actively acquired a new identity as a ‘non-drinking alcoholic’.  
Interpretive identity-work refers to the processes of interpretation and meaning-making 
that individuals partake in as they make sense of their own identity. This includes reflecting 
back on and (re) interpreting past and current experiences. Scott addresses this aspect of 
identity-work when she describes how we “make sense of ourselves” by reflecting “upon 
key events and experiences and (interpreting) their significance in relation to our life as a 
whole” (2015: 141). I discuss two examples of research addressing interpretive identity-
work (Karp, 1992; Estroff et al, 2001) in relation to mental illness below.  
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Scott’s (2011) analysis of ‘reinventive institutions’ (RIs) highlights all three dimensions of 
identity-work and their interrelations. She argues that since Goffman wrote about total 
institutions in Asylums (1961a), this new form of institution has emerged. A total institution 
is “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals […] lead 
an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (Goffman, 1961a: 11), and examples 
include jails, army barracks, and psychiatric institutions. Goffman understood these to be 
coercive institutions which stripped individuals of their individual identity. In contrast, an RI 
is: 
A material, discursive or symbolic structure in which voluntary members actively 
seek to cultivate a new social identity role or status. This is interpreted positively as 
a process of reinvention, self-improvement or transformation. It is achieved not only 
through formal instruction in an institutional rhetoric, but also through the 
mechanisms of performative regulation in the interaction context of an inmate 
culture (Scott, 2011: 3). 
 
Scott describes RIs as ‘sites of biographical identity-work’ that may have a religious, 
disciplinary, secret, therapeutic, educational or virtual purpose. Examples include prisoner 
rehabilitation programmes, weight loss camps, addiction treatment centres and eating 
disorder units. The processes of “reinvention, self-improvement or transformation” to 
which Scott refers is an example of transformative identity-work. Depending on the RI, this 
could include a shift from being a ‘drug addict’ to a ‘recovered addict’, or in the case of 
individuals diagnosed with anorexia, from being ‘eating disordered’ to ‘recovered’. The 
institutionally embedded processes of transformation that Scott describes involve sustained 
interpretive identity-work. In therapeutic RIs, “recovery is framed as a journey of self-
discovery, to be experienced as both a personal triumph of identity-work and as a public, 
socially negotiated career trajectory” (2011: 142). Here, interpretive identity-work is 
integral to the ‘self-discovery’ that recovery necessitates.   
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Scott argues that whereas total institutions involved rigid hierarchical structures and overt 
authoritative control of inmates, in RIs a form of disciplinary power exists in peers’ 
monitoring each other’s conduct through dramaturgically enacted peer-to-peer surveillance. 
Scott describes this as “performative regulation” which includes the “performance of 
conformity” - an example of performative identity-work – and the mutual surveillance of this by 
peers. These identity performances involve inmates performing as ‘rule followers’ and 
playing the ‘good inmate’ role, and this is then scrutinised by peers. The overall effect of this 
performative identity-work is that peers shape each other’s progress towards their shared 
goal.  
Symbolic interactionism and identity: concluding remarks 
Symbolic interactionism has been an important contributor to sociological analysis of 
identity in its portrayal of identity as being created, shaped, maintained, communicated, 
presented, negotiated and challenged in and by social interaction (Scott, 2015). In this 
research, I address the process and consequences of being diagnosed with anorexia via a 
focus on diagnostic identity and identity-work, and this is influenced by symbolic 
interactionist approaches. In this review, I have suggested that there are three dimensions to 
identity-work: interpretive, performative, and transformative. In this research, I use the 
former two dimensions in particular to understand how individuals are influenced by 
diagnostic understandings of anorexia and how they manage an ‘anorexic identity’.  
Sociological approaches to health and mental health  
Key concepts in medical sociology   
In this section, I review two major concepts in medical sociology – medicalisation and the 
sick role. These concepts are highly relevant to a sociology of diagnosis. In reviewing them, 
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and considering their place in this subfield of sociology, I therefore extend the discussion of 
a sociology of diagnosis that I began in the previous chapter. 
The concept of medicalisation, first adopted by medical sociologists in the early 1970s, 
refers to the expansion of medical understandings and activity into increasing domains of 
personal and social life (e.g. Zola, 1972; Illich, 1975; Conrad, 1975; 1992). Despite critiques 
of the concept and proposals for it to be replaced with updated ideas (Rose, 2007; Clarke et 
al, 2003), it is still used and considered by some to have ongoing relevance for 
understanding the role of medicine in society (Busfield, 2017). There is a close relationship 
between medicalisation and diagnosis, such that Jutel suggests that this “may be the 
fundamental explanation of why a sociology of diagnosis has not [previously] had its own 
delineation” (2011: 9). Indeed, the creation and application of diagnoses are key activities 
within processes of medicalisation. Conrad stated that “Medicalisation consists of defining a 
problem in medical terms, using medical language to describe a problem, or using a medical 
intervention to “treat” it” (1992: 211). It is clear to see here that these processes (the first 
two especially) are tied up with, and reliant on, diagnostic categorisation and terminology. 
The recent extensive criticism and controversy surrounding the publication of the DSM–5 
(see Kinderman et al, 2017) offers a contemporary example which highlights the relationship 
between psychiatric diagnoses and medicalisation. A major critique of the manual relates to 
the changes made to the diagnostic categories since the previous edition, in terms of both 
the addition of “new and bizarre ‘illnesses’” and the expansion of existing categories “in a 
way that seems to defy common-sense” (Johnstone, 2014: 12). Accordingly, Johnstone 
(2014) argues that a general effect of the DSM–5 has been a massive expansion of 
psychiatric ‘illness’, leading to an increasing medicalisation of everyday life. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the expansion of the number of diagnoses it is possible to receive is 
one aspect of what Brinkmann calls diagnostic expansion, a process he links to 
74 
 
 
 
pathologisation and of which he is critical. He argues that responding to existential, moral 
and political concerns as individual, psychiatric problems pathologizes human suffering and 
risks the loss of vital resources of self–understanding. 
The sick role concept was introduced to medical sociology in the 1950s via Parsons The 
Social System and related publications (Parsons, 1951a; 1951b). It was one of the major 
concepts of the subdiscipline of medical sociology until the 1980s (Burnham, 2014). Parsons 
(1951a) understood illness as a form of deviance which is socially controlled via the sick 
role. Inherent to this role are norms which involve expectations for how the sick person 
should behave, in terms of both their ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’. Specifically, the sick person is 
assumed the right to be exempt from their ordinary daily responsibilities and roles and to 
not be held personally accountable for their illness. They are also obligated to try to ‘get 
better’ and adhere to the advice given by the relevant legitimate social bodies (i.e. the 
medical profession).  
The patient-physician relationship is integral to the sick role; the proper performance of the 
role involves the patient cooperating with the doctor’s advice and respecting this expertise. 
The authority and relative power afforded to the medical profession is seen in their ability 
to legitimise illness, grant or deny entry to the sick role and provide access to relevant 
treatment. This authority is functional in terms of regulating deviance (in the form of illness) 
and hence contributes to the maintenance of the social structure.  
Friedson (1970) contended that access to, and the nature of, the sick role depends on the 
seriousness and legitimacy of the medical condition in question. For conditions from which 
it is possible for the individual to recover, they have conditional access to the sick role, and 
for incurable conditions, the individual has unconditional access. Lastly, if the individual’s 
condition is stigmatised, the condition is illegitimate and access to the sick role denied. In 
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addition, the seriousness of the condition – indicated by whether it is a minor or serious 
deviation – shapes what the sick role involves, in terms of the extent to which ordinary 
obligations are suspended and which additional privileges are afforded. 
When the concept of the sick role was popular it was subject to extensive application, 
critique and refinement (see e.g. Twaddle, 1972; Segall, 1976). However, it fell in popularity 
in the 1980s and very little original work using the concept was subsequently published. This 
occurred amidst the advocation of new, alternative ideas about illness such as those 
emphasising the social construction of health, political critiques of Parsons theories which 
accused his functionalist ideas of conservatism, and related misrepresentations and 
distortions of the sick role idea (Burnham, 2014). That said, the phrase ‘sick role’ – whether 
used in more or less in accordance with Parsons original description – remains in active use 
in the sociology of health and illness (see e.g. Perry, 2011; Higgens, 2014; Chrisp et al, 2013).  
In respect to a sociology of diagnosis, the sick role concept points to the regulatory power 
of diagnosis. ‘Being diagnosed’ provides access to the sick role and “gives permission to be 
ill” (Jutel, 2011: 4). Jutel relates this to Parsons’ (1951a) ideas about the ‘claim for 
exemption’ within the sick role. Moreover, diagnosis is functional in that it “enables the 
individual to reintegrate [with] a sanctioned explanation of what makes him or her different 
from everyone else” (Jutel, 2011: 4). In addition, Friedsons’ differentiation between the 
‘types’ of sick role available for different conditions highlights the different imputed meanings 
and impacts of different diagnoses. 
Labelling theory of mental illness 
Scheff originally published Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory in 1966, followed by revised 
editions in 1984 and 1999. Informed by Becker’s interactionist approach to deviance, he 
argued that psychiatric ‘symptoms’ are labelled violations of social norms and that ‘mental 
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illness’ is a social role. Scheff proposed that psychiatric symptoms, usually understood as 
indications of underlying biological illness, are incidents of residual rule-breaking. Residual 
rule-breaking involves the violation of fundamental social norms for which the culturally 
available category for interpretation is ‘mental illness’. Residual rule-breaking may involve, 
for example, hallucinating, continual muttering, or posturing. Scheff argued that most 
residual rule-breaking is normalised and its significance is transitory. It is primary deviance, 
because it is not publicly labelled and has little significance for a person’s identity (Lemert, 
1972). Here, the individuals ‘symptoms’ may be interpreted as eccentricity, or the rule-
breaking may end alongside the cessation of a causal stressor. However, when residual rule-
breaking is responded to as symptomatic of mental illness, it develops into a stabilised 
pattern, and becomes secondary deviance (ibid, 1972). This involves the public labelling of 
deviance, and it has consequences for the individual. The labelled person adopts a deviant 
identity, is responded to differently by others, and alters their self-concept accordingly.  
Thus, the residual rule-breaker adopts the deviant status of ‘mentally ill’ and begins to play 
this role.  Scheff emphasised the involuntary nature of this role-playing. The individual 
responds to others cues towards them, which serve to ‘funnel’ their behaviour into the 
recognised role of mental illness. When others uniformly act towards them as if they have a 
mental illness, this becomes the most convenient role available to them, and they come to 
fulfil it, even if they are not particularly interested to do so.  
Scheff argued that stereotypes of insanity are key to these processes. Once a person is 
labelled as mentally ill, traditional stereotypes guide the expectations and responses of those 
interacting with the labelled person. The labelled person eventually internalises the 
stereotypes, which shape their self-concept and behaviour. The individual is then rewarded 
for successfully adopting the stereotyped role, and punished for any attempts to move away 
from it (these being seen to indicate ‘a lack of insight’).  
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To summarise, labelled individuals come to fulfil the deviant social role of mentally ill 
through the labels applied and enforced in social interaction. Fundamentally, Scheff argues 
that being labelled with a mental illness is one of the most important determinants of 
chronicity36. However, since its initial publication, labelling theory has been extensively 
critiqued and refined (e.g. Gove, 1970a; 1970b; 1975; Greenley, 1979; Weinstein, 1983; 
Thoits, 1985; Thoits, 2005; Thoits and Evenson, 2008). Two important criticisms are the 
accusation of exaggerating the amount of secondary deviance produced by treating someone 
as mentally ill (Gove, 1970), and assuming passivity in the person who is labelled (Quadago 
and Antonio, 1975; Thoits, 1985). Gove drew on existing empirical evidence and argued that 
individuals are hospitalised for mental illness when they have a difficult to handle “active 
psychiatric disorder” and that this distress is “quite apart from any secondary deviance that 
may be associated with the mentally ill role” (1970: 882). He also disputed the degree of 
secondary deviance associated with hospitalisation. While agreeing that hospitalisation 
(which Scheff frames as a part of the labelling process) can be debilitating and may 
encourage the adoption of an ‘insane role’, he also pointed to the beneficial, restitutive 
processes that occur during hospitalisation. Gove claims that labelling theory 
underemphasises the importance of primary deviance, over emphasises secondary deviance, 
and is “substantially incorrect” (1970: 881).   
Quadago and Antonio (1975) argued that the labelling theory of mental illness portrays an 
overly passive view of individuals, whereby they have no choice but to conform to others’ 
expectations. They claim that the theory fails to recognise the ways in which labelled 
persons reject deviant roles and identities, and identify examples of label ‘resistance 
strategies’ among their sample of female mental patients in a psychiatric institute. An 
 
36 In the original publication, Scheff claimed that among residual rule breakers, labelling is the most important 
cause of careers of residual deviance. In the 1984 version, he changed this to among the most important 
causes. 
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example of a resistance strategy is symptom denial. In its direct form, this involves the 
individual denying having ever partaken in residual rule-breaking. In its indirect form, the 
person does not deny deviance, but claims that the interpretation of this as a symptom of 
mental illness is incorrect. Quadago and Antonio give examples of two women who had 
been hospitalised for attempted suicide but claimed not to have had suicidal intentions, 
wanting their behaviour to be interpreted as insignificant and not the result of pathological 
traits. Another resistance strategy is normalisation. Here, an individual asserts that their 
problems are common place and experienced by many. Aligning themselves with other, 
‘normal’ people is an attempt to be defined as normal themselves.  
Link and colleagues (1989) proposed a modified labelling theory. This suggests that labelling 
may not directly create ‘mental illness’, but that labelling and stigma are influential in placing 
mental patients “at risk for the recurrence or prolongation of disorders resulted from other 
causes” (1989: 404). This occurs because people are socialised to develop negative views of 
‘mental patients’. When they take on this status themselves, they imagine that others will 
reject them, and adopt coping strategies such as withdrawal and secrecy. Over time, their 
beliefs about how others view them and their coping responses have a negative influence on 
their self-esteem, earning power, and social connectedness, leaving them vulnerable to new 
or repeat episodes of ‘disorder’.  
While largely unaccepted in its ‘fullest’ form, Scheff’s theory made a significant contribution 
to the sociology of mental illness. Both labelling theory and modified labelling theory 
continue to be drawn upon and engaged with in contemporary research and have informed 
thinking in the sociology of diagnosis. For example, Russel et al (2012), who frame an autism 
spectrum diagnosis as a potential ‘social determinant’ of symptoms of autism, draw on 
Scheff’s argument regarding a self-fulfilling prophecy to justify their research focus.  
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Mental illness and identity-work 
In this section, I further explore symbolic interactionist work relating to identity and mental 
illness, with a focus on processes that I have described above as interpretive identity-work. 
In Karp’s (1992) research into lived experiences of depression, he describes how a 
‘depression identity’ develops overtime, and the processes through which this occurs. He 
suggests that a depression identity tends to emerge in a patterned manner and identifies 
four key turning points (Strauss, 1959) in a ‘depression career’. During the first turn, the 
individual experiences a period of inchoate feelings but they lack the vocabulary or 
understanding to identify these as belonging to depression. During the next turn, they 
conclude that ‘something is really wrong with me’. The third turn is a crisis stage, during 
which the individual has contact with therapeutic experts. Lastly, the individual ‘gets to grips’ 
with their illness identity and makes sense of what it means. This entails (what I have called 
above) interpretive identity-work. It involves the reconstruction and reinterpretation of past 
events, a search for the cause of one’s current situation, the construction of new theories 
about the nature of depression, the establishment of modes of coping, and the evaluation of 
one’s prospects for moving beyond depression. In theorising their own depression, most of 
Karp’s participants developed a depression identity that was at least partially medicalised. 
Some wholly adopted illness metaphors to understand their experience, but most 
negotiated a position which drew partly on biochemical explanations while also distancing 
themselves from the idea that they purely have a ‘mental illness’.  
Estroff et al (1991) undertook a longitudinal interview-based study of illness identity-work 
among 169 individuals with ‘severe and persistent mental illness’ recruited from four 
different hospitals. The most common diagnostic groups were schizophrenias, affective 
disorders, and personality disorders.  
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They adapted Snow and Anderson’s (1987) concepts of illness identity-work and illness 
identity-talk. Their description of illness identity-work alludes to my notion of interpretive 
identity-work. They define it as: 
The various enduring processes of biographical and autobiographical revision instigated 
by prolonged and severe dysfunction [and it] produces the words, ideas, images, actions 
and sentiments with which persons with disabling conditions reconstrue and get on with 
their lives (1991: 336). 
 
Illness identity-talk is a form of identity-work in which individuals elicit accounts of their 
illness and may self-label as mentally ill. Estroff et al identified five types of illness accounts in 
participants’ identity-talk. These were based on regularities in terms of where the illness or 
problem was located (the body, brain, or a psychological dimension), the ‘ingredients’ 
involved (what was thought to be unbalanced or affected, for example too little money or 
feelings such as anger), mechanisms (how the problem seemed to work, for example too 
much dopamine or too much stress), and terminology used to describe their illness (for 
example clinical terms such as schizoaffective, or spiritual terms such as ‘voice of God’).  
The first and most common type of illness account was medical/clinical. These contained 
aspects of current biomedical and clinical formulations of psychiatric disorders. Individuals 
eliciting this type of account were most likely to self-label as mentally ill. 
Emotional/developmental accounts were the second most common. These drew on a mixture 
of ideas about emotional and developmental trauma in describing influences on current 
problems or illness, and were sometimes combined with medical/clinical accounts. This 
group were the second most likely to self-label as mentally ill. In Social/situational accounts, 
the individual identified social circumstances and factors (such as a lack of financial resources 
or needing somewhere to live) as reasons for having developed symptoms or having been 
hospitalised. In these accounts, causal influences were located externally to the person and 
individuals adopting them were unlikely to label themselves as mentally ill. A group who 
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were highly unlikely to self-label as mentally ill were those who offered no problem accounts, 
claiming that they had no problems, and thus giving no explanations. Lastly were 
religious/spiritual accounts. These were given by a small group who did not label themselves 
as mentally ill, but drew on spiritual ideas, or other ideas of nonnaturalistic origins, to 
explain their experiences.  
Sociological approaches to health and mental illness: concluding remarks 
In this section I have reviewed two key concepts in medical sociology: medicalisation and 
the sick role. This has broadened the understanding of a sociology of diagnosis which is a 
key body of knowledge underpinning this research. I have also reviewed labelling theory, 
which has relevance to this research given that the process of being diagnosed with anorexia 
is a fundamental way in which this label of mental illness is applied. Considering Karp’s 
(1992) and Estroff et al’s (1991) work has involved addressing the consequences of 
interpretive identity-work, in terms of the extent to which this leads to clinical/medical self-
understandings. I examine this interpretive identity-work and its consequences in relation to 
the diagnosis of anorexia. In terms symbolic interactionist approaches to mental illness, 
then, these suggest that diagnostic labels may influence the trajectory of psychiatric 
‘symptoms' and personal identity, as well as the development of clinically-informed self-
understandings. This research seeks to understand these processes specifically in relation to 
anorexia, by exploring how individuals interact with the diagnostic concept, and the ways in 
which the diagnosis influences one’s performance of symptoms, identity and personal sense-
making. 
Conclusion  
This research is concerned with social aspects of the diagnosis of anorexia nervosa. The 
focus emerged from a need to address the process and consequences of the diagnosis (Jutel 
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and Nettleton, 2011; Jutel, 2011, see chapter one). This literature review has examined 
anorexia as a clinical entity, and how it has been understood and theorised by sociologists 
and anthropologists. The latter body of literature has not previously incorporated the 
process of being diagnosed with anorexia as a substantial focus, and this is intended to be a 
key contribution of my research. However, insights from this body of social scientific 
literature, including those relating to the value of anorexia as a source of identity and the 
ways that individuals may learn ways to ‘do’ anorexia in treatment, were crucial to 
interpreting data. This review has also considered symbolic interactionist approaches to 
identity. These have shaped the analysis of diagnostic identity in this research, especially in 
relation to identity-work. In addition, the insights drawn from symbolic interactionist 
approaches to mental illness, including the potential for diagnostic labels to influence one’s 
‘symptoms’, identity, and self-understanding has relevance to understanding how individuals 
respond to, and make sense of, their diagnosis of anorexia. In this research, I address this 
aspect using concepts such as interpretive and performative identity-work (which I have 
reviewed here), and Brinkmann's notions of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ a diagnosis (see chapter one). 
I suggest that using these concepts sheds new light on how individuals relate to their 
diagnosis, and the consequences of being diagnosed.  
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Chapter Three 
Research methods 
In this research project I used autoethnography and in-depth interviews to investigate how 
individuals experience the diagnosis of anorexia. The autoethnography analysed my own 
experiences of the diagnosis and treatment, and I conducted interviews with 14 adults who 
had (or had previously had) a diagnosis of, and treatment for, anorexia. 
This chapter begins with an overview of how I implemented the autoethnography and 
interviews. I then consider each of these approaches in detail, in each case justifying its 
suitability, discussing my epistemological stance, describing procedures used, acknowledging 
the challenges I encountered and evaluating the method. In the case of autoethnography, I 
start with a discussion of its methodological roots. Doing so is important, because the 
debates I trace informed the implementation of autoethnography in my own study.  Lastly, I 
consider ethical procedures and concerns relating to each method.  
Overview of research methods 
The autoethnography I present is an analytically-oriented retrospective self-study, akin to 
what Wall (2016) calls ‘moderate autoethnography’. This approach seeks to “combine the 
power of the personal perspective with the value of analysis and theory” (2016: 8). I used 
memory, personal and medical documents, and existing literature to reconstruct, ‘tell’ and 
analyse my personal experiences with anorexia, diagnosis, and treatment in a Specialist 
Eating Disorder Unit (SEDU). My own experiences acted as a vantage point for analysing 
broader sociological, theoretical issues (Vryan, 2006; Anderson, 2006a). Concurrently to 
producing the autoethnography, I undertook interviews with 14 adults (11 females and 3 
males). Most had (or had previously had) a diagnosis of anorexia, and one was self-
diagnosed. I conducted the interviews as a known ‘insider’. I was open with participants 
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about me being a ‘recovered anorexic’ and sometimes shared aspects of my experiences 
with them during interviews. The analysis of myself (within the autoethnography) and of 
others (in the interviews) was intertwined and the two methods were iterative; insights 
from my own experiences shaped the interview process, and the analysis of interview 
material in turn shaped the autoethnography. In addition, I adopted various reflexive 
strategies to manage the dynamics of insider interviewing. These were a post-interview 
diary, post-transcription analysis, and ‘asking interviewees’ (all explained later).  
Autoethnography  
Introducing autoethnography 
Autoethnography refers to research approaches which involve “the study of the self” (Reed-
Danahay, 1997: 9). An exact, comprehensive definition is not possible, due to the vast 
variety of approaches that the term has come to encompass (Ellis and Bochner, 2000). 
However, it is fair to say that sociological autoethnographies “are highly personalised 
accounts that draw upon the experience of the author/researcher for the purposes of 
extending sociological understanding” (Sparkes, 2000: 21)37.  
The term ‘autoethnography’ has its academic origins in the work of Hayano (1979)38, who 
used it to refer to the anthropologists’ ethnographic study of their “own people”, and 
applied it retrospectively to existing anthropological research (mainly ethnographic studies 
undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s). Towards the end of the 1980s, in a research context 
which advocated personal narrative, subjectivity and reflexivity (Adams et al, 2015), social 
science scholars began to adopt the term to describe their work which explored the 
interplay of introspective, personal selves and culture (e.g. Lionett, 1989 cited in Adams et 
 
37 See Muncey (2010) for a review of various definitions of autoethnography.  
38 The term was first used by Firth, to whom Hayano refers, in a seminar about structuralism in 1966. However, 
Hayano was among the first to have used the term in academic literature and is understood to have brought it 
into the academic mainstream (Hughes and Pennington, 2017).  
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al, 2015). In the 1990s, scholars such as Ellis adopted the term to develop a postmodern 
influenced approach to self-study (‘evocative autoethnography’ - see below), and the 
autoethnographic ‘movement’ began to flourish. Autoethnography increased in credibility 
and popularity substantially from the early 2000s onwards39. Since then the method has 
diversified, as authors such as Chang (2008) and Anderson (2006) created possibilities for 
autoethnography that depart from evocative autoethnography.  
There are now numerous ‘types’ of autoethnography (see Ellis and Bochner, 2000; Hughes 
and Pennington, 2017). These vary in their emphasis on self, wider culture, the research 
process, traditional analysis, and the study of (and interaction with) others (Ellis and 
Bochner, 2000; Ellis et al, 2011). As Wall (2008) notes, autoethnography ranges from that 
which is (relatively) conservative and methodologically rigorous, through to personal but 
theoretically driven work, and to highly literary and evocative writing.  
In particular, it is possible to contrast two opposing approaches to autoethnography within 
sociology; evocative autoethnography and analytic autoethnography. Evocative 
autoethnography40, which is associated with scholars such as Ellis and Bochner (Ellis, 1995; 
2004; Ellis and Bochner, 2000; 2006), is emotional, narrative, literary-based, postmodern-
influenced and heavily emphasises self. Conversely, analytic autoethnography (Anderson, 
2006a) is associated with traditional ethnography and more conventional research practice 
and has a strong emphasis on interpretation and analysis.  
 
39 During this time, there was a rapid growth in academic articles which cited ‘autoethnography’ as a key word 
(Muncey, 2010), and autoethnographic research approaches began to gain credibility and influence in top – 
tier social scientific research articles (Hughes and Pennington, 2017).  
40 This is an imprecise term which I use to loosely refer to a body of autoethnographic work which has certain 
distinctive tendencies, including evocation as a goal. It is a useful phrase for distinguishing this 
autoethnography from its other forms, although it has been used occasionally by some of its practitioners, 
generally they refer to their own work simply as ‘autoethnography’. 
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I refer to the autoethnography in this research as a moderate autoethnography (Wall, 
2016), an approach that sits somewhere ‘between’ evocative and analytic autoethnography. 
Later in this chapter I elaborate my approach and show how it fits with moderate 
autoethnography in detail. Firstly, I explain why I chose autoethnography in the first 
instance. 
Choosing autoethnography  
In choosing to use autoethnography in this research, my intention has been to illuminate in 
detail and depth one person’s set of experiences. There is great potential value in utilising 
one’s own life events as a source of sociological enquiry, especially when these events make 
deeply personal experiences unusually observable and provide access to data that is not 
otherwise available (Vryan, 2006; Chang, 2008). My experiences of anorexia and the 
associated documents provide an opportunity to gather rich data relating to the research 
aims. Self-study benefits from the absence of factors that, in other methods such as 
interviews and observations, can limit the depth of data. These factors include 
communication norms, emotions such as embarrassment and guilt, and a relatively limited 
sense of trust between researcher and participant (Vryan, 2006).  
Numerous scholars have utilised some form of self-study in sociological explorations of 
illness and treatment (e.g. Rier, 2000; Blaxter, 2009; Plummer, 2012; Reissman, 2015), 
including eating disorders (Tillmann-Healy, 1996; Garrett, 1998; Saukko, 2008; Stone, 2009). 
Indeed, autoethnographic methods may be particularly suitable for illness-related 
experiences because they centralise the voice of lived illness-experience and avoid this being 
‘othered’ by outsiders (Richards, 2008).  
The subjective nature of self-study remains contested in some areas of social science. This is 
the case particularly in areas in which conventional ‘scientific’ notions of researcher 
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impartiality and silent authorship have pervasive influence; even where scholars do not 
completely accept traditional notions of objectivity, research practice still tends to be 
strongly affected by it (Hammersley, 2011). However, I agree with Wall (2008) that using 
the self is not a problem, but how the self is used does matter. Next, I explain how I used 
my own experiences in this research and describe my approach to autoethnography 
theoretically and practically. This firstly necessitates a fuller discussion of evocative and 
analytic autoethnography, so that I can explain my own stance in relation to them. 
Evocative autoethnography  
Evocative autoethnography seeks to “balance intellectual and methodological rigor, emotion 
and creativity” (Adams et al, 2015: 2). It emerged from a number of interrelated ‘crises’, 
concerns and ‘turns’ in the social sciences, which reflected new ideas about research, and 
recognised limits to scientific knowledge and traditional research practice (Ellis and Bochner, 
2000; Ellis and Bochner, 2006; Ellis et al, 2011; Adams et al, 2015). 
A postmodern inspired ‘crisis of confidence’ during the 1980s (Ellis et al, 2011) doubted 
universal claims to truth, ‘master narratives’ and the privileging of scientific knowledge (e.g. 
Kuhn, 1996; Lyotard, 1984). Postmodernism accepts many ways of knowing as legitimate 
(Wall, 2008), does not privilege one method, theory or genre over another, and therefore 
challenges the superiority of science (Richardson, 2000). Further, the ‘crisis of 
representation’ in social research which emerged during the 1970s and 1980s challenged the 
ideal of the neutral, detached researcher who remains separated from the research 
experience (Adams et al, 2015). There was also a ‘narrative turn’ in the social sciences 
during the last quarter of a century (Goodson and Gill, 2011), which included a growth in 
narrative inquiry which used personal narratives as the basis of research (Ojermark, 2007).  
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In this context, evocative autoethnographers emphasise their “link to arts and humanities 
rather than to Truth claims and […] science” (Ellis and Bochner, 2006: 434) and write 
narratively. Evocative autoethnography produces aesthetic and evocative descriptions of 
personal and interpersonal experiences using elements of story writing (Ellis et al, 2011; 
Richardson, 2000). Evocative autoethnographers do not engage in traditional analysis, but 
“use stories to do the work of analysing and theorising” (Ellis and Bochner, 2006; 436)41. 
They reject the idea of a distant, detached ethnographic observer, and instead accommodate 
intimate involvement, engagement and embodied participation (Ellis and Bochner, 2006). 
There is a significant body of work which utilises evocative autoethnography and, especially 
in recent years, it has become increasingly recognised as an important and legitimate 
method (Adams et al, 2015).  
However, evocative autoethnography’s rejection of mainstream social science values means 
that it remains marginalised in some areas of social science (Anderson, 2006). Indeed, its 
location on the margins of disciplinary boundaries has raised questions about what 
constitutes proper research (Sparkes, 2000). Evocative autoethnography is accused of being 
narcissistic, self-absorbed, self-indulgent, and navel gazing (Coffey, 1999; Madison, 2006; 
Atkinson, 2006; Roth, 2009; Delamont, 2009)42, and of losing sight of valuable social 
scientific goals (Delamont, 2009)43. Atkinson (2006) contends that evocative 
autoethnographers have focused too prominently on the autobiographical, and that the 
 
41 However, some postmodern-influenced autoethnographers who may be associated with evocative 
autoethnography do explicitly analyse their personal experiences in relation to broader social processes (e.g. 
Ronai, 1995).   
42 Not all of these authors has specified particular reference to evocative autoethnography, however when 
taken in context, these criticisms do generally appear to be oriented towards evocative autoethnography, 
particularly those approaches which focus exclusively or most heavily on the researchers self. Also see: next 
footnote. 
43 Delamont specifies that her critique of autoethnography is centred on accounts where “there is no object 
except the author herself to study” (2009: 58), and the critique appears to be directed at evocative 
autoethnography.  
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privileging of evocation and the experiential value of writing undermines scholarly goals of 
analysis and theorising. Relatedly, Chang (2008) argues that a lack of cultural analysis 
restricts the writing to the level of descriptive autobiography. Evocative autoethnographers 
are also accused of being ‘lazy’ and not doing ‘proper ethnography’ due to the lack of 
substantial, laboured fieldwork, and because personal introspection is a poor substitution 
for data collection (Gans, 1999; Fine, 2003; Delamont, 2009). It is worth considering here 
what ‘proper ethnography’ involves. Although a contested term, ethnography is generally 
understood to be open-ended, small-scale, in-depth research involving an extended period 
of participant observation and often also other methods such as interviews (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007)44. Ethnography is a heavily involved, labour intensive and time 
consuming research process, and evocative autoethnography is accused of lacking these 
features. An additional criticism from Walford (2009) concerns evocative autoethnography’s 
tendency to embrace fictional elements of stories and distortion of the past. He suggests 
that it leaves readers in doubt about whether the events presented actually occurred and 
that research should not be ambiguous in this way. 
Evocative autoethnographers have responded to criticisms by arguing that, because 
evocative autoethnography and conventional research have fundamentally different goals, 
the former should not be judged according to the same standards as the latter (Ellis et al, 
2011; and see Sparkes, 2000; Holt, 2003).  
Analytic autoethnography  
Anderson developed analytic autoethnography in response to the success of evocative 
autoethnography, which he argued 
 
44 It is disputed whether or not research is truly ethnographic without participant observation (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007; Atkinson and Coffey, 2002), and some authors argue that participation and observation 
are essential to ethnography (Atkinson, 2015).   
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[…] may have the unintended consequence of eclipsing other visions of what 
autoethnography can be and of obscuring the ways in which it may fit productively in 
other traditions of social inquiry (2006a: 374). 
 
Accordingly, Anderson aims to define and demonstrate the potential of a type of 
autoethnography which he specifically positions as a specialised subgenre of realist, analytic 
ethnography (see Lofland, 1995). Analytic autoethnography therefore has obvious links to 
conventional ethnography, and differs only in its visible inclusion of the researcher’s self in 
the data and heightened reflexivity (Anderson, 2006b). Anderson supports his claim for a 
conventionally-grounded autoethnography by arguing that there has long been various 
elements of personal connections and self-analysis in traditional qualitative research. 
Anderson (2006a) delineates five key features of analytic autoethnography, the first of which 
is complete group membership. In conventional ethnography, the researcher has a role in 
the social world being researched (Hammersely and Atkinson, 2007), with possible roles 
ranging from those that are peripheral with little involvement to complete membership with 
full involvement (Adler and Adler, 1987). In analytic autoethnography, the researcher is 
always a complete member. The second feature of analytic autoethnography is analytic 
reflexivity. This necessitates a sustained and deep reflexive analysis of the researcher’s 
connections to their work, their effects upon it (Davies, 1999), and the reciprocal influence 
between the researcher and other members.  Relatedly, the third feature requires that the 
researcher be visible and active in the text; their “feelings and experiences are incorporated 
into the story and considered as vital data for understanding the social world being 
observed” (2006: 384). The fourth feature is dialogue with informants beyond the self. 
Including others moves the research beyond the subjective experience of one and 
recognises that researchers are only one part of the complex social world they are trying to 
understand (Atkinson, Coffey, and Delamont, 2003). The final definitive feature of analytic 
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autoethnography is its strong commitment to an analytic agenda. It aims to transcend the 
data to provide insight into broader social phenomena and contribute to theoretical 
development and refinement. The intention is to “gain insight into some broader set of 
social phenomena than those provided by the data themselves” (Anderson, 2006: 387). 
There are stark differences between analytic and evocative autoethnography which derive 
from their divergent epistemological contexts. Predominantly, this is seen in analytic 
autoethnography’s traditional analysis, as opposed to evocative autoethnography’s narrative-
focused analysis and refusal to “abstract and explain” (Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 744). Indeed, 
Ellis and Bochner (2006) contest Anderson’s analytic commitment to developing theoretical 
understandings. They challenge his mode of analysis which they perceive to be based on 
impersonal abstraction and ignorant to the narrative turn. Similarly, Denzin (2006) perceives 
analytic autoethnography as an uncritical adoption of conventional approaches which 
negates recent antifoundational arguments (see also Ellis and Bochner, 2006).  
Atkinson (2006) supports analytic autoethnography, and extends Anderson’s arguments 
with further recognition of autobiographical aspects that have traditionally featured in 
ethnographic work (see also Coffey, 1999; Charmaz, 2006; and Walford, 2009). Vryan 
(2006) views analytic autoethnography as a viable method, but argues that rather than 
referring exclusively to a specialised subgenre of ethnography, analytic autoethnography 
should refer more broadly to any autoethnographic practice which orientates itself towards 
explicit analysis. He suggests that analytic self-studies need not necessarily include data from 
‘others’. Rather, for some topics, it would be possible to carry out effective analysis, 
generate useful conceptual insight and produce original knowledge with relevance to other 
people or contexts from self-generated data alone.  
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A moderate autoethnography 
Wall (2016) acknowledges the polarized nature of the debate between evocative and 
analytic autoethnography, and advocates for a ‘middle ground’ approach that seeks to 
combine beneficial elements of each. This approach is moderate autoethnography, which 
Allows for innovation, imagination, and the representation of a range of voices in 
qualitative inquiry while also sustaining confidence in the quality, rigor, and usefulness 
of academic research (Wall, 2016: 1). 
 
Her support for such an approach is set in the context of her concerns about existing 
autoethnographic work. These relate to, for example, a lack of analysis, and concerns about 
the quality and use of data more generally. The moderate approach she proposes seeks to 
overcome these concerns by including explicit analysis, but unlike analytic autoethnography, 
this is not required to be conducted as a part of traditional ethnography. The following table 
outlines moderate autoethnography in more detail by showing how it relates and compares 
to evocative and analytic autoethnography.
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Table One: Key features of evocative, analytic, and moderate autoethnography. 
 Evocative Autoethnography 
(e.g. Ellis and Bochner, 2000) 
Analytic Autoethnography 
(Anderson, 2006) 
Moderate Autoethnography 
(Wall, 2016) 
Influences on 
development 
Influenced by postmodern 
criticisms of conventional social 
research, and the ‘narrative turn’ 
and ‘crisis of representation’ in 
the social sciences. 
  
Developed in response to success of 
evocative autoethnography.  
Developed in response to polarised 
debates between evocative and 
analytic autoethnography, and 
limitations in existing practice 
Epistemological 
underpinnings 
Postmodern, emphasises links 
between social science and 
arts/humanities. 
 
  
Realist/analytic ethnography. Not strongly linked to specific 
epistemology. May suit a range of 
epistemological approaches.  
 
Focus on self / 
others 
Heavy focus on researcher’s self – 
sometimes exclusively.  
Emphasis on self and others. Focus is 
on a social group of which the 
researcher is a part. 
 
  
Flexible: focus may be on self, or self 
and others.  
Analysis Narrative-based: “Use stories to 
do the work of analysing and 
theorising” (Ellis and Bochner, 
2006; 436). 
Seeks to be evocative. 
  
Strong emphasis on conventional 
ethnographic analysis. 
Emphasises need for explicit analysis. 
Also allows for innovation.  
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When designing my autoethnography and critically reflecting on existing autoethnographic 
practice, I shared other’s concerns regarding the limited analytic potential of (some) 
evocative autoethnography (Anderson, 2006; Atkinson, 2006; Chang, 2008; Delamont, 2009; 
Walford, 2009; Wall, 2016) and I wanted to distance myself from the postmodern sensitives 
associated with this approach. I was concerned that privileging evocation and the 
experiential value of writing could undermine the scholarly goals of analysis and theorising 
(Atkinson, 2006), and restrict the writing to descriptive autobiography (Chang, 2008). 
Analytic autoethnography resonated more strongly with my research values. However, I did 
not agree that it need be limited only to what is essentially heightened reflexivity and 
researcher visibility in ethnographic research (Vryan, 2006; Wall, 2016) and I needed an 
approach that would allow me to directly analyse my own experiences as a case in their 
own right (while also interviewing others). I therefore developed my own stance, that I later 
realised was akin to Wall’s moderate autoethnography. My research is heavily influenced by 
analytic autoethnography in that it is orientated towards explicit analysis and seeks to 
address broader conceptual and theoretical issues (Anderson, 2006), but is not couched in 
traditional ethnography. Also, while evocation was not a central goal, I did not deliberately 
avoid it. I recognise that it is possible for deeply personal and emotionally impactful accounts 
to also be analytic and sociologically valuable (Vryan, 2006; Burnier, 2006; Williams and 
Jauhari Bin Zaini, 2016). 
Autoethnographic documents 
Before describing the procedures I undertook to conduct the autoethnography, it is worth 
critically considering the documents I used to inform the analysis. These were personal 
documents and medical records. Other sociologists have also used diaries and medical 
records in autoethnographies of illness and treatment (Rier, 2000; Greehalgh, 2001; Blaxter, 
2009; Reissman, 2015). Both types of documents that I used were private due to their 
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closed access (Scott, 1990), unsolicited due to their ‘natural’ production (they were not 
produced for research purposes) (Berg, 2004) and primary because they were produced by 
individuals who directly experienced my illness and treatment (Mogalakwe, 2006). The 
documents were produced on a daily (or usually daily) basis during treatment and in this 
respect are a thorough record. I can be confident in their authenticity (Scott, 1990) because 
they were produced by me or relate to my experiences. I also benefited from not 
experiencing the access difficulties that are ordinarily associated with ‘sensitive’ documents 
(Barlow, 2016).  
Personal documents can give insight into an individual’s (then) definitions of the situation and 
how they made sense of their daily life (Berg, 2004). The diaries contain detailed accounts of 
my perceptions of treatment as they were experienced at that time. Both personal 
documents and medical records are highly subjective, and for my autoethnography, this was 
their value. That such documents  
[…] reflect the subjective views and perceptions of their creators […] makes them 
useful as data in a case study. It is precisely through this subjectivity that these 
documents provide information and insight about the subject (Berg, 2004: 255).  
 
Reissman (2015) suggests that personal diaries can act as a ‘counter narrative’ to medical 
records. The different authors of, and contexts for, each set of documents provided a 
source of comparison (see also Barlow, 2016). I was able to contrast the meanings attached 
to the same event from my personal, ‘patient’ perspective and the clinical, professional 
perspective.  
I did not treat the documents as direct, unproblematic representations of events. They 
needed to be understood in relation to the purposes, processes and social contexts of their 
production (Scott, 1990; May, 2001; Prior, 2003). In the following discussion, I consider 
these issues firstly in relation to personal diaries and then medical records.  
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Personal diaries can be written for a range of purposes and audiences. Even when a diary is 
intended for personal use, it may be written with an imagined audience in mind (May, 2001; 
Reissman, 2015). My motivations for diary writing while in treatment varied. I wrote to pass 
time, alleviate boredom, work through ambivalence, assist in decision making and for 
‘therapeutic release’. I usually consciously wrote ‘to’ a current or future self, however I also 
sometimes imaginatively directed my writing towards staff (while not intending them to view 
it). These varying intentions shaped the content and tone of my writing. Further, personal 
diary writing has a performative effect and can work to create, claim and transform an 
identity (Reissman, 2015). Parts of my diaries functioned to sustain an anorexic identity, as I 
sometimes used diary writing to ‘work up’ and express an identity as a ‘resistant patient’ 
who desired anorexia. It may be understood as one means through which I performed an 
(anorexic) identity for which the usual channels of expression were restricted by my 
involuntary treatment circumstances.  
Medical records are highly selective, highlighting only limited aspects of the patient and their 
behaviour, and they may be inconsistent in quality and quantity (Garfinkel, 1967; Prior, 
2003). Garfinkel (1967) found that medical records were constructed in accordance with 
contractual issues in the practitioner-patient relationship. They were kept in such a way as 
to legitimate the clinicians actions, and “demonstrate that the 'right things were done to the 
'right' person at the 'right' time.” (Prior, 2003: 51). According to Prior (2003), Garfinkel’s 
work provides an example of how records may be routinely used for quite different 
purposes to their original or ‘face value’ purpose. 
Medical records are commonly perceived as simple representations of ‘what has happened’ 
during a patient’s treatment, however they actively constitute (as well as record) medical 
practice (Prior, 2003).  For this reason, the content of an official document is not necessarily 
its most important feature, and there is a need to consider how it is used within the 
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relevant organisational setting (ibid, 2003). The content of my medical records informed 
aspects of the autoethnography, but always in a manner which contextualised this content 
through an awareness of the documents functions in my treatment and the conditions under 
which they were produced. 
Autoethnography procedures 
Following the recognition of my own theoretical stance on autoethnography, a key challenge 
was to translate this into practice. There are no ‘how-to’ training courses for 
autoethnography as there are for conventional methods, and existing guidance and 
suggested techniques (e.g. Chang, 2008; Hughes and Pennington, 2017; Muncey, 2010) were 
of limited use. This was because autoethnography is as personal and idiosyncratic as the 
experience that it draws upon, and as such there could not be widely applicable guidance. 
My autoethnography is unique, and an implication of this is that the implementation of the 
method, in terms of the practical steps I took, proved highly emergent and was constantly 
(re)negotiated.  
I began by writing the narrative of my experiences using memory, and my personal diaries 
and medical notes. Here, I ‘re-immersed’ myself in my past and structured my memories 
into chronological order, in order to have an as accurate representation and understanding 
of ‘what happened’ as possible. The documents were vital in this process. They helped me 
to order and ‘flesh-out’ memories that were timeless and vague, and to trigger the recall of 
additional memories that otherwise would have remained forgotten. While writing my 
experiences, I began documenting initial analytic insights as I noticed connections to existing 
sociological and anthropological knowledge and generated ideas that were relevant to my 
research questions. Later, while analysing interview material, I added depth to the analytical 
aspects of the autoethnography, using insights generated from interviews with participants 
to make further sense of my own experiences. For example, participants’ experiences and 
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conceptualisations of ‘bad anorexic patients’ – a patient role that I understand within this 
thesis in terms of ‘anorexic scripts’ – informed interpretations of my own experiences. I also 
incorporated my experiences into the analysis of interview material. In some places within 
this thesis, the iterative and ‘joined up’ nature of the analysis across the two methods is 
explicit. For example, while chapters five, six and seven predominantly pertain to 
participants’ experiences and interview material, in these chapters I also sometimes reflect 
back on the autoethnography or include additional information about my own experiences. 
However, for the most part, the intertwining of the methods is not made explicit. This is 
because they were always ‘joined up’. Learning about participants experiences will have 
affected my thinking about own experiences (and vice versa) in subtle ways that at times, 
even I may not have understood. The end result of the autoethnography is an approximately 
12,000 word written piece that intertwines description, interpretation, and sociological 
argument. 
Evaluating autoethnography 
In this section, I begin by describing a challenge that I faced while conducting my 
autoethnography45. I then briefly reflect on Le Roux’s criteria for assessing autoethnography 
in relation to my research. 
A challenge that is unique to self-study is the revealing of information about myself to others 
through my research. Prior to undertaking my PhD, my experiences with anorexia were not 
‘common knowledge’ and only close family and friends knew of them. Since beginning my 
research, I have regularly informed others of my identity as a ‘recovered anorexic’. Among 
academic colleagues and peers, my previous experience of anorexia and treatment is well 
known, and it only takes a short conversation about my research with a new acquaintance 
 
45 This discussion of the challenge I faced revealing information about myself to others during my research has 
been published elsewhere (O’Connell, 2020).  
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at an academic conference for them to realise this. Revealing personal information about my 
past diagnosis to people I do not know well is sometimes uncomfortable. That said, doing 
this in academic contexts does feel relatively safe. Somehow, I imagine as if the information 
will be received through an academic lens, and thus more neutrally with less judgement (or 
at least with awareness on the part of the other person that they ought to treat the 
information in this way). However, academia is not the only context in which I discuss my 
research, and questions about what I do for a living (and consequently, my research) are 
raised in my ‘everyday life’ too. In these situations, I tend to reveal as little as possible, 
stating only that I am undertaking a sociology PhD in the field of eating disorders. This is in 
order to avoid the discomfort in revealing my past diagnosis. Interestingly, my selective 
revealing of information in this manner echoes the strategies that participants described in 
relation to the public management of anorexia (see chapter seven). In this sense, managing 
my identity throughout this PhD has been its own form of identity-work.  
A number of authors have developed sets of criteria for evaluating autoethnography (Ellis et 
al, 2011; Chang, 2016; Le Roux, 2017). While Ellis et al’s (2011) and Chang’s (2016) are 
relevant to specific ‘types’ of autoethnography (evocative and analytically-focused 
respectively), Le Roux’s (2017) are designed to be applied flexibly, in ways that are relevant 
to the autoethnographic stance in question. I apply these criteria here. They are: 
subjectivity, self-reflexivity, resonance, credibility, and contribution.  
Subjectivity necessitates that “the self is primarily visible in the research” and that “the 
research […] retells a noteworthy or critical personal relational or institutional experience” 
(Le Roux, 2017: 204). In my autoethnography, I consider this not so much a criterion for 
evaluation, but a description of the end product. My self is visible throughout the 
autoethnography, which retells my critical experiences of clinical interventions.  
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Self-reflexivity “points to self-awareness, self-exposure and self-conscious introspection” (Le 
Roux, 2017: 204). I have sought to be self-aware throughout. This has involved continuous 
reflections on the potential criticism of my work being ‘too subjective’. During the earlier 
stages of my research, I occasionally wondered whether my inability to ‘step outside’ of my 
experiences would reduce the quality of sociological analysis. However, I would now suggest 
that while my inescapable closeness to the subject matter directed the analysis and made it 
partial and highly specific, it also enhanced it. Beresford (2003) argues that the shorter the 
distance between direct experience and its interpretation, the less distorted the resulting 
knowledge is likely to be. I suggest that the directly lived, felt experiences on which I drew 
improved the depth of insight. In addition, self-exposure and self-conscious introspection 
have been inherent to the method itself, in both writing and analysing my experiences. 
Le Roux states that resonance “requires the audience to be able to enter into, engage with, 
experience or connect with the writer’s story on an intellectual and emotional level” (2017: 
204). This criterion is best assessed by the audience reading my autoethnography, as I 
cannot know how it is experienced by them. However, I attempted to achieve resonance by 
being thorough in my personal introspection and memory recall, honest and detailed in the 
written descriptions of my experiences, and by drawing on academic literature in meaningful 
ways.  
Credibility requires evidence of verisimilitude, plausibility and trustworthiness, and that the 
autoethnographic process is “permeated by honesty”.  Indeed, I consider honesty, as well as 
accuracy, central facets against which the three (closely overlapping) aforementioned 
dimensions of credibility can be judged. I have recalled events as honestly and accurately, 
and in as much relevant detail, as possible. The use of documents enhanced credibility, 
because they are primary and were highly beneficial in the recall of events. However, a 
limitation relates to my lack of anonymity. My awareness that others will read the 
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autoethnography knowing that I am the author means that there are inevitably very select 
aspects of my personal experiences that I have not shared – despite being honest and 
prepared to make myself vulnerable. These are aspects that are deeply private, and that I 
will never share with anyone. My autoethnography is a public narrative, and as such I 
unavoidably wrote it with an audience(s) in mind. I understand this as an unavoidable aspect 
of interpersonal communication. In addition, there were aspects of my experiences omitted, 
due the impossibility of sharing all relevant experiences. Crucially however, I do not 
consider that the aspects of my experiences that I have not shared, which are minimal in 
comparison to those I have, affect the quality of sociological argument made within the 
autoethnography.  
Contribution relates to extending knowledge. The main sociological contribution of the 
autoethnography relates to the arguments I make in this thesis about ‘anorexic scripts’ (as 
will emerge in later chapters). In making these arguments, I draw on insights which begin in 
the autoethnography, and are further extended and broadened in the analysis of interviews. 
Therefore, the contribution to knowledge made within the autoethnography need be 
considered in the context of this research as a whole.  
Interviews 
Choosing to do interviews 
Interviews have been described as a conversation with a purpose (Berg, 2004). In line with 
the goals of qualitative research more generally, this purpose is to elicit information to assist 
an interpretation of events from the perspective of the participant (Bryman, 1988). I chose 
to do interviews primarily because they are useful for understanding others’ perceptions and 
the meanings that they attach to certain phenomena or events (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998), 
and were therefore well-suited to the aims of this research. In addition, I benefited from the 
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flexible implementation of interviews in a number of ways. I designed a semi-structured 
interview guide, in which there were some predetermined topics and questions, but I 
adapted these and generated additional questions in accordance with the circumstances of 
each interviewee (Berg, 2004). The open-ended questions allowed for interviewees to speak 
within their own frame of reference, and for ‘new issues’ previously unknown to me to 
emerge. I was then able to pursue these new issues further (Rubin and Rubin, 1995), both 
within the same interview and in later interviews with other participants. Indeed, as I moved 
through the interviews, I refined the guide to improve the relevance and quality of 
questions. In addition, I was able to be flexible in the ways and extent to which I shared my 
personal experiences with interviewees (I refer to this as interviewer self-disclosure). I 
made in-situ decisions about whether, when, and how much to self-disclose (Reinharz and 
Chase, 2003) based on my sense of what worked best for each interviewee. This was 
particularly in terms of encouraging them to share their experiences, as I acted in whichever 
ways seemed to best support the goal of the research interview – to understand the 
participant (Farnsworth, 1996). As I discuss later, this resulted in a variety of interviewing 
‘styles’, and the use of self-disclosure in this manner seemed to prove beneficial.  
Conceptualising interviews in this research 
Two broadly opposing conceptualisations of the research interview can be identified – the 
interview as a phenomenological report and as a discursive account (Seale, 1998; Rapley, 2001; 
Talmy, 2010; Brinkmann, 2013; Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015). The attribution of a clear 
dichotomy between these conceptualisations is an over-simplification and they may be most 
usefully conceived as occupying either end of a continuum (Brinkmann, 2013). None the 
less, a direct contrast is heuristically beneficial. 
The conventional conceptualisation of the interview positions it as a phenomenological report. 
The interview is conceived as an opportunity for knowledge collection (Brinkman, 2013; 
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Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015) and interview data as a direct representation of the 
interviewee’s reality outside of the interview (Seale, 1998). The interview is utilised as a 
research instrument seeking to get as close as possible to the lived experience of the 
interviewee - the ‘what’ of their experience (Talmy, 2010; Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015; 
Brinkmann, 2013). There is a primary concern for validity, whereby valid data is an accurate 
representation of what ‘really’ happened and what respondents ‘really’ felt (Talmy, 2010). 
Interviewers therefore seek to minimise interviewer effects, develop rapport, avoid ‘leading’ 
questions and assess the trustworthiness of the interviewee’s account (Talmy, 2010; 
Brinkmann, 2013; Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  
The opposing conceptualisation of the interview as a discursive account is influenced by the 
constructionist paradigm and positions that have been critical of conventional 
conceptualisations (Rapley, 2001; Talmy, 2010). This conceptualisation utilises the interview 
as a social practice and an opportunity for knowledge construction (Talmy, 2010; Brinkmann 
and Kvale, 2015). Interview data is conceived as a representation of the reality that has been 
jointly constructed by the interviewer and interviewee within the research situation itself 
(Seale, 1998). Rather than the interviewer being someone who simply collects data “as if 
picking daisies” (Nunkoosing, 2005: 703), the interviewer and interviewee collude to create 
and co-construct stories. Interview talk is a local-situational accomplishment, and both the 
interviewer and interviewee are involved in actively constructing data (Rapley, 2001; Talmy, 
2010).  Rapley (2001) focuses on the identity-work involved in interviews, pointing to their 
performative nature (see also Nunkoosing, 2005). Interviewer and interviewee are 
concerned with presenting themselves as certain types of people and in a morally adequate 
light (Rapley, 2001). When the interview is conceptualised as a discursive account, analysis 
contains at least some degree of focus on ‘how’ people talk and interact in the interview, and 
not solely on what they say (Talmy, 2010; Brinkmann, 2013; Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  
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Taking either position to their extreme is problematic (Brinkmann, 2013; Brinkmann and 
Kvale 2015). Interviews do not provide unmediated access to lived experience, but this does 
not mean that they cannot allude to, and provide valuable insight into, lived experience 
outside of the research situation. While entirely’ ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ interview accounts 
are not possible, individuals can refer more or less accurately to their past experiences 
(Brinkmann, 2013). I adopted this ‘middle ground’ position, and conducted analytic 
approaches that allowed for: “the “what” and the “how” [to] fertilize each other in 
productive ways” (ibid, 2013: 40). Before I discuss my approach to analysis in detail, I 
describe the procedures used to recruit for and conduct the interviews, and the sample of 
participants.  
Recruitment and interview procedures 
I recruited participants in two stages. Firstly, I created a website that included an overview 
of the research and an invite for individuals interested in participating to contact me by 
email. I shared the website on my personal social media pages, where I already had links to 
networks of individuals whom I suspected would meet the inclusion criteria. When potential 
participants expressed their interest, I sent them a participant information sheet (see 
Appendix One). This provided further details about the research and the precise inclusion 
criteria for participation. The inclusion criteria were written as follows: 
To participate in this research, the following should also apply to you: 
• Age 18yrs or above and living in the southern or midland regions of England 
• Have been diagnosed with anorexia by a health professional (you may or may not 
still have this diagnosis).  
• Have received, or are currently receiving, treatment for anorexia. ‘Treatment’ 
includes any regular input from a health professional(s), for example: seeing your 
GP to be physically monitored, attending an outpatient or inpatient eating 
disorder service, appointments with a home treatment team, or time spent on a 
hospital ward.  
• Not be feeling especially unwell or have very serious health complications. 
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In addition, I explained: 
I am interested in speaking to a range of people, including individuals who consider 
themselves to currently have anorexia, those who are in recovery and those who are 
recovered. 
 
I deliberately used a broad definition of ‘treatment’, so as to encompass a range of 
experiences and levels of contact with clinical approaches.  
This initial recruitment strategy proved successful and after one month, I had arranged and 
begun to conduct interviews with 10 participants. My second strategy was to recruit 
participants via the Beat website. Beat is a UK eating disorder charity, and its website 
includes a research page dedicated to recruiting participants for academic research. At this 
point, in seeking to increase gender and class diversity in the sample, I altered the inclusion 
criteria to specify males, and females with a highest level of education below degree level 
(taking educational level be an approximate indicator of class). I recruited two males and 
two females. However, it transpired during interviewing that the two females had previously 
begun to study for a degree but left university due to anorexia. This meant that the final 
sample was not as diverse as intended in terms of class (I discuss this further below).  
I conducted the interviews at a time and location that was preferred by the participant. I 
met with eight participants in person, and this usually involved me travelling to where they 
lived and conducting the interview in their home or a private room in a university or public 
library. I conducted interviews with the remaining six participants over Skype, usually due to 
it not being practically viable to meet face-to-face. While there were minor and infrequent 
‘technical difficulties’ using Skype (such as an occasional ‘frozen screen’), I found that this 
method was a useful alternative to meeting face-to-face (Lo Iacona et al, 2016; Deakin and 
Wakefield, 2014; Hanna, 2012). Despite my initial concerns that building rapport may be 
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more problematic over Skype, I did not find this to be the case (see also Lo Iacona et al, 
2016; Deakin and Wakefield, 2014), and the ‘depth’ or flow of conversation did not seem 
negatively impacted.  
Interviews lasted between 50 minutes and 2 hours and 45 minutes, with an average length of 
around 1.5 hours. Two of the 14 interviewees participated in two interviews, and a further 
three responded to further interview questions by email after their first interview. In these 
five cases, the second sets of questions were ‘follow-up’ questions which I devised after 
having reviewed the original interview. In addition, two participants (one who had answered 
a second set of interview questions by email, and one who had participated in only one 
interview), engaged in further, unstructured, ‘naturally arising’ conversation by email. In 
these cases, I sought permission to use this content as per the interview material. All 
participants were also asked two ‘post-interview questions’ by email, as part of a reflexive 
strategy – this is explained in detail later (see Appendix Two for a summary of research 
processes for each participant).  
The ‘style’ of the interviews varied, and this partly related to the extent to which I self-
disclosed during the interview. Most interviews were largely conventional, but some also 
moved towards containing significant elements of interactive interviewing (Ellis et al, 1997). 
In conventional interviewing, the interviewer directs the interview, asks questions of the 
interviewee in a non-reciprocal process, and does not disclose their own experiences. Here, 
a “friendly but not too friendly” interviewing-stance is considered ideal (Oakley, 1981). 
There is a hierarchical relationship between interviewer and interviewee, in that “the 
researcher defines and controls the situation” (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015: 6). An 
alternative approach is interactive interviewing (Ellis et al, 1997). This undermines the 
hierarchical dynamics of the conventional interview. Interactive interviewing is  
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a collaborative communication process occurring between researchers and 
respondents […it] involves the sharing of personal and social experiences of both 
respondents and researchers, who tell [...] their stories in the context of a 
developing relationship (Ellis, 1997; 121).  
 
All of the interviews in this research were largely conventional in that, for at least half of the 
interview (and usually more), I was directing the conversation, asking questions, and 
attending to interviewees experiences exclusively. However, all interviews to varying 
extents also included some element of self-disclosure, which in some cases moved aspects 
of the interview towards (but never entirely in line with) interactive interviewing. I examine 
the impact of my self-disclosure and ‘insider status’ in detail later.  
Participants 
I interviewed 14 participants, including 11 females and three males (see table two below for 
details of each participant). Interviewees’ ages ranged from 21 to 52 years, with most being 
aged between 21 and 29. Most (13) participants had been formally diagnosed with anorexia, 
and one (a male aged 52) was self-diagnosed. The final sample were culturally homogenous; 
all were white, and might (crudely) be said to be lower middle, middle, or higher middle 
class. In focusing on white, middle-class experiences, I have unintentionally reproduced 
stereotypes of ‘who has anorexia’ and missed opportunities to explore how the diagnosis is 
experienced by other groups. This is a notable limitation of my research. Participants were 
mixed in terms of their current illness/recovery status and experiences of treatment. At the 
time of the interview, seven were currently receiving treatment for anorexia, two were ‘in 
between’ treatments (they had recently ended treatment and were waiting to begin a new 
phase), and five were not receiving any treatment. They had experienced a range of ‘types’ 
of treatment (inpatient and outpatient, NHS and private, generalised and specialist), and 
while some individuals’ treatment was relatively short and transient, others had long and 
varied treatment careers. I have roughly categorised participants treatment trajectories into 
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three types: ‘extensive’; ‘fractured’, and ‘singular’. There were five participants with an 
extensive trajectory. They had undergone both inpatient and outpatient treatment over an 
extended period of time. They often completed or ended treatment, went for a time 
without any, and then re-entered treatment again. In the fractured trajectory there were 2 
participants, both of whom also had more than one occasion of treatment over an extended 
period of time. However, compared to the extensive trajectory, these occasions were short 
lived and/or non-intensive. Regarding the singular trajectory (7 participants), experiences 
were linear in that participants had begun a period of specialised treatment (either as an 
outpatient only, or as an inpatient and then directly followed by outpatient) during which 
time they ‘recovered’ (or were currently in treatment and in the process of recovering), and 
then either finished treatment or progressively received less intensive treatment. It is also 
possible to categorise participants according to their descriptions of their current 
relationship to anorexia (although these categorisations are not absolute or ‘neat’). 
Participants were either ‘in recovery’ (6), ‘early in recovery’ (3), or ‘in relapse/struggling’ (5). 
Those in recovery considered themselves to be relatively ‘far along’ in recovery and were at 
the end of treatment, or post-treatment. They often used the word ‘managing’ to describe 
their current relationship to anorexia. ‘Early in recovery’ reflects participants who still 
considered themselves to be ‘in anorexia’, but had come some way in getting better. Both 
the two participants in this category were undergoing outpatient treatment. Participants 
who were ‘in relapse/struggling’ described their situation mainly in terms of the struggle 
they were experiencing, and usually also in terms of it having recently worsened. 
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Table Two: Participant details 
Partici-
pant 
Gender 
(Age)46 
Age developed anorexia, age of 
diagnosis  
Current treatment status Treatment 
trajectory47 
Relationship 
to anorexia48 
Mia 
 
Female 
(22)  
Developed age 11 
Diagnosed age 12 
 
Outpatient treatment for anorexia Extensive  In relapse  
Anna Female  
(37)  
Developed and diagnosed in mid 30s  
 
Recently discharged from outpatient 
treatment for anorexia 
Singular  In recovery 
Natalie Female 
(28) 
Developed age 16 
Diagnosed age 18 
 
No treatment Extensive  In relapse 
Kelly 
 
Female 
(24) 
Developed age 18 
Diagnosed early 20s 
 
Group therapy (not eating disorder 
specific) as an outpatient 
Singular  In recovery 
Sarah Female  
(29) 
Developed early teens 
Diagnosed age 16 
 
No treatment, apart from very 
occasional private therapy 
Fractured In recovery 
Claire  Female  
(21) 
Developed age 12 
Diagnosed age 16 
 
No treatment  Singular  In recovery 
Ben 
 
Male  
(22) 
Developed and diagnosed early teens 
 
 
No treatment  
 
 Singular  In recovery  
Naomi 
 
Female  
(28) 
Developed in teens (‘traits’ since child) 
Diagnosed early 20s 
 
Outpatient treatment for anorexia Extensive  In relapse  
 
46 These are approximate ages based on participants descriptions of when their eating disorder developed. However, they did not always identify a clear beginning. 
Beginnings were often vague and gradual, and the start of ‘anorexia’ not necessarily clearly distinguishable from ‘dieting’ or ‘eating disorder traits’. 
47 Defined above 
48 Defined above 
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Michael  Male 
 (52) 
Developed age 30 
Diagnosed early 50s 
 
Appointments with dietician Singular  Early in 
recovery  
Amelia  Female 
(20)  
Developed age 18, diagnosed age 19 
  
 
Outpatient treatment for anorexia Singular  Early in 
recovery  
Jack Male 
(21) 
Developed age 17 
Diagnosed age 19 
 
No treatment (waiting to start 
therapy for anxiety) 
Fractured  In relapse  
Maddie  Female  
(23) 
Developed age 20 
Diagnosed age 22 
 
Outpatient treatment for anorexia Singular  Early in 
recovery  
Lisa Female  
(40) 
Developed age 18 (‘traits’ since age 11) 
Diagnosed with bulimia age 22, diagnosed 
with anorexia age 32 
No treatment (waiting to start 
outpatient following recent discharge 
from inpatient) 
Extensive  In recovery  
Hannah Female 
(23) 
Developed age 15 
Diagnosed age 18. 
 
Outpatient treatment  Extensive  In relapse  
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Interview analysis 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) identify two broad approaches to interview analysis; those that 
focus on meaning and those that focus on language. The former includes techniques such as 
meaning condensation and meaning interpretation, and the latter includes techniques such as 
conversation analysis and narrative analysis. Meaning-focused analyses tend towards a 
phenomenological report conceptualisation of interviews and language-focused towards a 
discursive account conceptualisation. However, these distinctions are not strict and some 
techniques, such as ‘meaning interpretation’, are open to being implemented flexibly with 
respect to epistemological stance. Indeed, I used meaning interpretation techniques in this 
flexible way within my analysis.  
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) identify three different contexts for meaning interpretation. 
These are self-understanding, critical commonsense understanding, and theoretical 
understanding. A self-understanding interpretation involves formulating “a condensed form 
(of) what the subjects themselves understand to be the meanings of their statements” (2015: 
242). A critical commonsense understanding goes beyond the subjects’ own meanings by 
involving a wider frame of understanding. Rather than taking participants’ statements at ‘face 
value’, general knowledge about the content of the statements and the context in which 
they are made can be used to amplify and enrich interpretation. Theoretical understanding 
refers to the use of a theoretical frame for interpreting meaning and involves the application 
of insights and concepts associated with a given theoretical perspective. 
In my own analysis, I applied elements of all three contexts in such a way that I attended 
primarily to the content (the ‘what’) of interview data, but also to the social processes 
involved in the interview (the ‘how’). I began by analysing participants self-understanding in 
two ways, both of which involved condensing the meanings expressed by interviewees into 
shorter formulations (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  Firstly, I condensed the meaning of the 
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entire interview into a ‘summary overview’. This document reflected a shortened version of 
the interviewee’s whole narrative. I offered to send this and the interview transcript to the 
interviewee to review, amend, or add to the content if they wished. This was for ethical 
purposes (ensuring that participants had included all aspects of their experiences that they 
wanted to and were content with what they had said), and a way of checking my 
interpretation of their experiences. Most participants opted to receive these documents and 
confirmed that they agreed with the content, and one participant added further detail about 
her experiences. Secondly, I worked through each transcript and broke the interview 
material into (what I judged to be) ‘meaning units’. I then wrote a shorter, summarised 
version of each of these units, such that I was thematising the interviewees statements 
(Giorgi, 1975, cited in Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  
A second layer of analysis explored ‘outside’ of participants’ immediately intended meanings 
by drawing on wider sources of knowledge and insight to interpret in a critical 
commonsense context (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015). This included noting contradictions 
and inconsistencies in what participants said, as well as addressing how the language used 
shaped and conveyed meaning. For example, in chapter six, I discuss how participants 
‘entified’ anorexia (i.e. referred to it as an external being, such as through personification). 
Amelia stated that she did not personify anorexia, but in her explanation of this she actively 
personified it – thus the expression she used contradicted the meaning of what she said. I 
also posed critical questions to the interview content (see box one below). Some of these 
were theoretically informed, and therefore an element of theoretical understanding as a 
context of interpretation was also involved. These questions were developed and adapted in 
light of new insight and emerging analytic concepts. 
More generally, methodological reflexivity also acted as a source of insight for analytic 
purposes. I describe the reflexive strategies that I used in the next section. Insights from 
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these strategies, which pertained to the impact of my identity and actions as an interviewer 
on the interviews, provided contextual information for interpreting findings. They meant 
that I was sensitive to the role of my identity, talk and actions in producing the form and 
content of the interview, and to the identity-work that was involved in the interviews, both 
on my part and on the part of the interviewee (Rapley, 2001; Talmy, 2010). As I later argue, 
interactional processes relating to identity and anorexia that form the substantive content of 
this research have been at play within the interviews themselves, and this was ‘felt’ by both 
me and the interviewees. Therefore, a consideration of the interview interaction, through 
reflexive strategies, assisted in generating analytic insight that directly addressed the 
research objectives.  The table overleaf summarises the stages of interview analysis.  
Box one: Critical and theoretical questions posed to interview content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What does this tell me about the participants: 
a) relationship to/meaning of a diagnosis of anorexia? 
b) self-understanding as ‘anorexic’ (anorexic identity)? 
c) the meaning/value of anorexia to them? 
d) personal construction of anorexia: what/where it is (e.g. entification)? 
e) interpretive identity-work in relation to anorexia? 
f) performative identity-work in relation to anorexia? 
g) construction of anorexic scripts? 
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Table Three: Stages of interview analysis 
           
Stage Task 
 
Purposes 
1 Transcribed interview recordings and wrote interview 
summaries (condensed meanings). 
-Preparatory  
-Familiarisation with interview content.  
-Analysis 
- Interpretation context – self understanding 
2 Sent transcript and summary to interviewee for them to 
review and comment on or amend if appropriate.  
 
Incorporated comments into transcripts/summaries if 
relevant (occurred for one participant) 
- Checking meaning with interviewees – for ethical and validity 
purposes. 
 
 
3 Asked interviewee the post-interview questions (a reflexive 
strategy, discussed later) 
 
 
 
- Reflexive strategy 
 
4 For each transcript: 
Divided into ‘meaning units’ and condensed content to 
thematise participants self-understandings  
 
 
- Analysis 
- Interpretation context – self-understanding 
 
5 For each transcript: 
Posed critical and theoretical questions (see box one above)  
Pursued other avenues of critical insight as appropriate  
Used transcripts, summaries, and responses to post-
interview Qs, as appropriate.  
-Analysis  
- Interpretation contexts – critical common sense understanding and 
theoretical understanding 
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Insider interviewing, interviewer self-disclosure, and reflexive strategies 
The distinction between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ refers to a researcher’s social position in 
relation to participants (Kirpitchenko and Voloder, 2014). An insider researcher shares with 
participants a relevant experience, identity or culture. I shared with participants the 
experience of being diagnosed with, and treated for, anorexia. However, in practice, insider 
and outsider positions are more fluid and multiple than a simple case of either/or (e.g. 
Eppley, 2006; Chavez, 2008; Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Couture et al, 2012). While I shared 
aspects of experiences with participants, there were sometimes also clear differences, such 
as gender, age of diagnosis, and type of treatment, and various elements of similarities and 
differences moved in and out of focus during each interview. 
The relative impact of insider and outsider positioning has warranted much methodological 
debate (Kirpitchenko and Voloder, 2014; Chavez, 2008). Most of this literature concerns 
insider research in ethnography or participant observation (e.g. Bonner and Tolhurst, 2002; 
Hodkinson, 2005; Chavez, 2008; Greene, 2014). However, a smaller body of literature has 
specifically addressed interviewing as an insider, and related to this, interviewer self-
disclosure. This literature identifies a range of benefits and disadvantages of insider 
positioning and self-disclosure and tends to conclude that it is a ‘double-edged sword’ (Daly, 
1992b; Farnsworth, 1997; Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Pearce, 2010; Berger, 2015).  
An aspect of insider research that concerned me from early on was the potential for my 
subjective position to problematically impede the interviews. I was concerned that my direct 
personal experiences might ‘cloud’ my perceptions of interviewees or unduly shape the 
interviews in lines of questioning or analysis of data (Daly, 1992a; 1992b; Dwyer and Buckle, 
2009; Berger, 2015). Further, I was concerned that my self-disclosure risked overwhelming 
the participants narrative or ‘closing down’ interaction in the interview (Pearce, 2010; Abell 
et al, 2006). These concerns were especially pertinent given that I was not only an insider, 
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but also actively studying my experiences in the autoethnography. I read other’s suggestions 
that studying the self detracts from a researcher’s ability to understand others (Madison, 
2006), and that the personal element of autoethnography can overwhelm and seriously 
impede the research, leading to ‘concept tunnel vision’ (Morse, 2002: 1159). 
However, while these concerns needed consideration, it should be noted that they relate to 
issues of subjectivity and objectivity that have been long and widely debated in the social 
sciences. These issues are relevant to all research, not only autoethnography and insider 
research. The objectivity/subjectivity debate raises questions about how a researcher’s 
subjectivity ‘impedes’ the research and what (if anything) can/should be done about this. In 
regard to insider research and that which involves self-study, the ‘threat’ of subjectivity is 
more obvious. Methodological discussions need to avoid the oversimplification of 
distinctions between insider research/self-study and other methods. All researchers hold 
particular beliefs, values, assumptions and ideas regarding their topic, and this subjective 
positioning alongside the researcher’s personality inevitably influences the research process 
(Sword, 1999; Letherby, 2013). Importantly: 
Being an insider might raise issues of undue influence of the researcher’s perspective, 
but being an outsider does not create immunity to the influence of personal 
perspective (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 59).  
 
None the less, the degree to which the researcher’s personal realities shape their 
expectations may be greater in cases where the researcher has direct experience of the 
topic in question (Daly, 1992b), and I sought strategies to manage this. These strategies 
incorporated reflexivity. Reflexivity involves the researcher turning a critical gaze towards 
themselves (Finlay, 2003), and engaging in explicit, self-aware, meta-analysis of the research 
process (Finlay, 2002a). It has been practised in a range of ways in accordance with differing 
117 
 
117 
 
theoretical and methodological standpoints (Finlay, 2003; Gough, 2002; Lynch, 2000). 
However:  
It is commonly viewed as the process of continual internal dialogue and critical self-
evaluation of researcher’s positionality as well as active acknowledgement and 
explicit recognition that this position may affect the research process and outcome 
(Berger, 2015: 220).  
 
Reflexivity is thought to enhance the accuracy, credibility and quality of research (Berger, 
2015; but see Pillow, 2003) and, crucially for me, has been identified as beneficial for 
managing the complexities of insider research (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Drake, 2010; 
Greene, 2011; Couture et al, 2012; Berger, 2015). Berger suggests that reflexivity in insider 
research “helps address the double edge sword inherent in the situation” (2015: 230).  
Letherby’s (2013) contribution to the objectivity/subjectivity debate has also motivated my 
incorporation of reflexivity. She argues that subjectivity is not inherently problematic, but is 
an inevitable part of the pursuit for objectivity. She frames objectivity not in the traditional, 
‘scientific’ sense of value-freedom, but as value-explicitness. Value-explicitness is achieved 
through theorised subjectivity, which entails “the constant, critical interrogation of our 
personhood – both intellectual and personal – within the knowledge production process” 
(2013: 80). This critical interrogation is what I have pursued through reflexivity, because 
through this, “subjectivity in research can be transformed from a problem to an 
opportunity” (Finlay, 2002a: 531). 
The reflexive strategies I adopted were: 
1) Post-interview diary – I wrote down any reflections and ‘senses’ I had immediately after 
each interview. This included insights regarding the relationship between myself and the 
interviewee, the mutual meanings that emerged in our relationship, and the extent and 
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apparent impact of my self-disclosure (Finlay, 2002b). Berger (2015) described a similar 
reflexive strategy for insider research when she recommended keeping a ‘log of encounters’. 
2) Post-transcription analysis – I studied the content of the interview transcripts at least one 
month after the interview to attend to facets such as the impact of my self-disclosure. 
Returning to the interviews after time had passed offered an “opportunity to view the same 
material through a ‘new lens’” (Berger, 2015: 230).  
3) Asking interviewees – At the end of the interviewing process with each interviewee, I 
asked them two questions by email, namely, “how did you find it taking part in an interview 
with someone you knew to have a previous diagnosis of anorexia?” and “Do you feel that 
this affected the interview process?” (I here on refer to these questions as the ‘post-
interview questions’). Participants responses to these questions offered valuable insight into 
how they experienced my insider status and self-disclosure. This was a novel reflexive 
strategy that, as far as I am aware, has not previously been used. 
These strategies did not make it possible to entirely ‘put my experiences to one side’ while 
attending to the experiences of interviewees (Fansworth, 1997), because it is impossible for 
me to escape my own positioning. Indeed, my reflexive analysis has been undertaken from 
the very subjective position that I am seeking to analyse, and I may not have a good 
understanding of my own bias and assumptions (Risjord, 2014). None the less, reflexive 
strategies have been valuable in developing an awareness of the impact of my personal 
experiences within the research. 
Here, I draw on insights from these strategies to discuss the relative pros and cons of 
undertaking research as an insider. I address these in accordance with five (overlapping) 
facets; recruitment and making connections, interviewer skills, rapport and openness, 
interviewer-interviewee relations, and substantive insight.  
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       Recruitment and making connections 
My insider status likely benefited recruitment in that potential participants may have been 
more willing to share their experiences with someone whom they expected would properly 
understand and represent these (Farnsworth, 1997; DeTona, 2006; Chavez, 2008; Berger, 
2015). As Hannah explained: 
I felt reassured and less judged once you said that you had been a sufferer yourself 
and that you would indeed then understand how it really feels to suffer from 
anorexia (email). 
 
In addition, joint awareness of our shared experiences seemed to help us forge connections 
from the outset, ‘easing’ the process of recruiting, meeting, ‘getting talking’, and developing 
rapport (Fansworth, 1997; Berger, 2015) by providing “a common ground from which to 
begin the research” (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 58).  
However, these recruitment-related benefits are not the whole picture. Sarah described 
how, while she ultimately decided prior to participating that our shared experience would 
be beneficial, initially she had considered this potentially problematic: 
When I […] read the bit when I found out that you’d had it, I have to admit at first I 
was quite surprised, and I thought [I] have to think very carefully, is that going to be 
OK, and then I thought yeah it is, it’s fine […] actually I can say anything and you will 
understand (Sarah, email) 
 
Sarah had described during the interview how, at the height of her struggles, direct 
comparisons with others diagnosed with an eating disorder created a powerful drive in her 
to ‘become worse’ (comparisons among individuals with anorexia are discussed in detail in 
chapter seven). It is to this that she referred when she questioned whether participating in 
the interview would be ‘OK’.  
Anna expressed similar concerns: 
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When you sent the information sheet and mentioned you’d had anorexia, it was one 
of the things that made me pause for thought about whether or not I’d take part. I 
was a bit worried because my own recovery is in an early stage. I think I’d 
mentioned how I hate seeing other people with anorexia at the gym, I feel like 
they’re bringing anorexia into my recovery space […] But also a worry that us 
talking about our anorexia could be too complicated. Sort of blurring the lines 
between empathising, comparing, competing, and that sort of complaining ‘oh isn’t it 
awful when… that also ends up celebrating something (email). 
 
These extracts highlight how aspects of the experience of anorexia affected participants 
decision-making about participation. For individuals who are seeking to ‘recover’ from 
anorexia, being exposed to others who in some way embody or represent the diagnosis can 
feel difficult and potentially aggravate a desire to return to restricted eating/weight loss. Eli 
(2014b) explains that the ‘eating disorder community’ can trigger disorder-supporting 
desires, and for the above participants there was concern that the interview situation might 
engender similar feelings. It may be that some individuals chose not to participate for these 
reasons.  
Interviewing skills 
I felt that my ‘insider understanding’ facilitated my skills as an interviewer. I was aware of 
which issues needed to be addressed, and I addressed what otherwise may have been 
difficult topics with ease (Berger, 2015). It also provided me with a more nuanced and 
sensitive understanding of interviewee responses, including aspects that were ‘hidden’ or 
‘unsaid’ (Chavez, 2008; Berger, 2015). As Berger explains in relation to the insider 
interviews she conducted with women with whom she shared migrant status, “I knew what 
to ask and how to ask it […] I was able to hear the unsaid, probe more efficiently, and 
ferret out hints that others might miss” (2015: 223). 
Conversely however, I may have made assumptions about what I knew, and this may have 
led me to miss opportunities to properly understand participants responses or take up 
effective lines of questioning (Daly, 1992a; 1992b, Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Berger, 2015). 
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While it did seem that my insider knowledge was greatly beneficial in terms of knowing 
which issues to address and understanding implied content (Berger, 2015), this very 
knowledge may have also led to blindness to important aspects of participants experiences 
(Daly, 1992b). I attempted to overcome this by checking the meaning of what interviewees 
said with them, or asking them why or in what ways something was the case, even if I 
thought I already knew. I also tried to avoid the potential pitfall of a skewed analysis which 
focused disproportionately on aspects of experiences that we shared, by ensuring that I also 
focused on difference and that I consistently pursued aspects of participants experiences 
with which I was unfamiliar. 
Openness and honesty  
The most significant way in which my insider status and related self-disclosure benefited the 
interviewing process was by facilitating rapport and encouraging openness and honesty, 
enhancing the depth of my research (Farnsworth, 1996; Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). 
Participants responses to the post-interview questions indicated that they perceived me as 
understanding due to my insider status, and that this encouraged openness because they felt 
less judged, that I would interpret their experiences correctly, and that I would be able to 
grasp ‘small’ matters that others would consider insignificant, as well as the complexity of 
the experience of anorexia. One participant understood my insider status as being essential 
to my ability to understand: 
Maddie: No matter how much you read or understand it from an outsider's point of 
view, unless you have been through it you can never fully appreciate the journey of 
what it feels like in the mind (email). 
 
My self-disclosure at times appeared to play a crucial role in facilitating openness and 
honesty. I explored this by using the post-transcription analysis and insights from my 
interview diary to examine how my self-disclosure functioned during the interviews. One 
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way that it functioned was to create an atmosphere of non-judgemental sharing in which 
experiences that are ordinarily ‘unspeakable’, became speakable. This occurred in two ways. 
The first was by me using self-disclosure to ‘speak it first’. I was able to ‘offer up’ an aspect 
of my own experience that I was aware was a matter that often remains hidden in the 
experience of anorexia, to make it ‘OK’ for the participant to reveal a related aspect of 
their experience. In the following example from Mia’s interview, the usually unspoken issue 
in question concerned the ‘self-consciousness’ that someone undergoing treatment for 
anorexia can experience in terms of whether or not they are appearing to behave in an 
expected manner. Picking up on a point made by Mia, I told her I could relate to what she 
had said. Wishing to probe deeper into this, I described a similar experience from my own 
inpatient experience in which I had had to make a decision about whether or not to inform 
staff that they had given me a smaller sized meal than I was supposed to have. The following 
conversation ensued: 
Lauren: for me [this] was about that is not how somebody who is a patient, an 
anorexic patient doesn’t behave like that, an anorexic patient needs to be rejecting 
the food not asking for it [I was] concerned about how other people saw me and I 
wondered, I mean your experience might be completely different […] but is that 
something you can relate to at all? 
 
Mia: Definitely. I think not last week but the week before, they sort of described me 
as chronic, and I’m just like I’m not, and you know what if you are going to describe 
me as that I am going to do it [Mia continues to explain her experience in detail]. 
 
By sharing my own experience of feeling worried about how I was ‘seen’, I opened-up the 
space for Mia to share a related experience. Like Daly (1992b), I found that raising a 
‘sensitive’ issue within the interview based on my own experience enabled me to encourage 
the participant to reflect on this in a non-intimidating way.  
The second way that my self-disclosure created a non-judgemental atmosphere was by me 
using it to show understanding. During the interview with Kelly, she had begun to describe 
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how she had wanted a diagnosis of anorexia when she first sought help from her GP. I had 
then asked her if she could remember why she had wanted the diagnosis. The conversation 
continued: 
Kelly: This is a really bizarre thing, and I really struggle to explain why, all I know is I 
kind of had this overwhelming feeling of really wanting to have the diagnosis. When I 
reflect on it I think it’s because I really wanted to be it was, it sounds really sick to 
say […] 
 
Lauren: I guarantee it’s not going to sound sick to say it  
 
Kelly: It’s almost like, it’s almost like a badge, kind of like a, OK this is like ‘you did it’ 
 
Lauren: Yep, it doesn’t, it doesn’t sound like a ‘sick’ thing, it’s very relatable so, on a 
very personal level I can really, really relate to that [further discussion ensued] 
 
At the point at which the participant became hesitant and was concerned about how her 
experiences would come across, I interjected with reassurance that it would not ‘sound 
sick’. She responded by further explaining her experience, and I was then more explicit 
about my own experience being similar to hers. My demonstration of understanding via self-
disclosure thus prevented the participant from restricting her response through fear of 
negative judgement.  
It need also be recognised that my insider status may have led interviewees to sometimes 
explain their experiences less fully, due to them making assumptions about what I already 
knew (Daly, 1992b; Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Pearce 2010; Berger, 2015). As Natalie wrote: 
“it made me not feel the need to give as "full" answers as I knew you would most likely 
understand where I was coming from with it”. 
Also, when reviewing transcripts, I noticed occasions where my self-disclosure may have 
unintentionally restricted participants ability to speak. This may be because in revealing 
information about myself, I made them no longer feel as though they were being informative 
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by talking of their experiences (Pearce, 2010). Related to this, Abell et al (2006) suggest that 
a researcher’s attempts to construct similarity via self-disclosure can sometimes construct 
the interviewer as having a greater entitlement to speak on the topic in question. In my 
post-interview diary, I also noted an occasion having left an interview and feeling I had 
spoken too much. Noting these concerns through the reflexive strategies, I was able to 
improve my interviewing skills over time.  
The ‘double-edged’ nature of my insider status and self-disclosure meant that while this 
mostly appeared to facilitate openness and honesty, it may also have sometimes restricted 
participants answers. However, overall I found that “the deliberate use of the self in the 
research process helped to unravel the experience of the other” (Daly, 1992b), and that 
bringing in my own experiences to the interview yielded disclosure of more personal and 
deep stories than I imagine would have been possible using a more distanced stance (Berger, 
2015).  
Interviewer-interviewee relations 
Self-disclosure seemed to be beneficial in terms of facilitating the developing relationship 
between myself and participants. Daly (1992b) explains that “a relationship within the 
research context is not unlike any other developing relationship, for which the reciprocity 
of disclosure is crucial for understanding” (Daly, 1992b: 110). In the post-interview question, 
Natalie stated: 
You were quite open to sharing your experiences in the interview […] I'm not sure 
exactly what it did, but it did something useful for me. I guess it made me feel like I 
got to know you a little bit? (email). 
 
One of the impacts of ‘getting to know me’ seemed (to me) to be a reduction in the 
hierarchical power relationship that usually manifests in the expectation that the interviewee 
will reveal detailed, personal information while the interviewer remains relatively 
125 
 
125 
 
anonymous and ‘closed’ (Oakley, 1981). By sharing ‘unspeakable’ aspects of my experiences, 
I made myself vulnerable and risked judgement, and this perhaps helped to ‘level the playing 
field’. That said, interviewer self-disclosure can only go so far in reducing power inequality in 
an interview, given that there are other dimensions of power to consider, such as the 
interviewers’ academic, institutional status (Ross, 2017). In addition, my self-disclosure was 
highly self-selective and in this way I had more control over what I revealed than 
interviewees.  
Competitiveness and comparisons 
I discussed above how participants were initially concerned that being interviewed by me 
may trigger a desire to return to restricted eating/weight loss.  These concerns allude to the 
interpersonal dynamics of comparing and ‘competing’ that can occur among individuals with 
anorexia, and I explored these dynamics in the substantive content of my research. 
Participant’s responses to the post-interview questions therefore sometimes acted as 
material for answering research questions, as well as being a methodologically focused 
reflexive strategy. This can be seen in chapter seven, where I draw on insights from 
participant’s responses to the post-interview questions in my analysis.  
Evaluating interviews 
In various places in the proceeding discussion, I have recognised challenges, strengths and 
limitations linked to the interviews. In this section, I draw on some of these (and other) 
insights to evaluate my research in terms of validity and reliability. I apply these terms in 
ways influenced by Brinkmann and Kvale (2015). They suggest that validity in interviews can 
be assessed by quality of craftmanship, and that it is processual in that it derives from all 
stages of the research project. They describe aspects of validity in relation to seven stages: 
thematizing, designing, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, validating, and reporting. In the 
following, I reflect on select stages of this ‘process validity’ in relation to my own research 
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(see Appendix Three for details on evaluating all seven stages). I provide only brief summary 
points as I draw back on issues already discussed elsewhere in detail.  
Designing – validity depends on adequacy of the design and methods used for the subject matter. 
Interviews were the most appropriate method for gaining insight into participants’ subjective 
experiences and understandings of the diagnosis of anorexia. The flexibility of the interview 
guides and interviewing styles was highly suitable to the subject matter. 
Interviewing – validity pertains to the trustworthiness of subjects reports and the quality of the 
interviewing, which should include careful questioning to the meaning of what is said and a continual 
checking of the information obtained. 
The interview design, including my status as an insider and the flexibility of questioning, likely 
facilitated the trustworthiness of accounts. My insider status and knowledge assisted in 
generating rich, detailed interview material. However, my insider status may have sometimes 
limited what interviewees felt able to share (as discussed above), and my skills as an 
interviewer were sometimes limiting. When reviewing interview transcripts, I noticed places 
where I felt that my questioning seemed to ‘cut interviewees short’, or that it interfered 
with their narrative. I suspect that my self-disclosure also did this on occasion.  I ‘checked 
meaning’ with participants during the interviews (for example, by repeating back to 
interviewees my interpretation of what they had said), and afterwards, by providing them 
the opportunity to review the summary overview of their interview.  
There is also an epistemological point to note here. While it is important that the interview 
material is trustworthy, insight was sometimes derived from the meanings inherent in the 
verbal descriptions and contradictions used by participants, more than the content of what 
they said. This element of analysis does not require interviewee ‘honesty’ as such. 
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Analysing – includes whether the logic of the interpretations made is sound. 
Careful and thorough analysis, in which I employed reflexive strategies to assist 
interpretation, sought to lead to sound interpretations. In addition, discussions with my 
supervisor acted as a weak form of triangulation.  
Reliability in interviews “concerns whether the interview subjects will change their answers 
during an interview and whether they will give different replies to different interviewers” 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015: 281). My insider status impacted on the interview processes 
such that that it is likely that different interviewers would have obtained different responses. 
However, it is precisely my insider status that assisted the depth of interview material 
generated, and allowed the interviews to ‘reach’ aspects they otherwise would not have 
done. Therefore, while the interviews were not reliable in terms of consistency across 
(hypothetical) interviewers, I do not consider this a problem.  
Ethics 
Ethical approval was obtained via the University of Essex49. Ethical guidelines which governed 
this research include the British Sociological Association (2017) Statement of Ethical Practice. 
No serious ethical concerns arose, but there were ethical challenges to navigate. In the 
following discussion, I address these firstly in relation to autoethnography and then 
interviewing, as well as considering ethical dimensions of these methods more broadly. 
The ethics of autoethnography  
Tolich (2010) delineates ten foundational ethical guidelines for novice autoethnographers 
(see Appendix Four), and places these under three broad headings; consent, consultation, 
and vulnerability. I used the guidelines in a flexible manner, with recognition that they had to 
 
49 I also had approval from Beat in the second round of recruitment.  
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be adapted in terms of my own specific case. I base the following discussion of ethical issues 
in my autoethnography loosely around the three aforementioned broad headings.  
Consent  
Ethical complications arising from autoethnography that relate to consent concern the 
identification of others aside from the researcher. Using personal experience implicates 
others. Due to the researcher being identifiable, others are identifiable by association. 
Further, the content of an autoethnographic account may problematically impact the 
‘implicated others’, especially if deals with ‘sensitive’ concerns. Ellis (2007) refers to the 
researcher’s responsibilities to ‘intimate others’ who feature their writing as ‘relational 
ethics’. Autoethnographers have detailed their grappling with these concerns in relation to 
topics such as illness, abuse and intimate relationships (Medford, 2006; Ellis, 2007; Jago, 
2002, 2011; Chatham-Carpenter, 2010; Tamas, 2011). 
I avoided others being personally identifiable by keeping them anonymous, restricting 
information about personal characteristics, and omitting select details of the SEDU I was in. 
Medford (2006) refers to this difference between what an autoethnographer ‘knows’ and 
what they actually write as ‘mindful slippage’. It has been argued that these protective 
devices could problematise the integrity, interpretation, and authenticity of the research 
(Ellis et al, 2011; Delamont, 2009). However, while I restricted information to protect 
others, this did not affect the key analytic insights I made.  
Autoethnographers can obtain retrospective consent from others by seeking their 
permission for the account to be published (Tolich, 2010). The ‘others’ in my account are 
mainly patients and staff involved in my care, and obtaining consent from them was not 
feasible. However, the limited extent to which I directly discuss specific others means that I 
do not consider this ethically problematic. 
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Consultation  
Tolich recommends consulting with others regarding ethical concerns. In my case, it was 
suitable to discuss ethical issues with my supervisor. Tolich also recommends a general 
principle which I applied, and that is to not publish anything that I would not (hypothetically) 
show to the persons discussed (Medford, 2006; Tolich, 2010).  
Vulnerability 
Tolich urges a consideration of ‘internal confidentiality’ (Tolich, 2004). This concerns the 
potential for ‘insiders’ to identify each other within the publication. Most of the information 
concerning insiders in my account is that which other insiders already know (or could be 
reasonably expected to know) due to them having ‘been there’. However, I took care not 
to reveal information about particular individuals which is not ‘general insider knowledge’.  
Autoethnography also raises concerns about vulnerability and protection from harm 
regarding the researcher themselves (Tamas, 2009; Pearce, 2010; Chatham-Carpenter, 
2010; Tolich, 2010; Dashper, 2015). Conducting self-study can be an emotionally draining 
process which places demands on the researcher’s mental wellbeing (Pearce, 2010). 
Chatham-Carpenter discusses the difficulties she faced conducting autoethnographic 
research on anorexia. Retelling her story, confronting past behaviours and speaking to 
others who had experienced anorexia renewed her desire for thinness, and she felt 
compelled to return to anorexia. I did not experience this. When I began my 
autoethnography, I had been ‘recovered’ from anorexia for approximately seven years, and 
was adept at coping with ‘triggers’. Undertaking this research was not the first time that I 
had thought deeply about my past experiences or confronted anorexia in another person. 
That said, being heavily immersed in my past for a significant amount of time was not always 
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easy and could be emotionally challenging. Importantly, any difficulties were short-lived and 
have not had lasting impact. 
I also had to consider the future personal and professional impact of autoethnography (Jago, 
2002; Tolich, 2010; Dashper, 2015). Dashper (2015) urges autoethnographers to consider 
the aftermath of publication. She found that the personal nature of her autoethnography 
about a facial injury led her to feel vulnerable and exposed when others responded to her 
work. I carefully considered this issue prior to undertaking my research and I judged then 
(as I do now) that on balance, the perceived benefits of my autoethnography outweighed 
any personal or professional risks.  
The ethics of interviewing 
In accordance with widely accepted principles of ethical research conduct, written informed 
consent was obtained from interviewees prior to participation in the study, interviewees’ 
information was treated confidentially, and their identity was not revealed to others at any 
point during the research process or in the publication of findings50. Interviewees were 
informed about the nature of the research51 and the potential consequences of taking part in 
writing when deciding whether or not to participate, and verbally at the beginning of the 
interview. They were also informed of their right to withdraw from the research at any time 
and without detriment, and were debriefed after the interview. As previously explained, I 
asked interviewees if they wished to have a copy of their interview transcript and the 
summary overview to review and alter content if they wished. I also made sure participants 
 
50 While confidentiality cannot strictly be assured (Wiles, 2013), I used all reasonable means to prevent 
interviewees from being identified.  
51 There are limitations to just how ‘full’ informed consent can really be, especially in qualitative research 
(Wiles, 2013). It may not be easy for a researcher to fully convey the time and effort that a depth interview will 
involve, what the emotional costs will be and exactly what the interview will reveal (Lee, 1993).  Further, an 
interviewee is unlikely to be informed about all of the technical intricacies of research (Valentine, 2007). 
However, it is necessary to inform the potential participant of what is reasonably to be expected and to inform 
them of those aspects of the research that seem most relevant for ethical purposes. 
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knew how they could seek help if they were unexpectedly distressed after the interview, 
and provided them with information for accessing support from Beat. 
The interviews may be considered ‘sensitive’ because my research “potentially pose[d] a 
substantial threat to those who are or have been involved in it” (Lee, 1993: 4). While it is 
important not to make simplistic distinctions between sensitive and the implied category of 
‘non-sensitive’ research (Coomber and Letherby, 2010), it was vital to recognise the threats 
that the research posed to interviewees. These were of an intrusive nature, because the 
interview addressed private and potentially stressful and emotionally charged topics (Lee, 
1993). Interviewees may have felt uncomfortable, distressed and/or embarrassed during (or 
after) the interview and there was also a risk of ‘eating disordered thoughts’ being 
‘triggered’. In order to minimise these risks, especially vulnerable individuals (those who 
expected that participation would be difficult or challenging and/or those with severely 
compromised health) were not recruited (see participation information sheet, appendix I).  
However, interviews may have been unexpectedly difficult, and I could not know in advance 
how each person would respond to participation in my research (Lee, 1993; Valentine, 
2007; Wiles, 2013). On two occasions, interviewees cried during the interview. I was careful 
in how I responded to these overt signs of emotion. I decided that I need not suggest that 
the interview be terminated, but instead responded to them in a sensitive and non-
judgmental manner, and attempted to empathetically ‘share’ their pain (Lee, 1993). 
Interviews such as these were also challenging for me, as it can be difficult to manage one’s 
own emotions while also ‘taking on board’ interviewee’s distress (Bloor et al, 2007; Wiles, 
2013). 
Interviews that address personal or ‘sensitive’ matters may be unintentionally experienced 
as therapeutic by interviewees (Oakley, 1981; Birch and Miller, 2000; Rossetto, 2014; 
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Valentine, 2007; Grace et al, 2017). While this can be beneficial for them (or for the 
research), when researcher-therapist roles ‘overlap’, the researcher enters “ethically murky 
territory” (Ross, 2017: 6). I recognised that my responding to potential requests for 
information, advice, and support from interviewees (Sword, 1999; Ross, 2017) could be 
problematic if it contributed to a definition of the situation as ‘therapeutic’. However, I did 
not wish to refuse such requests, because I agree with Oakley (1981) that interviewers have 
an ethical obligation to respond to (reasonable) requests of these sorts to reduce the 
exploitative nature of interviewing. Given these complexities, I sought to limit the possibility 
of me overstepping boundaries by clearly stating the limits of my role to participants (Daly, 
1992a). I explained that the goal of the interview was not therapeutic, that interview 
participation was not a substitute for treatment (Grace et al, 2016), and that any personal 
experiences I shared were particular only to me (and should not be taken as any sort of 
advice or suggestion). In practice however, it was sometimes difficult to maintain clear 
boundaries, and I wrestled with a desire to help. This was particularly the case with two 
female interviewees who were both younger than me and ‘in the grips’ of anorexia. These 
participants asked me questions about my recovery, and I sensed that they were looking for 
guidance from me. As Daly (1992a; 1992b) notes, there is a greater likelihood of ‘role 
confusion’ when the interviewer has familiarity with the subject matter and insider status, 
because they may be perceived by the interviewee as an ‘expert’ with lived experience who 
is able to provide answers. During the course of interviewing these participants, I came to 
care about them as people who were struggling, and felt a strong desire to emotionally 
support them. I therefore attempted to be empathetic, caring, and understanding, and I 
answered their questions honestly, but did not offer any direct advice.  
My self-disclosure during interviews required ethical consideration, because there is 
potential for this to emotionally burden interviewees (Valentine, 2007; Ross, 2017). I judged 
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the appropriateness of self-disclosure ‘in the moment’. I became especially aware of my 
need to be sensitive to the unpredictable ways in which my self-disclosure could impact 
participants following the second interview (with Anna), after feedback I received from her 
about my mentioning of my binge-eating during recovery: 
Anna: The only thing that was trickier I think was your mentioning after how you left 
treatment and did go through a phase where the ‘wolf’ [urge to eat] came out and 
your eating disorder continued but because you were no longer low weight you 
were considered recovered. This has been a huge fear of mine since I began 
restricting, that fear ‘If I start eating, I’ll eat and eat and never stop.’ […] But it’s also 
reassuring in a way for you to see this fear as actually realistic […] your mentioning 
it was like a reminder that that fear still lurks in the back of my mind (obviously you 
didn’t put it there!) (email). 
 
Chapter three summary 
In this chapter, I have examined the methods used in my research, namely, autoethnography 
and interviews. This has included a justification of my decisions to use these methods and of 
the theoretical orientations and practical strategies I adopted within them. I have also 
evaluated my use of each of these methods. A key point that can be drawn from these 
evaluations is that, while my personal experiences and subjective positioning have needed to 
be reflexively managed and have at times added complexity and challenge to the research, 
they have also been a valuable resource. In the autoethnography, they have acted as 
research material for direct interpretation and analysis. In the interviews, I have been able to 
draw on them in such a way as to better understand participants.  
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Chapter Four 
Becoming a diagnosis: an autoethnography 
In this chapter, I ‘retell’ and analyse my experiences of anorexia drawing on material from 
my medical notes and diaries. I begin by addressing the emergence of my eating related 
struggles, and the circumstances and processes through which I sought help for these, was 
diagnosed with anorexia, and came to draw the diagnosis into my self-understanding. I then 
address how, around the time of being diagnosed, I developed ambivalence towards 
anorexia, and in this circumstance agreed to an inpatient admission at an adult SEDU. This is 
followed by an examination of my experiences of inpatient treatment, with a focus on the 
ideas and meanings of anorexia that I encountered, and how I engaged with them. I then 
turn to explore how, over time, being positioned as ‘anorexic’ and experiencing the 
restrictions of being in hospital under section became increasingly problematic and 
exacerbated aspects of my distress.  I conclude using aspects of Brinkmann’s (2016) heuristic 
model of living with a psychiatric diagnosis as a broad framework for making sense of my 
experiences, especially in terms of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ anorexia. In addition to sometimes 
quoting material from my medical notes and diary extracts, I also include ‘memory recalls’, 
presented in italics. These describe subjective experiences from the past, but are written in 
the present tense, as if I were writing the extract at that time.  
Coming to identify with anorexia 
It is difficult to define the beginning of anorexia (Darmon, 2017). I could begin with the 
period in which I first recognised myself as ‘eating disordered’. Or I could begin with the 
time when ‘symptoms’ first began. I could reach further back still, to concerns about my 
body size in my early teens, or back yet again to my childhood where the roots of my 
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anorexia possibly lie. It is fair to say that there are many possible beginnings, and here I have 
chosen one; my first decision to diet. 
I am 16 years old shopping with my boyfriend when I go into Topshop to try on a pair of 
jeans. As I stand in the changing room wearing them, I turn to look in the mirror and am 
struck by how fat I look. Upset, I leave the shop quickly and insist that we head home. We 
go back to the car and I cry, telling my boyfriend how unhappy I am with my body. I feel 
utterly miserable on the drive home. As I sit in silence and ruminate over the image in the 
mirror, it occurs to me that I will go on a diet and lose weight. In this moment of realisation, 
I sense a definite shift occur in my mind. I don’t take time to consider how or whether the 
dieting will work, I simply know that it is going to happen. I plan to eat Ryvita for lunch 
(memory recall).  
 
During the five or so years prior to my decision to diet I had increasingly considered that 
my peers were slimmer than me and that I was ‘too fat’. My upset in the changing room that 
day was an eruption of the sadness and shame about my body that had been building for 
some time. Like many who come to be diagnosed with anorexia, I had had a history of 
‘normal’ dieting which gradually transformed into an unrelenting pursuit of weight loss 
(Walsh, 2013). Darmon (2017) suggests that this dieting is part of a deliberate and 
determined self-transformation in which the individual makes a direct break from the past 
and initiates engagement into a longer term ‘anorexic career’. The aspect of self-
transformation that I had consciously sought through dieting was focused on my physicality; 
I had wanted what I regarded as an acceptable body. 
I dieted by restricting my intake of ‘fatty’ foods. Adopting the dominant ‘diet thinking’ of that 
time, I created my own set of rules to avoid fat, such as not consuming more than 30 grams 
of fat per day, and eliminating food such as cheese, chocolate and butter. My dieting was 
‘successful’; it wasn’t too arduous, I lost weight, and occasionally received positive 
comments from peers. McLorg and Taub (1987) explain such comments in terms of the 
initial dieting conforming to cultural values of slimness. However, they note that as this 
weight loss increases, it starts to transgress social norms, and others may then respond to it 
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as deviant (McLorg and Taub, 1987; Darmon, 2017). On this occasion, my dieting did not 
reach the point of ‘deviance’, because I still ate a ‘normal’ amount and the foods I restricted 
were those that were considered by many to be ‘unhealthy’. The diet lasted around a year 
before I reverted back to eating ‘normally’.  
At age 19, I left the family home to move in with my best friend and go to university about 
an hour away. A year prior to this, aged 18, I had returned to dieting, again motivated by a 
sense that I was ‘too fat’. This sense had been heightened by spending time with a new 
friend to whom I directly compared myself; she was smaller than me and would openly 
comment on her weight and eating habits. During this bout of dieting, I experienced 
occasional episodes of overeating in which I would break my self-imposed diet rules – which 
continued to be based around the avoidance of fat - and eat beyond fullness. Over the next 
three to four years, during the period in which I first left home, I lived out a cycle of dieting 
and overeating - and accompanying weight loss and gain – which became increasingly 
intense. Strict dieting led to overwhelming hunger, and this in turn led to overeating, panic, 
further overeating, and attempts to fix the problem through stricter dieting. During these 
years, my mum commented on my weight loss when this occurred, but did not seem to 
show any outward concern. My close friend did show some concern, and occasionally 
pointed out how unusual my eating habits had become. I did not consider myself to have a 
‘clinical eating disorder’, but my eating did feel problematic. Retrospectively, I view my binge 
eating as an understandable physiological and psychological response to my restrictive 
eating. However, I made no link between the two extremes of behaviour at that time. 
Instead, bingeing felt like a personal moral failing which interrupted my otherwise successful 
dieting.  
On a number of occasions I sought help, motivated by a desire to end the binge eating. At 
the age of 18 I saw a GP who described me as having “an eating disorder – like - bulimia and 
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anxiety” (Medical notes, GPs, 30th July 2003). On two occasions I was referred for therapy 
(such as cognitive behavioural therapy) but did not continue beyond the initial appointments. 
The nature of my eating was repeatedly shifting – from under eating to over eating - and 
accordingly so was my motivation to engage with help. When my dieting was successful, I 
had no reason to change. Here I remember my thoughts when I was 20: 
I am in the third year of my degree and living in a shared student house. I spend a lot of 
time focusing on my studies, which I am taking increasingly seriously. When I go to bed at 
the end of each day knowing I’ve worked hard on my assignments and eaten little, I feel 
satisfied. For the first time, I am incorporating exercise into my attempts to lose weight and 
I go with a housemate to the gym. At the induction a member of staff weighs me and notes 
that I am slightly underweight for my height, but that it isn’t a cause for concern. I would 
prefer to be more underweight and for it to be a cause for concern, but the realisation that 
my weight is getting down into new lows is thrilling none the less. I catch myself in the 
mirror and notice that I look unusually and pleasingly thin (memory recall).  
 
Later that year: 
I have recently finished my degree and am at home packing boxes ready to move out of the 
student house. I am stuffed full of food, nauseous and unable to concentrate on the task at 
hand. Driven by an overwhelming urge to taste and chew food, I go to the shop next door 
and buy sweets which I eat alone in my bedroom. I finish them and feel immense self-
disgust. I lie on the floor of the packed-up room, dig my nails into the carpet and cry 
through sheer frustration at my inability to stop myself from eating (memory recall). 
 
Still aged 20, towards the end of the last year of my degree, I began to develop a sense that I 
was struggling with a ‘mild eating disorder’. I had bought a self-help book for ‘overcoming 
binge eating and bulimia’, and strongly identified with the first-hand descriptions of the chaos 
and shame involved in bingeing. I also noticed a difference in my relationship with food 
compared to those around me, and was unable to recall the ability to be ‘careless’ like they 
were. How could my housemates (who were other university students) simply order a 
takeaway, enjoy it, and then stop eating? Others had also started to comment on my weight 
and behaviour. A notable memory is of me sat on a train reading the calorie content of 
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foods in a nutrition book. My then boyfriend, who was feeling exasperated by my growing 
‘obsession’ with food, pointed out how abnormal this was. I had not thought it abnormal 
until he said this.  
Motivated by worry about gaining weight by bingeing, I attended an appointment at a local 
charity-run eating disorder service. I explained my eating habits and concerns that I might 
have an eating disorder like bulimia (minus the vomiting). The counsellor suggested that 
perhaps it was not bulimia I was experiencing, but anorexia. I was surprised. I knew that my 
dieting was extreme, but I had not thought of it as anorexia. Surely I wasn’t thin enough, and 
surely I liked food too much?  
Thinking of myself as ‘anorexic’ felt presumptuous, and like an overstatement of my weight 
loss. Further, maintaining food restriction was like walking a tight rope; at any moment I 
could slip, lose control of my eating and gain weight. Associating myself with the diagnosis 
invoked anxiety that I was not good enough to warrant it (Lavis, 2011), and I was therefore 
wary of doing so. Yet, to some extent, I also wanted to identify with anorexia. The word felt 
rewarding, marking out a level of seriousness I had never thought I would achieve, and 
offering a valued sense of distinction (Warin, 2010). I liked the idea that I had taken food 
restriction far enough to be defined as clinically ill. I recall as a teenager about 14 years of 
age, being fascinated by a magazine article about a young woman who had ‘recovered’ from 
anorexia. The ‘before’ and ‘after’ pictures juxtaposed images of her obviously emaciated 
body against how she looked once ‘recovered’. Reading the article, anorexia had seemed 
other-worldly. When the counsellor had used the word to describe me, she was suggesting 
that I had somehow stepped foot into that other world - that ordinary Lauren had achieved 
something extraordinary. In addition, I had attended this appointment thinking of myself as 
experiencing some variant of bulimia, and considering it as anorexia instead seemed 
preferable. This accords with literature which suggests that bulimia is often culturally 
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understood, and experienced by individuals with eating disorders as, ‘failed anorexia’ and a 
‘lesser’ diagnosis (Squire, 2003; Eli, 2018; Frey, 2019). 
After the diagnosis had been suggested, I did not continue with appointments. I moved out 
of the county temporarily to work as a waitress over the summer, and also experienced 
some distressing binge eating whereby my worries about losing my thinness were 
confirmed. It became too painful to ‘face up’ to my eating patterns and I no longer wanted 
help.  
By the age of 21, my eating had settled back down into a relatively ‘normal’ pattern. While 
living with my partner and studying for a Masters degree, I started work as a research 
assistant and shortly afterwards developed an abscess on my gums. This made eating difficult 
and I consequently lost a little weight. This unintentional weight loss pleased me and 
motivated a further period of food restriction which eventually led to intentional, sustained 
and marked weight loss. One evening I had been unable to finish eating a slice of pizza 
because of the pain from the abscess. Three to four months later, I was meticulously 
monitoring and severely restricting my calorie intake. I was thrilled by the discovery that I 
was able to lose significant amounts of weight. Intoxicated by new extremes of food refusal, 
my enamour fuelled its escalation. 
I am lying with my boyfriend in the park on a sunny day. I am happy. I weighed myself this 
morning and the number was a new low. As I lay on the grass with the warm sun on my 
skin, I think about how I have been feeling increasingly physically weak recently. I am aware 
that my food intake is very restrictive and that there is now a whole range of foods I will not 
eat. It is getting harder now, but it seems worth it. I just need to keep it up (Memory 
recall).   
 
Gradually, my restricted eating shifted from being something that I simply wanted to do 
(despite it posing some difficulties), to something that I wanted to continue but also found 
extremely problematic. I started to feel constantly weak, everyday tasks became arduous, I 
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struggled to concentrate on work, and I was no longer finding pleasure in activities that I 
had previously enjoyed. Recognising the extent to which I felt ‘stuck’ in my restrictive eating 
patterns and was obsessively concerned with my weight, I gradually came to understand 
myself as someone who was suffering with anorexia. I had begun to understand my 
restricted eating in terms of the diagnosis since it was first suggested by the counsellor and 
this understanding strengthened as my weight loss became more extreme and problematic 
and I read more books about anorexia. Four months into this bout of weight loss, I started 
weekly appointments at the eating disorder charity I had attended previously and went to 
my GP, where a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa was officially recorded for the first time. 
When seeking help on this occasion, I described myself as having anorexia, and the diagnosis 
was immediately assumed and referred to in appointments. Around the time I reinitiated 
help-seeking, I also began keeping a diary, something which in itself reflects the new meaning 
that food restriction and weight loss had taken on.  
Over the following three to four months, I continued with weekly appointments at the EDS 
and with my GP, where I expressed a desire to change due to how much I was suffering. I 
was lacking energy and feeling light-headed and constantly cold. Life was now very restricted 
and monotonous. My mood flattened, I lost interest in anything other than food and weight, 
and others commented that my personality had left me. Nothing made me happy anymore. 
Yet, I simultaneously did not want to stop restricting food. I was captivated by weight loss 
and unable to imagine living without this exciting ‘thing’ in my life. I relished the secrecy and 
privacy; I had something that was mine and that no one else could touch. The private 
knowledge that I was successfully starving felt like a reassuring, comforting presence. The big 
and important things that had previously mattered – such as academic achievement and 
doing something meaningful with my life - did not matter so much, so long as I was losing 
weight. With anorexia, I felt less raw, less threatened by the risk of failure. No matter what 
141 
 
141 
 
else happened, I had this. Torn between staying in my pseudo-protective state of starvation, 
and an ever-increasing sense of guilt for the ‘proper life’ I was not living, I was highly 
ambivalent. Ambivalence is a commonly recognised experience among individuals diagnosed 
with anorexia, and results from a recognition that one’s self-starvation performs apparently 
‘useful’ functions, in addition to being intensely problematic (see e.g. Colton and Pitrang, 
2004; Williams and Reid, 2010; Lavis, 2011). Anorexia is “a form of distress that can make 
its sufferers feel better as well as worse” (Rance et al, 2017b: 127). 
At the eating disorder service I was given guidance on increasing my food intake, which I 
intended to follow, but did not. Undercutting the meal plan became a way of reproducing 
the safety that anorexia offered (Lavis, 2011).  
I haven’t tried to lose more weight, but I consciously let it happen. I want to get 
better but the relief at seeing the scales go down (or stay the same) and the sense of 
achievement that comes with the feeling of emptiness and hunger in my stomach 
builds a big security blanket that I don’t want to let go of. If I’m not restricting 
calories; counting calories; weighing myself; thinking about what I eat, then I feel 
scared, anxious, out of control, panicky and lost. I can literally feel the anxiety wash 
away when I count up a days calories and realise I’ve ‘beaten’ my ‘target’ (I’ve eaten 
less than what is set out on the eating plan) (Diary, 22nd July 2006).  
 
Over time, my identification with anorexia strengthened all the more. This is reflected in my 
diary entries, which refer increasingly to ‘my anorexia’ and to disorder-based understandings 
of my struggles: 
The conflict between the want to get better and the need to be thin makes me 
question a lot about my ‘disorder’. How much is this disorder mine? How much is it 
something externally imposed on me? Can I get better through a series of choices? 
Or is there too much in the way of making these choices? […] What am I – who am 
I – what do I have if I let go of my ‘disorder’? (Diary, 26th July 2006). 
 
About three months after the diagnosis had been recorded, the GP asked me whether I 
would consider an admission at a SEDU. Wanting to change but unable to do so alone, I 
agreed. In the six-week wait to be admitted, I became increasingly desperate.  
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I am at home in my flat having a shower on the evening of my 22nd birthday. My friends 
are in the front room, they have come to see me. I have the shower water very hot in an 
attempt to warm me up. This is futile. The cold, seemingly impossibly, continues to radiate 
from the inside, even while the scorching hot water creates red marks all over my skin. I 
begin to feel sick and faint and decide to climb out of the shower. I am weak and breathless 
with a constant buzzing ringing through my ears. As I bend down while drying myself, the 
veins in my arms bulge from my skin as if they might explode. I feel unreal. I stand on the 
scales and the red digits flash a new number; I have lost another pound. In that moment, I 
don’t feel the euphoric elation I usually do when losing weight. Instead, I think: ‘What am I 
doing to myself? I really should eat.’ It occurs to me that I cannot. I go to my bedroom, sit 
on the bed, and cry (Memory recall).  
 
Despite my desperation, I questioned the legitimacy of my anorexia and need for inpatient 
treatment. Making reference to a lay construction of the diagnosis, I considered I fell short 
of what I thought of as ‘proper anorexia’. I imagined this involved being emaciated to a 
greater extent than I perceived myself to be, and actively fearing food. Not only did I not 
fear food, but I desperately wanted to eat it, I just could not allow myself to for worry about 
weight gain. I also imagined that proper anorexia occurred for people who were so deeply 
troubled that they lacked appetite, whereas my struggles involved me trying to squash and 
contain a desperate appetite. There therefore seemed to be something pretend about what 
I was doing, and as though my anorexia was not serious enough for inpatient treatment. In 
emails to a friend (who was also diagnosed with an eating disorder and whom I had met 
online), I explained:       
I am too fat to stay as an inpatient. Inpatients are usually desperately thin, on their 
death bed, shockingly emaciated, I’m not […] my BMI is 13.6, which must be wrong. 
That is not me with a distorted anorexic way of thinking; I’m just not that skinny! 
Very thin, yes […] completely emaciated and in need of hospitalisation I am not! 
(email, 3rd October 2006).  
 
Waiting to begin treatment, I was caught up in two opposing but simultaneous positions in 
relation to the diagnosis of anorexia. I strongly identified with it, recognising as I did the 
nature of my suffering in the clinical, self-help and autobiographical books I read about 
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anorexia. However, I also doubted it. I did not match up to the idea of anorexia that I had in 
mind, which I understood as considerably more severe. 
Admission to the SEDU: Encountering anorexic scripts 
I arrived at the unit on a Monday morning, and a few hours later ate my first lunch sitting 
with staff. I will never forget that meal (I can still remember exactly how it tasted) and I 
struggle to fully comprehend how I simply sat down and finished it all, having found it 
impossible to increase my food intake at home. However, it is likely that I was so bound up 
in the expectation that this is what I would do (completing meals was non-negotiable, and it 
is what all the other patients did), that it did not even occur to me that I might not. 
During the first few weeks I gradually got used to the hospital routines and learned what 
was expected of patients. I did not want to gain weight, but in some respects enjoyed eating 
and was grateful that I ‘had to’. I worried that this enjoyment of food proved the 
fraudulence of my anorexia. Aware that a patient in an SEDU should be not wanting to eat, 
as appeared to be the case for other patients, I kept these concerns to myself.  
After so long of being so very hungry and eating very limited food stuffs, being forced 
to eat a (half-sized) normal meal was almost a welcome relief […] A proper anorexic 
would no way be pleased at the sight of the plate of food I just ate […] I’m a greedy 
person who wants to stuff their face in the body of someone with a low BMI (Diary, 
9th October 2006).  
 
My diaries from this time allude to the two subjective positions that I constantly shifted 
between; one was that my anorexia was fraudulent and pretend (I was not anorexic at all), 
and the other was that I was not a ‘good’ anorexic (I was not anorexic enough).  
The fact that I’m not trying to get out of eating butter when I eat a meal here means 
I’m not trying hard enough. I was never a good anorexic in the first place because 
surely then the butter would be harder? I’m a fraud case, I’m not anorexic. I want my 
anorexia (Diary, 14th October 2006). 
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These positions were heightened by comparisons with other patients, who concerned me 
immediately upon being admitted. On the second day, having spoken with them, I described 
my comparative sense of inadequacy:  
All the other girls have been loads skinnier than me. Some of them have been in 
[general] hospital because they’ve been that underweight. And then there’s me. Thin, 
but not exactly emaciated (Diary, 10th October 2006).  
 
This sense of inadequacy was also enhanced by well-meaning comments from staff. I was 
told that I had a good chance of recovery because this was my first admission and first phase 
of severe anorexia. I had voluntarily sought help, too; these were good signs. I took this to 
mean I was not as anorexic as other anorexics.  
Initially, the weight gain did not feel too difficult. I knew that I did not want to lose my 
thinness, but something about the change in context (hospital rather than home) made the 
scale reading relatively meaningless to me. However, a few months in, I began to see the 
changes on my body, and things became hard: 
Struggling today with my size. I feel so much bigger these last few days […] There 
have been two new admissions in the past few days and I hate it. It really screws me 
up seeing extremely thin people, especially when they so openly struggle […] I don’t 
feel deserving of time and attention from staff, especially in comparison to new 
admissions […] they are pleased they are not as fat as I am (Diary, 18th January 
2007).  
 
New admissions reminded me of what I no longer was. Extremely thin, noticeably struggling 
patients who appeared to need care were the embodiment of anorexia, whereas I was not. 
The more the patient struggled with eating, and the thinner they appeared, the more they 
threatened the legitimacy of my own struggles and the less I rightfully belonged to anorexia. 
Describing a newly admitted patients ‘non-compliance’, I wrote in my diary: 
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The new admission is a complete nightmare. She refused to eat all of her food and 
somehow got away with it?! Then she spent ages kicking up, screaming and crying. I 
just cannot stand it. It’s fucking typical that [my named nurse’s] other patient is that 
kind of patient. It makes me feel so fat! […] I wish I could wear clothes that just hid 
me completely so that no one could see any of me, ever. So that I didn’t have to see 
myself (Diary, 30th January 2007). 
 
As I continued treatment and started to approach a ‘healthy’ weight, I felt increasingly 
conflicted. Continuing weight gain involved an ongoing search for (what I referred to at the 
time as) ‘permission’. This meant being able to make choices that worked against anorexia, 
without entirely undoing my sense that I was anorexic, and overlaps with what Lavis (2011) 
calls ‘compromise’. She details how individuals in treatment use compromises, such as 
relinquishing responsibility for their eating, to allow them to consume food but prevent it 
from breaching their sense of self. One way I searched for permission was by convincing 
myself that I simply ‘had’ to continue to eat. In the example below, I was going home on 
leave for a weekend and was struggling with the idea of adhering to my meal plan, something 
that I enabled myself to do by positioning myself as not having a choice. 
If I don’t gain my set kilo a week by deliberately not eating enough, then I will be 
discharged. So I had no choice but to go home and eat everything (Diary, 25th 
February 2007). 
 
The ability to locate responsibility for eating in the treatment programme was a 
compromise that, in some ways, made inpatient treatment appealing. Early in my admission I 
wrote: 
I would probably cope here with weight gain, because the fat on my body wouldn’t 
be down to me - it would be in the control of someone else so I could just blame 
them. You’re in a shell, protected from the rest of the world. You don’t have to face 
all the consequences of fatness, just being fat and hiding away (Diary, 15th October 
2006). 
 
Nearing ‘normal weight’ also made it even more difficult to be around other patients. 
Describing a therapeutic group, I explained in my diary: 
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[We were] looking at pros and cons of changing anorexic behaviours […] Makes me 
feel like shit because I’m sat there blatantly one of the fattest people in the room and 
it looks to an outsider like I don’t have any anorexic behaviours (Diary, 7th March 
2007). 
 
I considered that my size revealed that I was bad at anorexia. If thinness is indicative of one’s 
successful moral resolve against hunger (Lavis, 2011), being (or nearing) a ‘normal’ weight 
belied my lack of success. Body fat indicated my disloyalty to anorexia, and disloyalty felt like 
an immense loss.  
After twenty-four weeks in treatment, I temporarily reached a BMI of 19 before deliberately 
undercutting my meal plan. As I neared the end of my admission, my weight was becoming 
my own responsibility again (I was now eating away from staff), and accordingly my 
‘permission’ frittered away. Further, my partner and I split up, in part (I feel) due to my 
preoccupation with self-starvation, and the time I spent away in treatment. This made my 
imminent discharge feel even more uncertain.  
I’m absolutely dreading being discharged […] I don’t want anything - the job, friends 
– nothing (and) I don’t want to have to find somewhere new to live. I have actually 
considered, like properly considered suicide as a real option, but I don’t want to die 
[…] I just don’t want to have to deal, cope, get by etc in the real world when I feel 
this depressed (Diary, 27th April 2007). 
 
Being an inpatient for eight months had disconnected me from ‘the real world’. I had 
previously wanted to recover for the sake of my personal relationships, job and other 
interests, but over time these lost their motivational influence. Rather than being immersed 
in ‘normal life’, I had been in a unit where anorexia was ever present - in other patients, in 
the treatment programme, in my daily interactions. I was used to anorexia being the 
standpoint from which I related to others, and the way that I understood myself. It was now 
even more familiar to me than ever before. Not only this, but I had also been exposed to a 
new, ‘other’ anorexia, which was more than my own self-starving. It was an anorexia that 
147 
 
147 
 
was bound up with clinical activity and involved being really sick - multiple hospital 
admissions; concerned doctors; deathly low weights; being detained; physical complications; 
bed rest; threats of tube feeding52. I suggest that this ‘serious anorexia’ can be understood as 
an ‘anorexic script’ (Brinkmann, 2016). ‘Anorexic scripts’ emanate from the diagnosis of 
anorexia and ascribe expectations of how the individual with anorexia behaves, their 
physical appearance and motivations, and how their distress psychologically manifests. There 
are numerous overlapping ‘anorexic scripts’ which informed my own (and, as I show in 
chapter seven, also participants’) self-understandings and the performance of the diagnosis in 
important ways. ‘Serious anorexia’ is a script dictating absolute committal to food refusal, 
extreme self-starvation and emaciation, and – crucially - clinical recognition of physical 
illness. I saw this anorexia in others and their treatment and I heard it in their histories. I 
saw it in the ‘high dependency’ rooms on the unit, with special mattresses for the other 
patients whose weight was so low they would otherwise get bed sores. It was detailed to 
me by staff, who told of the threats anorexia posed to me in the future if I did not ‘recover’ 
now. The SEDU privileged this ‘serious anorexia’, which for me carried intangible overtones 
of success and achievement. As Lavis argues, the clinical practices associated with anorexia 
form part of the desire for it: “through both its legitimisation of, and intervention into, 
‘anorexia-as-illness’, the clinic itself […] is central to pro-anorexic desire” (2011: 279). To 
me, it seemed remarkable, and was elusively appealing. Beginning with this first admission, 
gradually (and imperceptibly at that time), my ‘wanting’ was shaped by the SEDU and clinical 
discourse I was immersed in. My sense that I needed to lose weight was no longer only 
about wishing to return to the ‘psychological benefits’ of extreme food restriction. It was 
 
52 ‘Tube feeding’ refers to the use of a nasogastric feeding tube to “promote weight gain and to correct severe 
nutritional deficiencies” (Kells and Kelly-Weeder, 2016: 450). It is a practice used in the treatment of ‘severe’ 
eating disorders, clinical guidelines for which state that “the preferred route of feeding is oral. However, some 
patients fail to gain weight when fed orally […] Others may resist weight gain by any means and in such cases 
compulsory treatment (always under the relevant mental health legislation) using nasogastric intubation and 
feeding may be necessary” (RCP, 2014). 
148 
 
148 
 
also about desiring the diagnosis of anorexia itself (Lavis, 2011), and the construction of it I 
had encountered in treatment.  
Once discharged, I continued the weight loss that had begun on the unit, although I was not 
really sure why. None the less, two weeks later, I was back at work and had moved in with 
my close friend. However, I felt incapable of doing my job, struggled to adjust to life out of 
hospital, and was extremely lonely. An unshakable feeling of displacement cemented my 
continuing weight loss, and I began to more actively seek a return to anorexia, now with a 
clear picture in mind as to how this should ‘look’. I restricted my diet much faster than I had 
previously, and as a result felt far worse physically and was utterly miserable. I had constant 
nausea and a low-pitched hum ringing through my head, which I imagined to be a physical 
manifestation of my low mood. As others (friends, family and my community team) 
expressed concern that my rapid weight loss would continue, I felt anxious about not losing 
enough weight to meet this expectation. “[I’m] concerned that everyone is concerned. In 
case I don’t lose more and all the fuss is over nothing (what a terrible anorexic!)” (Diary, 
29th May 2007). 
My community team seemed exasperated, as I was not only very open about my weight loss, 
but also about the fact that I would not even try to stop it. Their concerns for my physical 
health escalated when a blood test indicated muscle wastage and eight weeks after I had 
been discharged from the unit, a referral was made for me to return.  
Relapse of anorexia […] Has ruled out any possibility of community-based treatment 
working […] weight almost certain to go down further […] mood blunted with little 
emotion evident. Rational acknowledgement of the consequences of continuing as at 
present but inability to do anything to change things (Medical notes, community 
team, 3rd July 2007). 
 
At my pre-admission assessment at the SEDU, I was told that the speed of my weight loss 
meant that I risked being sectioned and admitted elsewhere (to a general ward or 
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psychiatric unit) if I did not agree to an admission. I agreed, and used the three-day wait to 
be admitted to lose more weight. I wrote in my diary that I needed “to be as low 
weight/look the thinnest possible for my admission”. I had wanted to show through my body 
that I deserved to be called anorexic (Warin, 2010), and that my admission to the unit was 
justified.  
The first few days of this second admission I was utterly disoriented and confused, and as I 
began eating, overwhelmed by the sensation of food in my stomach. I wrote in my diary: 
I don’t even know what the date is. I hardly even know what’s going on. It’s been 
horrible. I feel like I’ve just been thrown in and everyone assumes I know what I’m 
doing because I’ve been here before […] I am so not with it. I feel completely 
hideous for the food I’ve eaten […] My head is somewhere else, my leg muscles feel 
strange, I feel a bit high like I’ve taken something (Diary four, 12th July 2007). 
 
Medical notes from the same day state: 
Anxious and tearful young Caucasian female […] rapport – poor (tearful and 
unwilling to speak) […] mood low, judgement and insight partial (recognises her 
poor health and inability to cope well) (Medical notes, SEDU, 12th July 2007).  
 
I immediately compared myself to other patients: 
There are some girls here who are so, so, thin. Wish I was more like them, so that 
maybe people would care that I am eating, or I would feel more justified in looking 
like I don’t want to eat. I feel as though everyone thinks I am putting on a show 
(Diary, 12th July 2007).  
 
The culture on the unit was different from how it had been previously, due to there being 
some patients who were under section and (more or less openly) not ‘complying with the 
programme’. Their presence underlined to me the possibility of being on the SEDU as an 
involuntary patient. I found the idea that, in contrast to them, I was choosing to be in 
treatment and therefore choosing to eat, distressing: 
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Lauren spoke about feeling undeserving and confused about why she’s here i.e. feels 
‘normal’ and ‘too big’ etc […] expressing much distress at ‘choosing’ to be here, 
much guilt after and during eating (medical notes, SEDU, 13th July 2007). 
 
In response to this distress, on the third day, I did not finish my breakfast. By the next day, I 
had almost entirely stopped eating and was covertly exercising. I was then told that I would 
be sectioned if I did not eat my lunch, but I could not wholly believe this would happen (not 
to me; I was not a serious-enough anorexic). This ultimatum that had been given to me by 
staff defined the ‘anorexic’ option for me, and I now ‘had’ to not eat, otherwise I would be 
taking the less-anorexic route. So I did not even try. Medical notes from this time describe: 
Lauren lacks the ability to ‘hear’ how ill she is […] she cannot hold the distress of 
having to eat herself to better health. Her reasoning is illogical, she refuses to let 
herself be encouraged to be fed […] (she) is currently physically unstable and lacks 
the insight to agree informally to treatment (Medical notes, SEDU, 16th July 2008). 
 
That afternoon I was placed on bedrest and constant observations53 and sectioned54, on the 
grounds of an abnormal electrocardiogram (ECG) reading, my BMI dropping below a certain 
critical level and staff’s resulting wish to be able to tube feed me against my will if I did not 
eat.  
I stayed on bedrest for a week. During this time, I was taken to the general hospital site for 
a heart echo and scan of my lungs, due to health concerns including a suspected blood clot 
on my lungs. During the heart echo I lay on my back topless on a cushioned, cold bed, a 
nurse from the unit to one side, and the clinician performing the test stood to the other. In 
 
53 ‘Constant observations’ is terminology which refers to the mental health nursing practice of ‘special 
observation’. This involves “maintaining an increased level of observation over particular patients when they 
are acutely ill […] with the purpose of maintaining safety and reducing the risk of adverse incidents” (Chu, 
2016: 21). The SEDU I was in adopted a commonly used framework of 4 different levels of observations of 
patients. Level 1 was ‘General observation’, level 2 ‘Intermittent observation’, level 3 ‘within eyesight’, and 
level 4 ‘within arm’s length’. The latter two levels were known as ‘constant observation’, because these involve 
the nursing staff remaining in very close proximity to the patient at all times (Chu, 2016). 
54 I was placed on a section 3, also known as a ‘section for treatment’. This is used to detain someone for 6 
months.  
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this situation, I no longer felt like the ‘stubborn anorexic’ I was becoming on the SEDU, but 
like a compliant and potentially critically ill patient. None the less, I still did not feel like I 
belonged here. I looked down at my body, and no matter how hard I tried, I could not see 
the deathly thin anorexic body that I imagined this situation required. They don’t think I am 
thin enough for this, I thought. Looking at the black and white 3D image of my heart on the 
screen, I momentarily felt differently about my body. The very private ‘psychological’ 
experience that was my anorexia had been transformed into an organic reality on the 
screen in front of me, to be experienced by others, as well as me. I temporarily saw my 
body not as an entity to will against, but as biologically dependent and mortal. Briefly, death 
felt like a possibility as opposed to some abstract, meaningless threat, and I felt sorry for my 
body, as if it were another person I had mistreated. 
I recall an occasion from this time when my psychiatrist stood talking to me while I was on 
bedrest, and told me starkly ‘Lauren, your anorexia is killing you’. In that moment, I wanted 
so badly to connect to what he had said, to find something to cling to amidst the 
precariousness of the vision I had of myself as properly anorexic. Indeed, serious medical 
conditions, in playing the fine line between life and death, can give more credibility to the 
diagnosis of anorexia (Warin, 2010). But the words were ghost-like and ungraspable, unable 
to do the job of confirming my anorexia. 
The results of the heart echo and scan were ‘clear’, but due to ongoing concern for my 
physical health, staff decided to tube feed me. When I was told, I was overcome with 
distress and sedated. The idea of gaining weight was difficult enough, but, following such an 
intense period of starvation, the thought of not even having the consolation benefit of eating 
food was unbearable (although believing that an anorexic should not be wanting to eat, I 
could not have actually said this). I also felt overwhelmed by the idea of liquid calories 
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entering into my body without my actions (eating) mediating the process. It seemed that 
being tube fed would completely unravel me. 
Due in part to my persuasive negotiations with staff, I was not fed through the tube for long, 
although it stayed in situ for a few weeks so that it could be used if needed (if I refused to 
eat). Over the next few months, the tube, along with completion of meals, bedrest, constant 
observations, cigarette breaks and my use of the wheelchair, became sites of negotiation 
with staff and were utilised in the micro-boundaries instated to manage my behaviour. The 
tube was sometimes reinserted for one-off ‘feeds’, and I was occasionally ‘controlled and 
restrained’ and ‘force fed’ using the tube. 
Wearing the tube allowed me to negotiate my positioning, both personally and socially, as 
someone who was eating but none the less ‘good at anorexia’ (Lavis, 2011). I could attribute 
my eating to the threat of being tube fed, positioning me as someone who ‘had no choice’, 
and allowing me an important compromise by locating the responsibility for my eating 
elsewhere (ibid, 2011). It carried pro-anorexic desire (ibid, 2011) and functioned as a 
“personal and public signifier of [my] anorexia” (Halse et al, 2005: 11). Thus, the tube 
crucially enmeshed with my identity (Halse et al, 2005), and the same was true for other 
practices that were, for me, invested with similar meanings (such as bedrest and constant 
observations). 
In addition, the tube signified a particular ‘type’ of patient; the ‘bad anorexic patient’ who is 
defiant, non-compliant and refuses to eat at all costs. ‘Bad patient’ is, I suggest, another 
anorexic script, one that overlaps with ‘serious anorexia’. In chapter seven, I examine the 
‘bad patient’ script in detail, noting how it overlaps with ideas about being ‘good at 
anorexia’, and understanding it in relation to a ‘good anorexic patient’ script. However, for 
now it is helpful to highlight how the ‘bad patient’ script is evident in clinical discourse. In 
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hospital-settings, those diagnosed with anorexia are generally assumed to be ‘non-compliant’ 
and ‘difficult’ (Darmon, 2017) and are “notorious for their often concerted resistance to 
therapeutic processes” (Gremillion, 2003: 3). Clinical literature describes how ‘anorexics’ 
are ‘difficult to treat’ due to them being manipulative and devious (Bruch, 1988) and actively 
subverting therapy (Vitousek et al, 1998). The ‘bad patient’ script was certainly evident to 
me in the inpatient environment. Especially from my second admission onwards, I lived 
alongside other patients who were publicly known to be ‘non-compliant’. Moreover, the 
script was reflected in the preventative rules on the SEDU. These rules, such as having to be 
observed post-meal and not being allowed free access to water, were designed to prevent 
‘deceitful’ behaviours such as water loading55, hiding food and vomiting after meals. Often, it 
was the very existence of these rules that made me aware of the behaviours. Discussing 
water loading, Gremillion notes that treatment environments “underline this as a possibility 
for patients by institutionalising a response to it” (2003: 14). Crucially, I experienced these 
possibilities as expectations. When I was exposed to the suggestion of such behaviours but 
was not engaging in them, I found my anorexia wanting (Lavis, 2011). The SEDU assumed 
how individuals with anorexia behave (i.e. deceitfully), and embedded this assumption in its 
treatment responses and everyday dialogue on the unit. These assumptions informed the 
anorexic scripts that I drew on and tried to fit myself into, so that when I acted in 
accordance with them, it strengthened my alignment with anorexia. Indeed, especially during 
later admissions, there were numerous ‘secretive’ behaviours I engaged in, such as 
exercising (detailed below), hiding food, and water loading. These behaviours were intended 
to maintain my anorexia by resisting weight gain, but they also impacted my sense of self. 
They were productive because they allowed me to reassert my self-determination and 
 
55 Water loading refers to the practice of distorting one’s weight so that it appears higher, by consuming large 
volumes of liquid prior to being weighed. 
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retain my anorexic identity (Rich, 2006). I felt empowered by the knowledge that I was 
acting in these ‘extreme’ and secretive ways. Witnessing myself acting how a ‘serious’ and 
‘non-compliant’ anorexic acts felt comforting and affirming and allowed me to embody my 
diagnosis. 
About two weeks into my second admission, I started to regularly exercise in secret. This 
increased rapidly and led me to avoid weight gain for seven weeks, despite eating a weight 
gain diet. My ‘need’ to exercise moved fluidly between being driven by me, because I wanted 
to keep the number on the scales down, to being something that I could not prevent and 
which overwhelmed me. On one level, it felt like a crucial lifeline, the only thing holding me 
together and stopping me from completely losing myself. On another, it was torturous. I 
wanted to rest and my body ached. Each day I woke up early and exercised in secret, 
moving between different rooms as staff did their checks to avoid being caught. And each 
time I woke, I was awash with dread about all of the exercise I would have to do that day, 
and anxiety about how I would manage to achieve it without being stopped. Eventually, 
having not responded to numerous exercise ‘care plans’, I was put on bedrest and constant 
observations and given a diet increase to force me to gain weight. I was also prescribed 
regular Lorazepam to reduce my distress.   
The initial weight change during bedrest was unbearable. More so than at any previous time, 
I could not tolerate the numbers on the scales increasing.  
Yes, the inevitable happened, I gained weight and I can’t cope with it. I can’t even 
write about it yet because I can’t accept it […] I feel like I’m cracking up (Diary four, 
18th September 2007). 
 
Partly, weight gain was intensely difficult due to my awareness that I was losing the thinness 
that made me feel psychologically safe. In addition, the sensation of becoming larger was 
intolerable and led my mood to depress significantly. But more than this, weight gain was 
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hard because it meant treatment was ‘taking away’ my anorexia. I knew that the weight gain 
following one week on bedrest was not visually noticeable. Yet, it made me feel I was 
‘cracking up’ because it was symbolic of my undoing (Lavis, 2011) and undermined my 
belonging to anorexia. Fox and Diab (2015) suggest that it is superficial to reduce the 
distress associated with ‘refeeding’ to a symptomatic ‘fear of gaining weight’. Rather, they 
argue, it results from the weight gain challenging the way that one perceives oneself and 
undermining one’s ‘anorexic identity’. I also felt that weight gain invalidated my suffering. In 
the SEDU, ‘more thin’ was equated with ‘more anorexic’ (Lavis, 2011), and as such a higher 
BMI positioned me as less deserving of care. I wrote in my diary “I guess what I fear is not 
only me getting fatter but also the fact that when my but BMI is higher I won’t be able to 
struggle as much” (Diary, 25th August 2007). 
On bedrest, there was nothing I could do to prevent weight gain so I stopped fighting it, but 
not without expressing how much I hated it. I was frustrated, and the tensions between 
myself and staff increased as their more immediate and blatant policing of my behaviour so 
obviously positioned us as working against each other. I spent many hours writing in my ‘red 
book’, a personal diary for which staff were an imagined audience. I wrote about ‘my 
anorexia’ and why I missed it. I expressed my intense anger and sadness and how hard it 
was gaining weight. In my references to what ‘they’ were ‘doing to me’, I reinforced a 
particular relationship to staff and the treatment programme – one in which I was being 
forced to give up anorexia against my wishes.  
Over the two to three months following bedrest, I got used to my weight steadily increasing 
and came to begrudgingly accept the inevitability of the process. In the main, I complied with 
treatment. This allowed me to negotiate with staff a BMI target of 16, by persuading them 
that I would maintain my weight at this level. They agreed but labelled it ‘against medical 
advice’.  
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During the latter stages of this admission when I was maintaining my weight, being reminded 
of the earlier stages invoked feelings of loss and sadness: 
There is a new girl here being tube fed and on 1:1 nursing. Don’t like the feeling it 
brings about seeing someone this ill. I think it is jealousy? I walked past and the image 
of her laying on that bed in the room I was in – it was like a twist in my gut. As 
horrible as 1: 1 was, I guess it reminds me of that nice secure place that was the 
height of my illness. There is no guilt because you are in a situation where there is 
literally nothing you can do to lose weight, it’s all out of your hands (Diary six, 17th 
December 2007).  
 
Towards the end of this admission, I was very uncertain about what to do next. I felt 
compelled to lose weight, but also miserable about the impending hunger. On the day my 
section was lifted, I made an in-the-moment decision to stay in treatment and gain more 
weight. However, when it came to it, I could not shake the guilt that came with voluntarily 
eating more food, and one week later, I self-discharged. As I was now a voluntary patient, I 
was allowed to go home.  
Feel like shit […] Stuck and depressed. It’s no good being here […] can’t tolerate 
any more weight gain! I want to go backwards. Don’t want to eat less and go hungry 
but do want to lose weight (Diary six, 27th January 2008).  
 
I did it, I discharged myself and I am back at home! It was all very easy […] 
[psychiatrist] simply asked “why do you want to be discharged” and I said “I can’t 
tolerate any more weight gain”-there was no trying to convince me or anything 
(Diary six, 31st January 2008).  
 
Upon returning home, I immediately began losing weight. I suspected that this would lead to 
a return to being an inpatient, but it still seemed preferable to trying to live ‘normally’. I only 
wanted to be ‘anorexic Lauren’, because this was an identity that had come to offer me a 
sense of belonging (I explore this further below), and inpatient treatment was a part of that. 
After six weeks of intentionally rapidly losing weight, my community psychiatrist sectioned 
me and I went back to the unit.  
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She is medically now at risk [and] unwilling to go into hospital despite being aware 
that she faces a life-threatening situation. Admission is the only way to keep her safe 
[…] In the absence of a section Ms O’Connell would probably not co-operate while 
in hospital (Medical notes, community team, 4th March 2008). 
 
I knew that being under section was suffocating and the source of much distress. However, I 
was unable to agree voluntarily to an admission, because I could not be seen to be agreeing 
to eat.   
I am lying on a bed in one of the high-dependency rooms on the unit. I have just begun my 
third admission. It is teatime. Lauren doesn’t begin admissions and simply eat. So I refuse to 
eat. They say they will have to tube feed me. I agree. I know I will begin eating tomorrow, 
but I have to not-eat just this one time. I have to be seen to be acting how Lauren acts. As I 
quietly lie in my bed, I can hear the rhythmic turning and ticking-over of the machine which 
slowly feeds the liquid-feed down the nasogastric tube, into my stomach. Here we go again. 
Time to un-do the hard work of starving. Time to gain weight again. The thought of the 
liquid feed entering my stomach is nagging and biting at the edges of my mind. In these 
moments, anorexia feels like the very centre of who I am. Seeing myself in this way is all-
encompassing, comforting and euphoric (memory recall). 
 
In situations such as these, I moved fluidly between feeling empowered and disempowered. 
The situation was disempowering; I was legally detained, unable to make decisions for 
myself, and physically restricted. Yet, personally and secretly, the sense of mastery I felt 
having become this sick gave rise to rushes of elation that at times made me feel ‘high’. 
Warin (2010) discusses the symbolic power offered by anorexia, that arises from its mark of 
distinction and sign of belonging to an elite group. For me, this distinction came largely from 
clinical intervention. The fact that others needed to intervene, that I could push the 
boundaries so far that I was forced into having to be fed, was empowering. There was also 
something very comforting and validating about engendering concern in clinicians. I felt 
better when I worried them.  
By my third admission, which began five weeks after my previous one had ended (which had 
been six months long), the diagnosis of anorexia had come to offer me a place in the world 
based on psychiatric disorder, and this in some ways felt easier than the anxieties of 
158 
 
158 
 
ordinary life. On the one hand, identifying with the diagnosis, and being Lauren-in-hospital-
with anorexia, provided a sense of belonging that was hugely comforting (Warin, 2010); I 
belonged to the world of psychiatry, inpatient treatment, and medical monitoring. Yet on 
the other, it made me different, and allowed me to avoid the expectations and uncertainty 
that I felt were placed on me as an ordinary person. The diagnosis of anorexia, and the 
anorexic scripts I encountered, offered me a blueprint for who I could be, when I otherwise 
felt very unsure. During my second admission, I wrote: 
I don’t really know who I am. I have no centre or core to my personality. I don’t 
know how to be. I seem to spend my life pretending and flipping between different 
Laurens, depending on who I am with […] This leaves me feeling that no one really 
knows or understands me (how could they when I don’t understand myself?). They 
are fluid, transient identities, they are not solid or anything to build yourself around. 
Anorexia, however, that is something real. It is authentic. I don’t know who Lauren 
is, but I do know Lauren the anorexic (Diary, 17th September 2007). 
 
I had come to value an identity based on ‘serious anorexia’ and being a ‘bad patient’, and was 
highly self-conscious regarding how I was performing it. Inpatient admissions had become an 
integral manner through which my anorexia was validated. However, over time, the more I 
acted in accordance with ‘serious’ and ‘bad patient’ scripts, the more problematic these 
positionings, and the experience of inpatient treatment became, in ways I address next.  
Hospital restrictions and a pathologised identity 
During my third and fourth admissions, my struggle against the treatment programme that 
had occurred previously continued. However, in these later admissions, staff increasingly 
saw me as ‘risky’, not only due to being ‘medically unstable’, but also because of my mood, 
self-harm and because I was as perceived as a potential suicide case.  
An example of how this played out can be seen at the start of my fourth admission. I was 
admitted voluntarily (under non-forceful but persuasive coercion, whereby the ‘threat’ of 
the Mental Health Act was invoked) and once on the unit did not eat (having not eaten at 
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the beginning of my second admission, I felt I had to ‘keep this up’ in all admissions). Notes 
from my ward round on the second day describe me as having ‘significant compromised 
health’ and as ‘a massive risk to herself’. I had left the meeting distressed, and the notes 
indicate that following this, the whole staff team were informed that I was at risk of 
absconding, self-harm and suicide, and that I met the criteria for detention under a section 5 
(4)56 I was indeed sectioned later that day, after being ‘safe held’ (physically detained) by staff 
when I tried to leave. I was initially detained under a section 5 (4), followed shortly by a 
section 5 (2)57, and was then placed under a Section 3 the following day. Notes from the 
Section 3 paperwork state: 
Has ischaemic heart changes on ECG and has been manipulating her weight to 
prevent readmission. She has suicidal ideation […] her BMI is around 12. She needs 
urgent refeeding, this will only be possible if detained. [Lauren] was tearful 
throughout the interview and labile in mood (Medical notes, SEDU, 20th November 
2008).  
 
During the latter two admissions especially, my mood was indeed extremely low. My inner 
world had become bleak and chaotic and I felt increasingly desperate. My treatment 
reflected this, as it became ever more restrictive and I had increasingly less ‘freedom’.  
The more I adopted the ‘anorexic role’, and the more time I spent in hospital under 
restrictive conditions, the more I became distanced from ‘normal life’. In turn, I sought to 
grip more tightly onto anorexia. Lavis (2011) describes how a recognition of the damage 
that anorexia has done to one’s life can serve to increase pro-anorexic desire, to the extent 
that anorexia seems necessary. At one point, I had lost all desire to pursue a career, had no 
home, no partner, and was accustomed to living in an institution. In these conditions, 
seeking to do anorexia well (instead of normal life) made sense. Seed et al (2016) note that 
 
56 A section 5 (4), also known as ‘nurse’s holding power’, is used to detain someone for up to 6 hours.  
57 A section 5 (2), also known as ‘doctor’s holding power’, is used to detail someone for up to 72 hours.  
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the loss of friendships, normal life and life skills that results from being in inpatient treatment 
for extended periods of time and from being repeatedly detained under the Mental Health 
Act can contribute to dependence on the treatment environment and relationships. This in 
turn impacts on one’s illness trajectory, making it harder to ‘let go’ of one’s ‘anorexic self’. I 
certainly felt this spiralling impact.  
I spent the last two admissions feeling entirely ‘stuck’. I continued to want anorexia, and as 
alternative options seemed to narrow off, I reached a point of being entirely unable to 
imagine life without it. With anorexia seeming inevitable, I was overcome by a pervasive 
hopelessness, as I saw an extremely bleak future. For many months, change did not seem 
possible, and I felt psychologically overwhelmed by the idea of eating and living ‘normally’. 
However, during the last two to three weeks of my final admission, my perspective began to 
gradually shift, largely due to a wish to avoid future hospital admissions. I was now finding 
the treatment environment, and the lack of autonomy that came with being under section, 
utterly intolerable.  
I had often felt it unjust when staff used pre-emptive responses and, for example, increased 
my observation levels due to perceived risk. It felt as though I was being punished for 
emotional responses that I thought were quite understandable, given my situation. Taking an 
example from my last admission, I had submitted to staff numerous requests for greater 
freedom prior to a meeting. These included being allowed home leave and to prepare some 
of my own meals. At this point, there was an expectation that I would be discharged eleven 
days later, so I argued that these requests would be helpful preparation for going home. 
During the meeting it was decided that my section would be lifted but that my requests 
would not be met. Notes made by staff during the meeting state: 
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She is not close to recovery […] she is very impulsive […] she is manipulating her 
weight to keep out of maintenance range […] [Psychiatrist] explained that this unit is 
not the right place for Lauren, as she is eating, but not doing the psychological work. 
Plan: [Psychiatrist] will take off section today, no leave […] no preparing meals 
(Medical notes, SEDU, 6th January 2009).  
 
To staff, I was behaviourally complying with meals, but not taking on the unit’s definitions of 
progress and recovery (Darmon, 2017). I was upset that my requests were not met and 
could not understand how I was being discharged in a few weeks yet not allowed any 
‘freedom’. Feeling unfairly treated, I declared that I would go on leave anyway now that my 
section was lifted. In response, they reversed their decision about the section. I then 
became even more upset, in turn increasing how ‘risky’ I was judged to be. Staff reacted by 
changing my cigarette breaks from ‘unescorted’ to ‘escorted’, and my upset deepened 
further: 
Lauren has been really angry since her review especially since her cigarette breaks 
have to be escorted again. She has been unable to channel the anger appropriately at 
this time (Medical notes, SEDU, 6th January 2009). 
 
I recall well how asphyxiating and disabling this series of moves felt, with staff reactions to 
my distress and frustration only increasing my distress and frustration.  
Being unable to make my own decisions significantly undermined my sense of agency and I 
felt positioned in a child-like role, which I found humiliating. I also frequently felt ‘unheard’ 
and my reasoning invalidated due to my inability to escape an anorexic framing. False 
accusations of ‘non-compliance’ felt impossible to refute, and this can be understood in 
terms of Goffman’s (1961a) ‘looping’. Here, my reactions to my situation were collapsed 
back into the situation itself; my denial of ‘anorexic behaviour’ was interpreted in terms of 
the pathology of anorexia. With my behaviour being viewed as ‘symptoms’ (Dobransky, 
2011), I was unable to defend myself in the usual way (Goffman, 1961a). A memorable 
example is from my last discharge meeting. The psychiatrist opened this by challenging me 
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on my recent request to change care-coordinator. I had cited the reason of a ‘personality 
clash’, having felt unable to develop rapport with her and finding her manner patronising. At 
the start of the meeting, I was questioned as to my ‘true’ intentions and accused of wanting 
a new care-coordinator because ‘the anorexia’ wanted someone new to manipulate. As a 
‘deceitful anorexic’, finding a way of believably rejecting their suggestions was impossible.  
Despite sometimes seeking to be positioned as a serious, defiant anorexic, this identity was 
also extremely problematic. Indeed, much of the experience of anorexia is contradictory 
(see e.g. Fox and Diab, 2015; Warin, 2010; Rance et al, 2017b). In treatment, anorexia was 
reductively constructed as a pathologised, medicalised condition, and while in some ways 
affirming, this also sometimes led me to feel misunderstood, invalidated and stereotyped (Eli, 
2014b; Rich, 2006; Malson, 2004; Boughtwood and Halse, 2010). Anorexia became the 
overriding source of my identification, leading to my behaviour being automatically 
interpreted as symptomatic of illness, and resulting in me feeling powerless and discredited 
(Malson, 2004; Eli, 2014b; Boughtwood and Halse, 2010; Smith et al, 2014; Seed et al, 2016). 
I therefore also sometimes attempted to manoeuvre out of a ‘purely’ anorexic positioning, 
in order to regain voice and a sense of legitimate personhood. 
Eventually, I came to realise that the longer I was in and out of treatment, the further the 
walls would close in. Sensing that I should try something different, I gradually, tentatively 
opened up in my mind to the idea of letting go of anorexia.  
I was discharged for the final time with a plan in place dictating that should my weight drop 
below the agreed range, I would be admitted to the local psychiatric unit or a general 
medical hospital for ‘refeeding’. In the immediate months following my discharge, I 
maintained my weight as required. It was hard, but I was motivated by the novelty of being 
out of hospital for a long period. However, after roughly three months, I began to binge eat. 
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I would feel an intense desire for food that was so overwhelming it was impossible to think 
about anything else. I would then eat in a wildly out of control manner, abandoning the rules 
and restrictions that ordinarily directed my eating. These episodes felt freeing and elating at 
first, and a huge relief would wash over me as I gave into the needs, desires and urges I had 
suppressed for years. However, the aftermath was horrific. I was in physical pain and full of 
shame, regret, and self-hatred. It is difficult to fully convey just how distressing bingeing was. 
It was confirmation that I was greedy after all; my anorexia had been fraudulent. I had 
expressed a fear of bingeing when I was in treatment, but this was invalidated and I was told 
that it was ‘just my anorexia talking’.  
During this time I was still attending appointments with the community mental health team. 
Bingeing was much harder to explain to professionals than starvation and I sensed that they 
hardly cared, because at least now I was eating. I felt enormously misunderstood and fed up 
with having to explain myself. I was also intensely ashamed attending appointments now that 
I was no longer ‘anorexic’. It had felt justified to be sat in a psychiatrists waiting room while I 
was extremely thin and starving. It was painful to be sat in the same room bloated from 
bingeing and twice the weight I had previously been. I wanted nothing more to do with 
services, so I used my weight gain to claim wellness, and six months after discharge from the 
SEDU, my psychiatrist was easily convinced to discharge me from community services: 
Her weight is now normal and has been for 6 weeks […] There is no evidence of 
anorexic behaviours. Overall I found Lauren extremely well settled and I don’t really 
see a role for myself to continue to be involved in her care at the moment (Medical 
notes, community team, 11th August 2009). 
 
Two months later, I returned to university to finish my Masters. The bingeing continued in a 
fluctuating pattern, sometimes happening on a daily basis, and sometimes ‘only’ once or 
twice a week. By one year after discharge from the unit, I was ‘overweight’. I struggled 
massively with my new body size, and the speed with which my previous sense of self (as 
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anorexic) had been ripped away from me. It was unbearable. Feeling the need to do 
something extreme in response to my own desperation, I took an overdose. I went to a 
shop, bought paracetamol and food, came home, binged, overdosed on paracetamol, left the 
house and called an ambulance. I was admitted to Accident and Emergency overnight, where 
I was visited by the hospital’s psychiatry service.  
Alongside her feelings of worthlessness she was particularly upset by the shift in her 
eating disorder […] When not distracted her thoughts are about food and suicide 
and she is struggling with this and is reluctant to ask for help […] her mood was 
objectively and subjectively low and she presented as tearful throughout (Medical 
notes, hospital psychiatry, 21st March 2010). 
 
I was advised to see my GP to have my anti-depressant dose increased and an emergency 
outpatient appointment with a psychiatrist was organised. I had that appointment two weeks 
later, with a locum psychiatrist: 
Lauren […] still feels detached about the event [overdose] saying that she has just 
carried on without any particular feeling that she wishes she was dead or alive […] I 
did ask her gently about the actual binge episode, and she understandably said how 
painful it was to actually describe them, with real sense of shame attached […] her 
thinking showed evidence of the old imprints of black and white thinking e.g. that she 
is either totally well and in no conflict […] or there is no hope for change (Medical 
notes, outpatient psychiatrist, 31st March 2010).  
 
This psychiatrist later wrote a letter requesting that I was offered help with ‘stabilisation’ on 
the basis that I was now struggling with bulimia and risked retreating back to anorexia. A 
few months later I moved to a different county and informed my new GP that I did not need 
support. Just prior to moving my eating had become slightly less chaotic and the frequency 
and intensity of my bingeing reduced. After I moved, I learned about, and attempted to 
adopt, intuitive eating practices. This involved eating in accordance with my natural hunger 
and fulness signals rather than externally defined ‘rules’. My binges reduced further as a 
result, and my eating patterns and weight began to normalise.  
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Conclusions: being and doing anorexia 
Through this autoethnography, I have addressed the ‘being’ and ‘doing’ (Brinkmann, 2016) of 
my anorexia diagnosis. Over time, I came to value an anorexic identity, and this had 
implications for how my suffering was ‘done’. The diagnosis of anorexia was invested with 
desire; it was a positioning I strove towards and which sometimes felt empowering (Warin, 
2010; Lavis, 2011). As such, I sought to inhabit my diagnosis. This involved an anxiety 
provoking, self-conscious monitoring of whether I was doing anorexia ‘properly’, and I did 
this in relation to the anorexic scripts that were detailed to me in treatment. As I moved 
through treatment, I learned new ways of doing anorexia, living up to the SEDUs implicit 
expectations of how ‘an anorexic’ behaves and how anorexia manifests psychologically 
(Lavis, 2011). In accordance with anorexic scripts, clinical recognition of my anorexia 
became such an essential part of doing anorexia, that they were largely one and the same; I 
needed to ‘be medicalised’ and recognised as ‘difficult’ in order to materialise my diagnosis. 
I was aware throughout my admissions that I was making efforts to cultivate anorexia (both 
in ‘actuality’ and appearance) that aligned with available scripts. In part for this reason, I felt 
that my diagnosis was fraudulent. I imagined that if I had ‘real’ anorexia, I would not need to 
try so hard. This was despite seeing ‘real’ anorexia in other patients, while knowing that 
they too were highly self-conscious about how they came across. In this context of concern 
about fraudulence, clinical recognition of anorexia (such as tube feeding and having a low 
BMI) became central to its performance. These acted as identity markers, because they 
proved my anorexia and warranted it a ‘serious’ status (Seed et al, 2015; Halse et al, 2005). 
Yet, they also somehow never fully did their ‘confirming’ job. Any sense of having done 
anorexia well enough was only ever fleeting and fragile. At the height of my illness, it was as 
if my destination was always just there in front of me, visible but perpetually out of reach 
(Lavis, 2011). As I strode towards it, achieving the markers I would have at previous points 
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imagined to be indicative of having reached my destination, these markers somehow lost 
their impact, and I never got there. This made leaving anorexia all the more difficult, because 
there was a sense that if I did it again, just one more time, I might get there. 
I have paid attention to the self-conscious, performative aspects of anorexia. However, I do 
not intend to reduce my experiences down to an agentic performance. Rather, this was only 
one facet of my experience. It was important and impactful, but it did not constitute 
anorexia in and of itself. Rather, there was a ‘core suffering’ to my experiences that the self-
conscious, performative aspects directed and ‘policed’. My self-conscious monitoring of both 
my internal world and my outward appearance smoothed over the messy edges of my 
experiences and channelled them into a recognisable ‘anorexia’(s). Moreover, I actively and 
meaningfully engaged in this process because ‘being anorexic’ served a purpose at that time, 
by providing me with a distinct, personally empowering identity (Warin, 2010) and a clear 
role, in a context of long-standing anxiety about who I was, my place in the world, and fears 
of not being ‘good enough’. 
Chapter four summary 
In this chapter, I have conducted an autoethnographic exploration of my own experiences of 
being diagnosed with and treated for anorexia. I have detailed how I came to be diagnosed 
with anorexia, and what this meant to me at that time. I have also shown how I came to 
value an identity based on anorexia, and that this had implications for how my suffering was 
‘done’. I have used Brinkmann’s conceptualisation of ‘having’ and ‘being’ a diagnosis, to show 
how, in seeking to hold on to a positioning as a ‘successful anorexic’, I sought to live up to 
the ‘ways of doing’ anorexia that I learned in treatment.  
In chapter five, I move on to examine the different routes to, and experiences of, receiving a 
diagnosis of anorexia for participants. In later chapters, I use concepts of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ a 
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diagnosis as broad frames for examining participant’s experiences. In particular, in chapter 
six, I explore participants ‘anorexic identities’, and in chapter seven under the frame of 
‘doing’, I explore how the various ‘anorexic scripts’ that they encountered informed the 
ways in which they managed and performed their diagnosis. In each of these later chapters, I 
occasionally return to and further examine and draw on my own experiences, such that 
these are understood alongside participants’ experiences.  
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Chapter Five 
The process of being diagnosed  
This chapter is concerned with the processes through which individuals come to be 
diagnosed with anorexia and what being diagnosed means to them at that time. I begin by 
examining participant’s various routes to diagnosis. In doing so, I illuminate the different 
interpretive processes and circumstances whereby individuals’ initial experiences of food 
restriction and weight loss led to help-seeking and were in turn recognised as ‘anorexia’ by 
a professional. I then turn to explore participants’ subjective meanings of being diagnosed 
and recognise how this intervention intersected with their experiences up until that point. 
Lastly, I use a case study to examine one man’s experience of coming to identify with 
anorexia but not being diagnosed. Michael was self-diagnosed, and I examine his case to shed 
light on the factors that shaped a trajectory of a ‘missed diagnosis’, and the subjective 
meaning of a potential diagnosis.  
Routes to diagnosis  
The route from the experience of ‘symptoms’ to being diagnosed with anorexia varied for 
participants, and was shaped by factors such as the subjective interpretation of ‘symptoms’, 
participants’ social and relational circumstances, and the understandings offered by medical 
professionals. I identify and use three categories to describe the various routes; self-directed 
and active; other-directed and passive; and a mixed route of both self and other-directed, and 
both active and passive.  For each category in turn, I summarise the key features, explore a 
case study example in detail, and then illustrate the category more broadly with reference 
to further participants. 
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Self – directed and active  
There were five participants in this category. All were women who were first diagnosed 
with anorexia in their early 20s or in their 30s58. All had sought help via a GP after 
recognising themselves as struggling with a problem that was detrimentally impacting their 
lives, and for which they needed professional input. Four of them – Anna, Kelly, Maddie and 
Lisa - had thought of themselves as having an eating disorder (or a problem of this nature) at 
the time they initially sought help, or by the second time. The remaining participant, Naomi, 
had only a vague idea that an eating disorder might be the explanation for her difficulties, 
instead adopting an understanding of her problems as being more exclusively ‘physical’. 
Once they had sought help, Anna, Kelly and Naomi all experienced a relatively straight 
forward route to being diagnosed, in that there were no significant protractions or 
problems experienced during the process. For Maddie and Lisa, the period from initial help-
seeking to being diagnosed was more problematic. None the less, all alluded to a sense of 
choice and agency in their descriptions of the help-seeking and diagnostic process, in that 
they actively drove this and independently made decisions within it.  
Anna is the case study example I have chosen for this route. She was 37 years old at the 
time of the interview and studying for a PhD. She had recently (within the previous month) 
completed one year of outpatient treatment for anorexia at a local EDS, having sought help 
from a GP approximately eight months prior to starting treatment.  Anna positioned herself 
as largely, but not entirely ‘recovered’, recognising significant improvements in daily life since 
beginning treatment, but also the ongoing effort and strategising involved in recovery. 
 
58 Three participants were diagnosed with anorexia aged 21 or 22. One was diagnosed with anorexia in her 
mid-30s, and one was first given a diagnosis of bulimia in her 20s and then, approximately 10 years later, a 
diagnosis of anorexia.  
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Anna’s experience of anorexia began in her mid-30s. She described ‘disordered eating 
patterns’ from a young age, such as eating irregularly due to a lack of interest in food or 
eating only a limited range of foods. However, she distinguished this from the development 
of anorexia which she described as her mind “latching on” to something and becoming the 
“focus of [her] attention” in a way that it had not done previously.  
While Anna described herself as having been a “very skinny” child who under ate, the 
changing nature of her eating habits during adulthood meant that by the time she began her 
PhD, she was “fairly overweight”. At the start of her PhD, she found it hard to adjust to the 
new ‘social world’ she was in, which she experienced as high pressure and competitive. 
During her first year, she made a significant effort to socialise and build a social network. 
She found this difficult and felt alienated by the unfamiliarity of the social settings and what 
she saw as an elitist academic culture. About half-way into her second year, in response to 
“intense feelings of stress and isolation”, she began enacting a “plan”. This involved 
controlling her eating and exercise and socially withdrawing. She experienced this ‘plan’ as 
all-encompassing and compelling, and as a useful way of dealing with the difficult 
circumstances she was in: 
I was eating, I was exercising, I was controlling, and the more I became obsessed 
with planning all of this, and monitoring everything and checking everything and 
weighing everything […] it just absorbed me and at first I found it really exhilarating, 
and it made me feel that everything had been terrible and then suddenly – I knew 
things were still terrible, I still felt terrible, but in a way I had this like little outlet for 
it. 
 
With hindsight, Anna understood the implementation of this plan as a shift in the focus of 
her efforts; she entirely ‘gave up’ on working hard to fit in, and put significant energy and 
“exact attention” into weight loss instead. 
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Anna also found that as she lost weight, others stopped asking her how things were going, 
something she had previously found stressful. She felt that this was because they had 
assumed that the weight loss signalled that things were going well: 
For the first good stretch of it people just thought I was getting better, like I was 
losing weight down to a healthy weight […] they just assumed that I looked on top 
of everything and acted on top of everything. 
 
She continued with her academic work during this period, although in hindsight she 
recognised that the plan had required so much time, energy and attention, that it slowed 
down her progress on her PhD.  
Anna described herself as having been an acutely anxious person since childhood. Anxiety 
was also a significant aspect of her experience of anorexia. For example, constantly checking 
her weight and her body for signs of thinness felt reassuring and anxiety-reducing: 
I was so absorbed, that it was like the anxiety went away […] in the short term it 
seemed like this amazing solution I found for these really intense and overwhelming 
feelings of being anxious, and of failing and of not having things under control. 
 
However, it was also an overpowering and excruciating experience: 
You have all the physical things of being very intensely hungry, and your body is 
bombarding you with thoughts of food and you cannot rest for a single second […] 
it is so intense. 
 
Anna’s weight loss continued at a rapid rate, and this prompted her to seek help from a GP. 
While things had been difficult for a long while, her restricted eating and weight loss was the 
more tangible aspect of her struggles than for example the loneliness she had experienced, 
and was something that she could ‘take’ to a doctor. This was a motivating factor for 
seeking help: 
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I know when I started the [non-] eating that everything was terrible […] it’s just that 
it became an extra thing of like now everything is really terrible and this is the part 
that I can actually explain to people […] it got to the stage where it was another 
terrible thing on a whole bundle of terrible things. 
 
Anna deliberately sought out a GP who specialised in eating disorders, to whom she openly 
explained her ambivalent position. She said to the GP: “I’m losing weight fairly rapidly and I 
can’t seem to stop myself from doing it […] I don’t want to continue, but also I don’t want 
to stop”. 
She described her weight at this time as ‘not terribly low’, and explained that for this 
reason, the GP monitored the situation for a few weeks before referring her directly to an 
EDS, and to her university’s counselling service. She recalled that the word ‘anorexia’ was 
used by the GP almost immediately, after she had enquired about her weight history. Anna 
attributed the doctor knowing the ‘signs’ of an eating disorder and the details of the referral 
process to her specialist understanding. 
Anna saw a psychologist at the university a short time after seeing the GP, and he confirmed 
anorexia. She described this as an “informal” diagnosis, due to it not being done “through 
the NHS”. Anna then waited three months for an assessment with the EDS, after which she 
was given an ‘official’ diagnosis in a letter. She began outpatient treatment with the service a 
further four months later.  
Anna had self-initiated help-seeking due to her personal recognition of herself as struggling. 
This recognition appeared to relate to a changing interpretation of her experience of weight 
loss, restricted eating and exercise from something that was performing useful functions 
which alleviated her pre-existing difficulties (such as anxiety), to something that had come to 
add to these difficulties. In addition, the eating part of her struggles felt like a more tangible 
and appropriate problem to ‘take’ to a GP than her other difficulties. 
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Thoits’ (1985) symbolic interactionist conceptualisation of self-labelling illuminates the 
processes through which Anna came to recognise her struggles as a potential eating 
disorder. According to Thoits, when the individual self-labels they take the role of the 
‘generalised other’, and “reflexively assess the meaning of one's actual or contemplated 
behaviours” (1985: 222, emphasis in original). If the individual observes themselves to be 
repeatedly breaking ‘residual rules’ (Scheff, 1966), they may understand themselves as 
disturbed, and thus seek professional help. Thoits conceptualises ‘residual rules’ in terms of 
emotional deviance, but recognises that other difficulties (for example cognitive problems) 
also lead to self-labelling.  
Self-labelling seems particularly important for Anna, given the extent to which she 
understood herself as having a potential eating disorder largely in isolation from others. She 
had “totally socially isolated” herself, suggesting that her behaviour was not highly 
observable to others and that others’ definitions of her behaviour were not a significant 
influence on her self-definitions, apart from imaginatively. This is also suggested in her 
descriptions of how others had tended not to interpret her weight loss problematically (at 
least initially).  
There was a sense of personal agency and autonomy in Anna’s account, which positioned 
her as an active decision maker. This is reflected in, for example, the fact that she was the 
only actor involved in the initial decision to seek help, and in her deliberately seeking out a 
specialist GP. Her experiences are suggestive of Pescosolido et al (1998)’s identification of a 
route into mental health services defined by ‘choice’. Pescosolido et al identify a range of 
different routes, including ‘choice’, ‘coercion’ and ‘muddling through’. Individuals whose 
routes to services are defined by choice actively seek help, and they make a decision that 
they want, or at least explicitly agree, to care. In contrast, the coercion route occurs when 
an individual resists care, but is (more or less overtly) ‘forced’ into it by others. ‘Muddling 
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through’ attests to routes in which the individual neither seeks nor resists treatment. 
Instead, they ‘bounce around’ and ‘off’ circumstances, without either they or others being 
identified as having directed the process. 
Turning now to the active and self-directed category more broadly, one of the defining 
features is the self-recognition of a problem. All those in this category had come to 
interpret their own experiences as problematic, and made a decision to seek help. For 
Anna, Kelly and Maddie, there appeared to have been a more or less gradual ‘tipping point’ 
(or points) in which their experiences relating to food and weight took on a meaning as 
signs that something was wrong. For Anna, this process involved a recognition that the 
enactment of her ‘plan’ was adding to her pre-existing problems. For Kelly and Maddie, 
factors such as noticing a more problematic reaction to being ‘made’ to eat, and the 
manifestation of physical problems that interfered with everyday living (as opposed to purely 
‘psychological’ distress) were important.  
Taking Kelly as an example, her struggles with food had started as a ‘normal diet’. Initially, 
when others encouraged her to eat more, she would feel uncomfortable, but none the less 
oblige and ‘move on’. However, over time, her reactions to such situations changed: 
The point at which I started to realise this isn’t good is occasions like my birthday, and 
someone would bring me a cake and I started to feel panicky and it wasn’t kind of 
like ‘oh I don’t want to eat this’, it was more about ‘this is really terrifying I don’t 
want it near me’ (Kelly, emphasis added).  
 
She explained that while she had experienced mental distress regarding food for some time, 
her decision to seek help from a GP, and her belief that she might have an eating disorder, 
were related to her development of physical symptoms. 
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I was visibly really underweight and lots of people started worrying about me […] I 
was physically really exhausted and couldn’t really go out and do much, couldn’t 
really work anymore because I was so tired, and I think that’s what spurred me on 
[…] there was a lot of mental distress for a really long time, but it was only when 
the physical symptoms started, part of that was […] possibly me being less 
concerned, about being taken seriously […] it was the only thing that convinced me 
that I had an eating disorder because I think I was so used to viewing one image […] 
I kind of thought, ‘oh I fit that bill now’. 
 
Naomi had sought help for ‘tummy problems’ and rapid weight loss that was causing her 
distress. At this time, she had only very uncertainly considered the possibility that she had 
an eating disorder, but she knew that she wanted “something to stop what was happening”. 
When anorexia was first suggested by her GP and she was advised to read books about 
anorexia, she immediately and readily identified with the diagnosis. 
Lisa’s experiences were different in that an identification with the idea of anorexia had come 
before the development of distressing ‘symptoms’. At age 11, she read about a character 
with the diagnosis in a book. For many years following this, she ‘fantasised’ about the idea of 
becoming like this character, and began restricting her food intake and infrequently purging 
food. At age 18 she recognised a worsening of her struggles when she attempted to ‘eat 
normally’, but found herself unable to. She was “calorie counting obsessively”, and bingeing 
and purging on food had become a “much bigger problem”. Lisa initially sought help from a 
private counsellor, mainly for her struggles with anxiety and self-harming. While seeing the 
counsellor she also sought help from a GP for physical problems that were manifesting as a 
result of her struggles with food, and for medication for anxiety. 
Regarding the process of reaching a diagnosis of anorexia after initial help had been sought, 
for Anna, Kelly and Naomi, this was straight forward; there were no significant protractions 
or problems and the first diagnosis they were given was anorexia. All had anorexia referred 
to or implied during initial GP appointments, and then an official diagnosis given at a later 
date by a specialist eating disorder service (for Anna and Naomi) or private psychiatrist (for 
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Kelly). They had all been referred to a specialist service by the GP from whom they had 
initially sought help, and reaching a diagnosis then involved waiting for, and attending, 
appointments with the relevant services.  
Naomi was diagnosed approximately three months after she had seen her GP, and she 
described this as having happened ‘quite quickly’. Anna, who was referred directly to an 
eating disorder service by her GP, also waited approximately three months for an 
assessment and diagnosis. She described this as ‘agonising’, however this seemed to refer 
more to the waiting involved in beginning treatment (which occurred a further four months 
after she was officially diagnosed), rather than for the diagnosis itself. 
Kelly found herself significantly struggling and “really poorly” during what was expected to 
be a three month wait for an appointment with an EDS. In collaboration with her mum, she 
sought help from a private psychiatrist to eliminate the waiting process. The psychiatrist 
diagnosed her with anorexia and referred her for inpatient treatment. Despite this 
‘departure’ in Kelly’s experiences, there was still a sense of the process being linear in that 
there remained an ‘expected’ and successive progression from an initial suggestion of 
anorexia by a GP to an official diagnosis by a specialised professional. 
For Maddie and Lisa, reaching a diagnosis of anorexia following help-seeking was more 
problematic. After Maddie’s initial appointment with the GP in which she was ‘dismissed’, 
she returned to the GP on numerous occasions. However, the idea of an eating disorder 
“never really got discussed”, and she was repeatedly offered other explanations for her 
struggles (such as ‘stress’). She therefore had to keep ‘pushing’ for appropriate help, and this 
exemplifies the self-driven aspect of her route. However, she was also influenced by her 
family, as Maddie described her repeated returning to the GP as involving “a little bit of that 
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strong arm” from them. Eventually she was referred to a specialist service by her GP and 
diagnosed with anorexia.  
At age 22, the GP whom Lisa saw while receiving private counselling offered her a referral 
to an EDS where she was diagnosed with bulimia. Lisa had sensed that this was not the 
‘correct’ diagnosis, but explained that it is likely that she was given it in part because of how 
she had presented her struggles; she had ‘downplayed’ the extremes of her problematic 
eating at the EDS assessment due to feeling ashamed. Being diagnosed with bulimia was 
problematic because it emphasised to her that her binge eating was the problem, rather 
than her restricted food intake. The diagnosis of bulimia also “entrenched and 
compounded” her confusion, and “the feeling the anorexia was a figment of [her] 
imagination”. About 10 years after the bulimia diagnosis, Lisa’s struggles with food and 
weight had worsened, and she was offered another referral to an EDS when she saw a new 
GP. This time she was diagnosed with anorexia binge/purge sub type59. 
To summarise, participants in this category had self-driven help-seeking after identifying 
themselves to be struggling. The decision (or repeated decisions) to seek help occurred 
largely independently. Some experienced a straight-forward route to being diagnosed after 
they had sought help. However, largely due to the alternative interpretations made by 
medical professionals, two found reaching a diagnosis of anorexia more problematic. 
My own experiences fit within this category. The occasions I had sought help for my eating 
related struggles had been self-driven and I had arranged appointments independently. Age 
21 when I saw the GP and presented with anorexia, I identified with the diagnosis having 
 
59 In the DSM-IV and DSM–5, anorexia nervosa has two subtypes: restricting type and binge eating/purging 
type. The former is diagnosed when the individual has “not regularly engaged in binge-eating and purging”, 
and the latter when they have “regularly engaged in binge-eating or purging” (APA, 1994; APA, 2013).  
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gradually come to understand my restricted eating in these terms during the months prior. 
From this point, reaching a diagnosis was unproblematic in that it was ‘given’ immediately.  
Other-directed and passive  
There were three female participants and one male participant in this category (Claire, Mia, 
Natalie and Ben). All were aged between 11 and 18 and lived with their parents or had 
recently left home when they were diagnosed. This category includes those who, at the time 
of initial help-seeking, had not personally understood themselves to have a problem that 
required intervention, and for whom others initiated the help-seeking. The initial 
recognition of a problem came from either parents, or staff at school who quickly informed 
parents. A striking feature of the descriptions given by these participants was their lack of 
agency in, and meaningful identification with, the process of help-seeking.  
The case study chosen here is Mia, who at the time of the interview was 22 years old and 
living in her family home with her parents and younger brother. Mia described herself as 
having a chronic relationship to anorexia. She was first diagnosed aged 11 and had 
experienced repeated periods of anorexia and recovery. She had undergone both outpatient 
and inpatient treatment and had moved ‘in and out’ of different treatment arrangements as 
she recovered, relapsed, and was judged (by herself and professionals involved in her 
treatment) to be not ‘working hard enough’ at recovery. At the time of the interview, Mia 
was ‘relapsing’; she was ‘not managing’ and her struggle had become significantly worse 
within the past month. She was seeing a doctor at an EDS for fortnightly appointments and 
having weekly counselling sessions at a charity. 
Mia described having a ‘fine’ childhood prior to the onset of anorexia. However, she 
recalled a difficult transition from primary to secondary school which led her to feel 
panicked, and implicated this as a contextual factor in the development of her anorexia. She 
179 
 
 
 
also explained that, by the time she reached secondary school, she was frequently 
comparing how she looked to how her peers looked. 
Mia further explained that in the lead up to her developing anorexia, she had fallen out with 
her friends and was not feeling ‘socially accepted’. This prompted her to ‘diet’ and eat ‘more 
healthily’. Over time, her dieting increased and then transitioned into (what she later 
identified as) anorexia: “It was like well as teenagers do, I’ll go on a diet, and start eating a 
bit healthy and it got a bit out of hand. Then that mechanism came and the voice came”. 
As the above extract suggests, at this time she experienced anorexia as a person who was 
physically present nearby and encouraged her to restrict her eating. She emphasised how at 
this time, the focus of her experience was on the physicality of her body, and that she “just 
wanted to lose weight.”  
Over time, Mia’s parents became concerned about her eating habits, and arranged a GP 
appointment. She stated: “I was sort of taken to the GP by my mum and dad because they 
were concerned that I was kind of being a bit silly and being a bit picky with my food for no 
apparent reason”. Mia explained that she hadn’t been remarkably underweight at this time, 
but that “in my head” there was definitely a “mechanism that wasn’t right”. 
She did not agree with her parents that she needed to see a GP. She was aware that she 
was actively trying to lose weight, but did not identify this as a problem requiring change. 
Rather, her parents were the “ones with the problem”. She became angry at them because 
the GP visit made it more difficult to continue restricting her food intake; the doctor had 
noted that Mia was underweight, and her family responded by monitoring her eating more 
intensively, and attempting to increase her food consumption: 
I had to be watched when I ate, things had to be added in, and then the games 
commenced really with hiding food, picking the lowest thing […] I just felt I was 
constantly in a battle.  
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Mia’s weight was then monitored by the GP every two weeks and she kept a diary recording 
her food intake and feelings around this. During this monitoring period, which lasted for two 
months, she did not “make any change” to her eating, and as such was referred to CAMHS 
(Child and adolescent mental health service) where she obtained a diagnosis.  
Mia’s experiences resonate with the third career stage in the process of ‘becoming anorexic’ 
described by Darmon (2017) (see chapter two). During this stage, an initial ‘alert’ is raised 
by another person (or persons), who is concerned about the individual’s wellbeing. In Mia’s 
case, this was her parents. The individual is then labelled as ‘deviant’ and increasingly 
monitored. This monitoring involves a ‘circuit of agents’ who employ techniques to 
‘normalise’ the individual’s behaviour. For Mia, this circuit involved her family and GP, who 
attempted to normalise her diet. A ‘circuit of mediators’ then develops, and as the individual 
moves through the circuit, they are eventually diagnosed. The GP was the first medical 
professional in Mia’s circuit, which then expanded when she was referred to CAMHS and 
diagnosed.   
Mia identified her parents as being in control during these processes and implicated herself 
as passive. She described feeling privately angered by what was happening, while outwardly 
‘complying’ and attending appointments. Her experience can be understood as incorporating 
an element of extra-legal coercion (Pescosolido, 1998). Coercion occurs when “social 
control, rather than free choice, is the dominant mechanism that pushes the patient into the 
health system” (1998: 281). The social control element was her parents, who were in an 
authoritative position and made decisions about her healthcare (Mia was only 11 or 12 years 
old at the time). She outwardly complied in the process, and in this respect was arguably 
‘agreeing’, however her compliance was entirely passive. 
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The recognition of a problem by another person is one of the key features of this category. 
All participants here had not considered themselves to be experiencing an eating disorder 
(or any other significant problem that required intervention) when help was sought. Rather, 
others (family members or staff at school) recognised a problem and began the help-seeking 
process.  
For Mia and Claire, there was not only a lack of identification of a problem, but also an 
active rejection of the definition and interpretation that was being imposed by others: 
Claire: I didn’t feel like I was underweight […] I felt like what I was doing was 
completely normal as well […] and I think that it did make me feel really good, I 
didn’t want it to be taken away from me at that point. 
 
Natalie and Ben indicated less of an absolute opposition to others’ interpretations. Natalie 
for example had had a sense that her restricted eating and exercise were not entirely 
‘normal’ and needed to be hidden, but none the less did not think of herself as having a 
problem that needed to change: 
I wasn’t thinking about how to hide my body because I didn’t see myself as being 
underweight at all […] I was just thinking […] how am I going to hide [not eating 
and exercising] so I knew but I didn’t, I didn’t see really what was going on. 
 
It is interesting to note, however, that while Natalie did not understand herself as ‘anorexic’ 
when she was taken to the GP, at a different point in the interview she mentioned having 
engaged in eating disorder communities online prior to having been diagnosed. This suggests 
that she may have previously - fleetingly or ambivalently - considered the possibility she had 
an eating disorder. However, it was clear in the interview that her overriding memory of 
the immediate lead up to being diagnosed was of not believing herself to have anorexia, and 
not ‘connecting’ to what was happening.  
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Brossard and Carpentier (2016) suggest that the pathway to a diagnosis of dementia 
involves a trouble-observability-interpretation convergence. The trouble-observability 
aspects are helpful for understanding how a problem was identified for participants in this 
category. Brossard and Carpentier use ‘trouble’ to refer to something ‘going wrong’, and 
suggest that a trouble must be observable (to the person themselves or to others) if it is to 
lead to a medical consultation. Given that these participants did not personally experience 
their eating and weight loss as problematic, these did not become a ‘trouble’ until they were 
interpreted as such by someone else. For this to occur, the behaviour or ‘symptom’ in 
question had to be both visible, and occur in a social configuration that allowed it to be seen 
(Brossard and Carpentier, 2016). Due to the participant’s ages, most of them were living at 
home with family members and attending school, meaning that ‘symptoms’ were potentially 
highly visible. Thus their age-related social and relational circumstances shaped their route 
to diagnosis.  
For Natalie, who had recently left home to attend university, it was a change in her social 
configuration that triggered the help-seeking process, as this made her ‘symptoms’ 
observable. She had returned home from her first term at university for the Christmas 
break when her mum immediately noticed that something was wrong, and ‘marched her to 
the GP’.  
The participants in this category (and also some in the mixed route pathway) were a child 
or adolescent at the time they were diagnosed, unlike those in the self-directed pathway 
who were adults. These age differences reflect the claim in previous NICE guidelines: 
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Typically individuals are persuaded to seek help by concerned family members, 
teaching staff or GPs with whom they consult about the physical consequences. 
Sometimes, however, the person begins to appreciate the damaging effects of the 
disorder and may seek treatment in their own right. Children and adolescents are 
almost always brought to treatment, very rarely actively seeking help initially and can 
present more complex diagnostic challenges […] The diagnosis of anorexia in its 
typical form is a relatively straightforward one in older adolescents and adults (NHS, 
2004: 14). 
 
However, the suggestion of the diagnostic process being problematic was mostly not borne 
out in participants accounts. Indeed, once help was sought, reaching diagnosis was mostly 
straightforward. As with three of the participants in the previous category, there were no 
significant delays, problems or barriers to being diagnosed. Claire, Mia and Ben were firstly 
monitored by the primary service with whom help had been initiated (a GP or school health 
service) and were then referred to a specialist service (CAMHS) where they were 
diagnosed. Claire explained that it took “quite a long time” to get a diagnosis, due to being 
monitored by a GP for a while who was “not very good”. However, this did not appear as 
an especially significant problem in her recounting of her experiences, and once referred to 
a specialist team, she was quickly diagnosed. Natalie had been diagnosed by her GP at the 
initial appointment, and promptly referred for ‘emergency’ inpatient treatment.  
In summary, participants in this category had not recognised themselves as having a 
problem; others had initiated the help-seeking process, which they had passively adhered to. 
However, once help had been sought, reaching a diagnosis of anorexia was mostly 
unproblematic. 
Mixed route 
The final category is a mixed route. It includes four participants (Amelia, Jack, Sarah and 
Hannah) who were aged between 16 and 19 when diagnosed. The picture here is complex 
in that, in different ways for different participants, there were features of both of the two 
earlier categories. Most described a ‘mixed’ sense of agency in terms of the extent to which 
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they directed or actively chose to participate in the process of help-seeking. Most were 
largely encouraged and directed by others (family/school) who played a significant role in 
recognising that there was a problem. However, they did not attribute the whole of the 
‘doing’ of the process to others, and to some extent had recognised there was a problem. 
One participant clearly understood himself to have an eating disorder, but was ‘mixed’ in 
terms of his desire for help and his active instigation of this process. Participants in this 
category also experienced a more problematic route to being diagnosed after help had been 
sought. 
I have chosen Amelia as the case study for this route. She was 20 years old and living at 
home with her parents and siblings when interviewed. She had been undergoing outpatient 
treatment for anorexia with an EDS for approximately one year. This involved undertaking 
CBT and seeing a dietician and psychiatrist. She also saw her GP on a monthly basis. Amelia 
described herself as ‘in recovery’, having recently become more ‘motivated’ in this respect. 
She identified her anorexia as having first developed when she was 18. During her A-Levels 
she had begun exercising regularly as a form of ‘stress release’. This escalated, and began to 
incorporate food restriction, towards the end of her A-Levels when a close family member 
died: 
The stress of that sort of allowed the anorexia to develop and was probably the 
reason why it wasn’t caught necessarily as quickly by my family, because for them it 
was grief […] that was a reason why I was allowed to not be quite myself.  
 
Amelia went on to lose a significant amount of weight during the following summer. She 
described this experience of weight loss as her being “possessed”, and explained that she 
had not lost weight deliberately: 
 
185 
 
 
 
It was never a weight thing […] if I looked at myself I was just me, there was nothing 
wrong with me and I didn’t understand why people were treating me differently and 
asking me if I was OK […] it was definitely a control thing, I needed to control 
everything I ate, and all of the activity I did. 
 
However, when later directly questioned about whether or not she had any history of poor 
body image or dieting, she indicated that she had been concerned about body fat in recent 
years: 
I was so happy with my body, however having said that do you know what, on 
reflection […] I definitely had a fear of being fat, and I hadn’t acknowledged this until 
about the past month […] to me it was always a negative like you’re less of a person 
if you are overweight, I know that’s engrained in me and I didn’t think that was the 
trigger but now on reflection I think potentially it was. And I never thought myself 
overweight but I remember being like ‘I want to be more toned’ […] I wanted to be 
attractive and fit. 
 
Towards the end of the summer, Amelia saw a GP after being persuaded to do so by her 
parents. She had gone on a family holiday, and this was the first time during that summer 
that she had spent an extended amount of time with them. According to Amelia, while on 
holiday her parents noticed that she did not want to eat or socialise: 
[They] said look I think you really ought to see a doctor, can you please, please go 
and see a doctor and I think it was that family support and encouragement that made 
me go, right, maybe I should just go and see one and see what they say. 
 
At this time, Amelia recognised that there was a problem but did not think of it as an eating 
disorder. She stated: “I knew that something was wrong […] I knew that I wasn’t right and I 
wasn’t happy […] I wasn’t me. But I wasn’t really prepared to admit that I was poorly”.  
All that Amelia could recall of seeing the GP, was him saying “you just need to eat more”, 
which she found unhelpful. In addition to stating that she had not thought of herself as 
having an eating disorder at that time, Amelia later explained that she had searched for 
information about anorexia online directly following the GP appointment. This suggests that 
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she perhaps had a vague idea that she might be experiencing an eating disorder, and she 
confirmed this was the case when I directly asked about this. 
At the end of the summer, Amelia left the family home to attend university and her situation 
worsened. While there, she saw a GP weekly, because her parents had set this as a 
condition. This GP informed her parents that she did not have an eating disorder, claiming 
that she would not be attending appointments voluntarily if she did. The GP had asked 
Amelia to keep a food diary, and in this she exaggerated the amount of food she was eating. 
Amelia suspected that this further convinced the GP that she did not have an eating 
disorder: 
[She thought] it’s definitely not anorexia because she is eating [and] she’s asking for 
help. Because I was going ‘I know I really need to put on [weight]’ […] I must have 
just been so convincing […] she just thought ‘if she wants to put on weight then 
she’s not got an eating disorder’. 
 
When Amelia came home during the Christmas period, her parents realised the extent of 
the problem and their concern increased. In the January, she was called in to see a GP 
(whom she had not seen before) after a check of her records ‘flagged up’ problematic blood 
test results. Her Dad went with her to this appointment and told the GP that Amelia was 
“not right at all”. Amelia explained that due to this and her low weight, she was offered a 
choice of either being referred to an outpatient EDS or being hospitalised. After being 
persuaded by her Dad, she agreed to outpatient treatment: “I remember my Dad saying 
don’t be ridiculous Amelia, just let her refer you and it […] took me a good hour or 
something to actually say ‘OK’.” 
She attributed her need to be convinced to her lack of desire to change: 
I thought OK maybe there’s something a bit wrong, but […] I thought I could 
survive like this […] if I was there on my own it wouldn’t have happened, I’d have 
probably been in hospital […] I think maybe I accepted I was anorexic, but I wasn’t 
bothered. 
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Amelia was referred to the EDS where she was diagnosed with anorexia and began therapy.  
I have shown that Amelia first saw a GP after being persuaded by her parents to seek help. 
However, while they played a significant role in this, unlike participants in the previous 
category, Amelia was not entirely passive in the process. She did have some recognition that 
seeing a GP might be a good idea, and also an ambivalent and vague idea that she might have 
an eating disorder. Her decision to seek help can be understood using Zola’s (1973) 
description of ‘sanctioning’. Zola argued that experiencing medical ‘symptoms’ does not 
directly influence decisions to seek help, but that these are mediated by a range of non-
physiological factors. One of these factors is ‘sanctioning’, which occurs when a decision to 
seek help is encouraged or ‘pushed’ by someone else.  
Amelia’s route to being diagnosed after initially seeking help was problematic in the sense of 
being protracted. It seems that the first GP implied that there was nothing seriously wrong, 
and the GP she saw at university did not interpret her struggles as anorexia. It was not until 
clinical tests revealed physical health problems and she saw a different GP that she was 
diagnosed.  
Looking at Amelia’s route to diagnosis as a whole, her shifting interpretations of her own 
situation are notable. She adopted different positions at different times, in a contradictory 
and ambivalent manner. Unlike those in the self-directed and active category, she did not 
clearly identify herself as having a problem for which she needed help, and unlike those in 
the other-directed category, she did not dis-identify with the idea that she had an eating 
disorder. Amelia’s recounting of her experiences position her as somewhere in between 
active and passive, and as both recognising a problem, and also not doing so. 
This mixture of both active and passive, other-driven and self-driven help-seeking, and 
accompanying ambivalence, is a key defining feature of this category. Hannah and Sarah had 
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also first sought help following pressure from others. For Hannah, as for Amelia, other 
people’s interpretations of her behaviour and ‘pressure’ from them to seek help influenced 
the help-seeking process. Yet, Hannah was not entirely passive or in disagreement with this, 
and she did recognise that she had a problem. She also sometimes made independent 
decisions during the help seeking process, such as not agreeing to see certain professionals. 
Sarah’s first occasion of help seeking had been heavily encouraged by her friends, who had 
told her that they thought she had an eating disorder. Sarah had ambivalently agreed that 
something might be wrong and that it might be worth seeking help and arranged to see a 
counsellor.  
Jack’s experiences were different in that he clearly understood himself to have an eating 
disorder. Yet his route to diagnosis was still mixed, and strongly characterised by 
ambivalence. This was in relation to his desire for, and instigation of, help. He had begun 
developing ‘eating disorder symptoms’ at age 12, in tandem with health problems related to 
his bowel. At 17 years, believing himself to be struggling with an eating disorder and feeling 
unable to cope, he went to his parents for help. They organised for him to see a GP, who 
referred him to CAMHS. However, by the time of his appointment, he had “come out the 
other side” of wanting help, and felt fearful about having to change. He therefore 
deliberately convinced the professional at CAMHS that his bowel was the source of his 
weight loss, and thus actively avoided a diagnosis of anorexia. Jack felt that his gender made 
it easier for him to “make an excuse”, with professionals being less likely to assume an 
eating disorder in a male. This resonates with Raisanen and Hunt’s (2017) research. They 
found that young men with eating disorders sometimes felt that professionals had been slow 
to recognise their symptoms as belonging to an eating disorder because they were men, and 
in some cases they had been misdiagnosed. Jack’s views also speak to other literature which 
suggests that anorexia goes underdiagnosed in males (Strother et al, 2012), and that GPs are 
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more likely to interpret ‘symptoms’ as an eating disorder in female rather than male cases 
(Currin et al, 2007). About a year later while away at university, Jack’s struggles had 
worsened, and he was admitted to hospital for two weeks with problems with his heart and 
kidneys resulting from weight loss. Here he was seen by a crisis team, who he continued to 
see every fortnight for about 6 months until he discharged himself from their care. The first 
four months of this involved them reaching a diagnosis of anorexia. Jack found this 
problematic and felt that it worsened his struggles: 
I don’t think they knew what they were doing with me […] I don’t think they really 
had a male person on their books ever [because] my receptiveness lasts a month or 
two [it] was actually making me worse rather than better. 
 
In varying ways and extents, all in this category had relatively problematic routes to being 
diagnosed. For Jack the problem was waiting a long time for a diagnosis. Other problems 
included initially being described by a professional as not having an eating disorder (Amelia 
and Hannah), and being ‘put off’ help-seeking (and the pursuit of a diagnosis) due to a 
difficult first experience seeing a professional (Sarah).  
In this mixed-route category, participants’ experiences sit somewhere between the other 
two categories. They incorporated changing, and sometimes contradictory positions 
regarding their recognition of an eating disorder, and / or a desire for help. They also 
tended to have more protracted and problematic experiences of reaching a diagnosis of 
anorexia.  
Meanings of being diagnosed 
This section is concerned with the ‘application’ of a diagnosis - the transfer of a diagnosis 
from the medical domain to the lay person’s experience of illness (Jutel, 2011). Diagnosis is 
a complex, negotiated activity which is impacted by the experiences of both practitioner and 
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patient and is shrouded in personal meaning (Kralik et al, 2001; Jutel, 2011), and it is to this 
personal meaning that I now turn.  
Firstly, it is necessary to note the ways in which the act of diagnosis differed for participants. 
Most identified a specific occasion in which they were diagnosed with anorexia, either by 
their GP or a specialised mental health or eating disorder service. However, three of them, 
all from different routes (Hannah, Mia, and Maddie), did not describe a specific occasion in 
which they were diagnosed. Rather, the diagnosis had been applied to them in effect through 
clinical activity. In these cases, the word anorexia began being used during appointments or 
started appearing on official paperwork, and participants differentiated this from the idea of 
a ‘sit down diagnosis’. As Hannah, for example, expressed: 
No one officially ever said, as in they talk the whole time now about my anorexia, 
but no one actually officially ever sat me down and said you have anorexia. It was 
just assumed. 
 
However, even when there was no specific act of ‘being diagnosed’, participants still 
identified a (more or less specific) time that the diagnosis came into play. 
Across the sample, there were three broad meanings assigned to being diagnosed: diagnosis 
as a useful way forward, lack of identification with the diagnosis, and diagnosis as a marker of 
success and recognition of suffering. As might be expected, participants who experienced the 
other-directed, passive route to help-seeking did not identify with the diagnosis. This was 
also the case for some in the mixed route category, and one in the self-directed category. 
Conversely, those who followed an active route to help-seeking often perceived the 
diagnosis as a useful way forward. For one participant in the active route, and one in the 
mixed route, the diagnosis was valued for providing a desired status.  
For each of the three broad meanings, I firstly detail a relevant case study by way of a 
contextualised example. I then illustrate the meaning further with reference to additional 
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participants. The case studies include two I have used previously - Anna and Mia – and a 
new one, Kelly.   
Diagnosis as a useful way forward 
A diagnosis of anorexia had initially been suggested to Anna by the GP, and was later 
confirmed by the psychologist at her university and the EDS. She experienced these 
confirmations as a relief, because they provided access to the treatment she desperately 
wanted. However, the diagnosis also provoked anxiety, because she felt she needed to 
continue to ‘live up to it’ to qualify for treatment. This feeling emerged from her 
conceptualisation of anorexia as something that one actively does and continues to do over 
time, as opposed it being something that one simply has: 
I remember just the kind of relief, but again the anxiety that I’m still going to have to 
prove this, like I’m still going to have to work really hard to make sure that they 
don’t take this away […] it wasn’t something that felt static, it’s like something you 
do. 
 
This conceptualisation is also recognised by Lavis (2011), who describes how maintaining 
anorexia involves continual, daily self-surveillance (see chapter two).  
After the diagnosis from the EDS, Anna waited a further four months to begin outpatient 
treatment. During this waiting period, she wanted to keep her weight stable so that she 
could avoid inpatient treatment. However, she did continue to lose weight – albeit more 
slowly – and she referenced a number of reasons for this. Partly, she felt compelled by the 
‘logic’ of anorexia: 
I could only at that time conceptualise the stability as being slightly downwards […] 
it had to be within the framework of losing weight […] even recovery had to happen 
inside the anorexia logic. 
 
Anna’s sense that she needed to be seen to be ‘doing anorexia’ in order to ‘keep’ the 
diagnosis fed her desire for continued weight loss: 
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I had this obsession that if I ever went to the doctor and my weight was higher than 
it had been the week before she would decide that I didn’t have anorexia anymore 
and that she would withdraw me from treatment […] I felt like I had it, but only if I 
worked really hard. 
 
At one point, Anna positioned this interpretation of the diagnosis (as something that she 
needed to prove) as part of the illogic of anorexia, describing it as a “weird thing” that 
sounds “ridiculous”. On another occasion, she explained this interpretation using ‘logical’ (as 
opposed to ‘anorexic’) reasoning. She recognised the impact of scarce treatment and stated 
that “people are effectively competing for treatment with their BMI” and “you do to some 
extent have to prove it”. However, she then repositioned this ‘understandable reasoning’ 
back into ‘anorexic logic’: 
It kind of reinforces back into that space […] where you’re not getting treatment, 
and you have an overwhelming logic that says you need to lose weight, and other 
people are kind of saying yeah you kind of do, even though they are definitely saying 
it to your face that they are not, you know in the back of your mind that there is a 
logic that goes into your logic. 
 
For Anna, then, being diagnosed offered the route to the treatment that she wanted, and in 
this respect was valued as a way out of her struggles. However, it was also a status that she 
felt she had to work hard at in order to retain to access treatment. 
Maddie also saw the diagnosis as a potential way forward. She had wanted an official 
diagnosis of anorexia because being told “what it is” would offer a route to improving her 
situation. She summed this up by stating “If I knew what it was, I could fight it”. For Naomi, 
the diagnosis acted as an explanation for why she was struggling. She had presented to the 
GP with ‘tummy troubles’, but identified with the diagnosis of anorexia upon reading books 
that her GP recommended. The diagnosis offered her a different way of understanding her 
struggles that she readily took on board and was an explanation of her distress which 
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suggested a route out. This meaning remained with her, as she explained “I suppose it [the 
diagnosis] gives an explanation for why I struggle and its helpful in that sense”.  
Similar meanings may be attributed to other psychiatric diagnoses. Hansson-Halleröd et al 
(2015), researching adults experiences of being diagnosed with ADHD, found that the 
diagnosis was experienced as an “explanation for difficulties” and that this could be a relief. 
Horn et al suggest that being diagnosed with BPD can provide someone a new way to think 
about their difficulties, and can bring about “hope and the possibility of change” (2007: 262). 
Being diagnosed with a psychiatric illness can be experienced as useful for the knowledge it 
represents, and this ‘knowing’ can be a way to take ownership of one’s struggles (Hayne, 
2003). By making illness evident and treatment and cure possible (Shooter, 2010), being 
diagnosed can offer a way of healing that cannot be provided in any other way (Hayne, 
2003).  
Lack of identification  
After being monitored by her GP for two months, Mia was referred to CAMHS. During an 
initial appointment, the word anorexia was used for the first time. This stood out in her 
memory because of the impact it had on her mum: “That was sort of where the word 
anorexia was first used. Because I can remember it upsetting my mum. But I still wasn’t 
100% sure because I was only like 11 or 12”. 
At this time, she did not relate to the idea of having anorexia. She explained that she did not 
really know what anorexia was, although she had been introduced to the term in the book 
she had read in primary school which included a character with the condition. Further, she 
only understood her own experience as being about wanting to avoid being ‘fat’: 
I definitely don’t think I fully understood it, I think just being that young age I thought 
it was just clearly I didn’t want to eat because I didn’t want to get fat. That was all 
[…] I knew. 
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Rather than associating herself with the diagnosis, she saw it as a way for other people to 
decide what to do: “I thought it was just a branding to help everyone else then work out 
what to do with me next, and know what treatment I was going to follow”. 
Looking at the meaning of diagnosis for Mia, then, there was a lack of understanding of what 
it meant. She therefore did not personally identify with it, and she understood her 
experience as being about nothing other than a desire to lose weight. She perceived the 
diagnosis as being for other people; its purpose was for her parents and clinicians to know 
what to do. 
This meaning was also relevant to six other participants. Three of them (Claire, Ben and 
Natalie) are the remaining participants in the other-directed, active pathway. Two of them 
(Amelia and Jack) are in the mixed route, and the remaining participant (Lisa) was in the self-
directed category. 
Claire was taken to her GP by her parents aged 16. At this time, she was deliberately 
pursuing weight loss, but did not perceive herself as underweight, and understood her 
behaviour “as completely normal”. When she was diagnosed at an appointment with 
CAMHS, it did not make sense to her:  
I didn’t think I was unwell […] I thought I was still really overweight and in the media 
obviously people who have got an eating disorder are all like stick thin and I was like 
I don’t look like that it can’t be right” (emphasis added). 
 
Hannah similarly described how, at the time that the diagnosis was first used, she did not 
feel that she “fitted that bracket”. This was because her personal experiences did not ‘match 
up’ to her idea of what anorexia was. Ben, who recalled the time around being diagnosed as 
“very confusing”, explained how he personally actively rejected the diagnosis, refusing to 
align himself with it due to ‘personally stigmatising’ the idea. 
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Natalie’s lack of identification was a passive lack of ‘connection’ with what was happening 
when diagnosed. She was diagnosed at her first appointment with her GP and referred for 
an emergency inpatient admission. When I asked what she thought when she heard the 
diagnosis, she responded: “I didn’t really hear it. I was like, I didn’t hear it, I wasn’t really 
thinking, I was just, honestly, I disengaged”. 
Similarly, when Amelia attended her first appointment at the EDS, she was diagnosed with 
anorexia and formally admitted as an outpatient. She described this occasion as a “blur” and 
said: 
I don’t feel like I was me, at all when I was there […] I just remember being in floods 
of tears because the anorexia was just so strong and saying like ‘you [staff at the 
EDS] can’t do this to me’. 
 
At this appointment, she and her parents were informed of what she was not allowed to do 
at home (for example, her exercise was restricted). It seems that Amelia was overwhelmed 
by these stipulations on her behaviour which were her overriding concern. She did not 
especially recognise, or place significance on, the diagnosis being officially confirmed.   
For Jack, being diagnosed by the crisis team had been a long and drawn out process that he 
found problematic, and the diagnosis itself meant “absolutely nothing” to him. He explained:  
They put too much emphasis almost on the diagnosis rather than trying to actually 
treat the symptoms as early as possible […] if you can treat the symptoms it doesn’t 
matter what you’ve got. You’ve got an eating disorder, why does it matter what sort. 
Treat the person rather than the label. 
 
Jack also implied that the diagnosis was about the crisis team’s processes and needs, rather 
than being about him. For example, he said: “they were just trying to put me in a section in 
their book of treatments […] but I wasn’t really fitting any of their pre-specified moulds 
(emphasis added)”.  
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Lisa struggled to identify with the diagnosis of anorexia. That she had initially been diagnosed 
with bulimia influenced the meaning that she attributed to her later diagnosis of anorexia. 
She was surprised to be diagnosed with anorexia, expecting instead to have been diagnosed 
with bulimia for the second time. It took a long time to ‘accept’ being treated as ‘anorexic’ 
instead.  
Jack’s view of the diagnosis as ‘meaningless’ resonates with research into ADHD and BPD 
which suggests that individuals given these diagnoses sometimes question their importance 
and usefulness (Horn et al, 2007; Hansson-Halleröd, 2015). Horn et al’s (2007) research 
into BPD also reflects Jack’s view of the diagnosis as being more about the health 
professionals than about him. Horn et al found that individuals diagnosed with BPD 
sometimes viewed the diagnosis as simply what ‘they’ (professionals) were calling it, implying 
that the diagnosis did not have meaning beyond this.  
Claire and Hannah did not identify with the diagnosis because they did not see themselves 
as ‘matching up’ to their pre-existing idea of anorexia. Similarly, in McLorg and Taub’s 
research into the development of eating disorder identities, participants had initially 
“vigorously denied the label” (1987: 247) of anorexia after it was applied by family, friends, 
or medical professionals. This was often because they felt they were not ‘anorexic enough’ 
or ‘skinny enough’ to match up to the bodily appearance they associated with anorexia.  
This making reference to a broader construction of anorexia was also alluded to by other 
participants when they described other points in the route to diagnosis (and not only when 
formally diagnosed). I have shown that one of the reasons Kelly decided to see a GP was 
because the physical manifestation of her struggles had reached a point where she was able 
to see herself as ‘fitting the bill’ of the ‘one image’ of anorexia that she held in her mind. 
Around the time when Maddie first sought help, she knew she had a problem but had also 
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not thought of herself as fitting what she associated with an eating disorder: “I’d always 
associated it with you had to be thin […] you were either making yourself sick or you were 
really, really thin”.  
Similarly, Naomi (who initially saw a GP with ‘tummy problems’) explained why at this time 
she did not think of her experience as anorexia:  
I remember kind of reading things about anorexia or hearing people talk about it and 
kind of thinking well that sort of sounds a little bit like me but, I don’t look […] 
someone wouldn’t look at me and think that would fit. 
 
This suggests that a lay construction of anorexia as entailing an obviously remarkably thin 
body and/or serious physical complications acted as a resource which participants drew 
upon in making sense of their own experiences, and which influenced decisions and 
experiences of help seeking and the personal meaning of ‘being diagnosed’.  
Diagnosis as a marker of success and recognition of suffering 
I have described above how Kelly had sought help from her GP after recognising herself as 
struggling with an eating disorder. She described this encounter as a “really good 
experience”. The GP had weighed her, explained that she was “clearly underweight” and 
that she was very concerned, and went to get another doctor. The doctors asked a lot of 
questions and Kelly initially felt this intrusive, but also that it demonstrated that they wanted 
to offer the right care. The doctors referred her to an EDS, informing her that there would 
likely be a three-month waiting list, and suggested she return for a check-up in a few weeks. 
Anorexia was mentioned in conversation between the two GPs, but she was not ‘given’ the 
diagnosis. When asked how she felt about this, she explained that she had been disappointed 
and she had “overwhelmingly” wanted to be diagnosed: 
I really struggle to explain that feeling in hindsight, but I definitely felt like because 
they hadn’t kind of given me one, and I knew that I would have a big wait […] I 
remember just feeling quite disappointed. 
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When asked to expand on why she had wanted the diagnosis, Kelly recalled her feelings as 
‘bizarre’. She also indicted some concern about how she would come across when 
explaining this, stating that ‘it sounds sick to say it’. Following some reassurance that it 
would not, she went on to describe how she had wanted the diagnosis for the recognition it 
offered: 
It’s almost like a badge, kind of like, OK this is like, you did it […] I think you seek 
validation because […] at the time I had no idea how ill I was, like absolutely no clue 
[…] I think you just feel like you want somebody to […] validate you and you want 
somebody to say no, you are suffering. 
 
While waiting for an assessment at the EDS, Kelly’s struggles worsened. She became “really 
physically poorly” and had to stop working due to struggling to walk. She recalled an 
occasion when she left a social gathering looking for somewhere to make herself sick, after 
feeling panicked about something she had eaten. In this moment, Kelly ‘stepped outside of 
herself’, and noticed how extreme her behaviour had become. She then contacted her mum, 
and together they organised for her to see a psychiatrist privately, about one month after 
she had seen the GP. At this appointment, physical complications emerged such as 
‘problems with her heart’, and she was diagnosed with anorexia binge-purge sub type. Kelly 
explained how she felt at this appointment: 
I want to get back to that feeling of reinforcement [with] the diagnosis and kind of 
like the word anorexia itself. It was almost a bit of a badge […] there was like OK so 
you are having physical symptoms […] it’s kind of like reinforced the fact you do 
have an eating disorder but I think what it also did was, everyone around me was 
really worried [and] one doctor told me ‘if you carry on you are going to die’, and I 
knew that my heart wasn’t good and I wasn’t scared […] I just kind of felt a bit, 
almost happy. 
 
Kelly’s description of the diagnosis being like a ‘badge’ that offers validation integrates two 
related ideas about anorexia: that it is an achievement that one has to ‘work at’ (“you did 
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it”), and that it recognises and names suffering, confirming that one is ‘really’ ill. Clinical 
recognition of her physical ill health fed into the confirming and pleasing effect of the 
diagnosis, as it provided further recognition of the extent of her struggles and further 
legitimised ‘anorexia’.  
Sarah also positioned the diagnosis as a desirable, earned status. It offered her a meaningful 
sense of achievement and “satisfaction”: 
[Being diagnosed was] like I’ve reached the point where someone has, I must look 
good enough to be classed as something beginning with A  […] Satisfying I would say 
the word would be […] a sense of achievement, and feeling like I had sort of, weirdly 
joined this club and reached this kind of level of […] other people who perhaps 
don’t eat that much or look a bit small, they haven’t got this label and I have and 
that’s good and yeah definitely I felt really pleased, but then also felt very defensive 
and like no one would take it away that label, but also really happy to have it. 
 
However, Sarah was also concerned that others would respond to the diagnosis by ‘trying 
to fix her’, and saw it as a way for them to enforce change:  
If I admit to that word, that’s a label and people will try and fix me for having that 
label, they will try and take that away from me, they can put me in a kind of category 
and be like right, what we need to do to someone in this category is do this, and I’m 
not going to give in to that. 
 
Sarah’s valuing of the diagnosis also led her to feel as though it was something that she 
needed to continue to work at: “So that [having the diagnosis] was good, and now I need to 
make sure that that continues to happen, and that I don’t lose that diagnosis”. We saw 
previously that Anna also felt that the diagnosis was something she had to work at. 
However, the motivations behind this were different for Sarah. It was about keeping the 
diagnosis for the sense of achievement it awarded her, rather than in order to access 
treatment.  
This meaning of diagnosis speaks to anthropological research that was discussed in chapter 
two. Lavis’ (2011) shows how the act of diagnosis itself can become invested with pro-
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anorexic desire, due to the sense of legitimacy that it confers. Similarly, Eli’s (2014b) 
research indicates how in inpatient settings, anorexia can be experienced as an ‘earned title’, 
and that the naming of anorexia that occurs via hospitalisation can feel valuable for its 
affirming and legitimising effects. Indeed, individuals undergoing inpatient treatment are 
sometimes invested in ‘being medicalised’ via the diagnostic label of anorexia and express an 
‘enjoyment’ of being defined as clinically ill (Boughtwood and Halse, 2008; Dignon et al, 
2006). Further, Warin (2010) describes how the diagnosis of anorexia can feel empowering 
because of the sense of distinction that it offers. For Sarah especially, we have seen that this 
sense of distinction can be profound. My own experiences of being diagnosed can also be 
understood in terms of this meaning, as I valued the diagnosis for the recognition and 
distinction it offered (see chapter three).  
Further reflections on being diagnosed 
Literature suggests that being diagnosed with a psychiatric illness can be ‘sharply penetrating 
news’, resulting in one’s identity being ‘snatched away’, confusion and distress (Hayne, 2003; 
Johnstone, 2014).  Dignon (2007) discusses how this may be the case for individuals 
diagnosed with anorexia. She suggests that being diagnosed may force the individual to 
confront the reality that they have a serious psychiatric illness, leading them to feel shocked, 
and acting as a form of biographical disruption (Bury, 1982).  
However, these ideas do not particularly resonate for participants in this research. In many 
cases, they did not (fully) identify with the diagnosis at the time, or they placed a desirable 
value on it (as a useful way forward, or an earned title), and hence it was not ‘disruptive’. In 
addition, the act of being diagnosed was not ‘sharply penetrating’ because it tended not to 
be especially distinctive in terms of the ‘newness’ of the information that it communicated. 
Being diagnosed did not always represent a significant departure or ‘turning point’ in terms 
of there being a clear distinction between not having and then having the diagnosis. This was 
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due to the individual already having an idea that they had an eating disorder, and therefore 
to an extent expecting the diagnosis, and/or because the diagnosis had already previously 
‘come into play’. In the case of the latter, being ‘officially’ diagnosed marked a sort of end-
point in a more gradual or accumulative diagnostic process. An example of this is Naomi. 
Her GP had already suggested that she might have an eating disorder and had recommended 
a self-help book for anorexia. Thus, the diagnosis had already been ‘brought into play’ in the 
proceeding clinical activity, and the later diagnosis was formal confirmation of this 
suggestion. Lavis (2011) similarly found that for her participants, being diagnosed with 
anorexia often affirmed to the individual what they already felt to be there. Thus, the act of 
diagnosis tended to confirm to them an existing sense of themselves as ‘anorexic’, rather 
than it bringing about change and being the starting point for a different view of themselves.   
Self-diagnosis: a case study  
Michael was a man in his 50s who was self-diagnosed with anorexia, having come to identify 
with the diagnosis since around three or four months prior to the interview. With hindsight, 
he understood himself to have had anorexia for around 25 years. He had recently sought 
help from his GP and was regularly seeing a dietician for guidance increasing his weight. 
However, these professionals understood him as someone who was underweight, but not 
as someone who had an eating disorder. Michael had lived with potentially diagnosable 
anorexia for many years. In this case study, I examine how his trajectory of a ‘missed 
diagnosis’ took shape, and how he came to self-diagnose and seek help to gain weight. I also 
examine how Michael made sense of his lack of diagnosis, and what a potential formal 
diagnosis meant to him.  
Michael began the description of the development of his eating disorder with his time at 
university, around 25 years prior to the interview. At this time, he had decided to take up 
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weight training and “bulk up” (gain weight and muscle), with this being the only free sporting 
activity available at university. Prior to this, he had been a keen cyclist, so when someone 
“fairly close” to him commented that his increased size from weight training would make 
him less effective at cycling, he decided to lose weight again. He stated that “something 
clicked in my head, and I thought ‘I need to get rid of this’”.  
He spent a few years gradually losing weight until he went to work abroad. While there, he 
experienced problems with his bowel. He linked this to his weight loss, and identified losing 
weight as a likely causal factor in him developing gastroparesis60 (Michael’s understanding of 
the links between his weight loss and other medical problems are addressed in the next 
chapter). He went on to experience increasingly severe medical problems, whereby his 
intestines “twisted” and he was hospitalised. These problems led him to become significantly 
underweight, such that when he was discharged from hospital, he was advised by a doctor 
to increase his weight. He began to do this, but after gaining around one stone (reaching a 
point where he was still “medically underweight”), he stopped: “all I could see was blubber 
around my middle so just automatically thinking ‘Gosh I’m getting fat, I better stop here’”. 
He then spent the next few years deliberately eating and exercising so that he maintained 
his low weight. He saw his GP for ongoing problems relating to his bowels, and noted an 
occasion when the GP commented on his weight (stating that he was “a bit light”), but was 
easily convinced that there was no problem. 
About 15 years after being at university, Michael got married, and this was helpful for slightly 
increasing his weight because it enforced some regularity and familial sociability around food. 
However, he still had “rules” about what he could eat and still maintained a low weight: 
 
60 Gastroparesis is “a syndrome of objectively delayed gastric emptying in the absence of mechanical 
obstruction. Cardinal symptoms include early satiety, postprandial fullness, nausea, vomiting, bloating, and 
upper abdominal pain” (Myint et al, 2018).  
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I wouldn’t eat potatoes, I wouldn’t eat bananas, I’d have a very light breakfast […] 
we’d go out the whole day cycling […] I was more than burning it off, my weight 
went up a tiny bit but stayed pretty level.  
 
He also had ongoing problems with his bowels and about three years after getting married, 
had an operation to remove some of his large intestines.  Following this, he was again 
advised to regain lost weight. As previously, he experienced this weight gain as him ‘getting 
fat’: 
My weight started to go back up, I got to about 9 stone and like I did before, I saw 
myself getting fat, I thought ‘oh I’m getting fat, I’d better stop here.’ So I just bang, I 
just made that decision, this is what I eat in order to maintain the weight I am now. 
 
He deliberately maintained a low weight for three years after the operation. Then, following 
further complications with the remaining part of his large intestines, he underwent an 
operation to have this removed too. This increased the range of foods he was able to eat, 
but he continued to restrict his overall food intake: 
It didn’t do anything to get rid of, and now I know what it is, this anorexia nervosa, 
but at the time it was just me […] although I was eating a wider range of stuff, you 
just fit it in to your system, this is how much food you can eat. 
 
This continued up until around three or four months prior to the interview, when he lost 
significant amounts of weight during a bout of flu and a stomach infection and decided to see 
a GP: 
I couldn’t eat for a couple of weeks, weight just flew off, went back to the doctors, 
and for some reason I just said ‘oh no, here we go again’. I don’t know why, but I just 
said to myself ‘I need to try and get this sorted, I can’t go through the rest of my life, 
you know I’m in my 50s now I’m fed up with this’. I said to the doctor […] ‘look I’ve 
lost weight again, you know is there anybody I can see’? 
 
The doctor referred him to a dietician, whom he had been seeing for a few months. She 
gave advice regarding increasing his calorie intake, and he worked at increasing his diet 
204 
 
 
 
incrementally. He described the ‘battle’ with himself that he has experienced during this 
process: 
It’s been very instructive in seeing two parts of your persona, there is the logical part 
that says ‘right you’ve got to eat this […] your body will heal’, but when you actually 
go and [eat more] you think ‘what am I doing’.  
 
He found that seeing the dietician was helpful for making his decision to gain weight “real”: 
The fact that I am seeing her has made it real. If I had just said to myself ‘oh I think I 
better eat more’, I would be more likely to slip […] you know having the dietician 
there making it real. 
 
Around the time that he sought help from his GP, he began to understand himself as having 
an eating disorder. For the 25 years prior, he had thought of himself as a “fussy eater”, and 
had “buried” his disordered eating and disguised it with the medical problems linked to his 
bowel: 
The term I gave myself was fussy eater, and I now know the word is an eating 
disorder […] I could always cover it under the veneer of ‘oh I’ve got bowel 
problems’, I could always excuse it. I recognise now I’ve had an eating disorder since 
my mid-20s but I’ve always, I’ve never let it be entertained because I could excuse it, 
I buried it very, very quickly. 
 
Michael did not pinpoint anything specific that led him to initially suspect the possibility that 
he had anorexia. This process was likely subtle and did not entail any clear-cut ‘turning 
points’. However, information that he read on the internet played a key role in him 
strengthening his understanding of himself as having anorexia, and in understanding what 
weight restoration would involve:  
It was actually only in reading [a Psychology Today article] that it really gave me an 
insight into the psychology behind somebody who chooses to eat in a certain way, 
eating disorders, and I certainly saw myself in that, and that’s been really helpful in 
making me realise that there are going to be physical changes. 
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He described having been “googling the subject” when he came across the Psychology Today 
article which made reference to Keys et al’s (1950) Minnesota starvation experiment61. He 
related to this because it described men’s experiences of starvation and recovery: 
For the first time it was a load of blokes, so rather than being a 15 year old girl it 
was actually men […] it was like somebody had taken a blind off my eyes, I thought 
‘oh my Gosh, why didn’t  someone tell me this earlier’ […] that’s me, it was like, 
glorious […] that made me see right, I can now see that this is the road that I need 
to tread in order to recover. 
 
The information he gleaned online allowed him to view weight gain and ‘getting better’ in a 
new way. It was also significant to his self-understanding in that it informed the idea that he 
was different to most others with eating disorders. In the representations of anorexia he 
usually encountered, he saw a particular demographic (young, female) with a particular ‘type’ 
of experience – one that was different to his: 
The You Tubers and bloggers that I’ve looked at in the last few weeks, a lot of them 
are young ladies [it’s usually] a 15 year-old girl, where as a 50 year old geezer is, you 
know. So although I’ve been informed, it’s being informed about something that’s so 
removed from who I am […] they all sort of fit into the same sort of thing you 
know, teenage angst, losing weight, body image problems […] most people seem to 
go into it and come out of it again within you know, between a 2 and a 5 year span 
[…] I’ve held onto it  for a lifetime.  
 
Not seeing his situation in the information he read also meant that he felt uncertain about 
his recovery: 
So I’m at the beginning of what I hope will be a recovery […] I haven’t seen or read 
yet of anybody who has had an eating disorder for this long and has chosen to come 
out of it so it’s almost like unchartered territory.  
 
In line with Michael’s experiences, literature suggests that representations of eating 
disorders in media reinforce the idea that they are predominantly female disorders and that 
 
61 Keys et al’s (1950) experiment investigated the physical and psychological effects of starvation and recovery 
using a sample of 36 men. During the starvation phase of the experiment, the sample consumed a starvation 
diet for 24 weeks, such that on average they lost 25% of their body weight. During the recovery stage, they 
followed various re-nourishing diets.  
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this may be problematic for males. For example, MacLean et al (2015) suggest that 
representations of male eating disorders in UK newspapers reinforce messages that eating 
disorders are inherently female. Robinson et al (2013) undertook research with male 
participants being treated for an eating disorder, and found that they felt that there is a lack 
of visibility of male eating disorders in media. In addition, research suggests that male 
experiences may not be adequately addressed in information about eating disorders 
provided by professionals and that this is problematic for males who are seeking more 
personally relevant information (Robinson et al, 2013; Raisanen and Hunt, 2014). In addition 
to this being the case for Michael in relation to information on the internet, it was also 
discussed by Ben. He described how, in his experience, information about the ‘biological 
impact’ of anorexia tends to be aimed more at females than males (I discuss the impact of 
this on Ben’s identity in chapter five). 
Michael explained that he enjoyed being recognised as very thin by others: 
Lots of my friends would jokingly say ‘oh I wish I was your size, I could eat what I 
wanted’, you know for me that’s a big tick, it’s a big tick you know, aren’t I amazing 
because I’m so skinny. 
 
He also described a situation in which he appreciated medical recognition of his thinness. 
When in hospital for reasons related to his bowel, Michael was recognised as having very 
low blood pressure and a slow pulse. On one occasion, a nurse was very alarmed about this, 
but he explained to staff that it was because he was very fit and doing a lot of cycling. He 
also thought to himself: “Aren’t I a hero because I’ve got low blood pressure and I’m really 
skinny” and stated “I always gave that to myself as a real brownie point” (I return to this 
aspect of Michael’s experience later in chapter seven).  
He described how others, including friends, family and medical professionals, had never 
challenged him for being underweight or for what he ate. In retrospect, he thought this 
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surprising. Referring to the occasion when staff had been concerned about his blood 
pressure, he explained: 
Now I realise they should have said you know, I’m not congratulating you, I’m telling 
you off you know, but nobody ever did! There was never anything about ‘you are 
underweight, you ought to eat more’.  
 
Michael understood the reason he had never been diagnosed with anorexia to be related to 
the length of time he had been consistently underweight, and to him never having had any 
rapid or sudden weight loss. This understanding was informed by what he had recently 
learned about why he was not eligible to be prescribed nutritional aids. When he “looked 
into the reasons”, he found that in his county, he needed to be diagnosed with an eating 
disorder and to have had a recent sudden weight loss to be eligible. He contrasted this to 
his experiences and explained: 
I’ve got like a 25-year history and I’ve maintained this thing. I don’t tick that box […] 
I don’t officially have an eating disorder because my weight hasn’t recently changed. I 
know I have got an eating disorder, as far as they are concerned I don’t tick their 
NHS box. 
 
He also applied this understanding retrospectively to numerous past occasions when 
healthcare professionals had not diagnosed him: 
I’ve had a number of times people have asked me, have you recently lost weight, if I 
had said yes at any of those times they probably would have sent me to the relevant 
things […] Nobody ever questioned me on what I eat. The only question that I got 
repeatedly was have you recently lost weight which I always said no […] I’ve never 
been diagnosed simply because I come in as low, I go out as low.  
 
Here, it is worth noting the similarities and differences between Michael and Jack’s 
experiences. For both, the development of their eating disorder was intertwined with 
physical health complications relating to their bowels. Both had also had encounters with 
professionals who had not diagnosed anorexia when they presented with potential 
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‘symptoms’. However, Jack had actively sought to ensure that he was not diagnosed with an 
eating disorder, but Michael had not. I have shown that in hindsight, Jack understood his 
(initial) ‘missed diagnosis’ as linked to gender, and that his understanding is reflected in 
literature (Currin et al, 2007; Strother et al, 2012; Raisanen and Hunt, 2017). In contrast, 
Michael, despite being aware that he did not fit the ‘typical demographic’ for someone with 
an eating disorder, did not frame his lack of diagnosis in gender terms. Instead, he 
understood it as related to his pattern of weight loss.  
The interpretation component of the trouble-observability-interpretation convergence 
(Brossard and Carpentier, 2016) is useful for understanding Michael’s experiences. A 
trouble needs to be both observable and interpreted as a medical problem that requires 
assistance, if it is to lead to a medical consultation. Michael had observed his own 
undereating and recognised that he was underweight for many years, but his interpretation 
of this was that he was a ‘fussy eater’ and it was ‘just the way he was’. There was a 
normalisation of his behaviour and ‘symptoms’ by both himself and others (Brossard and 
Carpentier, 2016). Normalisation occurs when ‘residual rule breaking’ or potentially 
‘troubling’ behaviour is unrecognised or rationalised away (Scheff, 1966). Moreover, the 
normalisation of his behaviour by others seemed to inform his own understanding, in that 
others’ not defining the situation as problematic contributed to him also not defining it as 
such. The following quote suggests that the lack of challenge from others contributed to him 
‘brushing it under the carpet’.  
Admittedly when I look at pictures of myself in a pair of shorts and a vest or 
something compared to my peers, I think ‘Gosh don’t I look skinny’, but then within 
an instant I just sort of brush it under the carpet and say you know, it’s just me, 
nobody has really challenged me. 
 
However, he began to interpret his experiences as a trouble that required assistance when 
he recently experienced a bout of weight loss and illness. This shift seemed to result from 
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the repeated nature of his periods of weight loss, and the fact that these had continued into 
his 50s. Coinciding with this interpretation of weight loss as a ‘trouble’ was his increased 
engagement with the idea that he had anorexia. Having reached a point where help with 
weight restoration felt necessary, the diagnostic category of anorexia offered a new 
framework for understanding his ongoing, long term experiences. 
Raisanhen and Hunt’s (2017) research also reflects Michael’s experience. In their study of 
young males with an eating disorder, they found that their participants did not initially 
recognise their symptoms as an eating disorder, and that they presented to professionals 
late in the trajectory of their illness. The authors attribute this to the widespread 
construction of eating disorders as a female problem. Their participants explained that they 
had lacked awareness of eating disorders in men and that this meant that an eating disorder 
diagnosis was not readily considered as the explanation for their struggles. For Michael, as 
with his understanding of why he had not been diagnosed by a professional, he did not 
directly draw on gender as an explanation for why he did not recognise an eating disorder in 
himself earlier. None the less, it is possible that had male eating disorders been a more 
culturally available narrative during the initial 25 years of his restricted eating, he might have 
suspected anorexia sooner. Like Michael, Raisanhan and Hunt (2017)’s participants also 
seemed to have had their initial lack of recognition of an eating disorder compounded by a 
lack of recognition by others in their social networks.  
Michael was ambivalent regarding a potential future formal diagnosis. On the one hand, he 
felt frustrated that his eating disorder had gone undiagnosed for 25 years and that it would 
be helpful if he were to be diagnosed and given access to psychological support. On the 
other hand, he expressed being unsure about whether he wanted a diagnosis, and felt he 
could manage his recovery without one.  
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Regarding his frustration at the lack of a diagnosis, he stated: 
It might be nice if somebody did diagnose me as having an ED, but I know that if they 
did, at the same time I’d be really angry, thinking why didn’t you tell me this 25 years 
ago? 
 
He felt that had he been diagnosed with anorexia in the past, he might by now be 
recovered. While he was currently finding the dietician helpful for ‘making real’ his need to 
gain weight, he also felt that some aspect of psychological input specifically for an eating 
disorder would be beneficial. He framed the diagnosis as desirable in its potential to give 
access to this. However, at other times he asserted that he could manage without a 
diagnosis and psychological support so long as he had access to information and someone to 
whom he could be accountable. When I directly asked Michael if he wanted a diagnosis, he 
responded in a way that reflected his overall uncertainty:  
I suppose yes, but at this stage I don’t know if it would be helpful or not. I suppose 
what I would really like is the opportunity to talk with people who have gone 
through it and come out the other side […] so it would be helpful to have a 
diagnosis if in having a diagnosis it led to me being able to be helped psychologically. 
 
An official, formal diagnosis applied by the medical profession is generally understood as 
more legitimising than a self-diagnosis. That an official diagnosis is awarded by a ‘knowing’ 
professional, as opposed to a lay individual, affords it ‘weight’. Being formally diagnosed thus 
comes to confirm that one is ‘really’ ill (Kralik, 2000), and in service-user mental health 
communities, there is a reverence for official diagnosis (Giles and Newbold, 2011). 
However, Michael did not seem to afford this reverence to a (potential) formal diagnosis. 
He firmly understood himself to have anorexia, and did not indicate that he thought himself 
any ‘less anorexic’ for not having been diagnosed by a professional.  
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Chapter Five Summary  
In this chapter, I have shown how individuals reach the point of being diagnosed via different 
routes, whereby one’s self and others play differing roles in defining the situation as 
problematic and initiating help-seeking. These different routes to reaching a diagnosis are 
linked to different experiences of being diagnosed. The diagnosis held different meanings for 
individuals, partly depending on the extent to which they believed themselves to have a 
problem and wanted help. Individuals who had self-driven their help-seeking, often perceived 
the diagnosis as a useful way forward, whereas those for whom help-seeking had been 
driven by others did not identify with it. In addition, this chapter recognises how some 
participants (and I) experienced the diagnosis as a marker of success and a validation of their 
suffering. In this meaning, we begin to see the emergence of anorexia as a valued identity 
and social positioning, and this is explored further in the following two chapters. I have also 
examined the situational and interpretive processes involved in the trajectory of a ‘missed’ 
diagnosis for a male participant. In this case, as well as in relation to the other two males, I 
have begun to illuminate some gender dynamics in relation to the diagnosis. 
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Chapter Six 
Being anorexia 
This chapter is concerned with diagnostic identity - the ‘being’ dimension of a diagnosis of 
anorexia (Brinkmann, 2016). As noted in previous chapters, a psychiatric diagnosis can be an 
important influence on one’s identity (Karp, 1996; Brinkmann, 2016), and research suggests 
that individuals diagnosed with anorexia come to manage and embody it as an identity as 
well as an illness (Rich, 2006; Warin, 2010). In this chapter, I am concerned with the ways in 
which participants related to the diagnosis of anorexia, how the diagnosis (and associated 
clinical knowledge) informed their self-understandings, and the value and meaning of an 
anorexic identity. The previous chapter has already begun to address some facets of this. I 
showed how identification with the diagnosis emerged for participants in the self-directed 
pathway, and how this influenced their help-seeking.  In an examination of the meanings they 
afforded it when first diagnosed, the chapter also revealed how individuals initially related to 
the diagnosis. 
I begin this chapter focusing on those participants who did not identify with the diagnosis at 
the time that they were first diagnosed. I address the question of when and how they did 
eventually come to identify with it, and the interpretive processes and social circumstances 
involved. I then turn to explore their identification with anorexia over time. This includes a 
consideration of how their identification sometimes fluctuated, and how it was expressed 
through the personification of anorexia. Following this, I explore how clinical understandings 
were incorporated into individuals’ personal sense-making about their diagnosis, and how 
this informed anorexic identities that were variously clinical and ‘critical’. Finally, I address 
the ways in which individuals sometimes valued (and even sought) being positioned as 
‘anorexic’.  
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Coming to identify with anorexia  
The previous chapter identified a range of meanings attributed to the diagnosis on the 
occasion that individuals were first diagnosed. For six participants (Claire, Hannah, Ben, 
Natalie, Amelia and Mia), this meaning was a lack of identification with the diagnosis of 
anorexia. I now follow up on this meaning and examine when and how – if indeed at all - 
these participants recalled that they did subsequently identify with the diagnosis. The 
development of an identification with a diagnosis and related self-understandings may be 
gradual, subtle and influenced by factors of which participants themselves may not have been 
aware. The focus here, then, is on what participants retrospectively recall as significant in 
this regard. 
Claire, Hannah, and Ben recalled having eventually begun to identify with the diagnosis 
during inpatient treatment. When Claire described the time that she first started to see 
herself as ‘anorexic’, she referred to her having had no choice but to be hospitalised, and 
the views of other patients - which were taken as more trustworthy than clinicians’ - as 
important influences on this: 
I only accepted that I had something wrong with me when I started going to the 
hospital full time, and actually had no choice about that […] something that helped 
me actually was when other people who had eating disorders told you that you 
looked like you had an eating disorder, I felt like I was more able to believe them just 
because they had been through it already as well, so I trusted their judgement a bit 
more than the professionals. 
 
Hannah’s first course of treatment was as an outpatient for a few months. As her situation 
worsened, she progressed to day-patient treatment for two weeks and then a 6-month 
inpatient admission to an adult SEDU. Prior to being an inpatient, Hannah had not been sure 
that she fitted “an anorexia bracket”. Like Claire, spending time with others also diagnosed 
with anorexia appeared to have influenced how she viewed herself: 
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When I became inpatient that was the first time I really understood, when I met 
other people who shared similar things […] Also there I felt different in some 
aspects. But it’s sort of like progressed as it’s gone on. My last admission I definitely 
was considered, like I definitely considered myself anorexic […] from being an 
inpatient and with all the other girls […] in groups and listening to them, you can 
definitely get a sense of how your eating disorder relates to theirs, and see the 
differences.  
 
Seeing aspects of her own experiences in others influenced her view of herself, and she 
recognised being in hospital as having influenced her increasing alignment with the diagnosis 
over time.   
Ben had been referred to a child and adolescent psychiatric unit about three to four months 
after an initial appointment with CAMHS. He described how, when he was first diagnosed 
with anorexia and admitted, in part due to his young age, he struggled to articulate his 
experiences. He felt that this led him to be more open to take on the diagnostic definitions 
offered by others during inpatient treatment: 
I didn’t have the vocabulary to say sort of at the time this is really what I find difficult 
about food […] I think a diagnosis then perhaps just sort of you know, this is what’s 
the problem […] I think I mainly took other people’s definitions as opposed to my 
own. 
 
However, Ben did not meaningfully internalise the definitions offered to him by others; he 
only vaguely identified with the idea of anorexia at the time of inpatient treatment, and after 
his admission remained distanced from the diagnosis (discussed in detail later).  
Claire, Hannah and Ben’s experiences can be understood in terms of what I call diagnostic 
framing. This is the process by which clinical knowledge of anorexia, in all the various ways 
it manifests and is communicated during treatment, offers a new interpretation of one’s 
experiences and recasts them as belonging to the category of anorexia. Through this 
process, what individuals once experienced as ‘normal’ or unproblematic, gradually come to 
be understood as ‘anorexic’. Darmon’s (2017) description of the final stage of the ‘anorexic 
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career’ is relevant here (see chapter two). This stage involves the individual entering and 
being ‘taken in hand’ by the hospital institution. The hospital seeks to reverse the individual’s 
commitment to anorexia by redefining their existing dispositions as pathological, and 
replacing them with ‘healthy’ ones. In gradually getting ‘on board’ with this process, the 
individual internalises the hospitals perspective, and actively invests in ‘recovery’. 
Recognition of oneself as ‘anorexic’ is a necessary first step in this process, and occurs as 
part of the redefinition – or diagnostic framing – that takes place. 
Claire and Hannah identified ‘seeing’ the diagnosis in others as playing a role in diagnostic 
framing. They will also have been exposed to ideas about ‘what anorexia is’ more variously 
and generally, such that they were gradually socialised into a new way of understanding their 
experiences and themselves. In addition, Amelia, who had only ambivalently understood 
herself as having anorexia prior to being admitted to outpatient treatment, alluded to 
diagnostic framing when she explained that “[treatment] made me realise I was poorly”.  
For Claire, Hannah, and Amelia, the newer interpretation of their experiences – that is, the 
understanding of themselves as ‘anorexic’ - was retrospectively (at the time of the 
interview) understood as the ‘correct’ interpretation. In the quote from Claire above, her 
use of the words ‘accepted’ and ‘helpful’ imply that she viewed the understanding of herself 
as having an eating disorder as the ‘true’ position, that before hospitalisation, she had not 
yet realised (but needed to). This is in contrast to Ben, who indicated a more ‘neutral’ take 
on diagnostic versus non-diagnostic interpretations, by seeing these as different but neither 
‘more true’. Here, then, is an initial glimpse into the different ways that anorexia entered 
into individuals’ current self – understandings, with some more readily or ‘wholly’ 
incorporating dominant diagnostic discourse than others. These different self-understandings 
are discussed in detail later.  
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In contrast to Claire, Hannah and Ben, Natalie was clear that she did not identify with the 
diagnosis until after she left inpatient treatment: 
Even during all of the treatment like I never really identified with having anorexia 
[…] it’s only really since I’ve left treatment that I’ve begun to identify more with it 
[…] I remember getting letters from the eating disorders service and they would 
have it written on the letters, and I couldn’t read it, I couldn’t even read that it was 
from the eating disorders unit […] I don’t know whether I didn’t want to recognise 
that I had an issue […] whether I was in so much denial about everything […] it’s 
only really after all of that that I have kind of slowly started to identify with it. 
 
Natalie’s description suggests an element of resistance to thinking of herself in terms of the 
diagnosis, which dissipated after she left inpatient treatment. However, when describing her 
experiences of inpatient treatment, she frequently alluded to her then-awareness of notions 
of ‘wellness’ and ‘sickness’, and her attempts to align herself within these different positions. 
This suggests a possible distinction between thinking of herself as unwell in some way, and 
as having the specific diagnosis of anorexia; the former may have occurred before the latter. 
However, even her recognition of herself as ‘sick’ while an inpatient was a position that she 
questioned, often feeling as though this was a ‘façade’ (discussed further later).  
Mia’s descriptions of how she had begun to identify with the diagnosis were less definite. 
Like others, she began to understand herself as ‘having a problem’ while in treatment, but 
this understanding was fluctuating. During her first bout of outpatient treatment in which 
she undertook CBT, she did sometimes shift towards seeing herself as ‘having a bit of a 
problem’, but largely did not accept herself as ‘having anorexia’: 
There were times when it was like OK, maybe I do have a problem, but then there 
were other times when it would just be like, because still at that age, it was very 
much mum and dad that actually took me […] I didn’t choose to be there […] I 
might as well engage in it but sort of maybe not fully accept it. 
 
Mia recalled a later occasion, when she had relapsed and was waiting to begin inpatient 
treatment the next day, as a significant moment in terms of her accepting the diagnosis and 
217 
 
 
 
the need for treatment. However, despite recognising such occasions as moving her 
towards ‘acceptance’, and despite describing herself as having ‘chronic anorexia’ at the 
beginning of her interview, her identification with the diagnosis was ambivalent and 
inconsistent. At one point, she suggested that she had only very recently accepted the 
diagnosis. She then directly followed this claim with a description of how she still currently 
actively rejects or negotiates it: 
I don’t really know if I accepted it until kind of recently […] because every time the 
word is bought up I sort of will just answer back with a ‘but’ kind of thing, not really 
listening to what has just been said to me and wanting to quickly cover that over 
because actually no I don’t because such and such. 
 
I have explained previously how Lisa had initially identified with the idea of anorexia aged 
eleven, and that her desire to become like the ‘anorexic persona’ (as she described it) she 
had read about in a book motivated her to begin restricting her food intake. Lisa was 
eventually diagnosed with anorexia in her early 30s. It took a long time for her to ‘accept’ 
this diagnosis, in part because she had initially been diagnosed with bulimia. A bulimia 
diagnosis had reinforced her belief that the binge eating aspect of her struggles was ‘the 
problem’, as opposed to the food restriction associated with anorexia. It also reinforced her 
belief that anorexia was a figment of her imagination. Indeed, ‘being anorexic’ had for many 
years been part of a “secret fantasy” that existed only in her mind, and was therefore 
difficult for her to accept as ‘real’. When she was eventually diagnosed with anorexia and 
advised to begin a programme of day treatment, Lisa found this hard to accept: 
I couldn’t really believe that it was being said to me because it felt like stuff that I’d 
read about in books and that happened to other people […] it just felt very weird, 
and it took quite long to reconcile to the fact that it was happening in reality. 
 
Gradually, over the course of around eight years and various periods of day patient and 
inpatient treatment, she came to relate to the diagnosis: 
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In the last few years since getting the diagnosis and being treated for anorexia […] I 
think I do identify with it in a way, in a more healthy way […] I accept that actually I 
have suffered with it for many, many years […] including before I was diagnosed with 
it. 
 
However, like Mia, there was also ongoing ambivalence in this respect. Early in the 
interview, Lisa explained: 
I don’t like the idea of me being anorexic. I still find it a little bit hard to believe that 
it is the case sometimes […] particularly now I feel like I’m kind of quite well. 
 
She felt that her positioning of herself as anorexic shifted and that while at times she 
strongly identified with the diagnosis, at others she found it difficult to believe.  
Diagnostic identity  
At the time of the interview, most participants identified themselves with the diagnosis of 
anorexia, and the diagnosis informed their self-understanding and experiences in important 
ways. In general, these participants spoke about the diagnosis of anorexia as if it were 
something that they had or were recovering from, and as if diagnostic understandings were 
the natural and ‘common sense’ way of accounting for their experiences (Dignon, 2007). To 
some extent, this was engendered by the interview situation itself; participants were being 
interviewed precisely because they had (or previously had) a diagnosis of anorexia, and as 
the interviewer, I implied a ‘diagnostic reality’ simply by referring to ‘anorexia’. However, 
throughout the course of the interview, participants were encouraged to speak within their 
own frames of reference and were given space to reflect critically on the diagnosis, enabling 
them to detach themselves and/or their experiences from it. Three participants did do this 
(in different ways and to different extents), and these participants’ interviews reflected more 
‘critical’ narratives. However, most did not reflect critically on the diagnosis, or at least not 
to a great extent.  
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Despite predominantly identifying with anorexia however, participants also sometimes 
doubted their diagnosis and an identification with anorexia was not always consistent over 
time. I have explained how this was the case for Mia and Lisa, both of whom recognised the 
fluctuating and complex ways in which they understood themselves as truly ‘anorexic’. Anna 
similarly explained that there was a “big part” of her that didn’t “quite believe” she had it 
“all the time”. She made reference to her (previously described) conceptualisation of 
anorexia as something that one actively does on a daily basis to explain why, now that she is 
no longer losing weight, she sometimes doubts that she has anorexia. Further, she explained 
how she sometimes struggles to make sense of the diagnosis due to it being indistinguishable 
from ‘just who she is’: 
I just kept constantly having that scepticism that I still have now, that I don’t quite 
believe [I have anorexia] it’s just a smaller part of how I think on a bigger scale about 
lots of different things, I can find that quite hard to spot as a tangible part of myself. 
Thinking in certain ways, being really anxious about things, judging myself quite 
harshly are just things that I’ve always done, and so it can be really hard to separate 
as a thing that is separate from just who I am. 
 
Related to this doubt about their diagnosis, it was common for participants to describe 
sometimes feeling they were not ‘sick enough’, not ‘doing’ anorexia well enough, or that 
their anorexia was fraudulent. These issues, discussed in depth later, are relevant here as a 
contextualising point. In the following discussion, I focus on the eleven participants who 
identified with the diagnosis of anorexia and explore the processes through which they 
related themselves to, and internalised, a diagnostic and clinically informed understanding of 
their experiences. The contextualising point that it is important to hold in mind is that these 
identification processes often occurred against a backdrop of doubt about their claim to 
anorexia, and were therefore not consistent or absolute in terms of what they meant for 
diagnostic identity. The identity processes I discuss are ‘entification’ (Brinkmann, 2016), 
diagnostic framing (introduced earlier) and interpretive identity-work. After this discussion 
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of identification with anorexia, I move on to discuss the more critical narratives of the three 
participants (Sarah, Natalie, and Ben) who tended not to currently identify with the 
diagnosis.  
Entification  
‘Entification’ occurs when a psychiatric diagnosis is treated as if it were a discrete object as 
opposed to a clinical label, and is a way of invoking a diagnosis as an explanation of one’s 
struggles (see chapter one) (Brinkmann, 2016). In anorexia, entification may be encouraged 
by therapeutic processes which seek to ‘externalise’ anorexia so that it can be resisted 
(Winston et al, 2012). Such approaches tend to derive from narrative therapy (Weber et al, 
2006; Scott et al, 2013), and often involve personifying anorexia by imagining it as a separate 
person who is both friend and enemy. Personification is sometimes also encouraged in 
treatment discourse more generally, for example via staff telling those with the diagnosis 
that their ‘anorexia is talking’ when they express apparently ‘irrational’ ideas (Lavis, 2011). In 
addition, some individuals directly experience anorexia as if it were a person or voice that 
they feel affiliated to (Tierney and Fox, 2010; Pugh and Waller, 2017). This was the case for 
Mia, Sarah and Claire, who described having (at least at some point) directly experienced 
anorexia as a person living alongside them (or a voice in their head) who encouraged them 
to restrict their food intake. 
Entification was one way in which participants related to anorexia and expressed their 
identification with the diagnosis. Most who identified with the diagnosis entified it to some 
extent during their interview. Sometimes this was only ‘slight’, and occurred for example via 
occasional reference to ‘the anorexia’ or ‘the eating disorder’ that positioned it as a ‘thing’. 
For five participants, entification was more significant. Here, anorexia was referred to as a 
separate entity that acted on them, interfered with their true self and desires, and that had 
its own agentic capacity, needs and goals. Here are some examples: 
221 
 
 
 
Claire: I think the anorexia makes you do things that you wouldn’t probably normally 
do and it makes you act in certain ways that you might not […] the anorexia made 
me do really nasty things.  
 
Jack: I can be quite manipulative and I guess that’s one of the main factors of it, the 
eating disorder can make you very manipulative how you do things, very secretive 
[…] the eating disorder is controlling you.  
 
Naomi: I think the problem with being someone that’s very able, very capable is that 
the eating disorder will hijack that. I can be trying hard to find ways to protect myself 
from the eating disorder behaviours […] but as quick as I come up with a way the 
eating disorder finds a way round it.  
 
Amelia described ‘the eating disorder’ as something ‘evil’ that had ‘possessed’ her, and 
implied that it was potentially separable from her ‘true’ self by stating “It’s engrained within 
your body to the point where you don’t know what’s you, and what’s anorexia anymore”. 
I therefore directly asked her whether she understood anorexia as something separate. In 
response, she described how ‘separating out’ anorexia was something she had attempted in 
the past (and implied that she does not do this currently). Interestingly though, when 
explaining this, she inadvertently engaged in the very process she implied she was not 
engaging in, by personifying anorexia via a description of it ‘playing a game’: 
When I first started recovery I tried to say it, this is the anorexia, this is me. But that 
was, that was the anorexia playing a game […] as in trying to convince everybody 
else that I was getting better when really I wasn’t. 
 
She also directly contrasted her own desires to those of ‘the anorexia’. For example, when 
describing her realisation that she was the longest-term patient among a particular group at 
the eating disorder clinic, she stated: “The anorexia was pleased about that. I was mortified. 
I was like oh my God, I’m still here what the hell am I doing”. 
In addition, she implicated anorexia as having its own needs. With reference to the support 
she has from her parents, she explained: “I think because part of the illness has been this 
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fear of being independent. The illness is now thriving on that. It needs, wants this continuous 
support from them”.  
Maddie also contrasted anorexia’s desires with her own and located apparently 
‘pathological’ needs within anorexia (as opposed to herself): 
[Being treated like a child] probably feeds the eating disorder more because I think it 
craves that attention and it craves that approval […] it wants you to not grow up 
and it wants that support and validation and I was trying to break free of that mould, 
I was trying to come back to being an adult and being myself. 
 
Maddie later explicitly addressed her personification of anorexia, explaining “I look at it as 
two people [anorexia and her] and I do I give it a different identity almost”.  
It is important to note however, that even for those participants who sometimes spoke 
about anorexia as a separate entity, they did not do so consistently. Taking Jack as an 
example, in addition to sometimes referring to anorexia as a controlling, outside entity, he 
also very much firmly located an ‘eating disorder drive’ within himself and his own thinking. 
When responding to a question about the extent to which his anorexia felt like a ‘conscious 
decision’ that he willed, Jack explained: 
I’m consciously doing an amount of exercise so it’s an exact precise amount […] It’s 
not I’ll do ‘about that’, I’ll do an exact amount. I’ll be at the gym for an exact amount 
of time […] The reasons behind it are probably more sort of […] in the background, 
but the actual doing it is a very conscious decision. 
 
Given that the personification of anorexia is sometimes encouraged in therapeutic and 
clinical discourse, it is likely that the entification of anorexia was learned during treatment, 
and/or engagement with clinical knowledge outside of treatment contexts. It can therefore 
be understood as potentially being a part of diagnostic framing and interpretive identity-
work, both of which are discussed next.  
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Diagnostic framing  
I introduced the concept of diagnostic framing when addressing how participants initially 
came to identify with anorexia during treatment. To recap, this is a process in which clinical 
knowledge offers a new framework for understanding one’s experiences and recasts them 
as belonging to the category of anorexia. This concept is also relevant to understanding how 
participants (increasingly) aligned themselves with the diagnosis over the longer term, and 
how they incorporated diagnostic-based understandings into their personal sense-making. I 
have chosen Anna as a case study to illuminate this. This is because, in her interview, she 
addressed the relevant issues explicitly, talking through many specific examples. For others, 
diagnostic framing was addressed more implicitly.  
For Anna, the clinical knowledge of anorexia that was bought into play during sessions with 
her therapist encouraged her to understand more of her experiences as ‘anorexic’. For 
example, her therapist pointed out that her feelings that she needed to lose weight in order 
to ‘keep’ her diagnosis were part of the mentality of anorexia, and this was a happy relief to 
her: 
They were like that’s part of the anorexia […] I thought it was proof that I didn’t 
have it, and they were like this is just further proof, people seeing recovery as a 
strategy to lose weight. 
 
Further, her therapist’s reaction to her extremely detailed recording of her food intake led 
Anna to realise that this was ‘weird’ and an ‘anorexic behaviour’. Discussing her food diary, 
she explained:  
I’d counted every gram, every calorie, mathematically, all mapped out, really neatly 
[…] I didn’t even notice it was weird […] until he said it to me, and he was like, you 
like detail don’t you, and then I just clicked a little bit back and was like ‘oh yeah’. 
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Such processes of realisation also occurred when her therapist drew on his understanding 
of anorexia to recognise something that she was potentially struggling with, without her 
raising it first: 
He just asked me ‘are you ever afraid of wasting calories’, and I was like ‘what does 
that mean’? He said ‘some people, they wouldn’t want to drink alcohol because if 
they are going to have those calories they are going to make it count’. I was like ‘Oh. 
That’s a thing (laughs)?’ […] I felt like I was keeping aspects of the eating disorder 
secret from him but he knew a lot of the time […] I would always be ashamed until, 
he would just be really matter of fact about it. 
 
Learning that worry about ‘wasting calories’ is a “thing”, shifted the meaning of this 
experience; rather than being an idiosyncratic and shameful experience, it became a shared 
‘symptom’ of anorexia and was thus diagnostically-framed.  
Diagnostic framing can reinforce a diagnostic identity. Brinkmann (2016) describes how 
psychiatric diagnoses can be self-affirming. That is, the interpretation of phenomena through 
the lens of a diagnosis can transform them into ‘symptoms’ that in turn confirm the 
diagnosis - even phenomena that might ordinarily count against the diagnosis (or be 
considered irrelevant to it). Brinkmann gives an example based on his research with 
individuals with ADHD. A participant in his research explained his orderliness as belonging 
to the ADHD diagnosis, by describing it as a way of avoiding the ‘chaos’ of ADHD. 
However, disorderliness and forgetfulness are usually considered ‘symptoms’ of ADHD. 
With regard to diagnostic framing, others (in Anna’s case, her therapist) may be instigators 
of this process. So too is treatment discourse more generally.  
Mia described how being exposed to new ideas in treatment led her to not only understand 
her struggles differently, but to in turn experience them differently. Prior to identifying with 
anorexia, Mia had thought of her self-starvation as ‘a physical thing’, with her focus being a 
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desire to lose weight. However, after being introduced to an understanding of anorexia as a 
‘mental thing’ during treatment, she began to experience it as such: 
[At first] it was very much kind of body image. Whereas now it’s a definite coping 
mechanism kind of feelings […] It was a Dr who said to me, it’s actually nothing to 
do with the food, that’s not the problem […] I was sat next to him and was like ‘oh 
my God. What?’. I always thought it was about food and that I didn’t want that 
because it had so many calories in […] not that I was actually maybe feeling nervous 
about something and that I was then choosing to use that as a tangible object of 
control. So that was the doctor who changed my perception on it, and then the 
second time round of relapse it became control, a thing I could just control. 
 
Mia therefore directly attributed her understanding of what anorexia is ‘about’, and her 
lived, internal experience of self-starvation, to the understanding that was offered to her by 
a doctor. I further examine Mia’s ideas about ‘control’ later in relation to interpretive 
identity-work.  
Some participants spoke explicitly about the positive value of coming to identify with the 
diagnosis of anorexia for their recovery. Looking again at Anna, diagnostic framing had felt 
relieving to her, because understanding her struggles as belonging to anorexia reduced the 
shame she sometimes felt, and provided a potential way forward:  
Sometimes I think that particular things are personal failings I have that I have to 
keep secret […] there is kind of a relief when something would be like well OK 
that’s part of the condition and the condition as a whole can be managed. 
 
Interpreting her struggles in terms of a clinical category felt to Anna as though it validated 
her experiences and allowed them to be taken seriously: 
[The diagnosis] was a lens through which we [Anna and therapist] could take things 
seriously. The things that upset me weren’t just ridiculous things I had to never tell 
anyone about, so we actually needed to pause and discuss them thoroughly […] and 
in so many ways I found that useful. 
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Her therapist’s ability to personalise treatment meant that, in addition to being understood 
as someone who belonged to the general category of anorexia, she also felt recognised as a 
person with her own unique experiences. She explained that her therapist both “made it 
feel as though it was a thing that could be treated, and that he knew about”, but also 
recognised that “everybody is different”.  
Anna also saw the diagnosis as having acted as a ‘stepping stone’ to addressing broader 
struggles, and something that she and her therapist “left behind and moved beyond”, to 
focus more on experiences such as anxiety, abuse, and stress.  
An identification with anorexia also remained valuable to Anna post-treatment. In continuing 
to make her struggles tangible, it reminded her that she needed to continue to look after 
herself, and not expect herself to be ‘well’ simply because she has regained weight: 
I think in some ways I find it [identifying with the diagnosis] useful, because I do 
struggle with my mental health and I think those things can slip under the radar […] 
it’s this thing that it’s like, tangibly, I actually really do need to be careful […] I think 
in many ways it’s like identifying myself with anorexia is a way of reminding people 
that this isn’t just something that is gone the minute my BMI is restored […] or even 
the fact that I can’t tell them that but I can reassure myself that this will be a longer 
process.  
 
Lisa also explained how coming to identify with the diagnosis, and in particular its related 
‘illness’ framing, was helpful in terms of managing her wellness: 
Seeing it as an illness […] and something that I am going to have to guard against 
[…] I think its understanding that actually, once you have that kind of restrictive 
illness perhaps, perhaps you’ve got to accept that even when you don’t want it 
anymore it’s going to, it’s probably going to be something that you’ve got to fight. 
Being able to see it in that way has helped me a lot.  
 
She explained how she retrospectively understands that she had indeed “needed” the 
diagnosis of anorexia, and that she has come to identify with it in a “healthy” way that has 
ultimately allowed her to begin to move beyond it.  
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Interpretive identity-work  
Karp (1992) explains how, once an individual has come to develop an identity as a depressed 
person, they then search for the meaning of that identity (see chapter two). This entails the 
reconstruction and reinterpretation of past events, a search for the cause(s) of one’s 
current situation, the construction of new theories about the nature of depression, and the 
establishment of modes of coping. Participants’ interviews suggested similar interpretive 
processes in relation to anorexia. I understand these as a form of interpretive identity-work. 
I defined this as the processes of interpretation and meaning-making that individuals partake 
in as they make sense of their identity. Having come to identify with anorexia, participants 
then sought to account for their belonging to this category. This interpretive identity-work 
is closely related to diagnostic framing, because the diagnostic understanding this imposes 
informs one’s personal sense-making. Interpretive identity-work may be integral to the 
therapeutic work and ‘self-discovery’ that occurs during eating disorder treatment (Scott, 
2011). 
In the interviews, interpretive identity-work was reflected in the ways that participants 
framed their biography in terms of anorexia. Earlier experiences were understood through 
the lens of the diagnosis. Life events were narrated as contextualising and causal factors for 
developing anorexia, and previous behaviours retrospectively understood as symptoms. 
Further, specific occasions took on new meanings as key ‘turning points’, as they were 
framed as moments of significant change (Strauss, 1959). A major aspect of interpretive 
identity-work which I focus on here is the identification of reasons for having developed 
anorexia.  Participants typically offered rich, multiply-informed accounts. They amalgamated 
a range of different understandings as they pieced together various aspects of their 
experiences and narrated these into an explanation. These explanations came across as 
well-versed and were suggestive of ongoing identity-work over time. It seemed that 
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exposure to new ideas (especially in treatment) and active attempts to better understand 
one’s situation (such as through ‘personal research’) had shaped these personal 
understandings.  
Participants’ explanations were often informed by common clinical understandings of 
anorexia, such as ideas about ‘control’, ‘coping mechanisms’, and ‘perfectionism’. Indeed, 
over time and through engagement with treatment, individuals may become ‘schooled’ in 
describing their experiences through a particular model, and in using clinical concepts to 
account for their anorexia (Dignon, 2007). Here we can see a direct link to diagnostic 
framing, as this can be considered a mechanism through which ‘schooling’ occurs.  
An example of a frequently drawn on clinical idea was ‘control’. This was a part of the causal 
narrative given by seven participants. For three of these (Jack, Mia, and Amelia), it was 
central to their descriptions of how and why they developed anorexia. The idea that 
anorexia manifests as a desire to control one’s eating and weight in response to a lack of 
control in other areas of one’s life is a common clinical and lay understanding of anorexia. 
Dignon (2007) argues that clinical knowledge of anorexia has served to construct a template 
of typical traits and manifestations of the condition. This template includes the characteristic 
of control, as well as fat phobia, fear of maturity, obsessionalism and perfectionism. 
Psychoanalyst Bruch (1978) was the first clinician to write about control in anorexia (see 
chapter two). She understood anorexia to be an attempt to establish a sense of identity and 
control whereby the individuals body becomes an “arena for their only exercise of control” 
(1978: 59). Feminist psychoanalytic therapists such as Orbach and Lawrence who were 
writing around a similar time also adopted ideas about control. Lawrence (1979) argued that 
a ‘control paradox’ is at the centre of anorexia. This refers to the anorexic’s rigid control in 
terms of self-denial and in relation to food and weight which is directly contrastable to their 
experience of themselves as ‘out of control’ and ‘greedy’. Later clinicians (e.g. Palmer, 1989) 
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also drew on ideas about control to explain anorexia, and clinical conceptualisations now 
frequently present anorexia as a control strategy, whereby self-starvation is a means for 
establishing a sense of control that is lacking in other areas of one’s life (Dignon, 2007). 
Indeed, ‘control’ is now generally acknowledged by clinicians as a key paradigm in anorexia 
(Nunn, 2001), and recent NICE guidelines reinforce this notion by referring to individuals 
with eating disorders as having ‘control issues’ (NICE 2017b: 24). 
Jack, Mia and Maisy all understood their eating disorder as ‘really’ being about control (as 
opposed to weight). As Jack explained: “It’s never been ‘I want to be a certain weight’ […] 
I’d say it’s more been a control thing over just like food and exercise rather than being like a 
weight thing 100%”. 
A control-based causal narrative was most strongly evident in Mia’s account, and we have 
already seen how she had initially been introduced to ideas about control by a doctor. She 
identified difficulties among friends and family which led to her feeling ‘out of control’ as a 
reason for her having first relapsed. She then explained that she had turned to weight loss 
to resolve this, stating “I needed some control back. So I just started to look again at food”. 
Furthermore, when describing her conceptualisation of anorexia, she stated that it involves 
her mind attempting to generate feelings of being in control, and that her ‘wasting’ body is 
an unintentional outcome of these attempts. She also explained that she had identified 
herself as currently having six specific behaviours that she habitually engages in and that she 
uses these “as a form of control”. Control, then, appeared as a central concept in Mia’s (and 
others) identity-work.  
For some participants, explaining their anorexia meant also making sense of simultaneous 
physical health problems or other psychiatric diagnoses. In these cases, participants’ 
narratives tended to account for both; the stories for both of their diagnoses intertwined 
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into one, and the explanation for each condition also accounted for the other. Jack’s 
narrative of the development of his eating disorder, and his ongoing management of his 
struggles, was inseparably bound with his experiences of bowel problems: 
The bowel symptoms definitely kicked off the being aware of what I was eating etc, 
which then you know sort of spiralled into the controlling nature which you know 
went into the eating disorder bit. 
 
The same was true for Michael. Since identifying with the diagnosis of anorexia, he 
retrospectively understood his bowel problems differently from how he had previously. He 
explained how the development of his anorexia and his bowel problems sustained each 
other: 
I now can see that it was because of that, because I wasn’t eating enough and losing 
weight [I developed bowel problems…] I can now look back and say, before I was in 
my mid 20s I never had a problem with my bowels, it only came about as I started to 
lose weight […] the gastroparesis, and because it slowed down, that led to 
constipation and this twisting […] that just added the fuel to the fire of the eating 
disorder, the twisting my stomach hurts I’d then be careful about what I eat, in being 
careful about what I eat I slim down even more which makes it [my eating disorder] 
worse (My emphasis).  
 
Retrospectively understanding the relationship between anorexia and the serious medical 
problems he had experienced was an important aspect of his interpretive identity-work. 
This work was also informed by information gleaned from the internet about anorexia and 
biological processes relating to weight loss and gain. Unlike others who had been formally 
diagnosed, Michael did not acquire information about anorexia from being directly immersed 
in clinical discourse of eating disorders during treatment. Rather, he actively sought out 
information online, the impact of which he understood as ‘formalising’: 
Since the beginning of the year my understanding of being somebody who is anorexic 
has become a lot more formalised […] My understanding of what eating disorders 
are, what anorexia is, how it affects you, how it affects your psychology as well as 
your physiology. 
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Naomi had a diagnosis of autism in addition to anorexia, and her understanding of each of 
these conditions merged such that they were both prominent in explaining her experiences: 
I can look back at my history now and see eating disorder traits back into my really 
early childhood, I think some of that probably comes from texture aversion with 
autism and sensory things. 
 
In addition to autism and anorexia, she also made reference to depression and anxiety, and 
linked these various conditions together: 
It wasn’t until actually my first admission and being in hospital that I realised how 
depressed I was and how it was that that was underlying the eating disorder and the 
anxieties around that and my mood and how I talked to myself […] through therapy 
I’ve discovered that it wasn’t just the depression, it’s an anxiety, and that underlying 
that is probably autism.  
 
Clinical and ‘critical’ anorexic identities 
Shohet (2007) differentiates between ‘full’ and ‘partial’ narratives of recovery from anorexia, 
and in doing so identifies different degrees of affiliation with institutional master narratives. 
Her participants engaged differently with clinical and feminist narratives of how anorexia 
comes about, and what recovery involves. While a ‘full’ narrative of recovery involves 
embracing institutional narratives, partial narratives involve adopting only select aspects and 
actively subverting others. That there are different degrees of affiliation with dominant 
clinical ideas also resonates in this research. As might be expected, the three participants 
who tended not to align themselves with the diagnosis and were critical of it, tended also 
not to have incorporated clinical narratives into their self-understandings (I discuss this 
later). However, even among those who did identify with the diagnosis, while they may have 
embraced some aspects of clinical ideas, they were sometimes also critical of others. Across 
the whole sample, individuals self-understandings ranged from those with a strong ‘clinical’ 
feel (an example being Mia in her incorporation of ideas about control) through to those 
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that were more critical and clinically distanced (the three participants discussed later), with 
participants between these two extremes incorporating elements of both.  
An example of a participant who incorporated both is Kelly, whose descriptions of how she 
would (hypothetically) explain anorexia to others intertwined a range of different 
explanations, drawing on clinically informed ideas about phobias, control, ‘methods of 
coping’, and self-punishment: 
[Anorexia is] a bit like a phobia […] I think I would probably explain it as a bit of a 
phobia. I would relate the fear of food and gaining weight […] it’s about really being 
scared and I think I’d probably explain it as well as a way, as a method of coping […] 
in a lot of cases it gives you somewhat of a release and a way of coping with bad 
things that have happened […] food is something that it literally sustains your life and 
you can deny yourself the absolute, if you can’t control anything else in your life, and 
you want to find a way to I guess punish yourself in some way. 
 
However, Kelly was also critical of the explanations of anorexia that she engaged with 
during treatment. She had experienced trauma and understood this as a reason for her 
developing an eating disorder. She found that this trauma was not accounted for in the 
discourse that was offered during treatment, leading her to feel “misunderstood”. She was 
also critical of the focus on “cultural norms of beauty” that had been an assumed causal 
factor during treatment, as this did not resonate with her experiences and she found this 
conceptualisation problematic. Accordingly, while she identified with the diagnosis of 
anorexia, she also did not feel that it fully represented her experiences:  
I felt like nobody really understood and I kind of wanted to say well yeah I do have 
this diagnosis, but that’s not going to tell you anything about what’s going on […] I 
didn’t ever see anorexia spoken about as a response to trauma that often […] as 
opposed to just kind of like you are losing weight to appear more beautiful. 
 
In the quote above, Kelly critiques the diagnosis and the clinical narratives that surround it. 
For three participants – Natalie, Ben, and Sarah – a critical understanding of the diagnosis 
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was more prominent. For a range of different reasons and in different ways, they did not 
readily identify as ‘having anorexia’.  
Sarah believed herself to have an eating disorder, but actively avoided saying ‘anorexia’.  She 
explained that this word (which she did not use during the interview) made her very 
uncomfortable, although on some level she recognised it as ‘correct’:  
I’m still not comfortable with that word as you see I don’t like using it. That has been 
given to me, that diagnosis, by lots of different people […] and it’s in my medical 
records and everything but it’s not a word that I can really use […] I feel quite 
comfortable saying I had an eating disorder and when I say that I mean I had that 
[anorexia], I just can’t say the word very easily […] I can go on the internet and I can 
find out what that diagnosis means, and I can associate with everything in it, so I 
suppose I know that that it is what it is. 
 
Sarah struggled to explain why the word anorexia makes her uncomfortable, but identified 
two possible reasons. The first relates to an aspect of her experience that has been 
described in chapter five in relation to the meaning of being diagnosed. That is, prior to her 
‘recovery’, she was wary of claiming anorexia for fear that this would offer others a route to 
‘fix’ her. The second reason was because of the difficult memories the word invoked: 
Thinking about that time in my life was so upsetting and I don’t ever want to go back 
there […] I’m so much happier and I just I guess I just want to not use that word, it 
just makes me think about it and it makes me feel scared I think. 
 
Sarah’s most significant experience of professional input was with a psychologist she saw at 
an eating disorder clinic at her university. She explained that he had not based her 
treatment around a diagnosis, and that he “never used that label and made a point of never 
using that label. [He said] ‘I’m not going to diagnose you or anything’”. Accordingly, despite 
believing herself to have (or have had) anorexia, her interview narrative was distanced from 
the idea of anorexia as a diagnostic concept. She did not describe her experiences in 
234 
 
 
 
diagnostic terms and there was also an absence of a clinical ‘feel’ to the descriptions and 
explanations that she offered. 
Natalie, who described having identified with anorexia after having left inpatient treatment, 
had since developed a more critical understanding of the diagnosis. She recognised that this 
had (at least in part) come from her experience of academia (she was currently studying for 
a social science PhD), where she had developed critical views: 
I’m quite anti-diagnosis about most things and I’m quite into not removing a disorder 
from yourself as a way of understanding it. Because I think actually, for me anyway, 
it’s a part of myself and that’s how I’ll understand most mental health issues […] I 
know that I’m a critical person about that so it comes from there too, but it’s really 
difficult (the idea that) it’s a disease, it’s not your choice […] because then it 
completely takes away autonomy. 
 
Natalie’s critical views extended beyond the concept of a diagnosis and its associated ‘illness’ 
framing, and also led to her critically questioning the ‘causal narratives’ that are associated 
with the diagnosis. For example, she tentatively invoked the possibility that her eating 
disorder had developed for reasons relating to (lack of) control, while also doubting this 
idea: 
A lot of people say ‘oh, eating disorders are all about control’. Maybe they are, 
maybe they are not, I don’t know, I mean if I look at what’s happened over the past 
six months of my life, everything has happened which has not been in my control, 
and now I’m really not having an easy time with food and my weight so I’m like OK, 
maybe it is a little bit about when things are not in your control. But it’s not that 
simple, I think it’s just so many things. 
 
Natalie did not identify with the diagnosis at the time of the interview, because she was 
critical of the associated illness framing. However, she still referred to herself as ‘having 
anorexia’, and still used the word to refer to her ongoing experiences of food and weight 
related distress. What we see here in relation to both Sarah and Natalie is an identification 
with anorexia in a ‘non-diagnostic’ manner. This suggests that ‘anorexia’ might be 
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understood as something of a variable term, that was invoked differently by different 
participants; while for some, it meant adopting a diagnostically and clinically-informed 
construction of anorexia, for others it incorporated at least some element of distancing 
from this dominant construction.  
Ben described having never fully internalised the idea that he has anorexia. He did not 
understand the diagnosis as adequately accounting for his experiences, due to these being 
more complex and broad than a diagnosis of anorexia suggests. Ben had gone on to 
experience further struggles after inpatient treatment that were unrelated to food and 
weight and explained: 
While anorexia is what we are talking about here today […] I don’t think it was the 
be-all and end–all of what was going on or still what then was to happen […] I still 
don’t think it explains for me this sort of, the complexity of the feelings. 
 
While he had ambivalently ‘taken on’ the suggestion of having anorexia during treatment, he 
still saw this as other people’s understanding, and never fully internalised it, even while he 
‘recovered’: 
I still don’t think I was saying right, I have this diagnosis and I’m going to work against 
it. It was just me achieving tasks and just doing stuff […] I never ever once thought 
to beat anorexia nervosa this is what I have got to do. 
 
He also described resisting the idea of being ‘categorised’: 
 
I didn’t join together the dots; heart rate, bad skin, you meet the criteria, because it 
was just all about me, I don’t meet a criteria and maybe that’s part of who I was you 
know […] I can’t be categorised because it’s just the way I am […] it’s like you don’t 
want to be, don’t want to fit the bill out […] maybe you know I just I’m so stubborn 
[…] like I am Ben, I do not fit. 
 
In addition, Ben described the gendered construction of anorexia as an influence on him not 
relating to the diagnosis, as he struggled to make sense of his own experiences through 
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available discourse. Reflecting on the gendered nature of information in media about body 
image, he stated that: “I think it was it was definitely sort of the reason why I didn’t want to 
position myself as that was because I didn’t have a gendered dialogue to be able to sort of 
articulate it”. 
That the diagnosis is predominantly associated with females contributed to Ben’s ‘self-
stigma’. The ‘stigmatisation of himself’ (as he described it) was an additional facet of his lack 
of identification with the diagnosis, and is discussed further in chapter seven. For now 
however, it is noteworthy that his concerns that others would view or treat him in 
problematic ways if they knew about his (past) diagnosis led him not to publicly identify with 
it, and thus contributed to him distancing himself from anorexia.  
Ben felt that perhaps it would have been helpful in the past to have identified with the 
diagnosis, because this would have led him to blame himself less, recognise commonality 
with others, and find a way of moving forwards. He explained “to have also maybe met with 
other people in a similar situation may have sort of helped, just to have like collectively 
worked towards something”. 
Valuing ‘being anorexic’ 
This section is concerned with participants’ valuing of an anorexic identity. It is well 
recognised that individuals attribute ‘psychological benefits’ to the experience of anorexia, 
such as feeling safe, special, and ‘in control’, and that anorexia is sometimes viewed as a 
protective friend whom it is difficult to leave (Serpell et al, 1999; Espindola and Blay, 2009; 
Warin, 2010; Lavis, 2011). Indeed, anorexia can become the object of desire (Lavis, 2016). 
Here, my focus is specifically on participants valuing of an anorexic identity; that is, their 
valuing of being recognised (by themselves or by others) as belonging to the diagnosis. This 
might be understood as distinct from a focus on participants valuing of the practice of 
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weight loss and/or restricted eating, as the concern is with wanting to be positioned as 
‘anorexic’, rather than valuing the behaviours and physical manifestations that are 
understood as symptoms of the diagnosis. However, these two facets overlap. For example, 
low weight may be valued precisely because it is indicative of one’s ‘anorexic status’ (Lavis, 
2011; Fox and Diab, 2015). Accordingly, a focus on the latter also addresses the former.  
Almost all participants described some aspect and extent of valuing ‘being anorexic’, in 
terms of either a private recognition of themselves as belonging to the diagnosis, or being 
socially recognised as ‘very sick’ with anorexia (with these processes being intertwined).  
Maddie spoke about this directly and explicitly 
I suppose I still want to keep hold of it [anorexia…] It feels like I kind of want to 
wear it and say ‘look, this is what I’m fighting, this is what I have done and got 
through’ […] I will never be that person I was before […] I don’t think people fully 
understand that the darkness you feel, and how you continuously remind yourself of 
what you’ve been through […] it’s almost a pride and it’s a shame at the same time. 
 
That anorexia can be a source of both shame and pride has been recognised elsewhere 
(Rance et al, 2017b; Skårderud, 2007).  The pride aspect of anorexia is thought to be partly 
related to an association between anorexia and self-control (Rance et al, 2017b; Skårderud, 
2007). Anna alluded to this idea, as well as explaining that the weight loss involved in her 
anorexia carried tones of achievement and success: 
I hate this part but sometimes there is satisfaction [in knowing I had it] because at 
one stage I did have that capacity of control […] When I secretly had anorexia, like 
no one knew that I had it, it was like achieving - I was managing to lose weight really, 
really rapidly, and that is hard […] you can’t help but attribute some kind of success 
to it. 
 
An association between anorexia and success, achievement and feelings of satisfaction has 
also been shown above in relation to the meanings that individuals attributed to initially 
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being diagnosed. These feelings may be understood as linked to anorexia’s imbuement with 
ideas about heroism, strength, and discipline (Lavis, 2011: 78).  
Sarah described valuing anorexia for the social role it offered her. Despite her discomfort 
with using the diagnostic term, it had been important to her that she was known as 
someone who underate. Around the time that she initially began to restrict her food intake, 
another student at her school was recognised by her friends as having difficulties with food. 
Sarah stated “I remember hating her and thinking no, that’s going to be my role”. As she 
became increasingly known by friends and family as someone with an eating disorder, this 
positioning became very important to her: 
That was who I am and in my friendship group you know, one friend is quite loud 
and funny and another friend is really good at music and I’m the person who doesn’t 
eat and that’s what I do, and there can’t be anyone else who does that. 
 
It was clear that Sarah valued not only being known to have an eating disorder, but also her 
being different in this respect. Furthermore, it had been important to Sarah to uphold this 
social identity (I examine the ways in which she did this in chapter seven): 
My identity was my eating disorder, without that I was a nobody, I was nothing, not 
pretty, not clever, just nothing. My eating disorder was my everything and it for me 
was the reason anyone would ever find me interesting or appealing in anyway.  
 
Since the time she described above, Sarah considered herself to be largely recovered. While 
she was happy about this, to some extent she continued to value her eating disorder, stating 
“I don’t want it to ever go completely because it’s part of me”. 
Mia and Amelia described how being known as ‘anorexic’ altered the expectations others 
had of them. Mia felt that when she was diagnosed, the label of anorexia instantly ‘stuck’ and 
affected others’ interpretations of her actions: 
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That label had been branched on me so I couldn’t do things, anything I did do was 
just always assumed that was the eating disorder speaking […] instantly that became 
who I was. 
 
Amelia identified benefits of others’ labelling and altered expectations, while also 
understanding these as ultimately detrimental. Being known as ‘anorexic’ led to a feeling that 
she was ‘important’ and ‘had been recognised’. She worried about losing this positioning, 
and in particular the inability to use the diagnosis as an ‘excuse’ 
I feel like it [anorexia being part of my identity] almost gave the anorexia a strong 
hold like, you are now important. You’ve been recognised and then it’s like that fear 
[…] well, what happens when you don’t have it, when you can’t say that you are 
anorexic anymore, what is going to be your excuse? For doing things that aren’t 
right, you can’t just blame it on something else […] I know I can say, I can’t do this 
because I’m anorexic.  
 
This idea of the diagnosis acting as an ‘excuse’ is identified by Brinkmann (2016), who 
describes how it can act as an exemption from responsibility. In relation to ADHD, he 
states that “responsibility is often transferred from the person as a volitional subject onto 
the “ADHD entity” (2016: 71). Here, we can see a link to entification, and in particular, the 
ways in which ‘undesirable’ and ‘abnormal’ characteristics are located within the separate 
entity of anorexia, rather than within oneself. 
The valuing of an anorexic identity was tied up with a wish to be positioned as good at 
anorexia and recognised as ‘very sick’. Even when participants did not explicitly describe 
valuing an anorexic identity, they none the less often alluded to there having been something 
desirable about the idea of being someone who was very unwell with an eating disorder. 
Participants spoke of wanting to do anorexia well, and having desired to be ‘the best 
anorexic’. For example, Anna referred to the ‘mental picture’ she had of the ‘very low 
weight anorexic’ as having at one point been ‘aspirational’. We also saw in chapter four that 
a desire to do anorexia well was also something that I experienced.  
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Medical markers of anorexia come into play here. These were often experienced positively 
for two overlapping reasons. Firstly, they acted as proof of one’s diagnosis (that they were 
valued for this reason further suggests that an ‘anorexic’ positioning was desirable), and 
secondly, they suggested that one was doing anorexia well. Subjective meanings of medical 
markers and the ways in which they inform how individuals ‘do’ anorexia are discussed in 
detail in chapter seven. Here I give examples of the meaning of medical markers to illustrate 
the current points. Regarding proof of diagnosis, Anna described having appreciated being 
prescribed calcium for the fact that it acted as confirmation that “I definitely have this”, and 
similarly, Jack explained: “When you see the blood test results it’s almost like, it’s not a 
good thing but […] that’s confirming me to that I’ve got it and it’s there”.  
Medical markers were therefore valued for materialising the diagnosis. In relation to doing 
anorexia well, Claire described how at one point, she had valued the affirming effect of 
having been in hospital in terms of proving that she had been good at anorexia:  
For a couple of years after I got discharged from hospital, it became more important 
that I could be like yes I had this, I was really good at having it, I ended up in hospital 
because of it […] it was like a kind of a positive, not a positive thing, but that 
affirmation that I needed to be like actually I was really unwell, I needed that support. 
 
The following quote from Hannah demonstrates the desirable qualities that were sometimes 
attributed to the idea of being extremely unwell: 
There was a girl when I was inpatient […] I think she was the worst person I have 
ever in my life seen […] she’d had two cardiac arrests, liver failure, kidney failure, 
everything failure. Even though all of us girls apart from her talked about it saying 
[…] “we’d never want to be like her”, I think there was a part of everyone that was 
like ‘how did she get that far, how did she manage that?’ 
 
Even though Natalie described having not identified with anorexia during inpatient 
treatment, much of her experience none the less involved concerns over the extent to 
which she was appearing ‘sick enough’. Describing her conflicted desire to be unwell, she 
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explained how she felt when seeing others who were ill: “I’m so weirdly jealous of you that 
is so poorly and gets to stay in bed but I shouldn’t be because that not, that’s not right like, I 
should want to be well and healthy”. 
Like others, she described the validating impact of medical markers that confirmed her 
sickness. 
If your bloods came back and they were dodgy […] if you’d passed out […] that was 
evidence that you were unwell […] there was a part that was like ‘yes’, I must really 
be, I must really be unwell then.  
 
These meanings of medical markers resonate with findings from Riley et al’s (2009) research 
into ‘body talk’ in ‘pro-anorexia’ and ‘recovery’ websites. They found that in ‘pro-anorexia’ 
websites, concerns about health and appearance were reframed as ‘markers of success’. The 
findings also accord with Eli’s (2014a) research into amenorrhea62. She found that this is 
experienced as a key marker of recognised illness and is “loaded with serious implications 
for identity validation, clinical recognition, and status hierarchy” (2014a: 54). The latter point 
about status hierarchy and role of medical markers and clinical interventions within this is 
further explored in the next chapter. 
I have described various ways in which participants valued being understood as ‘anorexic’. 
However, it is crucial to highlight the double-edged nature of this. Individuals with anorexia 
are ambivalent regarding the condition and about recovery and treatment (Norbo, 2006; 
Williams and Reid, 2010; Eli, 2014b; Boughtwood and Halse, 2010), and anorexia is often 
both intimately cherished and experienced as intensely limiting and problematic (Fox and 
Diab, 2015; Warin, 2010). Even while most participants in some ways valued being 
positioned as anorexic and ill, they also simultaneously wanted to not be anorexic and 
 
62 This was previously a criterion for anorexia, but it was removed in the ICD – 11 and DSM – 5.  
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indeed sometimes worked to avoid being positioned in this way. Again, this is a facet of 
participant’s experiences that resonates with my own. Identification with anorexia thus 
appears to be simultaneously desirable and undesirable.   
As has been alluded to previously in the discussion of entification, some participants 
understood this ‘split desire’ (both wanting and not wanting to identify with anorexia) in 
terms of a break between themselves and ‘the anorexia’. As the following quote from Jack 
suggests, an enjoyment of being unwell was often attributed to the pathology of anorexia: 
It’s almost like the eating disorder part of you is saying ‘yes I’ve beaten it’, or ‘I’m 
winning’. It’s almost like that little bit of your brain which is, the irrational bit, is 
almost celebrating it. 
 
Similarly, when Hannah described how she appreciated having ‘bad blood results’ for its 
confirmation of her eating disorder, she stated “I know that’s pretty unwell thinking (…) 
that is the illness”, and Amelia described the appreciation of the recognition of her ‘sickness’ 
as directly belonging to anorexia: 
When I was threatened with hospital it really pushed me to get better, like I didn’t 
want to go to hospital. However […] anorexia is satisfied that you are at a low 
weight so that could potentially happen […] that’s not the forefront of it but I know 
that […] is a factor […] I know I’ve got low vitamin D and there is part of the 
anorexia that loves that. 
 
The valuing of being positioned as a ‘successful anorexic’ and legitimately sick resonates 
strongly with the anthropological literature reviewed in chapter two (Rich, 2006; Warin, 
2010; Lavis, 2011; Eli, 2014b). This includes Lavis’ (2011) research which shows how 
individuals undertake deliberate practices to align themselves with the construct of a ‘good 
anorexic’, including for example the effortful, daily enactment of self-surveillance over one’s 
thinness. It also includes Warin (2010) and Rich (2006), who suggest that being a ‘successful 
243 
 
 
 
anorexic’ is a valued status position that offers a sense of distinction and empowerment, and 
that can be made more credible by medical complications. 
Anorexia, then, appears to be a sometimes-valued illness identity in which signs of illness 
and medicalised markers can become entwined. Anorexia is somewhat unique in the extent 
to, and ways in which, it offers a valued identity. However, historically, there are overlaps 
with other conditions. Sontag (2002) describes the romanticising of tuberculosis (TB) during 
the 18th and 19th century, noting its associations with upward social mobility and its 
perception as an attractive mark of distinction and breeding. She also describes how visible 
aspects of TB became an ideal feminine look, and how “a person dying young of TB really 
was perceived as a romantic personality” (1991: 31). Lavis (2011) draws similarities between 
the romanticising of TB death and death in anorexia. She suggests that Sontag’s claims create 
“a potent image of the wasting away of pure young bones”, and that this image is also 
evident in the construct of a ‘good anorexic’ (2011: 82). Warin (2010) draws similarities 
between HIV and anorexia in respect to desired identity. She argues that both conditions 
have their own powerful sense of connection and relationships as a shared identity, and that 
they both entail “a puzzling desire to belong” (2010: 77). However, despite these overlaps 
and similarities with other conditions, I suggest that anorexia is somewhat unique in the 
extent to which individuals often seek to become ‘better’ at their condition.   
Chapter Six summary 
This chapter has addressed how individuals develop different diagnostic self-understandings, 
or ‘anorexic identities’. They varied in terms of the extent to which they incorporated, or 
were critical of, dominant clinical understandings. It has also showed how these diagnostic 
self-understandings develop through interpretive processes such as diagnostic framing and 
interpretive identity-work. In addition, for those who think of themselves as ‘anorexic’, this 
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is sometimes fluctuating and / or fragile, in that they experience doubts about the ‘realness’ 
of their anorexia, or feel that they are not unwell ‘enough’. Related to this, being recognised 
(by oneself or others) as legitimately ‘anorexic’, and successfully embodying an anorexic 
identity, is sometimes valued by individuals. In the next chapter, I show how this valuing of 
an anorexic positioning can influence individuals efforts in terms of the ways that they ‘do’ 
their diagnosis.  
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Chapter Seven 
Doing anorexia  
This chapter addresses how the diagnosis of anorexia is ‘done’ or performed. Participants 
were self-consciously aware of their own behaviours and private experiences, and other’s 
perceptions of these, in terms of the extent to which they were indicative of them doing the 
diagnosis ‘well’. Sometimes there was a desire to fulfil expectations of the diagnosis and be 
recognised as legitimately ‘anorexic’ and ‘sick’. At others, individuals attempted to distance 
themselves from the diagnosis, to free themselves from associated behavioural expectations 
or as a way of managing perceived stigma and problematic misunderstandings of the 
condition. My focus, then, is on how participants performed both towards and away from 
anorexia (Warin, 2010). I begin by returning to the notion of anorexic scripts that I 
introduced in chapter four. I detail a core feature of anorexic scripts - low weight and 
weight loss - and explain the centrality of this to performing anorexia. I then discuss the 
various ways in which participants sought to live up to the diagnosis, and their reasons for 
doing so. I also address ways of doing anorexia in treatment, including via the adherence to 
specific anorexic scripts, and via hunger, eating, and medical markers and clinical 
interventions. Following this, I consider how individuals performed anorexia in relation to 
other patients, and the between-persons performative identity-work this involves. Lastly, I 
look at the ways and circumstances in which participants sought to distance themselves 
from the diagnosis, rather than align themselves with it.  
Diagnostic scripts 
The clinically-informed anorexic scripts I describe throughout this chapter are based on 
what emerged in participants accounts, and I describe them with reference to literature and 
clinical discourse. This adds breadth and depth to the previous discussion of anorexic 
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scripts, which related to my own experiences (see chapter four). It includes a return to 
serious and bad patient scripts, and the introduction of two additional scripts - chronic 
anorexia and good anorexic patient.  
Low body weight and/or ongoing weight loss are core features of anorexic scripts. By this I 
mean that they are common features that constantly reoccur across different anorexic 
scripts, are central to them, and are privileged in clinical settings. A low body weight has 
been a criterion for diagnosing anorexia since the DSM III (APA, 1980)63. Losing weight is 
therefore considered a primary ‘anorexic behaviour’; one does anorexia by losing weight. 
There is also an association between the extent of weight loss and the severity of one’s 
anorexia, whereby being a very low weight is indicative of ‘strong’ illness. This association is 
written into the DSM - 5 criteria for anorexia, which uses BMI to categorise severity64. 
Anorexia is considered mild for a BMI greater than 17, moderate for 16 – 16.99, severe for 
15 – 15.99, and extreme for below 15. As discussed in chapter two, treatment practices 
reinforce an association between weight and severity by equating anorexia with bodily 
thinness and ‘more thin’ with ‘more anorexic’ (Lavis, 2011). This equation was recognised by 
Natalie in her description of inpatient treatment: 
[There was concern with] what your bloods are and what you weigh and that that is 
a marker of how well you are, or that’s a marker of recovery […] it almost takes 
over everything else […] if all these people around me are focusing on my weight, 
then that must mean something so I should focus on that.  
 
Other participants also explained how their concern with weight was exacerbated by 
treatment, or even that it was learned through treatment in the first place. For example, 
Maddie explained that being weighed further increased her “obsession” with weight and 
 
63 Prior to the DSM III, DSM publications did not include specific diagnostic criteria.  
64 Severity can also be adjusted based on other ‘clinical symptoms’, such as the degree of functional disability, 
but BMI is the primary means for classification. 
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desire to control it. Amelia did not initially experience her eating disorder as a “weight 
thing” (as described in chapter five), but noted that weighing became a feature of her 
anorexia after she began treatment and was weighed weekly: 
I didn’t weigh myself, I don’t weigh myself. That never really became a control 
element of it until I went to [eating disorder clinic], and then […] it definitely 
became a big thing. 
 
Existing literature also suggests that concerns about food and weight are perpetuated when 
these are the focus of treatment (Eivors et al, 2003; Rance et al, 2017a). I suggest that 
treatment discourse privileges weight loss as indicative of the condition, and thus centralises 
its place and importance in anorexic scripts. With this being the case, low weight and weight 
loss are vital ways in which one performs the condition. This is highlighted in a quote from 
Claire: 
I wanted people to know that actually I’d been really good at having this eating 
disorder and that it was something that I was like the best at having […] I guess the 
way to show that back then, and even probably validates it to some extent, is the 
whole weight thing and you think that you’re not going to be taken seriously unless 
you’re really underweight (emphasis added). 
 
In the following section, I examine how the centrality of weight loss to performing anorexia 
played out in individual’s attempts to live up to the diagnosis.  
Living up to anorexia 
Reasons for living up to anorexia 
Some participants spoke explicitly about their wish to ‘live up’ to their diagnosis of anorexia. 
They identified a range of reasons for this, including access to treatment, adhering to an 
assigned social role, and securing the valued aspects of one’s anorexic identity. Related to 
these reasons, living up to anorexia was part of a wish to be positioned as genuinely ‘sick’. 
However, this aspect of living up to the diagnosis was expressed subtly and was alluded to 
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indirectly in discussions of treatment experiences. I therefore address it later in a discussion 
of medical markers and clinical interventions and focus initially on the participants explicitly 
described reasons for living up to the diagnosis.  
Accessing and navigating treatment  
Kelly, Anna and Lisa all spoke about living up to their diagnosis in order to access treatment. 
A major way in which they sought to do this was via ongoing weight loss, witnessed by the 
professionals involved in their care. In chapter five, I addressed how Anna felt that she 
needed to be seen to be doing anorexia in order to retain access to the treatment that she 
desperately wanted, and that she understood this to result partly from the ‘irrationality’ of 
her anorexia, and partly from the scarcity of treatment. Also relevant here, is Anna’s recall 
of her initial assessment at the EDS. She described how the picture of anorexia that she 
already held in mind and was further explicated within the assessment process formed part 
of an ‘aspiration’: 
When I mentioned in my assessment that I was afraid if I didn’t keep losing weight I 
wouldn’t get treated, the clinical psychologist emphasised several times that they 
treat people with many body types and weights […] I had this slightly ‘aspirational’ 
picture in my mind of the very low weight anorexic that I was measuring myself 
against […] and [she] was obviously consciously trying to make sure I didn’t think 
that she was also measuring me against it? Though assessment does implicitly 
measure you against an ‘ideal’ anorexic template because there are ’target’ weight 
ranges? The [BMI] 17.5, and 0.5kg weight loss per week65 etc (email).  
 
We can see how Anna related herself to a particular image of anorexia and that this 
informed her self-understanding. This idea of having in mind an image of anorexia prior to 
engaging with treatment has also been addressed in chapter five. I showed how Claire and 
 
65 Here, Anna referred to BMI and weight loss ‘markers’ that are used in clinical practices to assess the severity 
of, or risks associated with, an eating disorder, and to make treatment decisions. NHS guidelines (2017a) 
include BMI and speed of weight loss as factors to be considered when assessing for an eating disorder, and 
they are treated as indicative of medical risk (Treasure, 2009). A BMI 17.5 is significant in clinical discourse, 
because being below this was a criterion for diagnosing anorexia in the ICD – 10 and DSM – IV. 
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Hannah did not initially identify with anorexia because they did not see themselves ‘matching 
up’ to their ideas of what this ‘looks like’, and how Kelly’s decision to seek help was 
influenced by her recognition that she had started to resemble this ‘image’. With Anna 
however, she also recognised that this image was reproduced by the clinical standards in 
which she was immersed (I discuss this further below).  
Kelly and Lisa also both described actively seeking to continue weight loss in the lead up to 
starting treatment or in order to access further help. Like Anna, both attributed the ‘need’ 
to do this partly to the pathology of anorexia (or to ‘just how things are’ because of 
anorexia), and partly to clinical practices. For Kelly, the clinical practices in question were 
the BMI restrictions used to make decisions about admission to treatment66: 
One of the things that did spur me on to lose weight or just like another driving 
factor was probably so I could get the treatment and be taken seriously. I think that 
a lot of it was probably down to myself being unwell, but I think it was kind of driven 
a little bit by hospital guidelines. 
 
Lisa described how during her most recent relapse, she had asked for additional support 
from services when things were ‘slipping’. After some weeks of feeling that the extent of her 
struggles was not being recognised, she felt she needed to prove this by losing more weight: 
I’ve always left [treatment] feeling that I want […] to continue with recovery, but 
then its fallen away quite quickly and then I’ve been desperate to lose weight 
because, partly because I’m just desperate to lose weight, there doesn’t have to be 
reason, that’s just the way it is, the status quo […] but I also want to lose weight 
because I’m desperate for help and I’m desperate for somebody to notice. 
 
Kelly, Anna and Lisa all made explicit reference to the role of clinical discourse in informing 
their desire to lose weight. The ‘standards’ for anorexia portrayed in clinical practice 
 
66 This reflects Kelly’s perceptions of the NHS treatment that she received, and may not accurately represent 
the way clinical decisions were ‘really’ made. However, NICE (2017b) do recognise that admission decisions are 
sometimes made on the basis of BMI, especially in areas where funding is limited. 
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suggested that rate and extent of weight loss matter in determining severity of eating 
disorder and need for treatment. Thus, these standards appear to have reinforced to them 
the centrality of weight loss to anorexic scripts. 
As addressed in chapter two, existing literature recognises that BMI contingent admission to 
services within NHS treatment systems can incentivise weight loss (Treasure et al, 2011; 
Rance et al, 2017a). Ringer and Holen (2016) describe how, in their ethnography of 
outpatient and inpatient mental health services in Denmark, potential patients being 
assessed for admission had sensed that they had the responsibility to ‘prove’ the existence 
of their illness by presenting symptoms in a recognisable way, in order to access care. With 
available anorexic scripts detailing ongoing weight loss as a core feature of anorexia, 
participants took this up as a way of making ‘the illness within’ visible to professionals to 
prove their need for treatment.  
Participants also spoke about their wish to be seen losing weight (or maintaining a low 
weight) at other stages of clinical monitoring (and not only when seeking treatment). They 
described using strategies such as not eating or drinking the day of being weighed (Natalie, 
Maddie, Lisa, Sarah), using laxatives (Anna) and wearing the lightest clothes possible 
(Maddie). Maddie, for example, had been concerned that professionals may interpret any 
weight gain as a sign that she was no longer anorexic, stating “I almost thought that if I 
gained weight it was ‘oh you’re getting better, right off you go’”.  
In addition to describing her felt need to live up to the diagnosis while waiting for treatment, 
Kelly also described attempting to ‘fit’ the diagnosis during treatment. She stated that she 
felt the need to “fit the perfect bill of what other people thought an anorexic was”. As an 
inpatient, she sought to live up two conflicting roles simultaneously. Privately, she wanted to 
understand herself as ‘good at anorexia’, but she also sought to publicly perform being a 
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‘good patient’ who was ‘good at recovery’. I address these roles, which I understand as 
anorexic scripts, in detail later in this chapter. However it is relevant to the current 
discussion to address Kelly’s reasons for seeking to live up to these roles. She identified 
‘perfectionism’ and a desire to ‘perfectly’ fulfil the social positions she took up, as key 
reasons: 
Perfectionism was definitely like, is, a massive part of my life, and when speaking to 
other people that have had anorexia a lot of it was like you want to be the best at 
anorexia but then it gets to a point where you want to be the best at recovery […] 
so I did feel like I had to live up to this standard of the best person in recovery. But 
that also was really difficult to do when you were trying to fit the stereotype of the 
anorexic as well, so it’s like you are trying to fit into both roles at the same time and 
obviously they are completely different. 
 
Responding to labels: living up to chronic anorexia 
Mia described how, a few weeks prior to the interview, a professional had referred to her 
as having ‘chronic anorexia’. Her immediate response was to reject this suggestion, because 
she did not see herself as fitting her idea of how someone with chronic anorexia looks, as 
reflected in her saying “my legs aren’t like those stick things that somehow people get to”. 
However, this initial response was followed by a wish to inhabit the suggestion. She 
explained this using a metaphor of performing a role and character: 
If you are going to describe me as that I am going to do it […] it feels sort of like a 
role in a play. I didn’t feel as though I was that character in that performance, I had 
wrongly been given it, then I was like you know what I am going to play the role, and 
just almost hit all the specifications for it […] they were putting me in that lead role, 
I just felt fine, I am going to have to live up to the description of that character, if you 
are going to put me in that role then I’m going to be in the limelight and people are 
going to see me. 
 
Mia described wishing to act in ways that were congruent with professional’s expectations 
of her, and she expressed defiance in her wish to do this. She appeared to perceive the role 
of chronic anorexia as particularly visible and important, as reflected in her phrasing such as 
‘lead role’ and ‘in the limelight’, and this perception seemed to contribute to her felt need to 
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live up to the role. I suggest that ‘chronic anorexia’ can be understood as an anorexic script 
to which, once it had been suggested, she was motivated to adhere. 
I questioned Mia about the ‘specifications’ for chronic anorexia that she had referred to. She 
explained that they emerged from what she had ‘researched’, which she considered to be 
like a ‘checklist’ of chronic anorexia:  
All the bulletins, when it’s like ‘you are like this’ […] like baggy clothing and all that, 
that to me was like your specification. Like restricting, missing [food], so I just 
wanted to tick all of them. 
 
Chronicity is a clinical term which refers to conditions that persist for a long time. ‘Chronic 
anorexia’ refers to the individual with anorexia “who is continuously ill over many years and 
‘‘fearful’’ of change” (Strober, 2004: 247).  It is believed in part to result from the 
“recalcitrant psychopathology of anorexia” (Lacey and Sly, 2016), and is associated with low 
levels of recovery and ‘treatment resistance’ (Strober, 2004; Vitoesk and Watson, 1997). 
Chronic anorexia is identified as a challenging presentation to clinicians (Strober, 2004), who 
tend to be pessimistic about the likelihood of recovery (or are perceived by patients to hold 
this attitude) (Fox and Diab, 2015; Lacey and Sly, 2016).  
Mia’s description of chronic anorexia seems to allude to ideas about ‘seriousness’ more so 
than chronicity, as seen her references to behaviours and an emaciated body, rather than 
length of time of the condition. This perhaps indicates how chronicity is associated with 
severity, and how chronic and serious anorexic scripts overlap. Tierney and Fox (2008) 
identified four features of practitioners’ views of what constitutes chronic anorexia, and 
these suggest that it is understood as being about more than only length of illness. The 
features they described are entrenched patterns of food restriction, entrenched ‘‘anorexic’’ 
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cognitions, an identity intertwined with anorexia, and the maintenance of a BMI under 
17.567.  
Despite its limitations, the labelling theory of mental illness (Scheff, 1966) provides a broad 
frame for understanding Mia’s responses to the label of chronic anorexia. When described 
in this way by another person, she used the associated script to guide her behaviour and 
sought to ‘live up’ to that role. Moreover, it appears to be a role that she subsequently 
internalised and personally identified with, as reflected in her use of the phrase chronic 
anorexia to describe her current relationship with anorexia at the start of her interview. 
This accords with Scheff’s contention that individuals come to fulfil and internalise the 
deviant role (of mentally ill) that others place them in through social interaction.  
Anorexia as social reputation 
Sarah described her desire to live up to her eating disorder in terms of having a ‘reputation’ 
(that she valued) to uphold. As explained in chapter six, she valued being known in her 
friendship group as “the person who doesn’t eat” for the distinct social role it offered her, 
and because she felt that having an eating disorder was the only appealing aspect of her. 
Living up to the reputation of her eating disorder was about wanting to hold on to a 
valuable social positioning. However, while mostly speaking about living up to her 
‘reputation’ in terms of an agentic wish to retain this positioning, she also made reference to 
having been given the role of ‘eating disordered’ by others and stated: “I had a reputation to 
uphold, like everyone labelled me with an eating disorder so I had to live up to my 
reputation so people would always believe me”. 
 
67 This is a generalisation, as individual clinicians often specified a much lower BMI. 
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For Sarah, ‘upholding her reputation’ meant that in the food diary she kept for her dietician, 
she claimed to have eaten less than she had. She also avoided being seen by others buying 
food because she imagined that this would affect how they judged her eating disorder status: 
I’m just lying and making it up or I’m letting down my reputation like you know, I’ve 
got this reputation of being somebody who doesn’t eat and then people will just 
think ‘oh she hasn’t got that reputation anymore.’ 
 
Despite considering herself to be much better at the time of the interview, she still 
sometimes tried to retain aspects of the reputation, although only within her own family: 
I still now sometimes feel the need to keep up that reputation so if we have a big 
family gathering […] I will not have as much as I would eat normally […] because I 
don’t want people to think that its totally OK, I want them to still question it a little 
bit. 
 
For Sarah, the ways in which she sought to live up to anorexia and her reasons for doing so 
appeared less clinically informed than for others. She seemed to not so much want clinical 
recognition or a medicalised, diagnostic identity, but more to be known among groups of 
friends and family as someone who under-eats. This accords with Sarah’s experiences and 
identity more broadly, as has been described previously.  She had not had intensive or 
extended periods of treatment in a clinical setting, and while she believed herself to have (or 
have had) anorexia, she was somewhat distanced from a clinically defined diagnostic concept 
of it. 
Falling short of anorexia 
Participants recounted occasions when they had not ‘lived up’ to anorexia, and the distress 
this caused. Anna recalled explaining to a counsellor (whom she saw prior to beginning 
treatment at an EDS) that she was soon to attend a family event but was “really scared” due 
to not being able to count the calories in food. Initially, the counsellor advised her to “eat 
what everyone else is eating”, and when Anna explained that she was unable to, the 
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counsellor responded by stating “well you’re anorexic, so just go and don’t eat anything.” 
Anna experienced this comment as a suggestion that by intending to eat at the event, she 
was not being ‘properly’ anorexic, and she found this upsetting: 
It was like a knife in my heart to hear that. Because she didn’t understand that as 
hard as it was to eat, it was just as hard not to eat […] it is excruciatingly painful and 
to be told that this is what an anorexic is and you are now failing at it, I’ve never felt 
so upset. 
 
A situation described by Mia can be similarly understood. She had found it difficult to 
independently attend an outpatient appointment after transitioning to adult services, rather 
than being taken by her grandparents as she had been as an adolescent. She described 
“hating” doing it, “because it’s almost me like trying to fight it [anorexia]”. I suggest that Mia 
independently attending an appointment was difficult because it meant she was not acting in 
accordance with the expectation that ‘doing anorexia’ involves not ‘fighting it’. Being taken to 
appointments by her grandparents had been a compromise that allowed her to attend 
without undoing her sense of self as anorexic (Lavis, 2011).  
I have addressed various ways in which participants sought to live up to the diagnosis of 
anorexia, and their reasons for doing so. This included Kelly’s description of feeling she 
needed to live up to two contrasting roles – the good and the bad anorexic patient - while 
in treatment. I examine these roles further in the following section, and suggest that they 
are examples of anorexic scripts. 
The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ anorexic patient: doing anorexia and recovery 
in treatment  
Good and bad patient scripts 
The ‘good anorexic patient’ script denotes someone who complies with treatment, eats and 
gains weight as required, is honest, and has a ‘good attitude’. In contrast, the ‘bad anorexic 
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patient’ script, which I illustrated in chapter four, denotes someone who is ‘non-compliant’ 
in treatment, deceives staff so that they are able to prevent weight gain and/or avoid eating, 
is dishonest, and has a ‘bad attitude’. Here, I explore how ‘good’ and ‘bad’ patient scripts 
emerged in participants accounts. 
Mia’s doing of anorexia was partly informed by her contrast with another patient, whom she 
described as a ‘bad patient’. This patient was the only other individual diagnosed with 
anorexia with whom Mia experienced inpatient treatment68. She described her discomfort 
with this person, noting the ways in which she acted ‘badly’, and her own reasons for not 
acting this way: 
She was very much rebellious, I have always been well-behaved at school and in the 
presence of strangers, so although I did sort of like miss stuff [food], I wasn’t rude 
about it or a badly behaved patient, but she was just vile and aggressive […] with her 
knife and fork just scraping stuff across the plate like ‘I’m not having this’ […] When 
she was on the phone, once I can remember she just kept walking around and 
around the pool table […] it just made me mad. I didn’t want to be like that because 
I would say I was quite a well-behaved patient and that the staff were happy to work 
with me. 
 
Mia’s description of the ‘bad patient’ focuses on attitude (vile, aggressive and rude) and 
behaviour (refusing food and exercising). Her ‘othering’ of this patient strengthened her 
own positioning in line with an opposing ‘good patient’ script. We can also begin to see here 
how comparisons with other patients played a role in the doing of one’s anorexia, an idea 
which I address in detail later. 
Ben also put forward ideas about differences between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ patients. When 
directly asked about this, his response reinforced the association between being tube fed 
and being a ‘bad patient’ that I described in chapter four.  
 
68 Mia was an inpatient in a child and adolescent psychiatric unit, where most other patients were diagnosed 
with psychiatric conditions other than eating disorders.  
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I can relate to that [the notion of a bad patient] in some of the experiences I’ve had 
[…] you know in those that had to be sort of like fed through a tube, I categorise 
them, they are a bad patient but you know, their struggle was different.  
 
We can also see that he understood himself as different to ‘bad patients’, something that he 
had also alluded to at an earlier point of the interview when he was discussing his lack of 
identification with the diagnosis of anorexia: 
When I was in there [treatment] I wasn’t sort of kicking and screaming you know, 
people that sort of came into the inpatient […] had to be fed through a tube, I never 
had to do that. I was obligatory, you know I was decent, I was an obliging citizen of 
the inpatient community […] compliant is the word.   
 
The implication here was that the category of bad patient was more relevant to the ‘other’ 
patients than to him, and that his ready compliance marked his experience as different to 
those to whom the category belonged.  
Kelly described how the patients she was with in inpatient treatment had been known, by 
both staff and other patients, as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and how staff had seen her as ‘good’: 
[Other patients] would talk about people like ‘oh, they are a good person to be 
around’ or ‘don’t go near them because we know that they do this’ [for example 
water loading] they were made out to be like a really bad person as opposed to 
somebody that is unwell [staff would say] ‘it’s nice to have you because you’re like 
one of the ones that wants to get better’ […] it was spoken in terms of there are 
good patients and there are bad patients […] instead of it just being like there are 
patients that are a little bit further along in their recovery. 
 
Kelly was therefore critical of the moral judgements implicit within the notions of good and 
bad patients, suggesting instead that different behaviours and ways of engaging in treatment 
were related to the extent of ‘unwellness’ or ‘recovery’. I previously described above how 
Kelly had felt conflicted in treatment due to her wish to perfectly fulfil being “the best at 
recovery” and also “fit the stereotype of the anorexic”. In her descriptions of this, she 
equated ‘the good patient role’ with ‘being good at recovery’ (see page 240). At a later point 
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in the interview, she further implied this equation, and also significantly equated being a bad 
patient with being good at anorexia. The alignments Kelly made between these two sets of 
roles (the ‘good patient’ is ‘good at recovery’,  and ‘the bad patient’ is ‘good at anorexia’) 
can be understood further with reference to clinical discourse, and it is useful to do this 
here before attending in more detail to Kelly’s descriptions of how she aligned herself with 
these different scripts. 
Patient scripts, pathology, and recovery 
The bad patient script overlaps with being ‘good at anorexia’ because clinical discourse ‘ties 
up’ acting badly in treatment with the pathology of anorexia. As has been addressed in 
chapter two, anorexia is clinically recognised to involve an ‘egosyntonic’ valuing of 
symptoms, denial of illness, resistance to change, and a ‘lack of insight’ (Garner, 1985; 
Vitousek et al, 1998; Konstantakopoulos, 2011). Accordingly, anorexic patients are 
perceived to be potentially manipulative, devious, resistant to therapy, ‘non-compliant’ and 
‘difficult to treat’ (Bruch, 1988; Gremillion, 2003; Darmon, 2017; Vitousek et al, 1998), and 
anorexia is: 
[…] unpopular with clinicians because of the perception that clients habitually deny, 
deceive, and rationalise to protect their symptomatology (…) anorexics become 
adept at manipulating their apparent weight, disposing of food surreptitiously, and 
distracting professional attention from their physical status (Vitoesk et al, 1998: 392).  
 
This suggests that ‘being anorexic’ typically entails being a bad patient, because in the 
apparently desperate attempt to pursue one’s symptoms, one acts ‘badly’. Such a view can 
also be understood in terms of the entification of anorexia (see chapter six), which is 
embedded in some clinical approaches. This involves positioning anorexia as an external 
entity, and in terms of the ‘bad patient’, invokes an image of an individual who is 
overwhelmed by an external force to the extent that they are unable to control their ‘true 
self’ and will ‘do anything’ to maintain a low weight. Such a view of the potency of anorexia, 
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and its ability to interfere with treatment, was held by participants such as Naomi, who 
stated: 
When you’re being that controlled by these compulsions that you need to do you 
will do anything to be able to do them, even if you know really that you shouldn’t, 
you will still do that so you might lie about eating or you might find a way to slip 
your butter into your pocket. 
 
I asked most participants about their views on perceptions of individuals with anorexia as 
difficult to treat, manipulative, and deceitful. All recognised this as a commonly held view. 
Some ‘agreed’ with the perception and related their own and/or others’ experiences to it. 
Some were more critical of this as a stereotype and misplaced moral judgement. None the 
less, all recognised the existence of this perception. 
An example of a ‘deceitful’ behaviour that accords with a ‘bad patient’ script is water 
loading69. This behaviour is widely recognised among clinicians and is understood to result 
from an “intense fear of weight gain or a desire to please” (Martin et al, 2009). With regard 
to the former, an individual may seek to appear heavier than they ‘really’ are, so that they 
can avoid ‘actual’ weight gain. Thus, making oneself appear heavier is a way of doing 
anorexia. However, as described earlier in this chapter, many participants spoke about a 
desire to distort their weight the other way (i.e. to be lighter). While an ‘opposite’ 
behaviour, this too can be understood as a way of doing anorexia, because it involves 
performing a core feature of anorexic scripts – low weight and weight loss.  
I suggest that, while the ‘bad patient’ is linked to being ‘good at anorexia’, the ‘good 
anorexic patient’ script reflects a clinical version of ‘recovery’. In previous chapters, I have 
addressed how in treatment, recovery from anorexia involves (what I have called) diagnostic 
 
69 Water loading refers to the practice of distorting one’s weight so that it appears higher, by consuming large 
volumes of liquid prior to being weighed.  
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framing, and the patient internalising the institutions views and personally committing to 
recovery (Darmon, 2017). When learning to play the role of the patient in recovery, the 
individual adopts the expected, required attitudes and becomes an active participant in the 
government of the self (Carney et al, 2008). I suggest that in acting in accordance with the 
institution’s views, displaying the required attitudes, and actively governing the self, one 
becomes a ‘good patient’.  Scott’s (2011) work on RIs (see chapter two) also sheds light on 
good patient scripts. She argues that while total institutions (Goffman, 1961a) involved overt 
authoritative control of inmates, in RIs there is a form of disciplinary power in peers’ 
monitoring each others’ conduct. This ‘performative regulation’ includes the ‘performance 
of conformity’, and the mutual surveillance of this by peers. In these performances, inmates 
perform as ‘rule followers’ and play the ‘good inmate’ role. Playing the good inmate role 
might also be conceived as adherence to the script of the ‘good anorexic patient’. This idea 
of the mutual surveillance of peers is reflected in Kelly and Mia’s accounts which show how 
peers recognised each other as ‘good’ or bad’.  
Performing conflicting scripts 
Kelly described the different ways that she performed being both ‘good at anorexia’ and 
‘good at recovery’. She explained that the former performance was mostly private, and the 
latter was public and relational.  
Being the good anorexic, it was a lot more private [it] went on in my own mind. I 
almost policed my own thoughts, so I kind of felt like ‘oh you shouldn’t be thinking 
like this’. You know how we spoke about being hungry, it was like ‘well, people with 
anorexia don’t feel like that, so therefore you are not a good anorexic’ […] as if 
some kind of external force could understand what I was thinking at all times so I 
must kind of stick to this role. 
 
This alludes to Kelly’s self-conscious monitoring of the extent to which her internal 
experiences accorded with the script of a good anorexic. The performance was largely 
‘internal’, in that she seemed to perform in this way for herself. However, she did also 
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describe public aspects to her performance of anorexia when she described how the 
behavioural expectations in the inpatient environment influenced her: 
When I was around other people, other patients, I felt like I should be perhaps 
conforming to the norms that we had within the service […] like the dining room 
[…] being the correct amount of frightened of food. 
. 
In contrast to her privately performed ‘good at anorexia’, Kelly understood her 
performance of ‘good at recovery’ as being public and performed for others: 
Mostly when I was talking to healthcare professionals […] my parents, my partner, 
all the people who wanted to see me get better […] in the phrases that I would use 
when I was talking to them, I would say ‘oh I really want to recover’ and ‘I really 
want to do this with my life’ […] in the back of my mind I was thinking, and I 
suppose this plays into the conflict, ‘oh do I really want that, because I want to be 
the good anorexic’.  
 
Having described performative pressures to eat as an anorexic should while an inpatient, 
Kelly also described similar concerns in terms of trying to get ‘recovery’ right. She stated 
“I’d go out for dinner when I got a bit better […] and I was like ‘how do I do this, how do I 
look like somebody that’s recovering from anorexia?’”. This suggests that performing a 
recovering script is different from simply ‘being anorexic’ (and ‘frightened of food’), but is 
also not straight forwardly being ‘well’ and ‘normal’. Rather it is something of a balancing act, 
in which one is both ‘anorexic’, but also working not to be. 
Kelly’s descriptions show how performances were relational and shifting across different 
contexts. This was also highlighted by Lisa, when she described wishing she were able to 
turn her anorexia ‘on’ and ‘off’ depending on who she was with and where she was: 
I’ve often wanted to be able to switch on and off […] in different contexts. You 
know, present at work and be totally fine, present at an appointment with services 
really desperate for help and be able to kind of switch it back on […] alter your 
weight at the flick of a switch almost […] even when you feel that you’ve come to a 
kind of peace with where you are with it, it can still change in those different 
contexts. 
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Eating and hunger in treatment  
Restricted eating is important to diagnostic scripts in that it is a means through which 
individuals achieve weight loss or maintain a low body weight. As inpatients, participants 
were required to be eating, and were (more or less voluntarily) following a ‘meal plan’ as 
part of their treatment. In these circumstances, the ways in which they ate, and their 
apparent desire for food, were important to how they ‘did’ anorexia. 
During Natalie’s interview, we had a collaborative discussion about the experience of 
hunger and enjoyment of food during inpatient treatment. Within this emerged our shared 
sense that a desire to eat had been something to keep to ourselves or only share with 
certain other patients. Natalie described having felt that she should not have been wanting 
food by mimicking a caricatured, imagined staff position: “You want food? You shouldn’t 
want food and enjoy it!” She also described the feeling of hunger as “unspeakable […] 
because it doesn’t conform to that view of what you should be”. Here, she positioned 
hunger as outside of a clinically-assumed anorexic script. 
In the above quote (see page 249) we saw how Kelly, in her self-monitoring of her 
adherence to a ‘good anorexic’ script, experienced her hunger as a sign that she was ‘falling 
short’. Kelly also spoke about performing both being ‘good at anorexia’ and ‘good at 
recovery’ through the ways she ate, as she sought to align her own eating behaviour with 
that of other patients, and seek the correct ‘balance’ in her approach to eating as someone 
who was recovering. In addition, she described how in the lead up to her admission, she had 
had concerns about whether she appeared anorexic ‘enough’: 
What if they didn’t think that I was sick enough if I wasn’t like visibly struggling with 
every meal? […] the main problem with it was the feeling that somebody else was 
watching you eat all the time or would think that you were, you looked like you 
were just scoffing the food down, that you looked really fat, or that yeah they’d think 
you weren’t sick enough. 
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The concern with ‘looking fat’ when eating was also expressed by Mia. She described an 
occasion when a member of bank staff had forgotten to give her the snack she was meant to 
eat, and how she did not want to let them know. She explained: “I easily could have 
communicated that but I still just, I didn’t want to come across as fat, for like actually 
wanting the stuff”. The concern with looking fat reflects a wish not to appear to be desiring 
food. Desiring food does not fit anorexic scripts, and positions one outside of anorexia.  
During inpatient treatment, I was self-conscious regarding how my eating appeared to 
others, and sensed that my eating behaviour was viewed as indicative of anorexia. This sense 
was perpetuated by the treatment programme, in that eating increasingly ‘normally’ (e.g. 
completing meals at a ‘normal’ speed and appearing relaxed when eating) was treated as a 
sign of ‘progress’ and suggested that one was being ‘less anorexic’. A specific example of a 
performative aspect of mealtimes relates to my use of ‘staff support’. This involved inciting 
continuous verbal encouragement from staff during meals and an outward demonstration of 
my distress at having to eat, expressed verbally and in my body language. Enacting meals in 
this manner can be understood as me performing a rejection of food, and as a way of doing 
anorexia in circumstances in which I had to eat. It allowed me to be positioned me as 
someone who did not want to eat, despite eating. 
Medical markers, clinical interventions, and serious anorexia 
I have argued that low body weight and weight loss are core features of anorexic scripts. 
Low body weight is a key medical marker of anorexia, and is central to performances of 
anorexia. In addition, other medical markers were understood by participants as key 
indicators of extent and ‘realness’ of illness, either by being directly perceived as such, or by 
a recognition that others (patients and clinical staff) treated them in this way. These markers 
included for example ‘negative’ blood and ECG tests, and DEXA (bone) scans. Moreover, 
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clinical interventions such as being hospitalised, sectioned, tube fed, and prescribed 
medication, were also attributed this meaning. Because of these meanings, medical markers 
and clinical interventions were intertwined in performances of illness, and influenced how 
participants perceived anorexia in (and positioned themselves in relation to) others.  
The backdrop against which one’s ‘doing’ of anorexia occurred was often one in which 
there was concern about the fraudulence of one’s anorexia, that it was not serious enough, 
or that it did not warrant the treatment one was receiving. This was addressed in chapter 
six, when I explained how participants sometimes doubted their diagnosis. It is also reflected 
in the following quotes: 
Natalie: When I was admitted that time I was thinking […] ‘oh, I must be really sick 
now then’. Not actually believing it, but ‘Oh I am pulling off this false façade thing 
that I am a proper [anorexic]’, like I still don’t feel, I still feel like a fraud, still felt like a 
fraud, that I should not be there (emphasis added).  
 
Lisa: I feel like I’ve never been as low BMI as other people are, I’ve either gone in 
voluntarily as well, you feel that you’re being greedy and asking for help, and if you 
have real anorexia then you should be kind of forced into it (emphasis added). 
 
Kelly: I kind of walked in [to inpatient treatment] and everybody says the same thing 
that goes in […] ‘I’m the biggest one here’, ‘I don’t deserve to be here’ […] so that was 
a really big thing at the start (emphasis added). 
 
In chapter six, I recognised how participants sometimes valued being recognised as ‘truly’ 
anorexic and/or ‘very sick’. Concerns about fraudulence and being undeserving are 
dynamically related to this position of ‘true’ anorexia in the sense that they often strove 
towards or valued the latter, in order to move away from the former. However, in 
experiencing situations and encounters that left their anorexia ‘wanting’ (such as an in 
comparison to other patients), their status as ‘sick’ was undermined and they felt fraudulent 
or undeserving. As reflected in the above quotes from Natalie, Lisa, and Kelly, these 
dynamics were tied up with medical markers and clinical interventions. We can understand 
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these as informing the script of ‘serious anorexia’ (or serious enough anorexia). This is an 
idea that I introduced in relation to my own experiences in chapter four, where I indicated 
that clinical recognition of physical illness is a crucial feature of a ‘serious anorexia’ script. 
Also in chapter six, I described how the valuing of an ‘anorexic identity’ was indicated in the 
ways that medical markers and clinical interventions were imbued with desirability and 
valued as proof of one’s diagnosis and/or signs that one was doing anorexia ‘well’. This 
desirability is also seen in the language that some participants used. Medical markers and 
clinical interventions were referred to as ‘status symbols’ and ‘badges’, and attributed 
meanings of success and achievement. For example, Anna described the experience of 
medical complications as having a ‘badge-collecting aspect’, and Natalie referred to tube 
feeding as a ‘badge of honour’. Kelly described medical problems in a similar way: 
I had the ECG […] they checked my pulse and stuff and that was really low and again 
it, I kind of want to get back to that feeling of like reinforcement […] it was almost a 
bit of a badge […] there was like OK, so you are having physical symptoms […] its 
reinforced the fact you do have an eating disorder […] I knew that my heart wasn’t 
good and I wasn’t scared. I didn’t feel like ‘oh no, it’s such a shame or, or ‘I should be 
terrified’ or ‘this is really bad’, I just kind of felt a bit, almost happy. 
 
The apparent reassuring and confirming effect of medical markers and clinical interventions 
can be understood in terms of them acting as confirmation that one is properly performing 
a serious anorexic script and negating concerns about not being good enough.  
For some participants, there were further (related) implications of these meanings of 
medical markers. Lisa spoke about how she previously saw the proof of her anorexia 
afforded by medical markers as allowing her to ask for help, accept her ‘problem’, and make 
strides towards recovery: 
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I know I was always looking for some kind of external ‘proof’ of the reality of my 
illness […] I used to feel that UNLESS there was some kind of physical sign (an 
objective sign rather than subjective feelings such as tiredness/dizziness etc) then I 
had no ‘excuse’ to ask for help […] or to accept I ‘really’ had a problem with eating. 
I think I was always also hoping for some kind of marker that would allow me to 
stop what I was doing (email).  
 
For Anna, having medical complications recognised by clinicians created a ‘medical feel’ to 
her weight restoration that she found comforting and reassuring: 
One of the health complications I used to get was hypoglycaemia […] they’d urgently 
ring me because my blood sugar level was like coma whatever level […] on the one 
hand I was worried […] but on the other it was kind of like ‘this should be 
happening because I’ve lost a lot of weight’. So it confirms, ‘yes I really have lost lots 
of weight’ […] there was that sense that when you are restoring weight, like that 
notion is almost like a comforting thing because it has a sort of medical feel to it. 
 
During the final stages of her weight restoration, when she was no longer ‘recovering’ out 
of medical necessity, Anna had to ‘let go’ of this medical feel: 
I had to make the conscious decision to let go of, ‘I’m doing this because I’m being 
told to and because it’s a medical necessity’, to ‘I have decided to do this because I 
prefer life at a higher BMI’ […] it was breaking through that frame of the anorexia, 
like consciously stepping outside of it […] while it’s all done on those medical terms, 
when it’s like ‘your weight is very low’ […] there’s some kind of comfort in that, it’s 
a medical need, it’s because I’m anorexic. 
 
In the above quote, Anna ties together anorexia with its medicalisation, such that the 
medical markers and ‘need’ informing her recovery felt like an ‘anorexic frame’. Thus, in 
finally moving away from anorexia, she also had to move on from being medicalised.  
In both this and the previous chapter, I have shown how medical markers and clinical 
interventions were valued as signs that one ‘really’ had anorexia and that it was sufficiently 
serious. At this point it is worth reflecting back on Michael’s case study. Like others, Michael 
described valuing his thinness and, related to this, his low blood pressure and slow pulse for 
the feeling of achievement that it brought him (see case study, chapter five). However, 
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unlike for others, this valuing was not linked to the diagnosis of anorexia. At the time he 
was referring to when describing how he felt about his blood pressure, he did not yet 
identify with the diagnosis. Rather, the achievement seemed to be about his success in 
‘pushing boundaries’ with his cycling and body, more so than inhabiting a diagnosis. 
Related to medical markers and clinical interventions being valued as proof of anorexia, a 
lack of these signs – including as compared to others - induced a sense that one was not 
doing anorexia properly. Lisa described how she had previously had a bone scan which ‘only’ 
showed osteopenia (as opposed to osteoporosis)70 and that this led her to feel “like a bit of 
a failure”, especially because younger patients seemed to have “the full-blown diagnosis” 
(osteoporosis). She also described a feeling of fraudulence linked to blood test results: 
I have sometimes felt that ‘I can’t really be unwell/have a ‘serious’ problem if all my 
bloods are fine’ […] I still feel a bit of a fraud somehow for never having experienced 
problems with potassium since it’s such a key marker (email). 
 
Natalie described how having shorter periods of bed rest than other patients led her to feel 
she was ‘too fat’ and should not be in treatment. Medical markers and clinical interventions 
in others thus had implications for the ‘realness’ of her own anorexia.  
It is important to note however that a few participants (Naomi and Ben) did not describe 
having experienced medical markers and clinical interventions as signs of the extent of 
illness, or as having valued them or found them reassuring. When discussing her experience 
of being tube fed, Naomi explained: 
 
 
70 Osteoporosis is a condition of low bone density which results in a higher risk of fractures (Kanis et al, 1994). 
It is common in anorexia nervosa (Mehler et al, 2011) because starvation induces hormonal adaptations which 
contribute to lowered bone mass (Kanis et al, 1994). Osteopenia, also common among individuals with 
anorexia (Bachrach et al, 1991), is the stage before osteoporosis. It indicates that one has low bone density, 
but not low enough to be classed as osteoporosis (NHS, 2019). 
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I didn’t think it means that I was any more unwell than someone who manages to eat 
the food because, it’s the same […] I needed it to be able to see that well, those 
calories are equal to those calories […] to make those steps, whereas other people 
actually having what goes down the tube is worse than eating, they’d rather eat it. 
Everyone’s different and I accept that. 
 
A few participants who referred to tube feeding had described how in treatment these were 
seen as ‘status symbols’ (Lisa) or a ‘badge of honour’ (Natalie). In my own experiences, I had 
valued being tube fed for its confirming effect on my identity as a ‘serious anorexic’, despite 
it being distressing. For Naomi however, the only way she described having valued being 
tube fed was in seeing it as a needed intervention that allowed her to progress:  
I know I needed it and I know that I wouldn’t have managed to go from having 
nothing to food […] when it happened it was needed and there was no other way 
that I’d have been able to move forward without it. 
 
That there are varying meanings attributed to tube feeding accords with findings from Halse 
et al (2005) that adolescent female patients receiving treatment for anorexia attributed 
meanings to being tube fed that fit into four categories: an unpleasant physical experience, a 
necessary or helpful intervention, a physical or psychological signifier of anorexia, and a 
focus in a struggle for control. The view of tube feeding as a ‘signifier of anorexia’ accords 
with my own experiences and the meanings described by Lisa and Natalie. In contrast, the 
former two categories of meaning are relevant to Naomi.  
Performing anorexia in relation to other ‘patients’   
Patient dynamics: comparing and ‘competing’  
Literature suggests that being in treatment with others with a diagnosis of anorexia is 
experienced as simultaneously helpful and problematic. This is because, for example, 
support, understanding and friendships arise from shared experiences, but exposure to 
others’ ‘eating disordered behaviours’ can worsen one’s own and increase distress (Colton 
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and Pistrang, 2004; Offord et al, 2006; Rich, 2006; Warin, 2010; Smith et al, 2014; Eli, 2014b; 
Rance et al, 2017b).  
As was shown in chapter two, anthropological research into eating disorders has addressed 
ways in which this worsening of one’s anorexia can occur. To recap some key points, Eli 
(2014b) describes how, while valuing being a part of a community of patients and building 
friendships, her participants also felt endangered living alongside others with eating 
disorders because it could trigger “disorder-supportive desires” (2014b: 6). Living closely 
alongside other patients led to embodying their eating disorder logic and practices. Rich 
(2006) and Warin (2010) address competitiveness among individuals diagnosed with 
anorexia, whereby individuals strive to be recognised as the ‘best anorexic’ and the most 
sick, because being positioned in this way offers a sense of empowerment and distinction 
and legitimises ones diagnosis. It is useful to note here that when the idea of competition is 
used in relation to comparisons, this usually alludes to a desire or active seeking to be ‘more 
anorexic’ or ‘more ill’ than others.  
In accordance with existing literature, participants in this study who had undergone 
treatment alongside others with anorexia tended to experience this as both helpful and 
unhelpful. They described pleasant and meaningful relationships with other patients and also 
identified problematic aspects of living closely alongside them. In this section, I focus on 
between-patient comparisons and mainly highlight ‘difficult’ aspects of relationships with 
other patients. However, it is important to recognise that comparisons occurred among or 
within valued friendships.  
Almost all participants spoke about making comparisons with other patients (or others with 
an eating disorder more generally), in terms of weight, body size and eating behaviour, and 
often framed this as a known and expected part of anorexia. In addition to self-consciously 
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monitoring their own performance of anorexia, participants monitored others’ 
performances. Others’ ‘doing’ of anorexia had implications for one’s own, as they made 
sense of their own behaviours and symptoms in relation to others. As Naomi succinctly 
stated when describing her experience of comparing herself to others: “That person is doing 
that so I should do that, or I shouldn’t be doing that because that person is doing that”.  
Mia’s description of how she compared herself to the ‘bad patient’ whose behaviour she 
found difficult suggests that sharing a diagnosis with another invites comparisons: 
I just hated it instantly [when admitted]. I was just in comparisons, with her shape 
and me, what she was eating and what I was eating and I didn’t like it […] it was like 
I’m in here for the same reason as her, but she is not eating and almost again, 
conforming to that character, that role in the play, and I’m also that character but 
I’m being different and yet we still fall under the same category. 
 
Being in the ‘same category’ suggested that they should be acting in accordance with the 
same script, but the differences between them demonstrated they were not. For Mia, this 
realisation seemed to be uncomfortable.   
Comparing was an active process. It was not only about being aware of how one was 
similar/different to others, but also involved actively making meaning of those 
similarities/differences to reflect on one’s own positioning. The ways and extent to which 
comparing occurred varied partly in accordance with type of treatment, because different 
treatment arrangements involved different extents of contact with others with an eating 
disorder. Generally, it was the case that of those who had had more extensive contact with 
others (Amelia, who was in outpatient treatment, and all of those who had experienced 
inpatient treatment, apart from Ben) described being impacted by comparisons with other 
patients. In addition, comparisons with others were also a particularly important aspect of 
Sarah’s experiences (even though she had not had intensive treatment). Most of this 
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discussion therefore focuses on a treatment context, although I also address experiences 
outside of treatment when relevant.  
Participants tended to describe the comparisons that occurred in treatment settings as 
problematic and as having occured in a context of unhelpful competition. This accords with 
existing research whereby comparisons (and related competing) between patients are 
recognised as the source of much distress and as hindering ‘recovery’ (Colton and Pistrang, 
2004; Offord et al, 2006). Hannah described the inpatient setting as “toxic” because of 
comparing: 
At times it was quite toxic. It sort of always depended on the patients and who was 
there […] it was always quite a bitchy environment, and yeah there was quite a lot 
of comparing. That was what was difficult about inpatient is - you do compare. 
 
While participants often used the word ‘competing’ when discussing comparisons, Natalie 
and Kelly were critical of this term. Natalie, for example, felt that it simplified what is 
actually a very complex process. None the less, both still recognised the problematic 
interpersonal processes to which it refers; they still recognised that they, or other patients, 
at times felt a desire to do anorexia ‘better’ than (or as well as) those around them.  
Despite comparing and competition being problematic, there was sometimes an element of 
wanting to compare oneself with others. This seemed to be the case for Natalie (who also 
experienced comparisons as unhelpful). She described using bodily comparisons to make 
relative sense of her own body: 
I don’t have a clue what my body looks like if I don’t have anything to compare it to 
[…] if I know ‘OK this is my height, this is my weight, this is kind of what I look like’, 
I don’t know where that sits, unless I compare. 
 
Outside of a treatment context, Sarah deliberately sought to compare herself to others as a 
way of worsening her anorexia. In a context in which she valued her social identity as 
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someone with an eating disorder, it was important to her to be the ‘smallest’, and to be 
recognised as eating less than others. She described how, when another family member of a 
similar age developed an eating disorder and her family expressed their concern about this, 
her own positioning was threatened: 
I was so annoyed that I have always been the person with that in my family, nobody 
else has any problems with food, this is not fair and I found it really difficult and still 
to this day I just don’t like her […] I think well you know that’s my thing, that’s mine 
not hers. I’m the one with [an eating disorder]. 
 
Regarding deliberately seeking comparisons, Sarah described how conversing with someone 
with an eating disorder would invoke ‘competition’ and a drive to restrict her eating further, 
and sometimes revealed new ‘tips’ for doing so. Describing an occasion when she was 
‘unwell’ and met with an acquaintance who had recently lost weight, she explained: 
I could hear the sensible side of me going ‘don’t talk to her, you know that’s a really 
bad idea’ […] and then her [anorexia] saying […] ‘we need to go and see if she can 
give us any tips and this could be really good like we need to try and talk to her’ […] 
‘also we need to be better than her’ and it was almost like the beginning of a race, in 
like an athletics championship. 
 
Sarah also explained that if she had had the opportunity to take part in this research when 
she was “really ill”, she would have been motivated to do so in order to make comparisons 
with me (knowing I had previously had a diagnosis of anorexia): 
I’d have read that you’d had a problem then I’d be like this is a good opportunity to 
meet someone else who’s got a problem and like you know, this will make me worse 
and this will help me eat less so this is a good thing to do. But also I would have felt 
really, really competitive and I would have sort of, no offense but I would have hated 
you. 
 
Participants in Lavis’ (2011) research similarly described attempts to “deliberately cause a 
‘rising up’ of anorexia” and “agentially self-trigger the illness” (2016: 461). Her participants 
did this by bringing themselves ‘too close’ to food and thus inciting fear, through practices 
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such as thinking about food intensely and counting calories.  Lavis understands this desire to 
incite anorexia as a part of the continuous work that it takes to maintain the condition and 
hold on to the safety that it offers. It seems, then, that for many, comparing oneself to 
others was experienced as difficult, unwanted, and uncomfortable, but may have sometimes 
been purposefully sought.  
There were particular circumstances in inpatient treatment that especially engendered 
comparing. One such circumstance was the arrival of new patients into treatment. I have 
shown in chapter two how I found this distressing, because new patients seemed to 
successfully embody anorexia, whereas I did not. Participants had similar experiences. 
Natalie described how the arrival of a new patient on the unit led her to feel confused and 
to question herself: 
They’d come in and be admitted and you’d just be like ‘what does that say about 
me?’, like ‘how what do I do, how do I understand, how do I deal with all of this stuff 
that is going on inside of me?’ 
 
Claire described how a new patient’s apparently more successful anorexia – as indicated in 
the severity of their weight loss – led her to be critical of her own weight loss and suggested 
that she could have done it ‘better’: 
The hardest thing was when you had people who came in who were sicker […] if 
they’d been at a lower weight than I was when I got admitted I’d feel guilty because it 
would be like I could have got a bit lower, I could have got better [at losing weight] 
they’d be really, really stick thin and I was like why weren’t they stopped sooner […] 
I felt like I could have probably gone on a little bit further and done a bit better to 
actually get a bit thinner. 
 
Eating was another circumstance which engendered comparing. I have argued that one’s 
approach to food in treatment was important to performances of anorexia. This is further 
demonstrated in the ways that participants concerned themselves with others’ behaviours 
around food. Natalie described comparing her eating with others’:  
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[I would compare] how I behave with food, how I respond to food, to someone else. 
So I would watch them and think like ‘oh, you’re really struggling eating this banana 
or whatever and I’m not like, oh, maybe I should be struggling eating this banana, but 
I’m not bothered about the banana, I’m bothered about the other thing’. Or like ‘oh 
you’re doing this thing where you are separating out everything, yet I kind of like not 
doing that […] does that mean that I’m not sick enough? Maybe I should do this 
too?’ 
 
Viewing others ‘doing’ anorexia in the ways they ate led Natalie to doubt whether her own 
eating was correct - whether she was acting in accordance with anorexic scripts. This 
doubting led her to question whether she was sick enough, therefore highlighting the 
relevance of food performances to demonstrating ‘sickness’. These dynamics can also be 
inferred from Long et al’s (2011) research, which shows how ‘rivalry’ concerning who 
appears the most distressed can occur at meal times. Of particular relevance here, is a 
participant in their study who described comparing her eating with others’ and, when 
noticing something different about their behaviour, thinking “if I don’t do that, surely I’m not 
anorexic” (2011: 423).  
For Claire, others’ ‘anorexic’ eating behaviour induced frustration. She described how other 
patients used various tactics to minimise their food intake, such as choosing lower calorie 
options when these were not allowed. Observing this made Claire feel ‘annoyed’: “I was 
frustrated I guess at myself because I hadn’t kind of done it […] it was like the principle of 
the whole thing and then you’d feel guilty that you hadn’t done it as well”. 
Other patients’ behaviour highlighted what she ‘should’ also be doing, leading her to feel 
‘guilt’ and frustration. That comparing oneself with others in treatment, and a related sense 
of not being ‘bad enough’, can lead to feelings of guilt and shame is recognised in existing 
research (Offord et al, 2006; Rance et al, 2017b). I also personally experienced this, both in 
comparisons generally and specifically in relation to eating behaviour. I compared my eating 
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with others right from the outset of inpatient treatment. In the diary entry for my first day 
of treatment, I wrote: 
Every patient is naturally judging those around them – what are they eating? How 
fast are they eating it? […] When I was eating I was worried that I was eating too 
fast and that everyone else would think I was greedy (Diary, 9th October 2006).  
 
3 months later, I wrote about observing newly admitted patients during a meal time: 
I could see the table with the new admissions […] [She] looked completely 
distressed about having to eat. I hate to see it because it makes me feel bad that I am 
not like that with food anymore (was I ever like that?). 
 
Like Claire, a feeling of guilt emerged when I found myself not being as ‘anorexic’ as I once 
was or could have been. For me, this guilt incited a longing to return to food restriction.  
Hierarchies of anorexia 
As I have begun to show in relation to food performances, comparisons with other patients 
were an impactful aspect of Natalie’s treatment. She also said “I compared my body and 
weight constantly to every single person in there, and that was kind of like the benchmark 
for who is the poorliest person here”. I have also shown how Natalie had undergone 
inpatient treatment feeling ‘fraudulent’ and that seeing other patients with more significant 
clinical interventions – such as longer periods of bed rest – led her to doubt her own 
‘sickness’. Considering these aspects of Natalie’s experiences, it seems that key indicators of 
anorexia relating to the body, weight, and clinical interventions, informed a ‘hierarchy of 
anorexia’ (Warin, 2011) whereby Natalie was sensitive to finding herself positioned lower 
than others.  
Lisa alluded to this idea of a hierarchy when she described medical markers as ‘status 
symbols’: 
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I’ve noticed there’s almost something of a ‘competitive’ element in terms of ‘who has 
to take the most Sando K’71 in treatment [...] Mind you – re the ‘competitive’ stakes 
and low K, it’s still a far lower anorexic ‘status symbol’ (you know what I mean) than 
low BMI and NG tubes72 (email). 
 
Lisa, like Natalie, as a result of feeling less ill than other patients doubted her anorexia. At 
times, feeling less ill, thin, and distressed than others – in other words, being lower in the 
hierarchy – meant  she felt less deserving of having her needs met.  
The tendency to find oneself ‘less anorexic’ than others was recognised as common. When 
Lisa described understanding herself as ‘less unwell’, she stated: 
I’m almost always the most physically ‘well’ person in treatment (and that’s not just 
my anorexic goggles talking – I really HAVE been lucky to have escaped a lot of the 
physical issues other people experience, and have […] usually been admitted at a 
higher BMI than the trend seems to be in most inpatient settings) (email). 
 
In referencing ‘anorexic goggles’, she invoked a shared understanding that individuals with 
anorexia tend to inaccurately find themselves ‘falling short’ of others. Similarly, Kelly stated: 
“I think it’s bizarre how it operates that everyone else thinks that, in an inpatient situation, 
that everybody else is thinner than them”. 
Amelia also alluded to a hierarchy, and spoke directly about desiring to be the most ill. 
When explaining her experiences of being in a therapeutic group, she said: 
It’s almost elements of it become a competition with others, to who can be the best, 
I don’t even know what that means […] But that’s how your brain works, it’s like 
that competition of who is the ill-est. And it’s horrible.  
 
She also recalled recently attending a therapy group with four other young women with 
eating disorders, and appreciating having been there (in treatment) longer than them. This 
 
71 Sando K is a medication used to treat low potassium.  
72 ‘NG tube’ refers to nasogastric tube.   
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was seemingly because needing to be in treatment a long time suggested that she had ‘done’ 
anorexia better than those who did not. 
Comparative strategies and performative identity-work  
Participants sometimes engaged in, or were aware of others engaging in, active comparisons 
with each other which drew on personal experiences of medical markers, clinical 
interventions, and other indicators of ‘successful anorexia’. I understand these active 
comparisons as a form of performative identity-work, in which individuals ‘work up’ and 
perform an alignment with anorexia. The indicators of ‘successful anorexia’ that are drawn 
on act as identity markers, because they are used to communicate one’s anorexic 
positioning to others.  
Sometimes, this performative identity-work seemed to occur in a ‘one way’ process, as a 
way of demonstrating the extent of one’s sickness to someone else who did not have 
anorexia. More often however, it was described as occurring between patients, in a 
relational, comparative context.  
Lisa described the ‘one way’ process: 
I hear myself slipping it into conversation […] I’ve noticed that I’m most prone to 
doing it when I don’t feel someone really grasps the impact of this illness on me […] 
or if I feel somehow insecure about if they see it as ‘real’ or ‘serious’ [I’m] always 
mentioning how tired I am, and mentioning being anaemic or something! (email). 
 
This reinforces our understanding of medical markers as indicative of illness, as Lisa 
describes drawing on these in such a way as to perform her illness as ‘real’. Kelly also 
described her understanding of the ‘use’ of medical markers and clinical interventions in this 
way: 
 
278 
 
 
 
In the context of mental distress not really being taken seriously and physical distress 
being considered, probably being taken more seriously […] I think like it’s a very 
easy way to demonstrate to somebody this happened, this is how poorly I was and 
to be honest how would you know unless I told you that this had happened to me. 
 
The revealing of indicators of anorexia that occurred between patients and included a 
comparative dimension were usually described as unhelpful, and were recognised as part of 
the competition that occurs between patients. Lisa felt frustrated by other patients revealing 
such information:  
I HATE it when I have heard other patients ‘drop into conversation' how sick they've 
been - but I also recognise it as stemming from their own insecurity/vulnerability […] 
it's frustrating!  I always try not to be ‘triggering’ in any way if talking about my 
problems in groups (weight/medical issues/restriction etc) (email). 
 
The situation she describes is comparative in the sense that those revealing the information 
about their anorexia did so while aware that others with the diagnosis were present. 
Participants also described how the revealing of information occurred in processes of 
mutual sharing. This is noted by Warin (2010), who describes how “beyond the obvious 
markers of weight loss in anorexia there are the invisible indicators of metabolic imbalances 
and cessation of bodily processes (such as menstruation), results and effects that are 
compared among those diagnosed to reveal the seriousness of their disorder” (2010: 77). 
Kelly described this: 
It’s like anecdotal kind of like ‘yeah, I fainted here and here’ […] like various like 
physical things of like you know […] ‘I didn’t eat anything for like a month’ […] you  
start getting a bit of back and forth […] it’s not a positive conversation to have. 
 
I partook in these conversations in treatment, and sometimes initiated them. In a diary entry 
during my second admission, I describe walking away from a conversation with another 
patient feeling angry with myself, because I sensed that she did not like me for talking about 
how physically unwell I had been – something I had done in order to communicate the 
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‘strength’ of my anorexia. However, I also became frustrated with others if they seemed to 
be speaking about their own experiences for this purpose, especially if they did so too 
‘obviously’. Describing an encounter with a particular patient during my second admission, I 
wrote: 
She’s just so competitive, I can’t stand it! She asked me if it had just all gone wrong 
pretty much straight away when [last] discharged, I said that it had, and started to 
explain my situation […] she was like “oh I was losing more each week”. What do 
you want, a medal?! (Diary, 2nd August 2007). 
 
Participants’ awareness of comparative dynamics and their potential problematic impact 
were often revealed when they responded to the post – interview question. They expressed 
how they had been concerned with the potential for such processes to occur during the 
interview. Claire explained she had been concerned prior to the interview that she may 
have felt the need to “show off” to my “anorexic side”. Relatedly, to restate a quotation 
from Anna (originally presented in chapter three): 
When you […] mentioned you’d had anorexia [I worried] that us talking about our 
anorexia could be too complicated. Sort of blurring the lines between empathising, 
comparing, competing, and that sort of complaining ‘oh isn’t it awful when…’ that 
also ends up celebrating something. 
 
Anna’s use of the phrase ‘celebrating something’ alludes to the valuing of being positioned as 
‘ill’ and the ways this can be iteratively ‘worked up’ in interaction.  
Naomi described how her concerns about comparative processes during the interview led 
her to be conscious of what she said to me: 
There were times I was conscious about giving certain information that might be 
typically triggering or used by some sufferers as part of competitive comparisons. I 
know that you consider yourself recovered, but I found it hard to judge how much 
information might be too much information. 
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These examples show how the interviews unintentionally functioned like an experimental 
situation in that they shed light on comparative dynamics in anorexia. Literature suggests 
that insider research and interviewer self-disclosure can lead to a sense of comparison and 
competition (Abell et al, 2006; Berger, 2015). Due to the comparative dynamics that occur 
in relation to the diagnosis of anorexia, this was a particularly relevant in the interviews in 
this research.  
Concluding points: anorexic scripts in others 
The above analysis of between-patient comparing suggests that others’ performances of 
anorexia had implications for how participants understood their own. In seeing other 
patients apparently ‘do’ anorexia more successfully, participants’ understanding of 
themselves as ‘truly’ or ‘seriously’ anorexic was undermined. This was an uncomfortable 
process which induced shame, guilt and a feeling of fraudulence, perhaps because it 
undermined the sense of empowerment and distinctiveness associated with being a 
‘successful anorexic’ (Rich, 2006; Warin, 2010). The flipside to this is that finding themselves 
more successful in comparison to others, positioned them as ‘higher’ in an anorexia 
hierarchy, and this experience felt validating and rewarding. Perhaps for this reason, 
individuals sometimes tried to (re)align themselves with anorexia during performative 
identity-work. This involved ‘displaying’ their anorexia by demonstrating how well they had 
embodied anorexic scripts, and working to position themselves as ‘successfully’ anorexic in 
relation to others. Eli (2014b) suggests that, in the context of inpatient treatment, one’s 
eating disorder identity is ‘slippery’ and requires constant negotiation and work. We can 
understand this performative identity-work as part of this broader identity-work that occurs 
in treatment.  
However, it is noteworthy that Ben and Jack did not engage in these comparative processes. 
For Ben, this was perhaps due to him not being invested in a diagnostic identity based on 
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anorexia. Jack had only had limited contact with others with an eating disorder, and this was 
in online support groups or ‘chat rooms’. He compared himself with others, but did so in 
order to learn better ways of coping with his eating disorder.  
Distancing anorexia 
Avoiding others’ expectations 
Coinciding with others’ attempts to live up to their diagnosis and adhere to anorexic scripts, 
participants also sometimes worked to disavow their diagnosis or reshape other people’s 
expectations of it. This was in order to manage behavioural expectations and stigmatising 
and problematic understandings of the diagnosis.  
Participants who wanted to avoid the behavioural expectations associated with anorexia did 
this by not revealing their diagnosis to others. Sarah described an occasion when she first 
met the new girlfriend of a long-term friend, whom she assumed had heard about her eating 
disorder. She had felt awkward eating in front of her, because she felt she needed to live up 
to the expectations that she imagined the new girlfriend had, to prevent her from wrongly 
concluding that she had never had an eating disorder. Sarah then described how she 
sometimes chooses not to reveal her eating disorder to new friends, in order to avoid these 
sorts of concerns. Having others not expect that she will restrict her eating allows her eat 
‘freely’ with them.  
Natalie did not inform others of her diagnosis for similar reasons. At the time of the 
interview, she did not have many others in her daily life who knew about her ongoing 
struggles with under-eating. She explained that having others know would lead her to feel 
restricted and unable to change, and as though she needed to continue losing weight and 
restricting her food intake. Like Sarah, others not knowing induced a sense of freedom: 
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It’s so nice having nobody know, because you can go out for dinner and just eat 
whatever you want and no one is thinking anything. Whereas if I go out for dinner 
with anyone that knows, the only thing I can order is a salad, because I know I think 
that they are judging or watching or expecting that that’s what I’ll have. […] With 
most of them not knowing I can just, it is freer […] if I want not a soup or salad, it’s 
OK. 
 
Amelia also felt that others knowing about her diagnosis restricted her ability to change. She 
described how this led them to pre-determine her to act in a certain way, and explained this 
as them thinking “Amelia has got anorexia, and so she is like this”. She implied that this 
makes it more difficult for her to act outside of their pre-determined ideas and limits her 
ability to recover, citing a recent example of a family member finding it “weird” when she 
chose to sit down and relax in front of the TV (because this does not fit with her usual 
‘anorexic’ behaviour). Amelia explained that she had asked her family not to think of her as 
having anorexia or to make assumptions about how she will behave: 
I’ve now tried to say to my family can you please try to treat me as not anorexic 
[…] I now try to see myself as an underweight person that needs to put weight on, 
not as anorexic. 
 
The experiences of these participants can be understood in terms of them attempting to 
free themselves from anorexic scripts, because these invoked unwanted and restrictive 
behavioural expectations. For Sarah and Natalie, this was about not bringing these into play 
by avoiding revealing their diagnosis. For Amelia, it involved differentiating between a ‘label-
free’ description of her need to gain weight and a diagnostic one.  
Managing problematic perceptions 
Participants spoke about lay perceptions, stereotypes, and/or cultural and media portrayals 
of anorexia being problematic and inaccurate. Aspects of these that were considered to be 
especially problematic included the idea that individuals with anorexia are motivated by a 
desire to be skinny and become more attractive, that they are influenced by media images 
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and/or are overly concerned with their appearance, that anorexia involves not wanting to 
eat, having no appetite, never eating certain foods, and finding self-starvation effortless, and 
that it is only a female condition. Some of these aspects of imputed misunderstandings 
resonate with findings from Dimitropoulos et al (2016). In their study exploring how 
individuals with anorexia believe the general public perceive the condition, participants felt 
that the public understood their struggles as a desire to emulate celebrities and models and 
that this trivialized their experiences. As was also the case for participants in this research, 
the framing of anorexia as volitional and socio-culturally influenced was understood as 
problematic. For some in this research, perceptions of how others envisage anorexia led 
them to hide their diagnosis, and/or be strategic in the ways in which, and to whom, they 
revealed it. These strategies speak to the impression management that Goffman (1963) 
describes in relation to managing stigma.  
Mia felt “scared” to publicly identify with the diagnosis due to others’ misunderstanding of 
what it involves. She felt that the general perception of anorexia is stereotypical and depicts 
someone who does not eat because they think they are fat and want to lose weight. This 
perception did not resonate with her current experience: 
You say that word, people just instantly think that you’re not eating because you 
think you’re fat and you want to lose weight. I don’t want to lose weight any more 
[…] I hate how I look, I just know no different and as I say it becomes like an 
outcome of what’s happening in here [in my mind]. 
 
Mia’s family and a few close friends were aware of her diagnosis, but she did not tell 
additional people in order to not invoke the stereotype. Her perceptions of how others 
understand anorexia impacts on the language she uses in conversation with them. She 
explained that she will use the word anorexia when talking to someone who understands 
that she is not simply motivated by a desire to be skinny (such as a mental health 
professional). However, in conversation with friends, she will say “illness” or “eating 
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disorder”, as she imagines the word anorexia will lead them to “jump to a conclusion” (they 
will make incorrect assumptions about the nature of her experience).  
Prior to beginning treatment, Kelly had also found it problematic to be known as someone 
with anorexia. She linked this to the portrayal of anorexia in media, which she felt did not 
represent her experiences. She explained that anorexia is portrayed as involving wanting to 
lose weight to appear more attractive and never eating, whereas her own experiences are 
(partly) about responding to trauma, and behaviourally involve elements of what she 
referred to as bulimia (making herself vomit). Having others identify her as someone with 
anorexia therefore led her to feel that misconceptions about the diagnosis would be placed 
on her: 
I just don’t think that a label can sum up your experience […] I kind of wanted to 
say well yeah, I do have this diagnosis, but that’s not going to tell you anything about 
what’s going on. 
 
Having others know about her diagnosis also led her to worry that they would consider her 
“not skinny enough”, implying that she understood herself not to ‘match up’ to the physical 
appearance that others assume anorexia entails. Kelly described feeling pressured to ‘fit’ 
how she imagined others saw anorexia, and stated “I felt like I had to fit the bill of the 
diagnosis, as opposed to it fitting me”.  
Anna described having deliberately ‘cultivated’ her anorexia in a way that went against how 
it is typically portrayed in media. Rather than being understood as experiencing something 
“illogical” or “superficial”, she wanted to be recognised as having a “serious mental illness”: 
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My doctor would ask if I purged and I’d say ‘of course not, I know it isn’t effective 
and can only empty a tiny proportion of what I consume’ […]. It was like I wanted to 
appear totally rational and reasonable. And I’d be careful to avoid any suggestion that 
I was doing it out of appearance […] it was like I really wanted to have a form of 
anorexia that couldn’t be explained away as a fad, or illogical, or superficial, like it 
often is in the media. Like I was frightened that people would say there was nothing 
really wrong, I was determined to make sure my anorexia was unquestionably a 
serious mental illness (email). 
 
Ben perceived anorexia as a potentially stigmatising diagnosis. I described in the previous 
chapter how he had never fully internalised the idea that he was ‘anorexic’, and had only 
ever vaguely and ambivalently identified with the diagnosis. In part this was because he felt it 
did not fully account for his experience, and because he personally resisted ‘being 
categorised’. Also relevant to his lack of identification with anorexia was what he described 
as his ‘own stigmatisation’ of the diagnosis and his related hiding of it from others:  
I can’t easily say anorexia, like I really rarely say that […] I think because of the 
stigmatising element as well, of not wanting to say […] not wanting to communicate 
to others that this is something that I have had in the past 
 
In part, Ben attributed his perceived stigmatisation of the diagnosis to gender. He explained: 
“So few people know it about me. [After treatment] I wanted to sort of redefine myself as 
not the guy, the boy that was admitted to inpatient”.  
However, he sensed that he is likely misplaced in his concerns about how others would 
react if they knew: 
I don’t think I give people enough credit for actually […] being helpful as opposed to 
judgemental […] people don’t often go ‘so you don’t eat food?’ People don’t do that, 
but maybe that’s what I was scared of […] every time people see me they are not 
going to go […] ‘Ben, anorexic.’ […] they’ll listen to the story and then they’ll get a 
new Snapchat notification and they’ll soon move on. I stigmatise myself which is so 
bad. 
 
Participants also spoke about managing the ways in which they revealed their diagnosis for 
other reasons. Anna explained that she sometimes reveals her experience with anorexia to 
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others, and sometimes does not. When she does discuss her experiences, she, like Mia, is 
careful in the language she uses. She explained that she often chooses to use the phrase 
‘eating disorder’ as opposed to ‘anorexia’, due to the use of the latter leading to 
‘mythologising’ and ‘gossiping’: 
Even the ‘oh I’m so sorry, that’s awful, it’s so hard to recover from’ that comes out 
in reference to anorexia is a kind of mythologising and that sort of gossip where 
people relish the worst - that wouldn’t happen if it were binge-eating disorder. 
 
Regarding ‘mythologizing’, Anna seemed to be suggesting that discussions about anorexia 
being difficult to recover from can take on an exaggerated and unhelpful form. In describing 
how conversations about anorexia can ‘relish the worst’, she refers to the performative 
identity-work described above, whereby indicators of ‘successful’ anorexia are 
communicated. Naomi discussed her concerns about revealing her diagnosis in the context 
of newly developing relationships, particularly when ‘dating’. Her worry was that anorexia 
would be perceived as a burden.  
Most participants, then, spoke about perceived problematic and stigmatising perceptions of 
anorexia as factors which restricted their revealing of the diagnosis and led them to be 
strategic in terms of to whom and how they positioned themselves as anorexic. On the 
other hand, a few described their attempts to ‘be open’ about their experiences with 
anorexia precisely because they wished to challenge problematic views. Amelia explained 
she had told more people about her diagnosis and become increasingly ‘open’ over time, 
due to her belief that “it needs to be spoken about more”. Maddie described becoming 
“obsessed” with “raising awareness” of anorexia because “people need to understand it”. 
This had involved her reading, writing and talking to others about anorexia and various 
organised ‘awareness raising’ activities.  
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Chapter seven summary 
In this chapter, I have shown how the anorexic scripts – or ‘ways of doing’ anorexia – that 
individuals encounter in clinical contexts inform how they position themselves in relation to 
the diagnosis, and how they perform their diagnosis. This includes in relation to weight, 
hunger and eating, and clinical interventions and medical markers. I have also shown how 
individuals make sense of the ways in which they ‘do’ their diagnosis in relation to others, 
and how others’ performances of anorexia influence their own. Moreover, while the valuing 
of an anorexic positioning can influence individuals to perform towards the diagnosis, such a 
positioning is also sometimes problematic. This is due to perceived stereotyping and 
misinformation, and individuals adopt strategies to manage this in interaction with others. 
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Chapter Eight  
Conclusion  
The aim of this research has been to explore the experience and impact of ‘having’ a 
diagnosis of anorexia. I have addressed this through an exploration of my own experiences 
of being diagnosed with the condition and undergoing inpatient treatment, along with the 
experiences of 14 others who have also been diagnosed (or self-diagnosed) and had 
treatment. I have sought to understand how individuals experience being diagnosed, what 
this event means to them, and how the diagnosis informs their self-understanding, 
performance of symptoms, and interaction with others.  
In this concluding chapter, I outline the overall contributions of the research. I begin by 
summarising key insights relating to each research objective, and considering their 
sociological and clinical implications. I then summarise what this research has found in 
relation to male experiences of the diagnosis in particular. In doing so, I draw together 
facets relating to the gendered construction of the diagnosis which have thus far been 
addressed in a dispersed manner, across different chapters. Following this, I comment on a 
methodological insight regarding reflexive strategies and insider interviewing. I then identify 
possible areas for future research. Finally, I draw some overall conclusions about the 
diagnosis of anorexia and its functions.  
The experience of being diagnosed 
The first research objective was to explore how individuals come to be diagnosed with anorexia 
and what meanings they attach to this event. I have examined the interpretive processes that 
lead individuals to be diagnosed with anorexia, and the lived experience of being diagnosed 
in terms of what the event means to them at that time. This is an aspect of experience that 
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has not previously been an explicit or substantial focus of social science research into 
anorexia.  
I identified three different routes to being diagnosed: self-directed, other-directed, and 
mixed. These routes highlight the various interpretive processes, engaged in by both self and 
others, involved in identifying a problem and initiating help-seeking, as well as the pathway to 
receiving a diagnosis after having sought help. I pointed to the influence of lay 
understandings of what it means to ‘be anorexic’, in terms of aspects such as gender and 
how anorexia ‘looks’, on these routes. I have highlighted the role of personal meanings and 
ambiguity in the help-seeking process, and the ways in which individuals engage with their 
own and others’ understandings of their ‘symptoms’. These findings offer a sociological, rich 
understanding of help-seeking, which is an aspect of anorexia that has, in contrast, 
previously tended to be explored from a clinical, service-focused or psychological 
perspective. The findings are relevant to those seeking to improve services for anorexia, 
given that research commissioned by Beat has suggested that there is a “clear pattern of 
delay in seeking help for eating disorders” (Beat, 2015: 24) and that longer time to 
treatment following the onset of ‘symptoms’ is associated with poor treatment outcomes 
(Beat, 2015; Treasure and Russell, 2011). 
This research has shown that being diagnosed with anorexia holds various meanings. 
Participants either did not identify with the diagnosis, understood it as a ‘useful way 
forward’, or experienced it as a marker of success and recognition of suffering. This concurs 
with existing critical psychology literature which addresses the lived experience of receiving 
other psychiatric diagnoses (Horn et al, 2007; Hansson-Halleröd et al, 2015), in that the 
diagnosis holds a range of both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ meanings. This finding has relevance 
to clinicians involved in diagnosing anorexia, and supports the assertion that they should 
employ discernment regarding the functions of a diagnosis and its meaning to the person 
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being diagnosed (Hayne, 2003; Horn et al, 2007). That said, the meaning of the diagnosis as a 
‘marker of success’ appears to be somewhat unique to anorexia. This meaning is also 
reflected in anthropological research which suggests that anorexia is experienced as an 
‘earned status’ (Warin, 2010, Eli, 2014b), and is important in understanding performative 
aspects of the diagnosis (see below). I also found that the route through which a person 
reaches diagnosis is related to the subjective meaning it is afforded at the time it is ‘given’ 
(for example, those for whom help seeking was other-directed tended not to identify with 
the diagnosis). This has relevance to the sociology of diagnosis, because it suggests that in 
order to fully illuminate the process of diagnosis (Jutel, 2011), one needs to examine 
proceeding events and circumstances. 
An additional key finding is that the occasion of diagnosis may not in itself instigate or 
represent biographical disruption (Bury, 1982). While being diagnosed is both meaningful 
and impactful, it is not necessarily a pivotal moment in terms of changing a person’s 
understanding of themselves or interpretation of their experiences. This research suggests 
that personal identification with the diagnosis, and an ‘acceptance’ of it as the proper 
explanation of one’s struggles, occurs gradually over time, sometimes prior to being 
diagnosed (whereby receiving the diagnosis is confirmation of one’s existing understanding), 
or after being diagnosed. In the case of the latter, an identification with the diagnosis is 
learned through what I have conceptualised as ‘diagnostic framing’ and ‘interpretive identity-
work’. It seems then, that for anorexia, while the act of being diagnosed is meaningful for 
self-understanding and identity, it is not necessarily a discretely transformative event.  
Anorexia and identity   
An additional objective was to explore how individuals relate to the diagnosis of anorexia and how 
it informs their self-understanding and identity, and how these facets are influenced by the 
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experience of treatment. I explored how individuals develop an identification with the 
diagnosis of anorexia, and how the diagnosis informs their self-understanding and personal 
sense making. Using notions of ‘diagnostic framing’ and ‘interpretive identity-work’, I have 
shown how individuals learn an ‘anorexic identity’ in treatment contexts. These findings 
support existing research which suggests that individuals are socialised into clinical 
understandings of their anorexia diagnosis in the hospital institutions in which they are 
treated (Carney et al, 2008; Darmon, 2016). However, I have also highlighted how 
diagnostic understandings are not necessarily wholly accepted or internalised. Rather, they 
are critically engaged with, such that individuals may reject aspects of the diagnosis and 
associated clinical understandings, deeming them irrelevant to their experiences, insufficient 
for explaining them, or as not helpful to their ‘recovery’. This supports Brinkmann’s (2016) 
suggestion that a diagnosis is an interpretive resource drawn on by reflexive, self-conscious 
individuals. That said, it is necessary to recognise the relative dominance of diagnostic, 
clinical explanations in present-day western societies and the ways in which these constrain 
and direct the self-understandings available; there are limits on the extent to which the 
diagnosis can be freely ‘rejected’.  
I have also offered insights into the value and meaning of an anorexic identity, particularly in 
terms of how clinical recognition of illness can be drawn into this. That individuals may value 
being positioned as ‘successfully anorexic’ is recognised elsewhere (Rich, 2006; Warin, 2010; 
Lavis, 2011; Eli, 2014b). A contribution of this research has been to illuminate how medical 
markers of illness can inform and materialise this ‘success’, and be experienced positively as 
proof of one’s diagnosis and as suggestive that one is doing anorexia ‘well’ (see also Warin, 
2010). I reflect on this point further below when considering the performance of anorexia.  
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Performing and managing anorexia  
The final objective was to explore how individuals manage and perform the diagnosis, both in and 
outside of treatment contexts. I examined how and why individuals seek to ‘live up’ to their 
diagnosis of anorexia, and described how this involved adhering to clinically based ‘anorexic 
scripts’. I have argued that anorexic scripts significantly inform how individuals relate to and 
‘do’ their diagnosis. In addition, individuals sometimes seek to avoid being positioned as 
‘anorexic’, or work at managing the impressions they give others of their diagnosis, due to 
perceived stigma and misunderstanding.  
Brinkmann’s (2016) notion of diagnostic scripts has shed light on how individuals make sense 
of themselves as patients with anorexia, and how they reflexively interpret, monitor, and 
perform their symptoms. This aspect of the research has highlighted participant’s self-
awareness in terms of how ‘successful’ they are at anorexia. I stated above that this success 
is partly informed by clinical recognition of illness. It is also informed by comparisons with 
others. In exploring this aspect of performing anorexia, I have offered a new way of 
understanding ‘competition’ between patients. While typically interpreted using a 
pathological frame, whereby the ‘drive’ to compare oneself to others is understood as 
symptomatic of an illness, this research has approached comparisons in terms of personal 
sense-making and performative identity-work. Individuals perform their identity as ‘an 
anorexic’ in relation to others, ‘working up’ their anorexia in interaction with them and 
reading their performances and using them to make sense of their own.  It is important for 
clinicians to be aware of performative and inter relational dynamics in anorexia, given that 
they add a ‘hidden layer’ to the experience of treatment, which complicates a person’s 
engagement with it. Moreover, given the ways in which clinical recognition of illness can 
inform performances of ‘successful anorexia’, it is important that clinicians are sensitive to 
the complex and conflicting meanings and significance of experiencing health related 
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complications in eating disorder treatment. In a similar vein, the notion of diagnostic scripts 
has illuminated potentially iatrogenic aspects of treatment. Clinical settings and procedures 
can inadvertently reinforce aspects of anorexic scripts relating to low weight and weight 
loss, and thus individuals may seek to continue to lose weight in order to adhere to this 
diagnostic expectation. Similar to Lavis (2011), I have shown how for those admitted to 
treatment, “many learn how to ‘do’ and ‘be’ the clinic’s anorexia” (2011: 279). However, I 
have also nuanced this suggestion by identifying multiple anorexic scripts and recognising 
that there is more than one version of ‘the clinic’s anorexia’.  
Gender and anorexia - male experiences 
This research suggests that the construction of anorexia as a ‘female condition’ has 
implications for how males relate to the diagnosis and for their identity as someone with 
anorexia. For the three male participants in this research, these implications were varied 
and they were not all impacted by the gendered nature of the diagnosis in the same way. 
For Ben, we have seen that the gendered construction of anorexia contributed to his lack of 
identification with the diagnosis. He distanced himself from it, in part because he did not 
wish to be known as a male who had been treated for anorexia.  Moreover, he understood 
the female-specific information about anorexia that he had encountered in clinical contexts 
to have constrained his ability to relate himself to the diagnosis. In contrast, gendered 
understandings of anorexia did not seem to lessen Michael’s identification with the diagnosis, 
but they did have implications for what being anorexic meant to him. He understood that 
being a 50 year-old male anorexic made him different to most others with the diagnosis, and 
this affected how he related to the information he read about anorexia (in that he felt that 
he was being informed about something that was ‘removed from who he was’). However, 
gender did not feature as a major understanding in how he made sense of his lack of a 
formal diagnosis. This was unlike Jack, who also identified as having an eating disorder, but 
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understood gender to have impacted on how professionals interpreted his situation and to 
be a reason for his initial ‘missed diagnosis’. Thus, while gendered constructions of anorexia 
influence those who are diagnosed, the impacts are not homogenous.  
Methodological insight 
In this research, I adopted various reflexive strategies, including a novel approach of asking 
interviewees questions about their experience of undertaking an interview with a self-
identified ‘insider’. This proved effective, as participants’ responses to these questions 
offered valuable insight into the ways in which my insider positioning and self-disclosure 
impacted the interviews. Unexpectedly, the post-interview question also offered insight into 
the very interpersonal dynamics I was exploring in the substantive content of my research. I 
addressed this in chapter seven when I described how participants had reflected on their 
initial concerns about how comparative dynamics would potentially play out during the 
interview. These reflections offered valuable insight because they indicated the scope and 
weight of such concerns. My use of these post-interview questions is of relevance to future 
insider researchers who may also benefit from adopting this reflexive strategy.  
Recommendations for future research 
Clinicians’ perceptions and experiences of ‘anorexic scripts’: In order to elaborate the 
understanding of ‘anorexic scripts’ offered in this thesis, it would be beneficial to explore 
these from the perspective of clinicians working with individuals diagnosed with anorexia. 
This could include an examination of the anorexic scripts that clinicians encounter, and how 
they may perpetuate, reinforce or engage with these when treating patients. It could also 
assess how clinicians interpret the behaviours and presentation of individuals diagnosed with 
anorexia that do not ‘fit’ the scripts. This could be in terms of whether or not this is 
interpreted as evidence ‘against’ the diagnosis or whether it is subsumed into it. This relates 
295 
 
 
 
to Brinkmann’s (2016) discussion of diagnostic self-affirmation, in which he notes that a 
whole range of ‘symptoms’, including those that are not ordinarily associated with a 
particular diagnosis, can come to be interpreted as belonging to it.  
Male anorexia: This research has begun to explore issues relating to gender and the lived 
experience of a diagnosis of anorexia. Further research incorporating a wider breadth of 
male experiences would be beneficial for enhancing the tentative insights here. I have 
suggested that the three male participants in this research were all affected by the gendered 
construction of anorexia, but in different ways. It may be that common features of their 
experience would emerge in research pertaining to the experiences of a wider sample of 
males.  
The experience of an anorexia diagnosis: doing to and doing for 
When a medical professional diagnoses someone with anorexia, the intention is to help. The 
diagnosis can assist in better understanding the nature of the individual’s struggles and in 
providing access to treatment. It can therefore feel like a relief to the person who receives 
it, as it seems to offer a way forward, and validates and legitimises suffering. However, being 
diagnosed with anorexia can also have hidden or unintended consequences. For example, 
individuals may try to ‘live up to’ their diagnosis through continued weight loss and 
restricted eating, in order to not lose access to treatment or in hope of retaining the private 
sense of achievement that the diagnosis can provide.  
The diagnostic explanation of self-starvation – that it is a key manifestation of a condition 
known as anorexia nervosa – is culturally and clinically dominant in contemporary western 
societies. As a recipient of this label begins and moves through treatment, they are expected 
to accept, internalise, and ‘work with’ the understanding that they are anorexic. In this way, 
the diagnosis is imposed onto them. Once labelled as anorexic, they may struggle to be 
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understood by others – including friends, family, and clinicians - outside of the parameters of 
anorexia pathology, and an identity as someone who is ‘anorexic’ is difficult for them to 
reject legitimately. In treatment settings, they may also be understood as a certain ‘type’ of 
anorexic – as chronic or difficult, for example. This is an understanding which they may then 
(however passively or actively) come to adopt. Individuals may also encounter certain 
expectations of how they should behave, or misunderstandings of their experiences, which 
they must negotiate and work to avoid. In these respects, we can understand the diagnosis 
as doing to the individual.  
In other respects, the diagnosis does for the individual. Individuals use clinical understandings 
of anorexia resourcefully to make sense of their past and current experiences. They are 
reflexive and self-conscious regarding their diagnosis, rather than simply passively accepting 
the definitions and explanations of anorexia they encounter. They work at understanding the 
relevance of such explanations to their personal experiences, ‘drawing in’ those that 
resonate and are most personally helpful. Some largely reject the diagnostic definitions of 
their struggles, and do not personally or socially align themselves with anorexia. For others, 
the diagnosis offers a useful framework for their recovery, and for others still (or indeed, 
simultaneously), it offers them a desirable positioning and social role. In seeking to press 
themselves into this role, individuals reflexively draw on the anorexic scripts they 
encounter.  
Notions of identity, identity-work, and ‘having’ and ‘being’ a diagnosis have been valuable in 
illuminating the dynamics of the diagnosis as doing to and for those who are diagnosed.  By 
using these concepts as analytic frames, I hope I have contributed to a more detailed 
understanding of the experience of anorexia, and that I have highlighted the complexities 
underlying processes of seeking help, being diagnosed, and undergoing treatment. In relation 
to clinical diagnoses more generally, the findings from my research suggest that it is 
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important to recognise the ways in which cultural, clinical, and personal meanings of 
diagnostic categories interact, and how diagnoses intersect in individuals’ lives in varied 
ways. They also highlight the importance of sociology (and ‘critical’ social sciences more 
generally) in shedding light on the hidden and unintended consequences of clinical activity. 
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Appendix One 
Information sheet for participants  
Experiences of being diagnosed with and treated for anorexia  
I would like to invite you to take part in my research project concerning the diagnosis and treatment of 
anorexia nervosa. Participation in the project is entirely up to you. Before you decide whether or not to 
take part, it is important that you understand what this would involve. Please read through this sheet 
carefully. 
About the research team 
My name is Lauren O’Connell. I am a postgraduate researcher in the sociology department at the 
University of Essex, and this research is part of my PhD. I am the sole researcher on the project, which is 
also overseen by an experienced supervisor - professor Joan Busfield (University of Essex). My PhD is 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.  
I am keen to understand people’s personal experiences of being diagnosed with anorexia and receiving 
treatment. My interest in this topic partly stems from my own experience of an eating disorder. I was 
diagnosed with anorexia in 2006 and have been recovered for about seven years. 
About the research 
The aim of the research is to explore the experience of being diagnosed with and treated for anorexia, and 
how these events affect the individual.  The research will address questions such as: What does having a 
diagnosis and receiving treatment mean to the individual? How do these events affect the individual’s 
identity and their understanding of anorexia? In addition to conducting interviews, I will also investigate and 
reflect on my own experiences. 
Inclusion in the research 
To participate in this research, the following should apply to you: 
• Age 18yrs or above and living in the southern or midland regions of England 
• Have been diagnosed with anorexia by a health professional (you may or may not still have this 
diagnosis).  
• Have received, or are currently receiving, treatment for anorexia. ‘Treatment’ includes any regular 
input from a health professional(s), for example: seeing your GP to be physically monitored, 
attending an outpatient or inpatient eating disorder service, appointments with a home treatment 
team, or time spent on a hospital ward.  
• Not be feeling especially unwell or have very serious health complications.  
I am interested in speaking to a range of people, including individuals who consider themselves to currently 
have anorexia, those who are in recovery and those who are recovered.  
Participation in the research 
If you choose to participate then you will be invited to take part in an interview with me at some time from 
January 2018 onwards .We will arrange a time and place for the interview that is convenient for you. 
Before the interview begins, we will talk through this information sheet and I will answer any questions that 
you may have. If you still wish to participate, I will ask you to sign a consent form, and we will then begin 
the interview. The interview will cover topics such as your experiences of anorexia, being diagnosed and 
receiving treatment.  There will not be a strict set of questions to follow, so we will be free to talk about 
those aspects of these experiences that are relevant and meaningful to you. The interview will likely last 
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between one and two hours, and will be recorded on a digital voice recorder. I will type up the voice 
recording into a word document at a later date. At your request, I will send this document to you, so that 
you are able to alter the content and/or provide additional information and comments (if you choose). 
After you have participated in an interview, I may also invite you to participate in a second interview – but 
there would be no obligation to agree to this. The second interview would cover the same topics as the 
first but would be an opportunity to go into more detail.  
You will be free to leave the research at any time, without having to give a reason, and 
without disadvantaging you in any way – even if you have previously agreed to take part. You 
can do this by informing me in person or via the contact details below. If you wish, any information that you 
have already provided will be destroyed. This research is not linked to any treatment that you may 
currently be receiving, and so whether you participate will not affect your treatment in any way. 
Taking part in the interview will involve talking about your experiences of anorexia and treatment and this 
may be difficult for you. You should only take part in the study if you are content to discuss these 
topics in the context of a research interview. Your wellbeing is of upmost importance. Please do not 
take part if you expect that sharing your experiences will be stressful or that it will have a negative impact 
on your physical or mental wellbeing.  
Anonymity and confidentiality 
The researcher and supervisor will follow ethical and legal practice. Your participation in the study and 
your personal information will remain confidential. You will not be made identifiable to others at any stage 
during the research process or in the publication of findings. This means that your name and any other 
identifying information will not be used in publications.  
During the course of this research, the information you provide will be stored securely and anonymously 
and will only be accessed by the research team. The information will be destroyed after the research has 
been completed.  
Research publication 
The research will be published as a PhD thesis and also in academic journals and conferences. I will be 
happy to provide you with information regarding any publications relating to this research. 
Ethical review  
This research has been agreed by the research ethics committee at the University of Essex  
Contact details  
Lead researcher - Lauren O’Connell (BSc, MSc, PGCE).  
Email: lauren.oconnell@essex.ac.uk. Phone or text: 07702864499 
Project supervisor - Professor Joan Busfield 
Email: busfj@essex.ac.uk 
Ethics officer (Sociology department, University of Essex) – Professor Nigel South - Please use this contact 
for further information should you wish to speak to someone outside of the research team 
Email: n.south@essex.ac.uk  
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Appendix Two 
Interview processes for each participant 
Partici-
pant 
Interview 
mode  
Interview processes 
 
 
Post-interview questions Transcript / summary 
One  
 
Mia 
Skype • Interview one  - 1 hr and 15 mins 
 
• Interview two – 1 hour 
Responded  Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
Two  
 
Anna 
In person 
 
 
• Interview one - 2 hrs and 20 mins 
 
• Follow-up interview questions and conversation by 
email  
Responded  Sent to participant  
 
Comments added to 
summary  
Three 
 
Natalie  
In person • Interview one - 2 hours 
 
• Follow – up conversation by email 
Responded  Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
Four 
 
Kelly 
Skype • Interview one - 1 hr 45 mins 
 
• Interview two - 15 mins 
Responded Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
Five 
 
Sarah 
In person • Interview one - 2 hours 45 mins 
 
• Follow-up interview questions by email  
Responded  Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
Six 
 
Claire 
 Skype • Interview one - 1 hour) 
 
 
Responded  Participant did not wish to 
see 
Seven  
 
Ben 
In person • Interview one - 2 hours Responded  Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
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Eight 
 
Naomi 
In person • Interview one - 1 hr 35 mins 
 
Responded  Participant did not wish to 
see 
Nine 
 
Michael  
Skype  • Interview one - 1 hour 45 mins 
 
 
Did not ask (already 
addressed matter during the 
interview) 
Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
Ten 
 
Amelia  
Skype  • Interview one - 1 hour 20 mins Responded 
 
Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
Eleven 
 
Jack  
Skype   • Interview one - 1 hour Responded  Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
Twelve  
 
Maddie 
In person  • Interview one – 1 hour and 5 mins Responded  Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
Thirteen 
 
Lisa 
In person  • Interview one - 1 hour and 45 mins 
 
Further interview questions by email  
Responded  Participant did not wish to 
see 
Fourteen 
 
Hannah 
In person  • Interview one - 1 hour Responded  Sent to participant  
 
No comments returned 
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Appendix Three 
 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) Validity as quality of craftmanship: 
Validation at seven stages 
 
1. Thematizing. Validity relates to the soundness of the study’s theoretical presuppositions of 
the study and on the logic of the translation from theory to research questions. 
2. Designing. Validity relates to the adequacy of the design and methods used for the aims of 
the research. Ethically, validity relates to beneficence; valid knowledge is beneficial with 
minimized harmful consequences.  
3. Interviewing. Validity relates to “the trustworthiness of the subject’s reports and the 
quality of interviewing”. Interviewing should involve careful questioning and checking of the 
meaning of what is said.   
4. Transcribing. Validity relates to translation from oral to written language and is affected by 
the linguistic style of the transcript.  
5. Analysing. Validity relates to whether the questions put to a transcript, and the logic of 
interpretations, are sound. 
6. Validating. Involves reflective judgement on the forms of, and procedures for, validation, as 
relevant to a specific study.  
7. Reporting. Concerns the validity of the account of the main findings in the research report. 
Readers may also play a role in validating the results.  
 
Adapted from Brinkmann and Kvale (2015: 283 – 284) 
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Appendix Four 
Tolich (2010) Foundational guidelines for autoethnographers  
Consent  
1. Respect participants’ autonomy and the voluntary nature of participation. Document 
informed consent processes. 
2. Practice “process consent”. This involves checking at intervals that participants want to 
remain in the research. 
3. Recognize the coercion involved in gaining informed consent after writing a manuscript. 
Consultation  
4. Consult with relevant others. 
5. Do not publish anything that one would not show the persons mentioned in the 
autoethnography. 
Vulnerability  
6. Consider internal confidentiality: the possibility of ‘insiders’ identifying each other in the 
text. 
7. Consider ones’ future vulnerability as the author of the autoethnography.  
8. No story should harm others, and potential harm should be minimised.   
9. A nom de plume should be used to minimise risk, when relevant.   
10. Assume all people mentioned in the autoethnography will read it.  
       Adapted from Tolich (2010: 1607 - 1608). 
 
 
 
